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  I 
Summary 
Internationally, there is an emerging interest in the inadvertent harm caused to 
patients by the provision of healthcare services. Since the publication of the 
Institute of Medicine’s report, To Err is Human, in 1999, research and policy 
directives have predominantly focused on patient safety in hospital settings. 
More recently, the World Health Organization has highlighted 2-3% of primary 
care encounters result in a patient safety incident. Given around 330 million 
general practice consultations occur in the UK each year, unsafe primary care is 
a poorly understood, major threat to public health. 
  
In 2003, a major investment was made in the National Reporting and Learning 
System to better understand patient safety incidents occurring in England and 
Wales. Over 40,000 incident reports have arisen from general practice. These 
have never been systematically analysed, and a key challenge to exploiting 
these data has been to generate learning from the largely unstructured, free-
text descriptions of incidents.  
  
My thesis describes the empirical development and application of methods to 
classify (structure) incident report data. This includes the development of coding 
frameworks specific to primary care, aligned to the WHO International 
Classification for Patient Safety, to describe the incident, contributory factors 
and incident outcomes. I have developed a mixed-methods approach which 
combines a structured process for coding reports and an exploratory data 
analysis with subsequent thematic analysis. Analyses of reports can generate 
hypotheses about priorities for systems improvement in primary care at a local 
and national level. Existing interventions or initiatives to minimise or mitigate 
patient safety risks can be identified through scoping reviews. Future research 
and quality improvement activities should deepen understanding about the risks 
to patients, and generate knowledge about how interventions made in practice 
can improve safety.  
 
 
  1 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
Primary healthcare manages over 90% of healthcare encounters in the UK,(1) 
yet little is known about its safety. ‘Healthcare-associated harm’ is defined as 
“harm arising from or associated with plans or actions taken during healthcare 
provision, rather than an underlying disease or injury”.(2) Patient safety was 
recognised as a global public health concern by the World Health Assembly 
(Resolution 55.18) in 2002.(3) Policymakers have since deployed preventive 
strategies such as patient safety initiatives and patient safety incident reporting 
and learning systems to tackle the problem. However, these preventive efforts 
and related research and development have predominantly focussed on in-
hospital safety. The World Health Organization’s (WHO) recent Universal 
Access and Health Coverage agendas, predicated on the provision of primary 
healthcare services, is now creating demand for cost-effective, community-
based care models.(4) Given the relative paucity of knowledge about risk to 
patients receiving primary healthcare services, it is prudent and timely to identify 
the patient safety issues occurring in systems like the National Health Service 
before they are replicated in other countries.  
 
The conceptual basis of patient safety has evolved over the past five decades. 
Each conceptual approach, and its related theories and frameworks, offer a 
means to frame safety and to understand how to make healthcare safer. In this 
chapter, I will describe the seminal publications, policy documents and research 
which shapes the modern theoretical landscape for patient safety research. I 
will discuss the conceptual basis of patient safety research and explore my 
personal perspective to these approaches. 
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1.1. Patient safety in healthcare 
Evidence of discussions about patient safety in healthcare exists since antiquity. 
The teachings of Hippocrates, and the term ‘iatrogenesis’ (the Greek for 
‘originating from the physician’), is recognised as the earliest challenge to the 
medical profession to realise its role in healthcare-associated harm. However, in 
more recent times, it was the Austrian philosopher, Ivan Illich, who challenged 
the medical establishment in his book “Limits to Medicine: Medical Nemesis: 
The Expropriation of Health”, which begins:  
 
“The medical establishment has become a major threat to health. The 
disabling impact of professional control over medicine has reached the 
proportions of an epidemic. Iatrogenesis, the new name for this 
epidemic, comes from iatros, the Greek word for ‘physicians’, and 
genesis, meaning ‘origin’” (5) 
 
Illich’s challenge was ahead of the epidemiological studies that would eventually 
follow to support his claims. His seminal thinking raised the fundamental 
questions which continue to drive the modern patient safety movement, 
importantly: what is unsafe healthcare and how can it be prevented?   
 
1.1.1. Purpose of patient safety research 
Since the turn of the millennium, patient safety has assumed an important 
position in public discourse, healthcare policy and scientific research. Within 
academia, patient safety is a subset of healthcare quality research, which itself 
is a subset of health services and delivery research, undertaken to generate 
learning to achieve safer healthcare.(6) Shojania and Panesar (7) describe five 
purposes of patient safety research which include to:  
 
● evaluate progress in patient safety – the development and validation of 
measures to evaluate efforts to improve safety; 
● translate evidence into practice – develop and evaluate interventions that 
increase the extent to which patients receive evidence-based practices;  
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● assess and improve culture – use of strategies and interventions to 
improve culture and communication;  
● identify and mitigate hazards – use of retrospective and prospective 
methods to identify and mitigate hazards; and, 
● evaluate the association between organisational characteristics and 
outcomes – determine which characteristics help or hinder achievement 
of patient safety practices. 
 
1.1.2. Patient safety terms and definitions 
In an effort to standardise a set of definitions of core terminology, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) commissioned the development of a Conceptual 
Framework for the International Classification for Patient Safety (ICPS). 
Throughout my thesis, all concepts, terms and definitions are purposefully 
aligned with ICPS unless otherwise stated.  
 
The WHO defines patient safety as: “...the reduction of risk of unnecessary 
harm associated with healthcare to an acceptable minimum. An acceptable 
minimum refers to the collective notions of given current knowledge, resources 
available and the context in which care was delivered weighed against the risk 
of non-treatment or other treatment.”(2)   
 
Healthcare-associated harm is the agreed term to describe the outcome of 
unsafe healthcare and is defined as: “harm arising from or associated with plans 
or actions taken during the provision of healthcare, rather than an underlying 
disease or injury”.(2) Previously well-used terms with similar definitions include 
iatrogenesis and medical error.  
 
Patient safety incident (or incident), defined as “events or circumstances which 
could have resulted, or did result, in unnecessary harm to a patient”,(2) will be 
used throughout the thesis. ICPS highlights the word “unnecessary” in its 
definition and refers to the inclusivity of error (omission and commission) and 
violation. It asserts errors are unintentional, whilst violations are usually 
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intentional, though rarely malicious. For simplicity, incident will also refer to 
reportable circumstances.  
 
The outcomes from patient safety incidents can be a near miss, a no harm 
incident, or a harmful incident (also referred to as an ‘adverse event’). 
Consistent with ICPS, I will be describing the outcomes of incidents in terms of 
no harm and harmful outcomes, and, when feasible, by level of harm (none, 
low, moderate, severe, death).  
 
See Table 1.1. for additional definitions and examples of these key terms. 
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Table 1.1. International Classification for Patient Safety terms and definitions (2)  
Term Definition 
Healthcare-
associated harm 
Harm arising from or associated with plans or actions taken during the 
provision of healthcare, rather than an underlying disease or injury.  
Patient safety 
incident (or 
incident) 
Events or circumstances which could have resulted, or did result, in 
unnecessary harm to a patient…. The use of the word “unnecessary” in 
this definition recognises that errors, violation, patient abuse and 
deliberately unsafe acts occur in healthcare. These are considered 
incidents…. Incidents arise from either unintended or intended acts. 
Errors are, by definition, unintentional, whereas violations are usually 
intentional, though rarely malicious, and may become routine and 
automatic in certain contexts.  
Error An error is a failure to carry out a planned action as intended or 
application of an incorrect plan. Errors may manifest by doing the 
wrong thing (commission) or by failing to do the right thing (omission), 
at either the planning or execution phase.  
Violation A violation is a deliberate deviation from an operating procedure, 
standard or rule e.g. not admitting a patient with signs of an acute 
stroke to hospital for urgent assessment.  
Reportable 
circumstance 
A situation in which there was significant potential for harm, but no 
incident occurred e.g. taking a defibrillator to an emergency and 
discovering it did not work although it was not needed.   
Near miss A near miss is an incident which did not reach the patient e.g. wrong 
patient referred for CT scan but administrative staff identifying this 
before patient attended for scan.  
No harm incident A no harm incident is one in which an event reached a patient but no 
discernible harm resulted e.g. the GP prescribed penicillamine instead 
of phenoxymethyl penicillin V and this was dispensed by the 
pharmacist. The patient took two doses before notifying the GP and no 
harmful outcomes resulted.    
Harmful incident 
(adverse event) 
A harmful incident (adverse event) is an incident that results in harm to 
a patient. e.g. the GP prescribed penicillamine instead of 
phenoxymethyl penicillin V and the patient developed sepsis.     
Incident type An incident type is a category made up of incidents of a common 
nature, grouped because of shared agreed features and is a “parent” 
category under which concepts may be grouped.  
Contributory factor A contributory factor is a circumstance, action or influence (such as 
poor rostering or task allocation) that is thought to have played a part in 
the origin or development, or to increase the risk, of an incident. 
Factors may be external (i.e. not under the control of a facility or 
organisation), organisational (e.g. unavailability of accepted protocols), 
related to a staff factor (e.g. an individual cognitive or behavioural 
defect, poor teamwork or inadequate communication) or patient-related 
(e.g. non-adherence). A contributing factor may be a necessary 
precursor of an incident and may or may not be sufficient to cause the 
incident.  
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1.2. Ontological perspectives of patient safety research 
Ontology can be thought of as concepts within a domain, and the relationships 
between those concepts.(8) The ontology of patient safety benefits from 
decades of academic insight contributed from anthropology, sociology, 
engineering, psychology, statistics and management. Each discipline has 
approached “what is safety?” with different, albeit complementary, assumptions 
in the sense that the overall goal is to improve outcomes. There are two 
mainstream conceptual approaches to patient safety; others exist although have 
not been validated by empirical research. I will therefore focus on describing the 
two approaches that have been developed and validated through empirical 
inquiry, which are: systems thinking and high reliability organisations.   
 
Systems thinking is the conceptual approach behind the famed quote of the 
Dartmouth Professor, Paul Batalden, that “every system is perfectly designed to 
achieve the results it gets.”  Assumptions are made about the ability to optimise 
the structure (the working conditions) and processes (the steps to achieve 
healthcare) of care delivery to minimise the risk of unsafe care outcomes.(9) 
The systems thinking approach has gained popularity within hospital safety 
because of its emphasis on understanding how the systems failed rather than 
the individual professionals involved. A similar approach may support patient 
safety initiatives in primary care.   
 
High reliability theory has been another popular conceptual position that has 
emerged from the study of ‘high reliability organisations’ in the fields of aviation 
and nuclear power in the 1980s.(10) The approach encourages the 
development of effective communication mechanisms, autonomy amongst 
workers to raise concerns and act, and designing processes with multiple 
checks to identify failure. Given its popularity in medical specialties like 
anaesthesia and surgery,(10) this approach could also be beneficial in primary 
care. 
 
Throughout the thesis, I will refer to ‘systems improvement’ as “the result or 
outcome of the culture, processes, and structures that are directed toward the 
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prevention of system failure and the improvement of safety and quality”.(11) 
This definition draws on the Donabedian Structure-Process-Outcome model 
which considers the relationship between structure, process and outcome that 
can be examined to evaluate the quality of healthcare delivery.(11,12) My 
interpretation of the original model described in Donabedian’s book,(12,13) ‘The 
definition of quality and approaches to its assessments’, was progressed by 
Starfield’s explanation of the dynamics between its concepts (see Figure 
1.1).(13) Here, I use the Donabedian model modified by Starfield to outline my 
conceptual understanding of patient safety, informed by the concepts of 
systems thinking and high reliability theory, and consider its application in 
understanding safety in primary care. In doing so I will introduce further 
concepts and their definitions that I will use to describe my work.  
 
 
Figure 1.1. Donabedian Structure-Process-Outcome model modified by 
Starfield(13) 
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1.2.1. Donabedian’s Structure-Process-Outcome model 
In Donabedian’s model, structure refers to the factors that influence the context 
for healthcare provision such as staffing, education and training, finance or 
equipment. In my thesis, structure is referred to as ‘context’ in the broadest 
sense. When it is possible to be more specific about “a circumstance, action or 
influence (such as poor rostering or task allocation)” that is thought to have 
played a part in the origin or development, or to increase the risk of an incident, 
the term ‘contributory factor’ is used.(2) Process considers the actions that 
make up healthcare delivery and can be classified as technical processes such 
as problem recognition, diagnosis, management and reassessment (i.e. how 
care is delivered) and interpersonal processes such as communication with and 
about the patient (i.e. the manner in which it is delivered).(4)  
 
1.2.2. Reason’s Trajectory of Accident Opportunity  
To put into context how structure and process can be implicated in patient 
safety incidents, I will describe the ‘Trajectory of Accident Opportunity’ originally 
described by Orlandella and Reason, and later applied to healthcare by 
Reason. Lucian Leape brought the spotlight to Reason’s work within the 
medical community, and it was welcomed since the Swiss cheese model helped 
articulate the complexity underpinning error. It also introduced the concept that 
healthcare professionals, in the majority, have minor roles in patient safety 
incidents compared with consequences arising from the overall design of 
systems (structures and processes).(14) Such conceptual thinking emerged 
from industries that took a pessimistic view of human capability to not err and 
which had the ability to engineer people out of their systems. Reason advocated 
that an individual's actions must be understood in context. This does not mean 
medical negligence can be justified by account of a poorly designed system.  
 
Aveling et al.(15) have described the challenges raised by ‘systems thinking’ 
and appropriately delineate the accountability of healthcare systems and 
individual professionals. The authors draw upon Giddens’(16) conceptualisation 
of practice theory to describe the duality of structure and agency. They discuss 
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unsafe healthcare as an organisational phenomenon occurring as a result of 
everyday actions, with: i. individual agency (of professionals, staff, patients, 
carers, amongst others) defined as “the capacity of individuals to act 
independently and to make their own free choices”; and, ii. structural conditions 
(as described by Reason) defined as “recurrent patterned arrangements which 
influence or limit the choices and opportunities available” as a mutually 
constitutive, dynamic duality. 
 
Reason stated an individual’s actions must be considered in the context 
(conditions) under which they occurred. As Aveling et al.(15) describe it: 
“structure creates and shapes the possibilities for agency, at the same time as 
agency creates and shapes structure”. In this way, they describe how Giddens 
introduces a notion of accountability where an individual should “explicate the 
reasons for them and to supply the normative grounds whereby they may be 
‘justified’”.(15) In professional practice this is called the Bolam test, which is a 
judgement of whether an individual’s actions fall below the standard of a 
responsible body of other professionals.(17) Given the complexity of judging 
what is safe or unsafe, the Bolam test is an important principle for informing the 
design of patient safety research.  
 
1.2.2.1. Swiss cheese model 
The Swiss cheese model (Figure 1.2) uses the analogy of serial slices of Swiss 
cheese where each hole represents either an active failure (unsafe acts 
committed by humans) or latent conditions (error-provoking conditions or prior 
weaknesses in defences) that are transient opportunities for the steps in a 
process leading towards an incident.(9) Each hole in the cheese represents a 
‘contributory factor’ (active failures and latent conditions) which are 
circumstances, actions or influences, to initiate or increase the risk of an 
incident that could, or might not, lead to the unwanted or unintended 
outcome.(2)  
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Figure 1.2. Swiss cheese model & Trajectory of Accident Opportunity annotated 
with WHO ICPS terms 
 
A finite number and type of contributory factors can coexist at any one time to 
result in an incident. They can be diverse in nature, and thought of in terms of 
human factors, for example staff- or patient-related, as well as system factors 
such as organisational-, financial- or equipment-related issues. The ability to 
identify contributory factors when an incident occurs represents an opportunity 
to understand how healthcare systems and processes can be improved, to 
minimise weaknesses and strengthen defences. This study of human factors as 
a field of specialist inquiry is predicated on this basis and is described as: 
“enhancing clinical performance through an understanding of the effects of 
teamwork, tasks, equipment, workspace, culture, organisation on human 
behaviour and abilities, and application of that knowledge in clinical 
settings”.(18)  
 
It is not possible to anticipate the plethora of ways that a series of conditions 
could combine to culminate in a patient safety incident. An appreciation of 
common trajectories of incidents and contributory factors would, however, 
theoretically inform prioritisation efforts, and guide decision-making about what 
processes need to be changed to minimise the conditions, actions and 
influences speculated to increase risk of patient safety incidents. Such in-depth 
classification of incidents and contributory factors in primary care has potential 
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to reveal the human and system-level opportunities to improve patient safety. 
According to Brook et al.(19): "process data are usually more sensitive 
measures of quality than outcome data, because a poor outcome does not 
occur every time there is an error in the provision of care". Thus, understanding 
how and why failures in care processes (incidents) arise, in the context of the 
system structures that they occurred and the related contributory factors, should 
build a more complete picture of the challenges and opportunities for 
intervention. My thesis is predicated on the basis of developing and testing 
methods to generate such learning from incident reports.  
 
Finally, ‘outcome’ describes the effects of healthcare on patients and the 
population. Batalden and Davidoff, in more recent years, have defined quality 
improvement with three outcomes, “...better patient outcomes (health), better 
system performance (care) and better professional development.”(20) In 2001, 
the Institute of Medicine in Washington, DC, USA, published Crossing the 
Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century which defined six 
aims for these processes which are that healthcare is safe, timely, effective, 
efficient, patient-centred and equitable.(21) These aims are not mutually 
exclusive, and are defined as:  
● safety, to avoid unintentional harm from care provided to patients; 
● timeliness, reducing harmful delays;  
● effectiveness, providing care, informed by best available evidence, which 
provides clear benefits;  
● efficiency, avoiding waste;  
● patient- and family-centredness, providing care that is respectful of the 
needs and values of patients and their families; and, 
● equity, providing high-quality care regardless of a patient’s 
characteristics.  
 
Observing trends in outcomes provide important signals, in terms of frequency 
and severity of those outcomes, for more in-depth inquiry. Incident reporting 
systems collect data about structure, process and outcome, although it is 
unclear how to formally interrogate these systems to maximise the insight 
yielded from such reported data. This challenge largely arises from the volume 
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of unstructured free-text data now captured by incident reporting systems, and 
how to deconstruct reports to enable learning about weaknesses in existing 
structures and processes to inform systems improvement.  
 
1.2.3. Quality improvement (QI) methods 
A suite of methods and tools to achieve systems improvement have emerged 
from the seminal works of industrial engineers and statisticians, including Walter 
Shewhart, W. Edwards Deming, Joseph Juran, and in more recent years the 
Associates for Process Improvement. Common objectives of a QI project are to 
minimise duplication of effort, design new ways of working, and identify the 
means to ensure high-quality care is delivered for every patient, every time. 
Such methods have informed the educational content of major patient safety 
campaigns in the past two decades. Quality improvement projects often involve 
multiple professional groups and the issues being addressed span hierarchies.  
 
Deming’s Theory of Profound Knowledge is a management framework which 
informs my conceptual understanding of how to improve systems and is based 
on systems theory.(22) Healthcare systems have complicated designs that over 
time often merge into a mesh of interconnected departments, siloed practices, 
and process duplication. It is often the objective of quality improvement projects 
to examine a system’s structure and processes to seek opportunities to design 
or redesign new ways of working. Those leading QI show expertise which align 
to four major constructs described in W. Edwards Deming’s Theory of Profound 
Knowledge (22,23):  
● Variation – curiosity about variation in process and outcomes within 
systems, through continuous measurement and utilising statistical 
methods; 
● Systems thinking – awareness of the system context in which change is 
planned and tested, and the need to monitor and mitigate unintended 
consequences; and, the will to execute plans in collaboration with 
professionals across the multidisciplinary team and hierarchical levels, 
while building the infrastructure to sustain successful implementation;  
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● Learning – a commitment to understand what changes resulted in 
improvement with the courage to learn from failure; and, 
● Psychology – the energy to confront difficulties, including stark 
organisational realities of frustration, cynicism, and resistance to change. 
 
This conceptual approach for systems improvement has been promoted by the 
US-based non-profit organisation, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement 
(IHI), since the 1990s. Their approach often involves providing local teams with 
direction, coaching and training to develop capacity and capability to reliably 
implement evidence-based strategies, data management to measure their 
impact on organisational outcomes, and the opportunity to learn from other 
hospitals’ experiences.(24,25) These methods have been disseminated via 
national quality and safety campaigns such as the “100,000 Lives Campaign” 
between January 2005 and June 2006 in the United States, where hospitals 
agreed to implement best-practice interventions to collectively extend or save 
as many as 100,000 lives.(25) National programmes were later launched, 
supported by IHI, in Scotland (Scottish Patient Safety Programme, 2008–), 
Wales (1000 Lives Campaign, 2008-2010), England (Patient Safety First, 2008–
) and Northern Ireland (the Health and Social Care Safety Forum in 2007). In 
the early years of these campaigns or initiatives, the focus was largely safety, 
which later extended to preventive initiatives focussed on other Institute of 
Medicine aims such as optimisation of chronic disease management (e.g. heart 
failure), patient-centred care, and equity of access. The quality improvement 
methods and tools, and affiliations with IHI, are the shared common threads 
amongst these campaigns which have been major financial investments for 
each country.  
 
1.2.3.1. A programme ‘theory of change’ 
Quality improvement (QI) projects need a programme “theory of 
change”.(22,26) The theory of change is an articulation of conceptual thinking 
and programme design that should be amended with additional hypotheses 
throughout the course of the QI project.(27)  The programme theory is 
comprised of an explanatory theory, an operational logic model (the Plan-Do-
Study-Act plans) and draws on relevant theories of social change.(27)  
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The explanatory theory is an “...articulation of an overall aim, potential 
intervention(s) that will be tested in an attempt to achieve this aim, hypothesised 
cause/effect relationships linking intervention(s) to the aim and measure 
concepts that link to the cause/effect chains to support evaluation.” (28) Such 
interventions “[seek] to change individual or group behaviour, or organisational 
structure and performance” (29). A common tool used to graphically display the 
explanatory theory is called a driver diagram (described in more detail in section 
1.2.3.2).   
 
The philosophy and methods of quality improvement have been described by 
Langley and colleagues in the seminal textbook, ‘The Improvement Guide’.(30) 
‘Logic models’ typically used in research, are used in QI projects as a structured 
process (called ‘Plan-Do-Study-Act’ or PDSA) for developing and learning from 
iterative tests of change in practice.(31)  Each PDSA is thought of as a ‘PDSA 
cycle’ for generating learning from one test of change to inform the next test, 
and an opportunity to update and amend the explanatory theory. Such 
inductive-deductive tests of change are, as Ostom (32) cited by Davidoff et 
al.(33) put it, “a strategy of moving back and forth from the world of theory to the 
world of action”. 
 
Finally, recognising healthcare is a complex system, the four constructs of 
Deming’s Theory of Profound Knowledge,(29,30,34) provide a helpful baseline 
to attach the more general theories used internationally to inform the approach 
taken to achieve improvement with teams in practice.(27) Such theories include, 
for example, social network and influence theory (adapting interventions to each 
local context), theory of communication (utilising best available evidence, 
tailoring key messages to different stakeholder audiences) and process re-
engineering theory (the design and redesign of multidisciplinary care processes) 
which have been extensively described by Grol and colleagues.(35)  
 
1.2.3.2. Action effect (driver) diagram 
A QI tool called an action effect (or driver) diagram can be used to summarise 
the explanatory theory in terms of concepts and ideas from existing evidence 
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(e.g. incident reports), as well as the experience and beliefs of those within 
project teams. This combination is particularly pertinent for primary care 
improvement given the paucity of evidence that exists about improving patient 
safety in community settings. Langley et al. (30) originally developed the tool to 
enable the building of a testable hypothesis which articulates testable 
predictions of activities and infrastructure necessary to achieve a desired 
outcome. The diagram is pragmatic in nature, and outlines the changes that are 
proven (or believed) to be needed to accomplish an aim or outcome.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Schematic action effect diagram: guide to interpreting the 
components and overall structure of a typical action effect diagram. Reproduced 
with permission from Reed et al.(28) BMJ Quality and Safety. 
doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2014-003103.  
 
In Figure 1.3, at the far left of the diagram, the aim describes the objectives of 
the intended QI project. Reed et al.(28) attempted to make the method for 
developing such diagrams more accessible. They observed how improvement 
teams struggled to work collaboratively to produce useful theory and perceived 
driver diagram construction as low value.(28) They noted the term ‘driver’ was 
confused with strategic influences such as financial and political motivations 
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rather than the actions that could be undertaken during the project. In their 
revised approach, primary and secondary drivers are renamed “contributing 
factors”. ‘Major contributing factors’ converge on the aim and summarise the 
high-level leverage points for change in the system infrastructure that could 
support achievement of an improved outcome. Connected to each major 
contributing factor are lower-order contributing factors which tend to be 
represented as actionable approaches or opportunities to make the changes 
that are perceived by the team to enable achievement of the desired 
improvement.  
 
There is strong conceptual alignment between the WHO’s ICPS definition of 
contributory factor considered in the context of understanding patient safety 
incidents, and Reed et al’s proposed concept and term, ‘contributing factor’ 
represented in Figure 1.3 as a leverage point for change in the healthcare 
system infrastructure. Thus, in my thesis, contributory factors considered in 
relation to the incident type and the contexts in which they occur, are the basis 
of proposed issues for improvement. For example, identified contributory factors 
such as ‘ambiguous packaging’ and ‘adjacent storage of similar vaccines’ could 
be thematically combined to represent incidents related to ‘selection, retrieval 
and preparation of vaccines’. In the driver diagram, these issues could be 
represented by improvement plans to ‘reduce risk of staff mistakes’.(36)  
 
Whilst Reed et al.(28) have identified confusion about the term ‘driver diagram’, 
it is the internationally accepted reference to a diagram of its nature. For the 
remainder of my thesis, I will refer to driver diagrams only, but highlight my 
conceptual alignment with how Reed et al. use the action effect diagrams in QI 
projects. 
 
1.2.3.2.1. Change concepts  
In Figure 1.3, straight or interrupted arrows are used to represent documented 
evidence of cause and effect, or absence of such evidence respectively. Nolan 
and colleagues advised nine major conceptual opportunities for quality 
improvement; these are summarised in Table 1.2, and can be used to support 
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ideas generation amongst teams proposing change concepts and ideas. It is 
common for proposed outcome measures to be included on the driver diagram.    
 
The action effect diagram is iterated as learning about the impact of changes 
made in different contexts becomes apparent.(37) Comparing the diagram at 
the start of an improvement project and at the end, can support appreciation of 
how the programme theory has developed throughout the QI project. The 
diagram, as a visual summary of a planned or delivered improvement project, is 
becoming increasingly recognised as “a communication tool to engage 
stakeholders”.(28)  
 
Table 1.2. Potential change concepts and examples 
Nature of change concept Example 
Eliminate waste Eliminate multiple entry. 
Improve workflow Find and remove bottlenecks; automation.  
Optimise inventory Reduce multiple brands of the same item. 
Change the work environment Conduct training; focus on core processes and purpose; 
share risks. 
Enhance the producer / 
customer relationship 
Listen to the end-user; optimise level of inspection. 
Manage time Reduce waiting time; optimise maintenance.  
Manage variation  Develop operational definitions; develop contingency 
plans; exploit variation. 
Design systems to avoid 
mistakes 
Use reminders; use constraints.  
Focus on the product or 
services  
Change the order of process steps; manage uncertainty.  
 
 
1.2.4. A brief history of patient safety and quality improvement  
A brief history of patient safety and quality improvement initiatives is warranted 
given their influence in shaping the current patient safety research agenda. 
Specifically, the initiatives were created without formal evaluations to identify 
what approaches or interventions worked in different contexts.(34,38,39) Post-
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hoc evaluations in more recent years have been critical of this lack of foresight, 
and indeed have demonstrated why this was misguided, and have brought into 
question the effectiveness of promoted interventions and the quality 
improvement methods used to implement them.(40–43)  
 
To provide a sense of the scale of the quality improvement and safety effort in 
which efforts to improve primary care safety will coexist with, I will describe 
major international initiatives, followed by the national initiatives in the US and 
UK that have since been subject to evaluation. Observations from successes 
made in promoting patient safety as a threat to public health will be made. 
Lessons learnt from those evaluations that have implications for how incident 
reporting systems should be perceived (by policymakers, leaders, clinicians) 
and utilised for improvement purposes will be highlighted.  
 
The World Health Assembly Resolution 55.18 recognised healthcare-associated 
harm as a public health concern in 2002.(3) This milestone for patient safety 
was accelerated by the publication of seminal reports which raised awareness 
about the scale of the problem and the lack of existing infrastructure to respond 
to the apparent threat.  
 
Patient safety research dates back formally to the 1960s when clinicians 
reviewed the medical records of patients to identify unwarranted harm 
outcomes.(10,44,45)  However, it was the Institute of Medicine (1999) report, To 
Err is Human which accelerated the field of patient safety forwards amongst 
professionals, healthcare leaders, politicians and not least the public.(46) 
Internationally, it was the leadership of Sir Liam Donaldson (then the Chief 
Medical Officer for England) that is often credited with globalising the challenge 
to tackle patient safety. In 2004, the WHO World Alliance for Patient Safety 
(later the WHO Patient Safety Programme) was launched with the fundamental 
purpose of facilitating development of patient safety policy and practice in 
member states.  
 
To Err is Human (217) outlined several options for investment amongst 
policymakers to tackle patient safety. This included recommendations to:  
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● establish a national centre for patient safety in the United States; 
● to form a mandatory and voluntary national patient safety incident 
reporting system;  
● curate best practices and principles for beginning to achieve improved 
safety in practice (avoiding reliance on memory and vigilance);  
● focus on user-centred design;  
● move towards team-based care;  
● involving patients; and,  
● better information systems.  
 
Published in 2001 by the Department of Health in England, An Organisation 
with a Memory from the Department of Health, focussed on setting out the 
strategic priorities for enabling the NHS to have the capacity to learn from 
patient safety incidents.(47) Combined, To Err is Human and An Organisation 
with a Memory were influential in establishing the National Patient Safety 
Agency in England and Wales in 2002, and its cornerstone initiative, the 
National Reporting and Learning System in 2003.  
 
Since To Err is Human, several patient safety campaigns have emerged 
globally to disseminate evidence-based practices and the principles described 
in To Err is Human. The WHO has launched two international patient safety 
campaigns, and there are numerous examples of national campaigns.  
 
1.2.4.1. International patient safety initiatives 
The WHO launched Clean Care is Safer Care in 2005.(48) The initiative was 
designed to raise awareness of healthcare-associated infection across all 
income settings and focus action in five areas: blood safety; injection practices 
and immunisation; water, basic sanitation and waste management; clinical 
procedures safety; and hand hygiene. Whilst 98% of member states have since 
signed up to Clean Care is Safer Care, the campaign as a whole has not been 
evaluated. Interventions advocated to improve clinical procedure safety, have 
however, been subject to intensive evaluation and an intervention to minimise 
catheter-related bloodstream infections is described in more detail in section 
1.2.4.2. 
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In 2007, the WHO World Alliance for Patient Safety launched Safe Surgery 
Saves Lives to disseminate a surgical safety checklist which comprised 19 
clinical processes or tasks that should be undertaken for every patient before, 
during and following surgery (Figure 1.4).(49) A randomised controlled trial in 
eight centres in developed and developing countries demonstrated major 
reductions in morbidity and mortality outcomes.(50) As use of the checklist 
spread across the globe, mixed reviews emerged. At one extreme, the 
surgeons relished the complexity of their work and could see no value from 
introducing such basic checks into their work processes, whilst on the other 
extreme, the compelling evidence published in the New England Journal of 
Medicine (NEJM) enabled others to see each item on the checklist as a means 
of achieving reliability on important tasks for their patients. In amongst this 
debate, medical sociologists and patient safety researchers cautioned the risk 
of presenting the checklist as a piece of paper that will save lives. In their 
Lancet editorial entitled “Reality check for checklists”, Bosk et al.(51) 
emphasised the importance of understanding the contexts in which the 
innovation was being implemented, and said: “evidence summaries [informing 
each checklist item] need to be combined with an understanding of, and a 
strategy for, mitigating the technical and social/political and psychological (even 
emotional) barriers to using the evidence, and with feedback about 
performance.”  
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Figure 1.4. WHO Surgical Safety Checklist (First Edition)(49)  
 
Five years later, a study in the same journal (NEJM) concluded the checklist 
had no impact on morbidity or mortality outcomes in operating rooms in Ontario, 
Canada, despite a reported 98% uptake by hospitals.(52) In an accompanying 
editorial in the same issue, Lucian Leape writes:  
 
“the story of the patient-safety movement is one of slow progress 
punctuated by episodes of inspiring successes that are slow to be 
replicated…. The key is recognizing that changing practice is not a 
technical problem that can be solved by ticking off boxes on a checklist 
but a social problem of human behavior and interaction”.(53) 
 
1.2.4.2. National patient safety initiatives 
Another seminal study was the ‘Keystone ICU’ project, funded by the Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) in the United States, which 
involved 103 Intensive Care Units (ICU) in Michigan, USA, in a state-wide 
initiative, instituting evidence-based preventive strategies for reducing catheter-
related [central line] bloodstream infections (CRBSI).(54) The project focused 
on changing provider behaviour through addressing safety culture, incorporating 
a centralised education programme for team leaders at each institution and 
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closely collaborating with infection control staff. The intervention almost 
eliminated CRBSIs in most ICUs over an 18-month follow-up period, and 1500 
lives were estimated to have been saved.(54,55) 
 
Following the success and publicity surrounding the Keystone ICU project in 
Michigan, ‘Matching Michigan’ was a national initiative in England seeking to 
emulate the achievements and involved over 97% of acute NHS trusts.(55,56) 
The results were promising, and a 60% reduction in the number of CRBSIs was 
reported.(56) However, on closer analysis of data, it was difficult to determine 
whether the reduction in CRBSIs resulted from the Matching Michigan project or 
from a coinciding nationwide drive to reduce nosocomial infections, since many 
trusts were already implementing part of a five-point strategy employed in the 
Michigan intervention. There was also a decrease in other infections, which 
were not related to ICUs or CRBSIs.(56) 
 
A post-hoc ethnographic observational study of ICUs in Michigan, USA, was 
undertaken by UK medical sociologists. They demonstrated how adopting 
technical solutions (i.e. a checklist with key tasks to do for every patient when 
inserting a central line) to a socio-technical problem may underlie the failure to 
emulate Michigan’s achievements. Dixon-Woods et al.(43) described how the 
team in Michigan generated pressure for their ICUs to participate; created a 
sense of network amongst them; and re-framed bloodstream infections arising 
from central insertion as a needless, social problem; and teams were driven by 
learning from their data which demonstrated whether they were achieving better 
results for patients.  
 
More broadly, policymakers across the world responded to To Err is Human and 
An Organisation with a Memory by committing to develop the infrastructure for 
better surveillance and by launching preventive initiatives. However, the focus 
was almost exclusively on hospital safety. The UK charity, The Health 
Foundation sponsored the Safer Patients Initiative (SPI) between 2004 and 
2008 to develop and test organisation-wide service delivery interventions for 
improving hospital safety.(56–58) Twenty-eight hospitals participated over two 
phases. The independent summative evaluation concluded there was no 
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difference in improvement outcomes between hospitals that participated in SPI 
and a concurrent control group using a before and after design.(43,59) The 
evaluators wrote: “the conclusion of this study could have been different if 
concurrent controls had not been used.” More recently, Chen et al.(60) 
described the ‘rising tide phenomena’ to explain how promising service delivery 
interventions with contemporaneous controls can yield a null result. They argue 
this is because attention to the problems they intend to address is already 
heightened, and pressure to tackle them is mounting throughout the wider 
healthcare system. 
 
1.2.4.3. Learning from implementing healthcare improvement interventions 
One major criticism of patient safety initiatives has been about the lack of robust 
evaluation. There are no formal published evaluations of any of the major 
national patient safety campaigns like the 1000 Lives Campaign or Patient 
Safety First. I have, however, described the main findings from the focussed 
evaluations of Health Foundation funded programmes like SPI and Matching 
Michigan which highlight the overemphasis on technical interventions like 
checklists and other evidence-based interventions as being (unrealistic) ‘magic 
bullets’ for success. In the last decade, there has been an apparent disconnect 
between the marketing of how patient safety should be achieved and the 
realities of actually achieving it in practice. This needs considerable attention 
since the evidence is accruing that current approaches to achieving 
improvement in practice are not working as effectively as expected.  
 
Healthcare is a complex socio-technical system, in which even apparently 
simple tasks can depend on a wide range of social (e.g. psychological, team 
and managerial) and technical (e.g. equipment, IT and infrastructure) factors. In 
a review of 34 evidence-based interventions that had been replicated in other 
settings, 41% were found to have a smaller effect size or were not found to be 
effective in the subsequent setting.(61) The Keystone ICU project and the 
Matching Michigan experiments demonstrate that whilst improvement initiatives 
can be effective, as they became more widespread, a diminishing effect on 
outcomes can be seen. The complexity of the intervention in Michigan was not 
fully understood before it was spread to ICUs across England. Whilst the 
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technical interventions (changes in clinical practice) were clear, the non-
technical interventions (linked to leadership, teamwork and culture change), 
may not have been successfully replicated. In this situation, a simple but 
intuitively appealing summary model of the changes needed to produce 
improvement (i.e. a driver diagram) becomes a fixed protocol rather than the 
basis for teams to adapt the interventions locally.(34) This is portrayed in Figure 
1.5.  
 
 
Figure 1.5. Challenges of wide-scale implementation from Parry et al.(34) 
 
Improvement scholars, Perla and Parry,(62) frame this challenge as, “...how can 
[healthcare systems and leaders] design knowledgeable healthcare systems 
that maximise the alignment between the current best evidence (‘truth’) and the 
actions of healthcare providers (‘belief’)?” Drawing upon Plato’s Theaetetus, 
where knowledge is defined as the intersection of truth and belief, the authors 
describe how “knowledge cannot be claimed if something is true but not 
believed, or believed but not true”. Local adaptation could permit understanding 
about beliefs of different staff groups that would need to be considered for the 
intervention to be successful. Without this insight, there is a risk of rushing to 
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generate a summary of the changes needed to produce improvement outcomes 
too quickly, without truly understanding which change(s) led to 
improvement.(34) 
 
1.2.5. Summary of patient safety concepts informing my thesis  
I have explored the conceptual basis of patient safety research by considering 
the seminal polemics (Ivan Illich), policy documents and research which have 
informed my conceptual understanding of patient safety. In summary: 
   
● Reason’s ‘Trajectory of Accident Opportunity’ promotes the identification 
of weaknesses in systems which can be targeted for intervention.  
● Systems thinking does not mean overlooking the professional 
accountability of individuals involved in safety incidents when warranted. 
● The ability to identify contributory factors when an incident occurs, 
represents an opportunity to understand how structure and processes 
can be improved, to minimise weaknesses and strengthen defences. 
● Appreciation of common trajectories of incidents and contributory factors 
can inform prioritisation efforts to improve patient safety.  
● Concepts and related ideas for improvement must be adapted to each 
context in which they are implemented.  
● Understanding the context in which incidents occur (and interventions 
are implemented) should inform the design / redesign of improvement 
efforts.       
1.3. Why is improved patient safety in primary care needed? 
Patient safety research in hospital settings has shown that healthcare-
associated harm is responsible for a substantial, potentially preventable, burden 
of disease. Preventive safety initiatives have shown it is possible to identify 
patterns in patient safety incidents, which includes determining which incidents 
pose the greatest risk of major harm to patients and isolating those most 
amenable to prevention. Informed by epidemiological studies, patient safety in 
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hospital settings is now in an era of implementing interventions to improve 
safety. Similar progress is now needed for primary care.  
 
In 2012, the WHO recognised that progress in patient safety in primary care 
lagged behind achievements in hospital settings. In an attempt to support the 
development of a more comprehensive evidence-base, the WHO convened an 
international group of experts to discuss, debate, and advise on directions to 
bridge knowledge gaps about patient safety in primary care.(63) Progress made 
in hospital safety was discussed in terms of approaches used to establish the 
epidemiology of incidents, identify priorities for intervention and methods for 
evaluating their impact. The group concluded that a major commitment was 
needed to establish the epidemiology of patient safety in primary care.(64)  
 
Following conclusion of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) initiative, the 
WHO Universal Access and Health Coverage agendas have promoted the 
development and expansion of primary care services. This has been a 
welcomed development with the potential to improve access to healthcare 
particularly in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC). Developed nations are 
also transitioning to predominantly primary care-based models like the UK. 
Unstable political and economic conditions have impeded investment and 
development of primary care infrastructure in many LMICs; however, such 
infrastructure played an important role in many achievements made by MDG 
programmes focussed on HIV, maternal and child health.(65) The Universal 
Coverage and Health Access agendas both signal a renewed interest and 
recognition that successful primary care services are needed to support 
achievement of several Sustainable Development Goals.(66)  
 
Whilst there is no universally applicable primary care model, the challenge for 
each transitioning country will be to select the interventions and services that 
target the multiple diseases and risk factors affecting different population groups 
given the epidemiological, political, economic and sociocultural context in each 
country.(65) Improving primary care safety should benefit from the lessons 
learnt from attempting to improve safety in hospitals over the past two decades; 
however, the conceptual frameworks of patient safety need to be considered 
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within the context of primary care, and the epidemiology and methods of 
deriving and implementing interventions, may all need to be developed in their 
own right.(64)  
 
1.3.1. Definitions of primary care and general practice  
In my thesis, I will draw upon the 1978 Alma-Ata Declaration definition of 
primary care, defined as:  
 
“...essential healthcare based on practical, scientifically sound and 
socially acceptable methods and technology made universally accessible 
to individuals and families in the community through their full participation 
and at a cost that the community and country can afford to maintain at 
every stage of their development in the spirit of self-reliance and self-
determination. It forms an integral part both of the country's health 
system, of which it is the central function and main focus, and of the 
overall social and economic development of the community. It is the first 
level of contact of individuals, the family and community with the national 
health system bringing healthcare as close as possible to where people 
live and work, and constitutes the first element of a continuing 
[healthcare] process.”(67) 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) demonstrates that it is possible to deliver upwards of 
90% of healthcare outside the hospital setting; this equates to around 330 
million healthcare encounters in general practice per annum.(1) The benefits 
and limitations of primary care on health outcomes have previously been 
described.(68)  
 
General practice consultations represent a subset of patient healthcare 
encounters in UK primary care. The core characteristics of general practice 
have been defined by the World Organization of National Colleges, Academies 
and Academic Associations of General Practitioners (WONCA) and are 
summarised in Table 1.3. These are basic characteristics of general practice. 
Methods developed for the purposes of the research included in this thesis 
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should be applicable to common contexts of care provision in different income 
settings, particularly due to the central positioning of general practice in 
healthcare systems globally. Efforts to aid their universal applicability to other 
primary care disciplines will be made for these to be applied in future studies.  
 
Table 1.3. European definition of general practice defined by WONCA 
The characteristics of general practice are:  
a ...is normally the point of first medical contact within the healthcare system, providing open 
and unlimited access to its users, dealing with all health problems regardless of the age, sex, 
or any other characteristic of the person concerned  
b ...makes efficient use of healthcare resources through co-ordinating care, working with 
other professionals in the primary care setting, and by managing the interface with other 
specialities taking an advocacy role for the patient when needed 
c ...develops a person-centred approach, orientated to the individual, his/her family, and their 
community 
d ...has a unique consultation process, which establishes a relationship over time, through 
effective communication between doctor and patient  
e ...is responsible for the provision of longitudinal continuity of care as determined by the 
needs of the patient 
f ...has a specific decision making process determined by the prevalence and incidence 
of illness in the community 
g ...manages simultaneously both acute and chronic health problems of individual patients. 
h ...manages illness which presents in an undifferentiated way at an early stage in its 
development, which may require urgent intervention 
i ...promotes health and well being both by appropriate and effective intervention.  
j ...has a specific responsibility for the health of the community  
k ...deals with health problems in their physical, psychological, social, cultural and 
existential dimensions  
 
Models of primary care are delivered in many contexts, with variable 
management and financial arrangements, to provide a range of preventive 
health, public health and healthcare services to a diverse case-mix of patients 
of all ages, complexity (undifferentiated complaints, uncertain diagnoses, 
multiple comorbidities) and socio-cultural circumstance, by healthcare 
professionals (GPs, practice nurses, community pharmacists, community 
midwives, district nursing, dentists) that communicate through many formats. 
Challenges facing modern primary care could also inadvertently create greater 
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risks of healthcare-associated harm; for example, patients are discharged from 
hospital earlier than before, and receive episodic and decentralised care; GPs 
prescribe and monitor high-risk drugs; consultations are time-pressured; and 
continuity of care relies on coordination between many care providers and 
services.(69)  
 
1.3.2. Epidemiology of healthcare-associated harm in primary care 
A WHO-commissioned systematic review informed discussions at the WHO 
Safer Primary Care meeting, and concluded that 2-3% of primary care 
encounters result in a patient safety incident defined as “events or 
circumstances which could have resulted, or did result, in unnecessary harm to 
a patient”.(11) Of those, 1 in 25 incidents will result in a serious harm 
(shortening of life expectancy, permanent injury, major loss of function) or a fatal 
outcome.(70) From such estimates, it is unclear at which end of this range the 
UK belongs. Case note reviews of specific patient safety incidents like 
prescribing errors occurring in general practice in England suggest these occur 
for 1 in 8 patients.(71) 
 
The systematic review was limited by the heterogeneity of included studies in 
terms of reported measurement outcomes (e.g. adverse events versus patient 
safety incidents) and related variations in use of terminology. Given the range of 
definitions used, the existing evidence-base from which to pool estimates to 
identify priority areas for intervention is weakened. Studies that described either 
the frequency or outcomes of patient safety incidents were included if they 
utilised a method like case note review with a reliable reported denominator. 
Analysis of patient safety incident reports dominate previous patient safety 
research activity in primary care. This also includes incident reports gathered 
through surveys of clinicians and through established reporting systems. Such 
studies have used different hierarchical taxonomies to code data. In addition, 
few studies have focussed on understanding the underlying contributory factors 
to patient safety incidents, (69,72–78) which is reflective of the wider body of 
patient safety literature.(79)  
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The systematic review reported the three most common categories of patient 
safety incident type were: administrative and communication incidents; 
diagnostic incidents; and, prescribing and medication management incidents. 
Diagnostic and medication incidents were most likely to result in harm, and 
most likely to result in severe harm.(70,80) Diagnostic incidents concerned 
missed or wrong diagnoses. Thirty-five studies focused explicitly on prescribing 
incidents, where the rate of a patient safety incident occurring was between 1 
and 90 out of 100 prescriptions issued. Rates were higher in studies that 
focused on the elderly or those taking multiple medications.(81–84) Efforts to 
mitigate medication incidents are in an era of implementation and evaluation. A 
few more robust before-and-after studies and randomised controlled trials have 
found that up to half of all incidents may be preventable using interventions 
such as pharmacist-led medication review, computerised physician order entry 
and computerised decision support systems, error alert systems and education 
of professionals, and complex interventions combining professional education, 
informatics and financial incentives.(85–95)  
 
A systematic review by Makeham et al.(96) of interventions to minimise the risk 
of non-medication safety incidents identified nine studies (summarised in Table 
1.4). Safety culture, patient compliance, and incident report frequency were 
commonly stated outcome measures.     
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Table 1.4. Features of primary care patient safety intervention studies including 
outcome measures from Makeham et al.(96) 
Paper Design Intervention 
description 
Key findings Outcome measures 
Arora et 
al. 2015 
(97) 
Randomised 
controlled 
trial 
Intervention to 
improve safety 
in transitions of 
care 
SMS reminders 
improved attendance 
at follow-up 
appointments 
Patient compliance 
with follow-up 
appointment 
attendances   
El-Kareh 
et al. 2009 
(98) 
Longitudinal 
survey 
Computerised 
clinical 
decision 
support 
systems 
Clinicians reported 
increasingly positive 
perceptions over the 
year 
Safety culture/climate 
measurement using a 
physician perceived 
quality measures - 
questionnaire 
Garment 
et al. 2012 
(99) 
Randomised 
controlled 
trial 
Intervention to 
improve safety 
in transitions of 
care 
Transition of care 
intervention improved 
the odds of 
completion of patient 
care tasks 
Patient compliance 
with follow-up 
appointment 
attendances   
Physician assessment 
of performance based 
on compliance with 
assigned tasks 
Gurwitz et 
al. 2014 
(100) 
Randomised 
controlled 
trial 
Intervention to 
improve safety 
in transitions of 
care 
An electronic health 
record with enhanced 
information for 
primary care 
clinicians had no 
significant effect on 
measures 
Patient compliance 
with follow-up 
appointment 
attendances 
Re-hospitalisation 
rates 
Hoffmann 
et al. 2014 
(101) 
Randomised 
controlled 
trial 
Educational 
intervention to 
improve 
patient safety 
practices 
The Frankfurt Patient 
Safety Matrix 
increased numbers of 
reported safety 
incidents and led to 
better quality reports 
There was no 
significant effect on 
safety culture or 
climate 
Incident reporting 
numbers 
Safety culture/climate 
measurement using a 
validated survey tool 
Marsteller 
et al. 2010 
(102) 
Quasi- 
experimental 
Educational 
intervention to 
improve 
patient safety 
practices 
The educational 
intervention resulted 
in a significant 
positive increase in 
safety measures 
Safety culture/climate 
measurement using a 
practice based tool 
with 21 safety 
measures 
Singh et 
al. 2009 
(103) 
Quasi- 
experimental 
Educational 
intervention to 
improve 
patient safety 
Junior doctors' skills 
improved following 
their exposure to the 
curriculum 
Physician assessment 
of performance based 
on student 
performance in an 
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practices Objective Structured 
Clinical Examination 
(OSCE) 
Verbakel 
et al. 2015 
(104) 
Cluster 
randomised 
trial 
Improvement 
of incident 
reporting 
systems 
Practices which 
participated in a 
safety culture 
questionnaire and 
workshop increased 
their incident 
reporting 
Incident reporting 
numbers  
  
Zwart et 
al. 2011 
(105) 
Quasi- 
experimental 
Improvement 
of incident 
reporting 
systems 
Implementation of a 
local incident 
reporting procedure 
improves system 
uptake 
Incident reporting 
numbers  
  
 
Current global estimates suggest healthcare-associated harm results in 23 
million disability-adjusted life years.(80) Research about patient safety in 
primary care do not inform those estimates despite providing the majority of 
healthcare encounters in most healthcare systems. The global scale of 
healthcare-associated harm, once inclusive of outcomes arising from patient 
safety incidents in primary care, is still to be realised, although could highlight 
gross underestimates of the scale of the problem. The frequency and burden of 
avoidable significant harm is the subject of a separate Department of Health 
funded research study, the Avoidable Harm Study, being undertaken between 
the University of Nottingham, Cardiff University and others (April 2015 to 
December 2017).  
 
1.3.3. Primary care patient safety research and development priorities 
A three-round modified Delphi consensus study was undertaken at the WHO 
Safer Primary Care meeting to seek agreement on which safety incidents merit 
most attention, the contexts and disciplines that should be involved in different 
economic settings, and what empirical evidence was needed to follow the 
trajectory of success seen in hospital medicine.(63) 
 
General practice and community pharmacy were considered the main care 
settings to focus future research and development to advance patient safety in 
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primary care across all income categories. This should also extend to care 
home and nursing home settings in high income settings. Patient safety 
incidents requiring further study across all economic settings included 
communication between healthcare professionals and with patients, teamwork 
within the healthcare team, laboratory and diagnostic imaging investigations, 
issues relating to data management, transitions between different care settings, 
and chart/patient record completeness. Interventional, regulatory, and 
methodological issues for further development were agreed on by over 80% of 
participants after round 3, including:  
● education and training; 
● data collection methods;  
● developing policy to promote patient safety;  
● raising the public profile of patient safety;  
● greater clarity on definitions of patient safety incidents in primary care;  
● facilitating learning from patient safety incidents;  
● regulations to ensure that systems to improve patient safety are put into 
practice; and, 
● improved taxonomies and better ways of classifying errors in primary 
care.(63) 
 
1.4. Incident reporting systems 
Building on the experiences from other high-risk industries seeking to improve 
safety for their workers, a consistently high priority in many healthcare systems 
around the world have created patient safety incident reporting systems. Such 
systems permit healthcare professionals, patients/carers and others to detail 
their safety concerns and these reports can be systematically interrogated to 
derive learning. Patient safety incident reporting systems have been developed 
in several high-income countries, with the UK now having by far the largest 
such system in the world. Incident reports permit a retrospective ‘window’ on the 
healthcare system, providing a means of looking to the future, by identifying 
weaknesses of the system that are still present and could lead to further 
incidents involving patients.(10) 
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1.4.1. Types of incident reporting systems 
National systems which receive reports from healthcare organisations are well 
described in Denmark,(106–108) Norway,(109) and England and Wales.(110–
126) Regional systems exist for state-level learning in Australia (e.g. Victoria 
and New South Wales) or province-level learning in Canada (e.g. British 
Columbia Patient Safety and Learning System) and the United States (e.g. 
Pennsylvania State Reporting System), as well as at the provider level (e.g. The 
Veterans Health Administration).  
 
Theme-based systems also exist; for example: medication-related incidents like 
the MedMARx® system run by the Institute for Safe Medication Practice in the 
United States which has been extensively characterised;(117,127–146) the UK 
Bowel Screening programme which focuses on reports of harm associated with 
screening;(147–149) and, The University of Texas Hospital Close Call 
Reporting System which was established to collect reports about potentially 
serious events that did not lead to harm.(150,151) Case studies from individual 
hospitals are also commonly reported and published in peer-reviewed 
journals.(152–156)  
 
The purpose of these systems is to enable learning from incidents across local, 
organisational and national levels to inform improvements in patient safety. The 
intended learning feedback mechanisms are summarised by Benn et al.(157) in 
Figure 1.6  NHS staff have been encouraged to report patient safety incidents 
which were defined as “any unintended or unexpected incident which could 
have, or did, lead to harm for one or more patients receiving NHS care”.(158) In 
England and Wales, each hospital and healthcare facility has a reporting 
system that collects paper or electronic incident forms. These are first reviewed 
and analysed at a local level and then sent in batch returns by the 
organisation's risk manager to the National Reporting and Learning System 
(NRLS).  
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Figure 1.6. Framework for Safety Action and Information Feedback from 
Incident Reporting developed by Benn et al.(157) 
 
1.4.2. Evaluation of the National Reporting and Learning System 
A Special Health Authority called the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) 
was launched in 2002, with a responsibility of running the NRLS for England 
and Wales. The NPSA developed several categories of guidance designed to 
assist the NHS to learn from patient safety incidents (see Table 1.5 for an 
overview of outputs). These included patient safety alerts, patient safety 
notices, and quarterly data summaries. Evaluations of the outputs typically 
focussed on the uptake of guidance rather than the efficacy of the educational 
output as an intervention.(159,160) Several themed reports focussed on the 
improvement of safety in secondary care settings, and were published by 
special arrangement with the British Medical Journal, including: prescribing and 
monitoring lithium therapy;(161) reliable administration of insulin;(162) early 
detection of complications in surgical care;(163) and, essential care after an 
inpatient fall.(164) The NPSA also collaborated with Royal Colleges and 
permitted health services researchers to explore the data; for example in 
anaesthesia, system deficiencies relating to practical procedures, 
communication of information to patients, verbal and written communication 
practices, and continuity of care issues were identified as areas for 
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improvement.(165,166) Such analyses also led to the development of an 
anaesthesia-specific incident report data collection form.(167) 
 
Table 1.5. Overview of NPSA outputs (168) 
NPSA Output Description 
Patient safety alerts Published regularly and containing information on patient safety 
requiring urgent action. 
Patient safety notices Published regularly and containing information requiring longer term, 
system-wide changes. 
Themed reports Occasionally published in-depth reports into specialist subjects. 
Cause for concern 
letters 
Sent to trusts to follow up reports of patient deaths causing concern 
(Sept 2007 onwards) and for all incidents resulting in severe harm 
were subjected to the same process (April 2008 onwards).  
Letter highlighted where urgent local action was needed and 
required acknowledgement from board level in the reporting trust.  
Quarterly data 
summaries 
High-level aggregate of reports by describing their patterns and 
trends. 
Detailed feedback 
reports, issued to 
individual trusts from 
2007 
Aggregated report covering incident reporting and comparison data 
over the preceding six months. 
 
 
The NRLS currently contains over 14 million reports and continues to receive 
approximately 100,000 reports per month from healthcare organisations in 
England and Wales.(169) 98% (13.75 million) of incident reports in the NRLS 
have been received from hospitals. Approximately 230 000 reports from primary 
care (<0.5% of total reports), and 47,000 reports from general practice, have 
been received by the NRLS in over a decade. The under-representation of 
general practice within the NRLS is possibly a reflection of the national 
emphasis placed on patient safety in hospital settings. This is a paradox given 
at least one million healthcare encounters occur each day in community care 
settings. Despite this, primary care outputs from NRLS have included patient 
safety alerts on: 
● ambulatory syringe drivers;  
● prescribing, dispensing and administering of insulin;   
● vaccine storage;  
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● lithium therapy;  
● preventing harm to children with parents with mental health needs; and, 
● methotrexate compliance.(170) 
 
1.4.3. Effectiveness of patient safety incident reporting systems 
Stavropoulou et al.(171) reviewed 35 case studies extracted from published 
academic papers describing patient safety incident reporting systems in 
healthcare settings worldwide to determine their effectiveness on improvement 
of settings, structures, and outcomes. The authors concluded there is little 
evidence that incident reporting systems improve outcomes or enable cultural 
changes.(171) The authors might have reached this conclusion because case 
studies are seldom described and reported in the published literature. Also, 
patient safety incident reporting systems are complex interventions to improve 
safety and must function in complex healthcare systems. Such judgements of 
effectiveness risk oversimplifying the diverse range of contexts in which 
reporting and learning systems exist, as well as the diverse contexts in which 
learning arising from the system should be applied to inform practice 
improvement. This is highlighted in an assessment of the impact made by 
medication safety outputs issued by the NRLS; whilst organisations deemed the 
different outputs as essential for raising awareness and improving patients 
safety,(160,172) over half of the organisations studied were unable to 
communicate effectively and reliably with their junior doctors that were largely 
undertaking the prescribing.(173)  
 
Studies that have examined the sensitivity of patient safety incident reporting 
systems reveal they can be poor detectors of incidents occurring in 
organisations.(174–177) In England, Sari et al.(174) reported only 1 in 20 
patient safety incidents are reported to a formal incident reporting system. 
Studies in Australia and the United States have corroborated this 
finding.(175,177) Such studies highlight that the inherent bias of patient safety 
incident reporting systems must be carefully considered when analysing 
incident data.  
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Patient safety incident reporting systems often detect a small percentage of 
serious incidents compared with other patient safety data sources like 
complaints data. Staff often report issues with low harm outcomes that do not 
trigger more intensive investigation, although these reports do at least represent 
concerns felt by staff about the ability to deliver safe patient care. In addition, 
the frequency of reports reflects reporting patterns and cannot be used to 
monitor improvements in an organisation. Different methods used in a single 
system provide the broadest perspective for understanding the nature of risk to 
patients,(178) and can support the formulation of risk reduction strategies for 
systems improvement, with each method having distinct advantages:  
● patient safety incident reporting systems can yield rich descriptions 
and context about incidents to inform practice improvements, and 
provide clinicians with a feedback mechanism;(179)  
● clinical record review enables estimates of incident prevalence; 
and,  
● malpractice database reviews can provide greater detail on 
incidents with serious clinical outcomes.(178)  
 
Studies comparing learning from the aforementioned methods indicate there is 
little overlap in their results.(180) The methods yield different insights by virtue 
of their nature. For example, incident reporting systems require professionals to 
report an incident, and this requires their awareness that a patient safety 
incident has occurred. Alternatively, clinical records do not provide the same 
depth and contextual information about contributory factors that incident reports 
do because they will often contain descriptions of care as delivered although it 
may not be possible to identify errors of commission or omission unless 
explicitly described.(181)  
 
1.4.4. National-level patient safety agenda setting 
The Francis Inquiry report, published in 2013, found little evidence that primary 
care organisations have the capacity, down to the level of individual practices, 
to learn from safety incidents.(168) The need to develop infrastructure and 
clinical governance for patient safety in primary care is not new. The Safety 
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First report, published in 2006, considered NHS organisation arrangements to 
place patient safety at the heart of the healthcare agenda. The report 
recommended Primary Care Trusts (the current equivalent in England being 
Clinical Commissioning Groups which are clinically led statutory NHS bodies) 
be made accountable for ensuring all providers had effective reporting systems 
and were implementing technical solutions.(182) The low frequency of reports 
from general practice since 2005, described previously, suggest this 
recommendation made minimal impact. 
 
Despite important demonstrable value derived from secondary care incident 
reports whilst the NPSA was functioning, there has been a hiatus in the 
development of methods for making full use of the majority of incident reports 
that are not routinely analysed. Current incident reporting systems are 
undervalued and underutilised, garnering little respect from the health 
information and research communities.(183) Their role in systems improvement, 
in terms of informing the design of quality improvement projects or initiatives, 
has not yet been realised.   
 
The NRLS in England and Wales is the largest patient safety incident reporting 
system in the world. Unstructured data in the system exist as free-text 
narratives about incidents and need to be classified in order for any meaning to 
be derived. The WHO International Classification for Patient Safety (ICPS) was 
an international commitment to standardise the terms used to describe patient 
safety for comparison between contexts (this will be described in detail in 
chapters 2 and 3). Efforts to apply this classification system to primary care are 
needed, as well as a description of the process for coding data to learn from 
trajectory of error and related human factors and system conditions. Learning 
generated from characterisation of incidents in general practice in England and 
Wales should be transferable to common contexts of care provision in different 
income settings, and be used to stimulate discussion and thinking about 
strategies for improvement.  
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1.5. Learning from patient safety incident reports 
The relationship between learning, knowledge creation and organisational 
performance has been described in detail.(184–187) Patient safety is 
predicated on the ability to learn from healthcare-associated harm with a view to 
re-engineer systems. Establishing the National Patient Safety Agency, and the 
National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS), presented an opportunity for 
the National Health Services in England and Wales to embrace an era of 
‘organisational learning’. Systems scientist, Peter Senge, coined the concept of 
the ‘learning organisation’ which has been defined as “an organisation that 
exhibits adaptability, learns from mistakes, explores situations for development, 
and optimises the contribution of its personnel”.(188,189) Learning 
organisations require the support of infrastructure for a range of activities and 
processes to create what is often described in healthcare organisations as a 
‘culture of learning’.(190,191)  
    
Martin et al.(192) make an important distinction between data, knowledge and 
intelligence; they say: “data represent the raw material of knowing, but need to 
be identified, selected, processed, interpreted, and made the basis of action”. 
Data can be objective, quantitative information (‘hard data’), for example about 
outcomes, or more subjective, qualitative information that can contain rich 
contextual information from the first-hand perspective of patients, families and 
carers, or staff (‘soft data’). Both types of data can guide patient safety 
improvements:  
● hard data can provide signals for further interrogation (frequency or 
prevalence of incidents); and, 
● soft data can provide opportunities to gain an understanding about what 
happened and why it occurred, and be used to pinpoint specific actions 
or circumstances that increase the likelihood of healthcare-associated 
harm in different contexts.  
 
Drawing on Dretske’s (1981) definition of knowledge, Martin et al.(192) describe 
the ability to generate actionable learning from soft (qualitative) data as ‘soft 
intelligence’. This includes the processes and behaviours to seek and identify 
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soft data, as well as “the knowledge-producing activities of collation, synthesis, 
interpretation and application of insights”. Incident reports contain hard data in 
the form of categorical information (e.g. location of incident, type of incident, 
patient age group) and soft data in free-text descriptions of what happened, the 
reporter’s perceptions of why and how the incident occurred and the plans to 
prevent future recurrence.  
 
1.5.1. Challenges to generating learning from incident reports 
In 2005, The (UK) National Audit Office’s report, A Safer Place for Patients: 
Learning to improve patient safety (Safer Place for Patients), raised concerns 
about the outputs generated from the NRLS. A later report published in 2006 by 
the Chief Medical Officer of England’s office, called Safety First: A report for 
patients, clinicians and healthcare managers (the Safety First report) observed 
insufficient use of nationally collected incident reports to generate learning for 
systems improvement. It concluded:  
 
“despite the high volume of incident reports collected by the NPSA to 
date, there are too few examples where these have resulted in 
actionable learning for local NHS organisations. The National Reporting 
and Learning System (NRLS) is not yet delivering high-quality, routinely 
available information on patterns, trends and underlying causes of harm 
to patients.”  
 
A public inquiry in England led by Robert Francis QC was undertaken to review 
the failings in care that resulted in 1200 excess deaths at Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust between 2004-2009. The inquiry reviewed the role of the 
NPSA, and the NRLS, in supporting the identification of patient safety issues. 
The report concluded the NRLS played no part in uncovering the lack of safety 
at Mid Staffordshire. This does not seem a surprising conclusion considering 
the circumstances in which the NRLS operated. Whilst reporting systems had 
been identified as an important mechanism for learning from unsafe healthcare, 
they were borrowed from safety critical industries like aviation. Whilst aviation 
industry leaders might expect around 400 reports per year, the NRLS in 
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England and Wales receives over one million reports each year.(193) The 
NRLS had limited capacity (administrative and clinical expertise) and could only 
review incidents reported with severe harm or death outcomes.(168)  
 
1.5.2. Opportunities to learn from incident reports 
Following the Francis Inquiry, the Berwick report, A promise to learn - a 
commitment to act: improving the safety of patients in England (2013),(194) 
highlighted that “organisational learning is key to improving patients’ safety”. 
This recommendation echoes previous recommendations made in An 
Organisation with a Memory (2001) and suggests the NHS had been slow to 
realise how to generate and act on learning from healthcare-associated 
harm.(47) The report highlighted ‘incident reports’ and ‘incident reporting levels’ 
should be used within a suite of indicators to assess safety improvement and 
variation. Berwick stresses the need for healthcare organisations to have 
functional reporting systems: 
 
“Organisations should demonstrate that they have in place fully 
functional reporting systems for serious incidents, that staff know how to 
use them, that the systems are used, and that appropriate action is taken 
in response to incidents, including provision of appropriate support to the 
affected patients and their carers.” (194)   
 
There also remains a strong advocacy for national patient safety incident 
reporting systems at an international policy level, and as recently as March 
2016, the WHO convened healthcare system leaders from low- and middle-
income countries to support and advance discussions towards the development 
of national reporting and learning systems.  
 
Despite this strong position on the opportunities from patient safety incident 
reporting systems, there is a consistent message about missed opportunities 
that incident report data are not being more effectively utilised to inform systems 
improvement, or as Macrae puts it: “we collect too much and do too little” (193). 
Major investments have been made internationally to establish the infrastructure 
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for patient safety incident reporting systems. There is still uncertainty about how 
such systems can inform improvement in outcomes. Research and 
development is needed to better understand how to optimise them in 
healthcare.  
1.5.3. Classifications systems  
Since 1988, the Australian Patient Safety Foundation (APSF), led by William 
Runciman, has worked to understand how to “deconstruct” the information in 
patient safety incident reports to facilitate subsequent analysis and 
learning.(195) Classification systems (sometimes referred to as taxonomies) 
have been developed which are “an arrangement of concepts into classes and 
their subdivisions, linked...to express the semantic relationships between 
them.”(11,196) APSF developed a classification system to support the 
identification and retrieval of relevant information about an incident, and outlined 
a process for collecting and classifying incident reports. This approach 
underpinned the basis for the WHO-commissioned International Classification 
for Patient Safety (ICPS) which is described in more detail in chapter 2.(2,197) 
ICPS contains concepts (and preferred terms) used to deconstruct patient 
safety incidents and is intended to aid transition from data to knowledge and 
intelligence that can inform systems improvement.(11)  
 
Reports from general practice collected by the NRLS have never previously 
been systematically classified in England and Wales. There has, however, been 
a considerable volume of academic papers detailing the analysis of patient 
safety incident reports, including from general practice in other 
countries.(70,198) Learning from patient safety incidents hinges on the ability to 
generate learning from incident reports.(157,199) Given the expectations raised 
by WHO for incident reporting analysis in the publication of ICPS in 2009, a 
review of existing classifications and methods used to analyse patient safety 
incident reports is needed. 
 
  
  44 
1.6. Aims and objectives of PhD 
 
The aims of the PhD are to: 
● Develop and apply methods to generate learning from patient safety 
incidents occurring in general practice; and, 
● Explore how incident reports can be analysed to inform healthcare 
systems improvement. 
 
The objectives of the PhD are to: 
1. Review existing methods used to analyse the content of general practice 
patient safety incident reports. 
2. Empirically develop classification frameworks aligned to the WHO 
International Classification for Patient Safety to structure coding and 
sensemaking of incident report content. 
3. Test the classification frameworks on a sample of safety incident reports 
from general practice reported to a national database, to:  
a. Describe the frequency of different types of incidents, contributory 
factors and healthcare-associated harm outcomes and explore 
which characteristics are associated with different levels of harm;  
b. Map relationships between reported contributory factors and other 
variables to propose contributory themes occurring in similar 
groups of incidents; and, 
c. Propose areas with the greatest need and opportunity for future 
intervention strategies to improve patient safety in general 
practice. 
4. Determine the process for using incident report analyses to inform the 
design of improvement projects at a) national- and b) local-levels.  
5. Propose areas for future research and development to improve the ability 
to generate learning from patient safety incidents.  
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1.6.1. Conceptual justification of methodology to address aims and objectives 
The philosophical paradigm of my research, or put simply the “set of common 
beliefs and assumptions amongst scientists about how problems should be 
understood and addressed” (200,201) is strongly influenced by two main issues:  
 
1. Identifying priorities in big data – incident reporting system contain large 
volumes of data and a process for reliable data reduction is needed for 
prioritisation; and, 
2. Unstructured, jargon-laden data – interpretation of free text requires 
clinical knowledge to ‘sense make’ what is meant and generate 
understanding about context.   
 
1.6.1.1. Quantitative and qualitative belief systems  
Quantitative and qualitative knowledge can be conceptualised as belonging to 
two distinct, and opposing ‘belief systems’.(202) As Scott (202) puts it: 
“Quantitative knowledge is intrinsically bound to a realist ontology and 
objectivist epistemology. Qualitative knowledge is intrinsically bound to a 
relativist ontology and a constructivist epistemology.” 
 
An objectivist approach to analysis of incident reports means the researcher 
would code only what is explicitly stated. This is appealing given how incident 
reporting systems function in healthcare organisations. For example, healthcare 
administrative teams are often involved in the coding of reports received by the 
local system, or the reporter themselves are required to select high-level codes 
that represent the type of patient safety incident. Further, the identification of 
priorities requires a reliable and auditable process. Minimising variation in 
coding practices prior to the identification of priorities would support the 
reliability of agenda setting methods to reflect what gets reported by healthcare 
professionals and staff. From a research perspective, the objectivist approach is 
appealing because the application of codes can be considered in terms of inter-
rater reliability.  
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At the other end of the spectrum, a constructivist approach to analysis of 
incident reports means the clinical researcher would make sense of what is 
stated, based on their knowledge and understanding of a phenomena in the 
clinical setting and ability to interpret jargon-laden text. This could enable a 
deeper understanding about the contexts in which clusters of similar incidents 
had occurred. Given the resource intensive nature of the qualitative methods 
affiliated with this approach, a focus on identified priorities (clusters of similar 
reports) can be made.  
 
1.6.1.2. Combined belief systems – a mixed methods research paradigm 
Mixed methods research combines knowledge from both belief systems and 
can be called the ‘pragmatic paradigm’.(29,203) Conceptual concerns with 
mixed methods research arises from arguments about ‘epistemological 
incompatibility’ from opposing belief systems. However, those in favour of a 
mixed methods research paradigm stress how the nature and purpose of policy 
research should benefit from co-existing belief systems, and their related 
methods.(29,202–204)  
 
Examples of mixed methods research demonstrate how quantitative data can 
inform sampling options for further in-depth qualitative inquiry,(205) and 
advocate how combinations of approaches can facilitate richer data and 
develop the analysis.(204) The pragmatic paradigm has a deconstructive 
epistemology, which means, knowledge about reality is constantly negotiated, 
debated and interpreted in light of its usefulness in new, unpredictable 
situations (200). As described in section 2.1.1, Martin et al.(192) describe ‘soft 
intelligence’ as a process of selecting data, making sense of the message and 
realising the learning. Others have described a similar process called 
‘sensemaking’, defined as “the active process of assigning meaning to 
ambiguous data”.(206) 
 
1.6.1.3. Personal beliefs and process of inquiry   
Mixed-methods research is focussed on practical, operational issues and is 
predicated on the ability to optimise learning from the breadth and depth of 
understanding and corroboration possible from combined qualitative and 
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quantitative methods.(203) Morgan,(203) citing John Dewey, points to the 
importance of joining beliefs and actions in a process of inquiry that underlies a 
search for knowledge (Figure 1.7).  
 
   
Figure 1.7. Dewey’s systematic approach to inquiry  
 
I described in section 1.2.4.3 how improvement scholars, Perla and Parry, have 
explored the concept of knowledge in the context of implementing new 
innovations in healthcare. They said: “...how can [healthcare systems and 
leaders] design knowledgeable healthcare systems that maximise the alignment 
between the current best evidence (‘truth’) and the actions of healthcare 
providers (‘belief’)?”. They described how improvement science methods, a 
newly developing branch of mixed methods research, can support identification 
of beliefs about what aided an innovation to work or fail in a system. In a similar 
vein, I have designed my research with the belief that incident reporting 
systems can offer an opportunity to understand the beliefs of healthcare 
professionals in primary care about how and why an incident occurred, in order 
to raise hypotheses about how the system can be designed or redesigned to 
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improve its structures and processes. A deconstructive epistemology will 
support my in-depth inductive exploratory processes (objectives 2-3).  
 
Dewey’s systematic approach to inquiry (Figure 1.7) is based on five steps, 
which promote an explicit mechanism for linking my beliefs and actions (and 
learning) occurring throughout my PhD study.(203) The approach has aided my 
inductive development of classification frameworks and methods related to 
generate learning from incident reports. This includes efforts to promote 
personal and team-based reflexivity to achieve objectives 2-4. Objective 4b was 
designed to permit a deductive reflection on a case study of how the methods 
generated from concurrent research to achieve objectives 1-4a could be applied 
in a local context. 
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Chapter 2 – Scoping review of methods to analyse patient safety 
incidents 
 
In this chapter, I will describe a scoping review of existing methods used to 
analyse the content of general practice patient safety incident reports (objective 
1).  
 
Scoping reviews are undertaken with the purpose of mapping a body of 
literature, and generating a descriptive overview, on a particular 
subject.(207,208) Alternatively, other literature review methods like systematic 
reviews or meta-analysis provide a synthesis of the best available evidence 
from studies assessed for risk of bias.(209) My scoping review,(207,210) was 
undertaken by following a framework developed by Levac et al.(210) which 
drew on systematic review principles for structured searches and review of the 
included literature. Scoping reviews are recommended to map broad topics, 
especially where the body of evidence is still emerging.(207,210,211)  
 
2.1. Levac et al. approach to scoping reviews 
The approach proposed by Levac et al.(210) includes the following stages:  
● identifying the research question – to clearly articulate the review 
question(s) and consider the purpose and intended outcomes of the 
review; 
● identifying relevant documentation – to use the identified research 
question(s) and purpose to inform decision-making about types of 
documentation to be eligible for inclusion;  
● study selection – to adopt an iterative process throughout the study 
which involves searching the literature, refining the search strategy and 
reviewing potential documents for inclusion in the review; a commitment 
to regular meetings between reviewers at agreed intervals to discuss 
challenges and uncertainties about included documents;  
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● charting the data – the study team should collectively develop the data-
charting form; charting should be an iterative process and independent 
data extraction is recommended;  
● collating, summarising and reporting the results – three distinct phases of 
work including generating a descriptive numerical summary analysis and 
a qualitative thematic analysis; producing the ‘outcome’ relevant to the 
overall purpose or review question(s); and, consideration of the meaning 
of the findings for future research, practice and policy; and, 
● consultation – clearly articulate the type of stakeholders to consult and 
how their feedback will be collated and used to inform the overall scoping 
review outcome.  
 
2.1.1. Review questions 
The purpose of my review was to compare approaches used to analyse patient 
safety incident reports in healthcare, particularly those developed for use in 
primary care.  
 
The review questions were: 
- What patient safety classification systems have been used in healthcare? 
- What methods have been used to analyse patient safety incident report 
data? and, 
- What classification systems and methods have been used to analyse 
patient safety incident reports from general practice? 
 
2.1.2. Identifying relevant documentation 
A search strategy of key terms was developed from a range of topic areas 
pertinent to incident reporting. Synonyms, alternate spellings, abbreviations and 
historical terms were incorporated into the search strategy (Appendix 1). This 
search strategy was peer-reviewed by subject matter experts (Peter Hibbert and 
Meredith Makeham) and designed to facilitate maximum recall of relevant 
studies. Keywords were mapped to database search terms and subject 
headings. In addition, the key terms were searched as text word terms for all 
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databases. Boolean operators were used to combine search terms and 
maximise precision. Given the diverse involvement of academics from many 
disciplines in patient safety, searches of 14 electronic peer-reviewed and grey 
literature databases were chosen to include literature from biomedical science, 
health and social care disciplines, psychology, social science, economics, 
amongst others. The decision to undertake a review of such an extensive list of 
databases was informed by my earlier experience of the coverage each 
database permits whilst undertaking a systematic review of the primary care 
patient safety literature.(70)  
 
The following databases were searched:  ABI/Inform, Cumulative Index of 
Nursing and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL), Cochrane Library, EconLit, 
EMBASE, MEDLINE, PsycINFO, Social Sciences Abstracts, University of York 
Health Technology Assessment Database, Grey Literature Report, Papers First, 
ProQuest Dissertations & Thesis, University of Laval KUUC Knowledge 
Utilisation Database, and  WorldCat. Searches were undertaken by me, with the 
support of three medical students (Phillippa Rees, Hope Ward and Amy Butlin). 
In addition, members of the research team compiled a list of websites relevant 
to patient safety (Appendix 2). These websites were systematically hand 
searched using key terms. All references were exported to endnote and 
duplicates removed. 
2.1.3. Study selection 
Titles and abstracts of search outputs were scanned for relevance (Rees, Ward, 
Butlin). The full text articles of potentially relevant abstracts were retrieved. Two 
reviewers independently screened retrieved articles from the published 
literature (Butlin, Rees) and two reviewers (Ward, Rees) screened content 
retrieved from grey literature sources, for inclusion using pre-specified criteria 
with 3rd reviewer arbitration (Carson-Stevens) where needed. The inclusion and 
exclusion criteria were derived from the review questions (Table 2.1).  
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Table 2.1. Inclusion and exclusion criteria used for article selection 
Inclusion Exclusion 
Articles that describe an analysis of patient 
safety incident reports and include a 
description of methods.  
Non-English articles or abstracts. 
Published and unpublished English articles 
(or non-English articles with English 
abstracts) of all evidence types. 
Descriptions of efforts to improve 
incident reporting systems.  
 Studies investigating the reliability of 
incident reporting systems detecting 
incidents. 
 Descriptions of incident reporting 
systems from non-healthcare 
organisations. 
 
2.1.4. Charting the data 
A customised data extraction form was developed in Microsoft Excel 2013 
software to collect the following variables: study title, authors, journal, country, 
year of publication, clinical specialty, study design, conceptual approach, patient 
safety classification system and method(s) of analysis. 
 
2.1.5. Collating, summarising and reporting the results 
Frequencies of each variable (described in section 2.1.4) were calculated and 
the relationships between variables were explored by cross-tabulation through 
the use of a data summarising tool called a pivot table.   
2.1.6 Consultation 
The final list of included studies and a summary of the results, including a 
discussion of the key findings in relation to existing literature, practice 
implications and policy was reviewed by subject matter experts that developed 
the WHO ICPS project (Hibbert) and had previously developed a classification 
for general practice (Makeham). Their feedback was sought via comments on 
the manuscript and subsequent discussions on the telephone about those 
comments.  
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2.2. Results  
A total of 346 potentially relevant articles was assessed, from which 252 articles 
were included (Figure 2.1). See Appendix 3 for a table of included studies, and 
Appendix 4 for a list of excluded studies.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. PRISMA diagram of the review process  
 
Of included studies, 87% (n=218) were published since the Institute of 
Medicine’s seminal publication To Err is Human in 1999, and 45% (n=113) were 
published since the publication of ICPS in 2009. The majority of analyses were 
undertaken in North America (30%, n=76), United Kingdom (22%, n=56) and 
Australasia (19%, n=48). Over half (n=25) of the 48 publications from 
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Australasia pre-dated To Err is Human and reflects the early developmental 
work undertaken by the APSF (Figure 2.2). A minority of studies (6%, n=14) 
analysed incidents from primary care. 
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Figure 2.2. Clustered bar chart of the frequency of studies of incident report data by geography between 1980 and 2014  
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The most frequently stated types of study design were ‘cross-sectional’ (n=184), 
‘descriptive’ (n=31) and ‘mixed methods’ (n=18) (Table 2.2).  
  
Table 2.2. Reported study designs involving incident report data  
Study design Frequency 
Case-control study 1 
Case study 5 
Cohort study 5 
Cross-sectional - prospective 61 
Cross-sectional – retrospective 117 
Cross-sectional – retrospective and prospective 4 
Descriptive study 31 
Evaluation 3 
Implementation study 1 
Mixed methods 18 
Quasi-experimental 5 
RCT 1 
Total 252 
 
2.2.1. Classification approach to analyse incident reports 
Twenty distinct patient safety incident classification systems were identified.  
 
2.2.1.1. Novel classifications  
The majority of papers described a ‘novel’ approach to analysis (n=90, 36%). 
This included a description of how they structured their analysis as well as 
adoption of existing coding frameworks (e.g. Harvard Malpractice Study error 
types, the UK Royal College of Anaesthetists incident categories, Veterans 
Administration Severity Assessment codes) which may or may not have been 
originally intended for incident report analysis. Authors commonly gave titles to 
their classification approaches; for example, the ‘Medical Event Reporting 
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System for Transfusion Medicine’,(212) and the ‘International Taxonomy for 
Errors in General Practice’.(213)  
 
2.2.1.2. Commonly used classifications 
Novel classifications that have been independently used by others outside of 
the initiating research institution, health organisation or research collaboration 
are included in Figure 2.3, and include: the Australian Incident Monitoring 
System (AIMS) inclusive of its earlier form as the Generic Occurrence 
Classification for Incidents and Accidents in the Healthcare System (n=31, 
12%); The National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and 
Prevention (NCC MERP) in the United States (n=29, 12%); the National 
Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) in England and Wales (n=15, 6%); the 
Eindhoven Classification Model for System Failure (n=6, 2%), the International 
Classification for Patient Safety (ICPS) (n=5, 2%), and the International 
Taxonomy of Medical Errors in Primary Care (LINNAEUS) (n=5, 2%).    
 
2.2.1.3. Classification not explicitly stated 
When a description of the process to develop and organise the codes was 
absent, or a citation to previous frameworks or descriptions was absent, this 
was coded as ‘not explicit’ (n=71, 28%).   
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Figure 2.3. Clustered bar chart of classification systems described in papers published between 1980 and 2014  
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2.2.1.4. Additional stated conceptual approaches for analysis  
The following conceptual approaches were stated to inform the analysis in 15 
papers only, including:  
● Reason’s Trajectory of Error or ‘Swiss cheese’ model, n=7;(214–222)  
● Vincent’s ‘London Protocol’ n=3;(223–225)  
● non-specific descriptions of ‘system factors’, n=3;(221,226,227)  
● Macrae’s Theory of Risk Resilience, n=1;(228)  
● International Loss Control Institute’s Loss Causation Model, n=1;(224) 
and, 
● Rasmussen’s Skill-Rules-Knowledge based behaviour model, n=1.(222) 
 
2.2.2. Methods used to analyse incident reports 
The methods used to analyse incident reports are displayed in Table 2.3. The 
majority of studies used quantitative methods to describe proportions and 
examine relationships between coded data. Statistical tests and modelling 
methods have been undertaken where the investigators are seeking to 
determine: whether a staff group from a particular care setting reports more 
incidents; whether some incidents are reported more commonly than others; or 
a comparison of incidents received by different databases. Of the 18 studies 
with a mixed methods study design, all combined descriptive statistics with at 
least one qualitative method.  
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Table 2.3. Reported methods used to analyse incident reports 
Method Frequency 
Quantitative  
Descriptive statistics (means, medians, proportions) 216 
Chi-squared test 60 
Logistic regression 32 
Odds ratios 25 
t-test and ANOVA 15 
Fisher’s exact test 14 
Mann–Whitney U test 8 
Other (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, Bayesian hierarchical modelling, cross-
tabulation, impact ratios, rate ratios, relative ratios, relative risk, odds of harm, 
Rao-Scott modified Chi-squared, Wilcoxon rank sum tests, proportional similarity 
index, Cochran-Mantel Haenszel, Kruskal-Wallis, Kendall's Tau-b, Pearson’s 
Correlation Coefficient, Spearman's correlation, Poisson distribution, Z-test of 
equality between proportions, disproportionality analysis, cluster analysis) 
51 
Qualitative  
Comparative analysis 18 
Descriptive case study analysis 15 
Root cause analysis (229) 15 
Causal analysis 15 
Thematic analysis 11 
Content analysis 10 
Case reports  15 
PRISMA (Prevent and Recovery Information System for Monitoring and 
Analysis)(230) 
5 
Other (cascade analysis, data mining, mapping, trend analysis, critical incident 
analysis) 
9 
 
 
2.2.3. Primary care studies of incident reports  
Fourteen included papers described incident reports from primary care settings, 
including: general practice, n=8; community pharmacy, n=2; ambulatory care 
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settings, n=1; out-of-hours general practice, n=1; community nursing =1; and 
generally primary care, n=1. The characteristics of the studies are displayed in 
Table 2.4. The International Taxonomy of Medical Errors in Primary Care is the 
most commonly utilised classification approach. Only the earliest reported study 
by Britt et al.(72) from 1997 has an explicitly stated conceptual basis.  
 
Table 2.4. Characteristics of studies analysing incident reports from primary 
care 
Reference Setting Conceptual 
model 
Classification 
system 
Methods 
Britt H et 
al.(72) 
General practice Human error 
theory 
Not explicitly 
stated 
Critical incident 
analysis and 
descriptive 
statistics 
Hadziabdic 
et al.(231) 
Community 
nursing 
Not specified Novel 
classification - no 
name specified 
Content analysis 
Hickner et 
al.(232) 
Ambulatory care Not specified Novel 
classification - 
Medication Error 
and Adverse 
Drug Event 
Reporting 
System  
Descriptive 
statistics 
Kosiek et 
al.(233) 
General practice Not specified Novel 
classification - 
Learning from 
International 
Networks about 
Errors and 
Understanding 
Safety in Primary 
Care 
Not applicable 
Knudsen et 
al.(234,235) 
Community 
pharmacy 
Not specified Novel 
classification - no 
name specified 
Descriptive 
statistics 
Makeham et 
al.(213) 
General practice Not specified Novel 
classification - 
International 
Taxonomy for 
Errors in General 
Practice  
Descriptive 
statistics 
O'Beirne et 
al.(236) 
General practice Not specified WHO 
International 
Classification for 
Patient Safety 
Cascade analysis, 
descriptive 
statistics, logistic 
regression 
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Rosser W et 
al.(237) 
General practice Not specified International 
Taxonomy of 
Medical Errors in 
Primary Care 
(LINNAEUS) 
Descriptive 
statistics 
Shaw et 
al.(238) 
Primary care 
trust (from a 
multicentre study 
including acute 
care trusts, 
mental health 
and ambulance 
trusts) 
Not specified Not explicitly 
stated 
Descriptive 
statistics 
Woolf SH et 
al.(76) 
 
General practice Not specified International 
Taxonomy of 
Medical Errors in 
Primary Care 
(LINNAEUS) 
Cascade analysis 
and descriptive 
statistics 
Zwart DL et 
al.(105,239,
240) 
General practice Not specified International 
Taxonomy of 
Medical Errors in 
Primary Care 
(LINNAEUS)  
 
Eindhoven 
PRISMA, 
descriptive 
statistics and 
Fisher’s exact test 
 
2.3. Discussion 
2.3.1. Main findings  
Internationally, there is considerable variation for classifying and analysing 
patient safety incident reports. The majority of studies use a novel classification 
approach (n=90, 36%) which limits comparison between studies in the interests 
of maximising learning from different care settings. Since the ICPS was 
launched in 2009,(2) of the 113 studies published between 2010 and 2014, only 
five (4%) explicitly used, or was aligned to, ICPS. However, development of 
frameworks aligned to ICPS was evident in studies from researchers based in 
Europe, Australasia, UK and North America. Few studies (n=15, 6% of total 
included studies) had an explicitly stated conceptual basis to the research.  
 
A diverse range of methods was identified; descriptive statistics were most 
commonly used to summarise incidents, and statistical tests (e.g. Chi-squared 
test) and modelling (e.g. logistic regression) was used to explore relationships 
  63 
between variables, whilst qualitative options sought to identify relationships 
between similar incidents (e.g. thematic analysis, descriptive case study 
analysis) and understand causation (e.g. cascade analysis, root cause 
analysis). 
 
The 14 articles from primary care demonstrated variation in analytical 
approaches similar to the wider body of literature. One study described 
developing an incident reporting form aligned with the ICPS, and the 
International Taxonomy of Medical Errors in Primary Care (LINNAEUS) 
classification was used in five papers.  
 
2.3.2. Strengths and limitations  
I undertook a systematic scoping review following published guidelines to 
summarise a broad literature base.(210,241,242) The aim of a scoping review 
approach is to present an overview of identified existing evidence, rather than 
appraisal of the best available evidence.(211,242) A range of search terms 
were developed to reflect the diverse, unstandardised terminology used in 
patient safety, to maximise recall. The list of terms, and final list of included 
studies, was reviewed by subject matter experts that led the WHO ICPS project 
(Hibbert) and developed a classification for general practice (Makeham).  
 
In the absence of methodological standardisation such as a quality criteria 
checklist, I followed all six stages (the sixth, optional, stage involving expert 
consultation and review of results) of the Levac et al. guidelines.(210) I also 
undertook a quality assessment using AMSTAR (A MeaSurement Tool to 
Assess systematic Reviews) criteria for systematic reviews. The scoping review 
achieved a score of 9 / 11 which reflects rigorous and transparent methods to 
identify and analyse relevant literature.(243) Of note, two points were not 
awarded according to the AMSTAR criteria because methodological quality 
assessment and risk of bias assessment of included studies is not a component 
of scoping reviews.(243,244)   
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2.3.3. Relationships with existing literature  
Since To Err is Human, there has been a proliferation in classification systems 
which all offer an understanding of patient safety. Within primary care, the 
International Taxonomy of Medical Errors in Primary Care was developed in 
2002 by the LINNAEUS collaboration (which is an acronym of ‘Learning in an 
InterNatioNal group About Errors and Understanding Safety’).(245) The 
taxonomy was initially derived from the qualitative analysis of opinions 
expressed by participating primary care professionals involved in the 
collaboration. It is organised by the following classes: type of error, action taken, 
consequences, severity of harm, contributing factors, and prevention 
strategies.(245) Makeham et al.(213) later developed the International 
Taxonomy for Errors in General Practice by testing an earlier taxonomy 
developed in the United States,(246) by applying it to incident reports from 
general practice in five countries including Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, 
New Zealand, and the Netherlands.(213,247) In this system, incidents are 
coded as either process errors, or knowledge and skills errors, within a five-
level coding system.  
 
The WHO launched ICPS in 2009, which was the culmination of a five-year 
programme of activity to propose an international conceptual framework 
informed by existing classification systems, and to achieve international 
consensus on the key concepts and preferred terms needed to deconstruct a 
patient safety incident.(2) The purpose of ICPS was to avoid the need to create 
any further classification systems for deconstructing and understanding patient 
safety. Whilst ICPS does not provide a complete classification with explicit 
coding frameworks, it provides those seeking to understand patient safety with 
a method of organising patient safety data.(11) Given twenty individual 
classifications were identified by the scoping review, it would be prudent for 
future efforts to develop ICPS classes (and coding frameworks) applied to a 
discipline or specialty rather than create new classification systems.   
 
Coinciding with the launch of ICPS, European Union Framework 7 programme 
funding was awarded to researchers from seven countries to undertake the 
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LINNEAUS project (“Learning from International Networks about Errors and 
Understanding Safety in Primary Care”). One of the work packages was to 
develop a classification system for European primary care. The investigators 
undertook a systematic review to identify salient features in existing 
classification systems. They proposed and tested a novel classification for 
primary care using hypothetical vignettes and subsequent critical appraisal by a 
modified Delphi with international experts.(248) The resulting Patient Safety 
Incident Classification for Primary Care is available on the LINNEAUS project 
website (http://www.linneaus-pc.eu/). One study included in the scoping review 
used this classification for medication safety incidents by testing it on ten patient 
safety incident reports.(233) The LINNEAUS project’s study findings have only 
emerged from 2014 onwards.(233,248–250) Earlier patient safety 
classifications, including LINNEAUS, demonstrate variation in concepts and 
preferred terms used to describe patient safety incidents. O’Beirne et al.(236) 
have used several ICPS classes to structure their incident report form, although 
the paper does not explicitly describe the development of coding frameworks 
aligned with ICPS. 
 
2.3.4. Implications for my research 
ICPS was launched to harmonise patient safety nomenclature.(11) The 
development of a new classification system for patient safety is not needed; 
however, the classes within ICPS do require development for application, in the 
form of coding frameworks, to incident reports. Future work must involve 
empirically developing coding frameworks explicitly aligned to ICPS classes to 
understand patient safety in primary care. Existing coding frameworks, that 
align with ICPS concepts, could be used to inform a priori content for iteration 
by reviewing the content of incident reports and applying codes. The NRLS 
contains over 270,000 primary care reports and could be used to develop these 
coding frameworks. Such efforts to develop controlled vocabularies to 
deconstruct patient safety incident report data should be aligned with the 
internationally agreed concepts, preferred terms and definitions.     
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2.4. Conclusion  
Coding frameworks, aligned with ICPS classes, do not exist for primary care 
and need to be developed. A volume of patient safety incident reports from 
general practice in England and Wales would serve as substrate for the 
empirical development and testing of these classes. In subsequent chapters, I 
will describe the methods to develop the coding frameworks require to generate 
learning from patient safety incident reports from general practice. This is 
particularly relevant given: i. the paucity of explicit description of the conceptual 
basis of the majority of previous analyses of incident report data; and, ii. 
description about methodological (i.e. classification and coding framework) 
development. 
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Chapter 3 – Characterisation of patient safety incident reports from 
general practice 
 
In this chapter, I will present an analysis of patient safety incident reports from 
England and Wales. This analysis permitted the empirical development of 
several WHO International Classification for Patient Safety classes to code and 
make sense of incident report content (objective 2). The coding frameworks for 
each class were applied to characterise incident reports as part of a mixed 
methods study of patient safety incidents reported to general practice from 
England and Wales (objective 3a-c), in order to: 
● Describe the frequency of different types of incidents, contributory 
factors and healthcare-associated harm outcomes and explore which 
characteristics are associated with different levels of harm;  
● Map relationships between reported contributory factors and other 
variables to propose contributory themes occurring in similar groups 
of incidents; and, 
● Propose areas with the greatest need and opportunity for future 
intervention strategies to improve patient safety in general practice. 
The outline of this chapter is summarised in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1. Overview of chapter 
Section Description 
3.1 The methods developed and applied to generate learning from patient safety 
incident reports from general practice. 
3.2 Description of the characteristics of all included incident reports and will discuss 
the reports that have been excluded from the analysis in the interests of 
highlighting how the incident reporting system is misused or the purpose of the 
system is misinterpreted. 
3.3 In-depth exploration of each of five categories of safety incident described in 
general practice. 
3.4 Analysis of all reports describing serious harms and deaths, and describe 
inherent themes relating to the underlying reported preventable causes of such 
incidents. 
3.5 Summary of findings. 
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3.1. Method to design and implement a classification framework 
3.1.1. Funding of a NIHR HS&DR study 
The National Institute for Health Research HS&DR funded a research study to 
characterise patient safety incident reports from general practice (HS&DR 
12/64/118). I was the co-PI with Professor Adrian Edwards (lead PhD 
supervisor) and Professor Tony Avery was a co-applicant (2nd supervisor). A 
copy of the original study protocol is included in Appendix 5.  
 
3.1.2. Objectives of NIHR HS&DR study  
The original objectives of the study were to:  
● Empirically develop classification frameworks aligned to the WHO 
International Classification for Patient Safety to structure coding and 
sense making of incident report content (PhD objective 2). 
● Test the classification frameworks on a sample of safety incident reports 
from general practice reported to a national database (PhD objective 3), 
to:  
o Describe the frequency of different types of incidents, contributory 
factors and healthcare-associated harm outcomes and explore 
which characteristics are associated with different levels of harm;  
o Map relationships between reported contributory factors and other 
variables to propose contributory themes occurring in similar 
groups of incidents; and, 
o Propose areas with the greatest need and opportunity for future 
intervention strategies to improve patient safety in general 
practice. 
Amendments to the objectives were proposed by a professional advisory group 
and will be described in section 3.1.6.3. 
3.1.3. Study design 
The HS&DR study was a cross-sectional mixed methods analysis of patient 
safety incidents occurring in general practice reported to the National Reporting 
and Learning System (NRLS) in England and Wales.(251,252) In this chapter, I 
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will describe the NRLS and the content of reports it receives. I will also describe 
the study population and my related data sampling strategy.   
 
3.1.3.1. Overview of the National Reporting and Learning System 
In 2001, an arm’s-length body of the Department of Health in England (and part-
funded by the Welsh Government) was formed called the National Patient 
Safety Agency (NPSA). The centrepiece of the NPSA strategy was to create the 
National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) which integrated information 
from local systems in healthcare organisations in England and Wales. Since 
2004, NHS staff have been encouraged to report patient safety incidents which 
were defined as “any unintended or unexpected incident which could have, or 
did, lead to harm for one or more patients receiving NHS care”.(253) Each 
hospital and healthcare facility has a reporting system that collects paper or 
electronically submitted incident forms. These are first reviewed and analysed 
at a local level and then sent in batch returns by the organisation's risk manager 
to the NRLS. A small number have been made by staff and patients directly to 
the NRLS through an online submission process. The NPSA was abolished in 
2010 by the UK government although the governance and functions of the 
NRLS have since moved to other Department of Health funded bodies and 
currently reside within NHS Improvement.  
 
Healthcare professionals have a duty to report incidents to their organisations’ 
incident management system.(254) These are anonymised and uploaded to the 
NRLS. Reporting incidents that resulted in severe harm or death of a patient 
became mandatory in June 2010; however, before this all reporting was 
voluntary, and remains so for incidents resulting in no, low or moderate harm. 
How data are entered into the NRLS is variable. For example in England, some 
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) have a Local Reporting Management 
System (LRMS) which serves as the conduit to the NRLS for all mandatory 
reports. Organisations without a LRMS notify all severe harms and deaths 
directly to the CQC which then forwards reports to the NRLS. The CQC does, 
however, advise general practices to also report all incidents to the NRLS.(255)  
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3.1.3.2. Content of incident reports 
The NPSA advised the following inclusion criteria for reporting:  
● Incidents that you have been involved in; 
● Incidents that you may have witnessed; 
● Incidents that caused no harm or minimal harm; 
● Incidents with a more serious outcome; 
● Prevented patient safety incidents (known as ‘near misses’).(256) 
 
An incident report contains structured categorical information about the location 
of the incident, patient age and the reporter’s perception of the level of harm 
experienced by the patient (see Table 3.2). The report also contains 
unstructured free-text descriptions of the incident, potential contributory factors 
and planned actions to prevent reoccurrence. The free-text description, in which 
the reporter is asked to describe what happened and why they think it 
happened, offers a rich body of qualitative data for identification of areas for 
improvement.(183,257) These descriptions provide insight into the harms 
occurring or detected by reporters in general practice (which can include 
healthcare proessionals, administrative staff, patients or carers) from their 
perspective. 
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Table 3.2. Data variables in the NRLS (example report) 
Category Code name Description Example 
RP01 Unique ID Numerical 1456789 
RP02 Care setting Structured Community 
RP05 Local reference ID Numerical 3657 
RP07 Trust organisation code Numerical 0344 
PD01 Patient age Numerical 84 
PD05 Specialty Structured General practice 
PD09 Clinical outcome Structured No harm 
IN01 Date of incident  Date  01.03.2015 
IN05 Incident category Structured Administration  
IN06 Contributing factors Unstructured Education and training of all staff on 
this overlooked; transparency of 
administrative processes needed; 
staff sickness. 
IN07 Free-text description of 
incident 
Unstructured GP dictated urgent referral letter to 
dermatologist. Secretary off sick for 
4 weeks. Temp staff were not aware 
of folder where urgent referrals were 
dictated. Delay of 4 weeks. Patient’s 
lesion since diagnosed by biopsy as 
benign.  
IN10 Reoccurrence 
prevention  
Unstructured A standardised operating procedure 
for accessing dictations for 
administrative team available. 
Identified as a practice the 
administrative processes that could 
lead to potential patient harm if 
routine processes not adhered. 
Each staff member contributed to 
this.  
 
3.1.3.3. Study setting 
Incident reports were included from 571 different locations, such as Health 
Boards (formerly Local Health Boards) in Wales and Clinical Commissioning 
Groups (formerly Primary Care Trusts) in England. 
 
3.1.3.4. Study population 
Around 90% of patient encounters in the NHS occur via primary care services 
including, but not limited to, general practice, community pharmacy, district 
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nursing, community midwifery, and health visiting. Primary care is delivered 
across a multitude of care settings by a diverse health and social care staff. A 
recent WHO-commissioned Delphi consensus study recognised general 
practice as a priority context in which to understand and advance patient safety 
in primary care. General practice makes a major contribution to primary care 
delivery (up to 1 million encounters per day in the UK) and characterising 
incidents and identifying priorities would be an important first step towards 
improving patient safety in primary care.(1,63) Incident reports received by the 
NRLS between April 2005 and September 2013 from general practice were 
considered as the complete data set (n = 42,729 reports).  
 
3.1.3.5. Study sample 
From previous analyses of NRLS reports led by the team, (198) I had estimated 
each clinician could code between 20-30 reports per hour. Thus, it was not 
feasible, nor pragmatic, to code all 42,729 reports during the study timeframe. 
The study was therefore designed and costed to enable coding of 
approximately 13,500 reports.  
 
Multiple sampling options were considered, with each having potential 
opportunities and drawbacks.(258) For example, whilst an analysis of the most 
recent reports (e.g. from 2012 onwards) would have resulted in the identification 
of the most recent safety incidents, reports describing lower levels of harm 
outcomes would have dominated the sample by virtue of their current 
proportions. However, omitting learning from no harm and low harm reports 
would mean overlooking the learning from the majority of incidents experienced 
by healthcare professionals and their patients.  
 
Given the inductive and exploratory nature of the study, the study management 
group comprised of my collaborators (see Appendix 6) agreed by consensus 
that it was a major priority to characterise all incidents resulting in severe harm 
or death (n=1119), and to achieve a balanced representative observation of 
12,500 non-fatal reports which included no harm, low harm and moderate harm 
outcomes. To ensure that non-fatal reports in the sample were more current, a 
weighting was applied to the random sample so that recent reports (from 2012 
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onwards) were given a higher priority for inclusion than reports from previous 
years (2005–11). Since the ratio of no harm, low harm, and moderate harm 
reports was approximately 9:2:1, increasing proportions from no harm 
(n=30,979), low harm (n=7433) and moderate harm (n=3485) were selected 
with approximately 15%, 30% and 60% in each stratum using a simple random 
sample without replacement. This stratified sampling approach meant that the 
probability of drawing a report from group 2 (reporting period 2010-11) was 
twice the probability of drawing a report from group 1 (least recent, April 2005–
9, and increasing proportions of level of harm, from no harm to moderate harm), 
and four times more likely in group 3 (most recent, 2012 – September 2013, 
and increasing proportions of level of harm, from no harm to moderate harm) 
than in group 1. This approach resulted in a data set with 12,500 reports. The 
frequencies for each combination can be seen in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3. Sampling strategy for no harm, low harm and moderate harm reports 
 
 
3.1.4. Classification of incident reports 
Given the volume of unstructured data that each incident report can contain, it 
has been the trend internationally to deconstruct (“classify”) reports into their 
constituent parts to identify where and how to intervene in terms of better 
prevention and mitigation strategies.(259) 
 
The free text descriptions included in reports vary considerably in terms of style, 
length and completeness. Analysis of free text has largely been organised and 
managed using classification systems which comprise a taxonomy of classes 
(“a group or set of like things”) to support identification of relationships between 
them.(105,239,260–266) Multiple patient safety classifications have been 
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developed, including those specifically for general practice.(2,195,260,267–272) 
As identified in chapter 2, most classifications pre-date the WHO-commissioned 
development of The Conceptual Framework for the International Classification 
for Patient Safety (ICPS).(2) ICPS was developed to support learning from 
patient safety incidents, and permit comparison across care settings and 
between countries. ICPS contains 10 high-level classes. Figure 3.1 overviews 
the semantic relationships between classes, and the intended flow of 
information to empirically inform “actions taken to reduce risk”.  
Figure 3.1. World Health Organization International Classification for Patient 
Safety   
 
3.1.4.1. Judgements about classification  
In most studies describing an analysis of incident report data, the content of 
reports is usually deconstructed into the following classes, which align with 
ICPS: incident types(72,262,273–279) contributory 
factors;(72,263,273,274,277,280) and, harm outcomes.(72,263,273,274,277–
284) However, given the conceptual influence of Reason’s work on my 
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research, I intended to code (deconstruct) the narrative in incident reports at a 
granular level in order to preserve meaning on reconstruction. This required two 
major decisions:  
1. To empirically develop a detailed classification system for application to 
general practice reports; and,  
2. Code the data in a structured way in order for the relationships between 
codes to be understood and a thread of narrative to be preserved as 
much as possible on reconstruction.  
 
Previous classifications identified by the scoping review described in chapter 2, 
particularly Makeham’s International Taxonomy for Errors in General Practice 
and Runciman’s Australian Incident Management System,(195,247) provided 
considerable guidance about the detail required in the coding 
frameworks.(195,260,267–272,285) However, whilst existing classification 
systems specific to general practice or primary care offered high-level codes, 
they would not permit the detailed coding necessary to describe potentially 
complex incident trajectories. Whilst the Australian Incident Management 
System offered the granularity of codes sought for my study, it had been 
developed for hospital safety with a big emphasis on application in 
anaesthetics. Thus, for the purposes of my study, I concluded the empirical 
development of three new coding frameworks was needed for general practice, 
to include: incident type (which includes contributory incidents), contributory 
factors, and patient and organisational outcomes. Further, these coding 
frameworks should be aligned to WHO ICPS and contain codes that can be 
used in conjunction with rules to preserve understanding about the sequence of 
events and contributory factors that culminate in, and contribute to, the incident 
in the context of general practice. The existing WHO ICPS coding framework for 
‘level of harm’ was deemed suitable, and agreed by my collaborators and 
professional advisory group, for use in the study.(11,195,285,286) 
 
3.1.4.2. Example of a classified incident report 
This is an example of free-text from the NRLS:    
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“Child had been placed with adoptive parents and adopted mum had 
been advised by a social worker to attend family practice to complete 
primary vaccinations. Mum attended surgery with parental held record, 
no other family practice or child health medical records available. Only 
two immunisations had been recorded in the red book, remaining 
immunisations given with consent. Later informed by social services that 
child has already completed her primary immunisations.” [report edited] 
 
The free-text report about the looked after child who received the wrong number 
of vaccine doses has been coded in Figure 3.2. Salient features of the narrative 
have been represented by codes belonging to each class (incident 
characteristics, contributory factor, outcome, level of harm). As demonstrated in 
Figure 3.2., unstructured free-text data can be deconstructed into codes (e.g. 
‘Looked after child’) which can be later reconstructed and still retain the original 
report’s narrative.  
 
Figure 3.2. Overview of classes and codes 
 
  77 
Codes are selected systematically to reflect the chronology (trajectory) of the 
incident (see Figure 3.3), and adhere to multiple rules about the nature of each 
class (see Table 3.4). Primary incidents included those proximal 
(chronologically) to the patient outcome, whereas contributory incidents 
included those that contributed to the occurrence of another incident. Multiple 
codes for incident type, contributory factor, and incident outcome were applied 
to each report where necessary. This permitted modeling of the steps preceding 
and leading to primary incidents, e.g., contributory incidents and factors, which, 
in turn, resulted in patient outcomes (Figure 3.3). 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Example of codes from the classification system using the Recursive 
Model of Incident Analysis (287) 
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Table 3.4 Rules of the Recursive Model of Incident Analysis (288) 
 
 
Information about systems resilience, such as detection and mitigation factors, 
are not explicit free-text categories of information in the NRLS. Such information 
relating to resilience would be identified and included in my analysis by memos 
generated during coding (stage 1 of analytical process) and thematic analysis 
(stage 3).  
 
3.1.4.3. Coding management system 
To ensure the classification system could be utilised in healthcare 
organisations, and to enable future implementation in low- and middle-income 
countries, I decided not to use existing coding and qualitative data analysis 
software in favour of a database that utilised open source software. In addition, 
in the interests of data security and given the distributed and international 
nature of the project (members of the research team in the UK, the USA and 
Australia), I commissioned a bespoke solution to support the iteration of 
frameworks and provide secure access to numerous concurrent reviewers 
regardless of geographical location. The system comprised a back-end 
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database system and a web-based portal. The back-end database was built on 
Microsoft SQL Server 2014 (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA, USA) by 
Huw Evans (an academic F2 doctor with informatics expertise), with custom 
SQL algorithms to provide, for example, live concordance checks of reviewers’ 
double-coding. The web front end was also produced by Evans using a 
customised version of Portofino 4.1.1 (Many Designs, Genoa, Italy), an open-
source web framework written in JavaScript (Netscape Communications 
Corporation, Mountain View, CA, USA). 
 
3.1.5. Reviewer training  
A multidisciplinary team of clinicians was recruited as report reviewers. These 
included a research nurse with a special interest in human factors and patient 
safety (Anita Deakin), two general practitioners (Huw Williams and Alison 
Cooper), and two academic foundation year two doctors (Huw Evans and 
Emma Shiels).  
 
Preparatory online modules on patient safety provided by the Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement Open School were completed by all reviewers. Next, a 
human factors expert and co-author of the WHO ICPS, Peter Hibbert, delivered 
training on incident analysis, classification, root cause analysis and human 
factors in healthcare and supported reviewers via weekly calls to undergo 
simulation with a practice data set. During the training period, to focus reviewers 
on the relevant content of interest, they were asked to identify in each incident 
the content which corresponded to each question outlined in Figure 3.4. I 
developed these questions by undertaking a pilot content analysis of 500 
randomly sampled incidents with a medical student (Hope Ward). The initial 
frameworks used as the basis of the coding frameworks in the main study were 
developed during this pilot work which is accepted standard practice for 
qualitative research.(289) 
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Figure 3.4. Criteria for orientation to incident report content 
 
The reviewers’ interpretations were informed by tacit knowledge, clinical 
expertise and the human factors training received to guide sensemaking, 
defined as “the active process of assigning meaning to ambiguous data”, in 
order to identify the learning that can be used to inform improvements in clinical 
care.(290,291) Once greater than 70% agreement (kappa statistic) between 
reviewers and an experienced coder (Huw Williams) was achieved, the 
reviewers were eligible to code the study data. 
 
To achieve reflexive processes that permitted iterative developments of my 
methods, I established effective communication with my team that worked 
under my close supervision via weekly group meetings. In addition, I sought 
feedback about methods from collaborators including a patient and public 
involvement (PPI) representative meeting with Antony Chuter on a monthly 
basis, and a professional advisory group meeting at least every six months 
(members listed in Appendix 7) over a 24-month period.  
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3.1.6. Description of analytical methods  
The overarching analytical plan for my study corresponded, in qualitative 
research approach terms, to a Framework Analysis.(292) This approach was 
designed by the National Center for Social Research specifically for generating 
policy and practice-orientated findings. However, given the scale of the study in 
terms of the volume of free-text data for analysis, the opportunity to generate a 
coding frameworks that could be used by other research groups and healthcare 
organisations, the number of clinical reviewers, and an effort to promote 
transparency throughout the analytical process, modifications to the processes 
of conventional Framework Analysis processes were needed.  
 
The five steps of Framework Analysis described by Ritchie and Spencer (292) 
are: 1. familiarisation; 2. identifying a thematic framework; 3. indexing; 4. 
charting; and 5. mapping and interpretation. The aim of the analysis is to order 
data to facilitate interpretation. On review of these steps, processes inherent in 
each step were considered and alignment with the three overall stages of my 
analysis plan: steps 1–3 as ‘stage 1: familiarisation and data coding’; step 4 as 
‘stage 2: generation of data summaries, using exploratory data analysis (EDA) 
methods’;(293) and step 5 as ‘stage 3: interpretation of themes and learning’.  
 
 
3.1.6.1. Modifications of Ritchie and Spencer’s Framework Analysis 
The major modifications to the steps described by Ritchie and Spencer were 
made in order to strengthen the overall analytical process in the interests of 
producing coding frameworks aligned with the WHO ICPS as an output from 
steps 1–3 (stage 1); and, a structured, analytical plan for transparency, and to 
permit the generation of an audit trail of analysis by quantifying the data and 
using descriptive statistics in step 4 (stage 2). 
 
In stage 1, I aligned my methods with Ritchie and Spencer’s approach to first 
code the data with sequential interpretation (stages 2 and 3); therefore, report 
reviewers were instructed to code data objectively based on the explicit content 
described in reports. This was an important decision because it also permitted 
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use of the Recursive Model of Incident Analysis rules for structuring the 
data.(288) 
 
In stage 2, the methods of cross-tabulation used during EDA aligned with the 
matrices advocated by Ritchie and Spencer (292) for aiding the identification of 
themes and explanations (stage 3). This approach also supported maintaining 
the context of the data, and cross-tabulations were linked back to the original 
reports. Cross-tabulations supported a question-focussed approach which is 
also promoted in Ritchie and Spencer’s (292) approach. 
 
Given the objectives of my study, and conceptual influence by Reason’s work, 
the focus of this stage of analysis was to identify and explain the contributory 
themes present amongst clusters of similar reports. An interpretive and 
explanatory analysis followed in stage 3 which was supported by the 
infrastructure generated by preceding stages. For example, the Recursive 
Model of Incident Analysis structured the application of codes, and enabled 
sequential interpretation of their relationships. My method for stage 3 was 
aligned with best practices of thematic analysis advised by Ritchie and Spencer 
and other scholars.(200,292,294,295) My personal preferences for developing a 
thematic framework, given my qualitative research methods preparation from 
MPhil study (2008-9), meant I had encouraged the writing of reflexive memos 
and hunches by the team throughout stages 1 and 2, and this supported me 
and a colleague (Huw Williams) to link together themes, identify patterns and 
evidence such links.  
 
In summary, the three stages of analysis were: 
● stage 1: familiarisation and data coding, which involved reading the free 
text of the report and applying codes to describe incident type, potential 
contributory factors and level and type of harm. 
● stage 2: generation of data summaries, using EDA methods. 
● stage 3: interpretation of themes and learning; seeking to understand the 
most commonly identified patient safety incidents, contributory incidents 
and reported contributory factors, and the contexts within which they 
occurred. 
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Each stage will now be considered in more detail. 
 
3.1.6.2. Stage 1: data familiarisation and coding 
Reviewers orientated themselves to content by reading the incident report. The 
reviewer was required to objectively choose the codes, with no inferences 
made, that represented the content described in each report from four classes: 
incident type, contributory factors and type and degree of harm (see Figure 3.5 
for a summary of the data coding process). Collectively the four classes were 
referred to as the “Primary Care Patient Safety (PISA) coding frameworks” or 
the PISA framework. The nine rules for applying the Australian Patient Safety 
Foundation ‘Recursive Model of Incident Analysis’ (see Table 3.4) were used to 
guide chronological ordering of coded data (Figure 3.3).  
 
 
Figure 3.5. Process summary of stage 1 - data coding 
 
Coding such a large amount of data required effective teamwork amongst 
simultaneous coders in order to utilise the tacit knowledge and experience of 
multiple coders.(295) To ensure validity and reliability of coding throughout the 
study, regular intercoder reliability checks were undertaken on a 20% random 
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sample of each reviewer’s coding quota for every 250 reports coded.(296) 
Kappa statistics were calculated for each principal incident type, defined as the 
incident that occurred just before the harm or potential harm. A kappa of > 0.7 
was sought and is consistent with previous studies of a similar nature.(268) The 
reviewers met to discuss discordant reports and where discrepancies could not 
be resolved by discussion between reviewers, I provided third-person arbitration 
as the senior investigator.(296) 
 
Learning from discussions about discordance was shared at weekly coding 
meetings and informed the inductive iteration of codes and their definitions 
throughout the study process. The study team comprised professionals from 
medicine, nursing, physiotherapy and mixed-methods researchers, and also 
benefited from the participation of a pharmacist (my PhD student, Khalid 
Muhammad, at the University of Nottingham) and dentist (my PhD student, Dr 
Eduardo Ensaldo-Currasco, at the University of Edinburgh) present via 
teleconference. A human factors expert (Peter Hibbert) attended weekly 
meetings and advised the team on classification development and analysis of 
complex incident reports. These meetings were also used to discuss intercoder 
agreement and attempted to resolve any issues that related to the 
understanding and application of specific codes, as well as for wider discussion 
among a multidisciplinary team. Ideally, a code book (a collection of coding 
classes) should be ‘all inclusive’ with codes with definitions that are ‘mutually 
exclusive’.(297) When an existing code was not available to describe the 
incident characteristics, at the weekly coding meetings, the study team 
discussed whether a new code was needed or the definition of an existing code 
should be amended to be more inclusive. Cimino described twelve desiderata 
for the design of a controlled healthcare vocabulary in "desiderata for the 21st 
Century" (see Table 3.5.). These rules guided the development of each class. 
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Table 3.5. Desiderata for the design of a controlled healthcare vocabulary. 
Modified from Cimino (298)  
Desiderata  Definition 
Concept orientation The unit of symbolic processing is the concept 
and each concept in the vocabulary should have 
a single, coherent meaning. 
Concept permanence A concept's meaning cannot change and it 
cannot be deleted from the vocabulary. 
Meaningless concept 
identifier 
Concepts typically have unique identifiers (codes) 
and these should be non-hierarchical (see code-
dependance) to allow for later relocation and for 
multiple classification. 
 
Polyhierarchy Entities from the vocabulary should be placed in 
more than one hierarchy location if appropriate. 
Formal definitions Semantic definitions of concepts, for example, 
Streptococcal tonsillitis=Infection of tonsil caused 
by streptococcus. 
No residual categories Traditional classifications have rubrics that 
include NOS, NEC, Unspecified, Other whose 
meaning may change over time as new concepts 
are added to the vocabulary. These are not 
appropriate for recording data in an electronic 
health record. 
Multiple granularities Different users require different levels of 
expressivity. A general (family) practitioner might 
use myocardial infarction whilst a surgeon may 
record acute anteroseptal myocardial infarction. 
 
Multiple consistent views Although there may be multiple views of the 
hierarchy required to support different functional 
requirements and levels of detail, these must be 
consistent. 
 
Representing context There is a crucial relationship between concepts 
within the vocabulary and the context in which 
they are used. Cimino defines 3 types of 
knowledge: 
Definitional - how concepts define one another 
Assertional - how concepts combine 
Contextual - how concepts are used 
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Graceful evolution Vocabularies must be designed to allow for 
evolution and change, to incorporate new 
advances in healthcare and to correct errors. 
Recognise redundancy Where the same information can be expressed in 
different ways, a mechanism for recognising 
equivalence is required. 
 
 
Hypotheses emerged from each step of analysis and were noted by reviewers 
during coding and analysis via electronic memos that were also discussed at 
weekly coding meetings. I chaired proceedings at meetings. As advocated by 
Macqueen (2008), one member of the team (Huw Evans) was the “codebook 
editor” responsible for the update of the codebook.(295) For example, as codes 
were assigned (e.g. ‘wrong dose administered’ and ‘wrong drug administered’) 
and the codebook was developed, the study team observed how cases 
clustered around particular codes or sets of related codes emerged, such as 
‘administration errors’.(299) Implications of changes to the code book were 
considered on a case-by-case basis; given the structured nature of the coding 
process, it was possible to isolate reports that would be impacted by new codes 
or changes to the definition of existing codes (see Figure 3.5). Examples of the 
coding frameworks are included in Appendix 8.  
 
Examples of the data collection form used to code data from each incident 
report are shown in Figures 3.6 and 3.7.   
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Figure 3.6. Example of selecting incident type from PISA coding frameworks  
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Figure 3.7. Example of codes used to describe an incident in the PISA database 
 
3.1.6.3. Stage 2: generation of descriptive summaries 
The originally proposed methods for generating descriptive summaries was: 
 
“Differences in proportions of demographics such as incident type, the 
incident location, and patient characteristics with the severity of harm 
event will be assessed by Chi-squared and Fisher’s exact tests, with 
differences in means calculated by t-test. Subsequent logistic regression 
modeling will evaluate the relationships between incident type, incident 
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location, and patient characteristics, to harm outcomes in the data 
(objective 3). Logistics odds ratios will be calculated to determine the 
odds of an event occurring; for example the odds of an event occurring in 
the out-of-hours clinic compared with all other settings. To rank the 
incident locations according to the degree of reported harm, we will 
calculate Harm Susceptibility Ratios, (Pham et al. 2010; Martinez et al. 
2011) which are the odds of reported harm for each incident location 
compared with the average odds of reported harm across all other 
incident locations.” 
 
I convened a professional advisory group (Appendix 7), comprised of health 
services researchers with quantitative and qualitative methods, policy and PPI 
expertise, to review and advise on methodological development. The group, 
together with my study collaborators, considered the aims and objectives of the 
study, and proposed a substantial amendment to the proposed methods 
following a pilot analysis of paediatrics reports, presented to the advisory group 
in July 2014.   
 
The advisory group highlighted the multiple caveats needed to be expressed 
upfront before calculating and interpreting odds ratios, including: justification 
about the reference incident type in the absence of robust epidemiological data; 
and, what the odds ratios meant given the nature of incident reports and their 
intrinsic biases (under-reporting, selective-reporting, incomplete reporting, and 
incident non-detection).  
 
The following points were raised during discussion:  
● The strength of incident reporting lies in identifying clusters of like 
phenomena, and analysing them in detail with respect to contributory 
factors and context. 
● Large discrepancies between ethnographic studies, medical record 
review and incidents reported are well recognised. Thus, incident 
reporting cannot be used to reflect the frequency of patient safety 
incident in practice because of under-reporting, selective-reporting, 
incomplete-reporting and incident non-detection, not least a minimal 
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primary care patient safety literature base to fill in the gaps generated by 
those uncertainties for the purposes of multivariate modelling.    
● The frequency of the characteristics described in reports, given the 
intrinsic biases of the data, do not constitute the basis for robust indices 
about harm.  
 
The advisory group agreed by consensus that most methods (Chi-squared, 
Fisher’s exact test, t-test, logistic regression and Harm Susceptibility Ratios) 
were of limited value for informing efforts to raise practical, pragmatic 
recommendations about the key change concepts to improve safety for 
children.  
 
The advisory group proposed a modification to the study design by 
recommending an amendment to the following research objective: “...determine 
which characteristics are associated with different levels of harm.” The advisory 
group did not think that the word determine was an appropriate term to use 
given the unknown denominator for these data and the inherent reporting 
biases of identifying and reporting incidents. The proposed amendment was to 
change this to “...explore which characteristics are associated with different 
levels of harm.” 
 
The professional advisory group underscored the purpose of this stage of the 
analysis should be to identify the reports containing descriptions of the most 
frequent incidents and most severe levels of harm. They advised an EDA 
approach, as championed by Tukey (1977), could be used to inform decision-
making about which reports should undergo further thematic analysis.(293) 
Common tools associated with EDA include cross-tabulation, frequency tables 
and Pareto charts, and can be used to support the identification of clusters of 
similar reports.(300) Further, in the interests of developing methods that could 
be emulated by healthcare organisations, especially by teams without formal 
training in statistical modelling, the advisory group championed using simple 
descriptive statistical methods to offer a logical and transparent process that 
others should be able to adopt with minimal training. 
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The recommendation and change in method was supported by the NIHR’s 
appointed scientific advisors.  
 
3.1.6.3.1. Exploratory data analysis (EDA) 
EDA is an approach to analyse and summarise data in terms of their main 
characteristics, often with visual methods.(293) It can be used to explore what 
data can reveal beyond formal modeling or hypothesis testing. John Tukey was 
a strong advocate for EDA to encourage researchers to formulate hypotheses 
that could lead to new data gathering or experimentation.(293) For the purpose 
of my analysis, the objectives of EDA were to describe and summarise data to 
inform hypotheses about the most frequently reported incidents and their 
causes; and, identify patient safety issues that would benefit from further 
research and development. The nature of the inquiry was inductive and was 
guided by clinical expertise. 
 
Descriptive statistics were used to explore relationships between variables. The 
exploration was a systematic inquiry comprised of frequency tables and cross-
tabulations of variables that the study team had identified as essential 
processes for first, determining the most frequent and most severe incidents; 
and second, the nature of those incidents by virtue of their relationship with 
other variables. Given the conceptual influence of Reason’s Trajectory of Error 
in this study, such relationships can indicate potential causal chains of incidents 
occurring in sequence and clusters of contributory factors which could all be 
potential targets for improvement.    
 
EDA methods were used to produce, for example, frequency tables, cross-
tabulations and bar charts, ready for interpretation and refinement through 
expert clinical guidance.(293) As the purpose of the study was to generate 
learning to support healthcare professionals to improve the safety of care 
delivery, I recognised (with supporting consensus agreement from the 
professional advisory group) that it was essential for the outcomes of the EDA 
to be both accessible and provide a logical account of how priority issues for 
possible intervention were identified. Frequency tables enabled identification of 
the most common and most harmful reported incident types. Cross-tabulations 
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between data variables (e.g. age group, incident type, contributory factor and 
incident outcomes), and between incident codes and contributory factor codes, 
helped to identify priorities (e.g. high frequency of vaccine errors in children 
aged 1–5 years old). 
 
Table 3.6 outlines the sequence of cross-tabulations undertaken based on a 
priori knowledge of the WHO ICPS and the major conceptual relationships 
between variables, and what they meant in terms of using such insights about 
those relationships to inform improvement strategy. Where there was a strong 
apparent relationship between variables (e.g. prescribing error and 
administration error), further sub-characterisation was undertaken by exploring 
the relationships with other variables (e.g. age, contributory factors). This 
exploratory process is similar to the constant comparative approach used within 
grounded theory-based approaches.(301) In this way, ideas about associations 
between variables are being generated and tested through further cross-
tabulations. This systematic process permitted the researcher to remain close to 
the data and identify clusters of similar reports for more in-depth exploration by 
thematic analysis.  
 
Table 3.6. Structure of cross-tabulation queries  
1st variable 2nd variable Purpose 
Incident type Age 
Location 
Identification of reporting patterns for particular 
patient groups or from a specific healthcare 
organisation; 
Contributory factor Identification of reported incidents with the most 
contributory factors described, and which 
contributory factors (in terms of frequency) were 
described for each incident; 
Contributory 
incidents 
Incident type with: identification of reported 
trajectory of incidents;  
Outcomes Identification of reported incidents with different 
levels of patient harm outcome, and organisational 
outcomes; 
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3.1.6.4. Stage 3: identification and interpretation of themes 
The application of codes in stage 1 was, in qualitative terms, a form of structural 
coding which applies “a content-based or conceptual phrase” to data. Such 
phrases were derived whilst adhering to the desiderata for the design of a 
controlled healthcare vocabulary. To maximise insight from the analysis, a 
second “cycle” of coding was required to deepen the analysis and interpretation 
gained in stage 1 (coding and description of characteristics of incidents) and 
stage 2 (identifying patterns in the data) to identify and prioritise the most 
important patient safety problems.(251) The purpose of this stage of the 
analysis was to develop a coherent synthesis of the data by identifying the 
themes and concepts apparent from the first cycle of coding. This additional 
interpretive and explanatory analysis enabled identification and description of 
additional recurring themes (or in improvement terms, change concepts for 
improvement), not captured by the quantitative data (stage 2) or earlier a priori 
themes, that could be targeted to mitigate future safety risks. 
 
EDA (stage 2) enabled collation of relevant codes and to explore the 
relationships between the most common and most harmful reported safety 
incidents and contributory factors and outcomes. Re-examination of these 
incidents in clusters (theoretically generated samples) of similar incidents 
provided an opportunity to identify contextual issues within each subset of data 
(e.g. all reports describing moderate harms or worse following issues relating to 
access of clinical services for urgent assessment). The subsets of reports were 
independently re-read by me and Huw Williams. We sought to identify any 
relevant clinical contextual issues that might not have been explicit in the report 
that could help explain the relationships identified from the EDA in more detail.  
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Figure 3.8. Process summary of stage 3 – interpretive and explanatory analysis 
 
During stage 3, interpretation of report content and the identification of stand-
alone and cross-cutting themes about reported causes and opportunities to 
prevent reocurrence within the data were encouraged (see Figure 3.8). Saldana 
(2015) describes a theme as: “an outcome of coding, categorisation, and 
analytic reflection”. The outcome from stage 2 was to identify which codes 
belonged to which categories. Whilst this is largely defined by the parent-child 
relationships in coding frameworks, opportunities to form new categories exists 
by grouping similarly coded data based on their shared common characteristics.   
 
The purpose of the analysis was to identify priority issues for improvement, 
which in itself requires a “theory of change”. The methodological processes 
used in my study are not utilising a grounded theory approach. Whilst at a 
cursory level the outputs seem intuitively similar, where the outcome of a 
grounded theory approach is the development of a social theory, the analytical 
stages to achieve this are less suited to a team approach.(302) Grounded 
theory approaches require a more intensive initial ‘open coding’ which is often a 
line-by-line analysis of the primary data which is not feasible given the volume 
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of reports for my study.(302) However, I deemed the ‘reflexivity’ encouraged for 
this approach to be beneficial for this study. In anthropological terms, reflexivity 
is the “...researcher's awareness of an analytic focus on his or her relationship 
to the field of study”.(302,303) To maximise insights about what constituted 
explicit or implicit judgements made by clinicians coding the incident report 
data, I recognised weekly team meetings and analytical memos would add 
value and were woven into my modified form of Framework Analysis to aid 
reflexivity throughout the project.   
 
Framework Analysis promotes a process to allow themes to emerge from the 
data throughout the project.(251) Categories were formed by grouping codes 
with similar characteristics. My analytical goals, with Williams, were to reduce 
the most frequent codes into categories (e.g. communication with and about 
patients). These were largely informed, although not entirely, by existing parent-
child relationships in the classes belonging to the coding frameworks. Next, I 
sought to identify ‘manifest themes’ which were explicit descriptions of the key 
relationships between incidents and contributory factors in each sub-category 
e.g. barriers to accessing clinical services (theme) and message handling and 
telephone calls (sub-theme). Whilst re-reviewing reports belonging to each 
manifest theme, "integrative themes" (what I call ‘contributory themes’ in the 
context of patient safety) emerged that wove the manifest themes together (e.g. 
lack of IT infrastructure resulting in poor administrative processes). Final 
manifest and integrative themes, and their supporting data including clinical 
vignettes, were discussed by the study team and recommendations for further 
research and improvement were agreed. See Figure 3.9 for an example of the 
relationship between codes, categories and themes.  
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Figure 3.9. An example of the relationship between codes, categories, manifest 
and integrative themes  
 
3.1.7. Ethics and data governance  
The Aneurin Bevan University Health Board Research Risk Review Committee 
waived ethics approval given the anonymised nature of the data (research and 
development reference number SA/410/13; see Appendix 9). No incidents were 
identified from the information within reports that raised serious professionalism 
or ongoing patient safety issues. 
 
3.1.7.1. Ethical considerations 
Recent public discourse concerning the security of health and care information 
has raised issues concerning how the public make choices about how their data 
are used, including in research.(304) My application for access to NRLS data 
was deemed by NHS England to fully adhere to Caldicott principles. A Data 
Sharing Agreement was signed between Cardiff University and NHS England.  
 
Additional data about NHS patients were not collected following review of 
incident reports. Incident report data had been anonymised by NHS England 
and there was no method to contact the original reporter; therefore, it was not 
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possible to obtain consent from patients. There was no method of re-identifying 
patients or healthcare organisations without contacting NHS Improvement.  
  
Should information within a report raise professionalism or ongoing patient 
safety concerns, I had agreed to inform the relevant leads at English NHS 
commissioning groups or NHS Wales Boards to appropriately deal with those 
concerns.  
 
Whilst reports had been anonymised according to NHS England’s information 
governance policies, an additional level of scrutiny was developed by the 
research team in order to minimise identifiability. For the purposes of choosing 
vignette examples, if an extract contains any of the following details, the 
suggested changes or omissions stated in bold italics were made: 
 
● Patient/relative should be made 
o   Name/nickname/initials change to [patient] (number 1, 2… if 
necessary) 
o   Date of birth (remove) 
o   Address (remove) 
o   Age (change to age range or remove depending on relevance 
to incident e.g. 23-year-old male to [male in his twenties]) 
o   Hospital number/ NHS number/ any identifying number (remove) 
Staff 
o   Name/nickname/initials change to e.g. [doctor, nurse, staff 
member] (number 1,2… if necessary) 
o   An unusual or unique job title (e.g. Chief Nursing Officer) (use 
judgement to anonymise effectively) 
● Location 
o   Name of hospital/ site/ ward name/unit name change to a generic 
term such as [hospital, ward name, GP surgery, haematology 
unit] 
o   An unusual title of a site or unit e.g. paediatric oncology unit. (use 
judgement to anonymise whilst retaining meaning if relevant) 
  98 
o   Name of geographic location (e.g. postcode, street name, town or 
city) (remove) 
● Dates relating to the incident (remove if irrelevant to report or improve 
anonymity if it is relevant e.g. 7/12/14 change to [December of that 
year] or [three months later]) 
 
If the extract contained any of the following clinical details, considerations were 
made about whether the nature of the incident or disease could be identifiable 
by virtue of its rare occurrence:  
● Rare diagnosis / rare treatment or rare presentation e.g. common 
diagnosis but rare in that age group; 
● Rare incident or sequence of incidents or rare outcome; or, 
● Indication of surrounding media attention. 
 
3.1.7.2. Data security 
The Data Sharing Agreement stipulated the security measures needed 
throughout the lifecycle of the information, in particular, during storage, 
transmission and destruction in line with ISO 27001 (specifies the requirements 
of information security management systems) and the HMG Security Policy 
Framework (high-level policies on security for the Government and its 
suppliers).  
 
The SQL database was stored on a designated patient safety research 
computing cluster located in the Division of Population Medicine at Cardiff 
University built in conjunction with the Informatics Services team (INSRV) at 
Cardiff University. The cluster has full NHS Information Governance Toolkit 
assurance for secondary use of data (IG Toolkit ID: 8WG65-PISA-CAG-0182). 
A full information security framework risk assessment was completed on the 
housing of the incident report data and was submitted to INSRV. All work was 
completed within the Division of Population Medicine on the Patient Safety 
Research Cluster. The data security requirements were scrutinised by INSRV at 
Cardiff University. The patient safety cluster was subject to monthly penetration 
testing by the INSRV Security Team to ensure compliance with all policies. Data 
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were backed up every 15 minutes to local storage and overnight to encrypted 
tapes which were stored in a fireproof safe in the INSRV data centre. 
 
3.2. Overview of results 
A total of 13,699 reports from general practice was coded. Five high-level  
incident-type categories summarise the majority of safety incidents described 
within the reports, and in descending order of frequency are: 
1. communication with and about patients; 
2. medication and vaccine provision; 
3. errors in investigative processes; 
4. treatment and equipment provision; and, 
5. timely diagnosis and assessment. 
 
Of the 9031 reports included in the analysis, the severity of harm could be 
determined in 5755 cases. This was unclear for the remainder (n = 3276 
incidents). Table 3.7 shows the number of incidents for each category of harm 
severity and also gives an example of an incident with different levels of severity 
of harm. 
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Table 3.7. Examples, description and number of reports by severity of harm 
 
Just over half of the included reports (50.3%, n = 4545) described harm to one 
or more patients. 
 
3.2.1. Severity of harm by incident category 
Table 3.8 reports the number and proportion of incidents in each category and 
the proportions resulting in no harm, harm or serious harm (all incidents 
resulting in moderate harm, severe harm or death). 
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Table 3.8. Number of incidents in each category by the severity of harm 
 
 
Incidents related to communication with and about patients were the most 
frequently reported safety issues (n = 2805, 21%), followed by incidents related 
to medications and vaccines (n = 2484, 18%) and investigative processes (n = 
1339, 10%). Incidents relating to timely diagnosis and assessment (n = 728, 
5%) and treatment and equipment provision (n = 754, 6%) were less frequently 
reported. However, diagnosis and assessment-related incidents were most 
likely to describe harm occurring to the patient; whilst 79% of incidents in this 
category resulted in a harmful outcome, two out of three of all harmful outcomes 
were serious harms or deaths (n = 366, 50%). This was followed by incidents 
relating to treatment and care equipment (68%, n = 515), and then medications 
and vaccines (52%, n = 1280). Although communication with and about the 
patient was the most frequently reported incident category, 46% (n = 1282) of 
these incidents resulted in harm and 6% (n = 172) resulted in serious harm or 
death. 
 
3.2.2. Reporting locations 
Although 462 separate locations provided at least one report, over half of the 
reports originated from only 30 locations (n = 7071, 52%). Sixty-seven locations 
reported only one incident. Figure 3.10 demonstrates the variation in reporting 
across locations. This implies that some organisations do not report general 
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practice safety incidents to the NRLS or do not have a mechanism for receiving 
incident reports from general practice. The top reporting location (shown in 
black) reported 920 incidents, of which 26% (n = 243) resulted in harm and 4% 
(n = 40) in serious harm. Other locations are similar to the organisation in blue 
where, of the 368 incidents reported, over half (60%, n = 219) resulted in harm. 
Where they do report, different thresholds for receiving reports (i.e. only serious 
harms or deaths), as well as different mechanisms or thresholds for uploading 
incident reports to the NRLS, could explain the variation identified. 
 
 
Figure 3.10. Scatter plot of the percentage of harmful incidents by the frequency 
of reports per location 
 
3.2.3. Reported age of patients 
The age of the patient was described in 6472 (47% of total) incident reports. 
Figure 3.11 demonstrates the frequency of reports by age group. The age group 
accounting for the highest proportion of incident reports was 76–85 years (n = 
1403, 22%), and 53% (n = 3417) of all reports involved a patient aged > 65 
years while 9% (n = 576) involved patients aged < 4 years. The frequency of 
incident reports by age group shows peaks at both extremes of age (children 
and elderly patients), consistent with the expected number of contacts with 
general practice in these age groups. This pattern was apparent across all the 
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incident categories (see section 3.4). In 2574 cases, both the level of harm and 
patient age were reported.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.11. Frequency of reports by age group 
 
 
Figure 3.12 demonstrates the clustered frequencies of each level of harm 
outcome per age group. Figure 5.3 also shows that those aged > 65 years 
feature most within incident reports describing serious harms (moderate harm 
or worse). The age group with the highest proportion of reports that resulted in 
serious harm was the 66–75 years age group (24%). 
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Figure 3.12. Frequency of level of harm by age group 
 
3.2.4. Reported contributory factors 
In total, 4862 contributory factors, defined as issues that did not directly cause, 
but contributed to, the occurrence of an incident, were identified. Only around 
one-third of incident reports described reasons why the incident occurred, which 
significantly inhibits learning to improve future practice. Staff-related factors (n = 
1792) were most frequently identified, followed by service- (n = 1505) and 
patient-related factors (n = 1383). A breakdown of those contributory factors 
classes is included in Table 3.9. 
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Table 3.9. Summary of contributory factors 
 
 
 
Although staff mistakes, defined as a deficiency or failure in judgement or 
inferential processes (omissions and commissions), were described in 986 
reports, additional information that could yield any insight into ways to improve 
future practice was minimal. However, reports describing failures in staff 
decision-making processes (n = 806) included failure to follow protocols (n = 
460) such as for international normalised ratio (INR) monitoring or an 
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inadequate skill set or knowledge (n = 266), for example relating to patients at 
risk of acute deterioration. 
 
Unavailability or inadequate protocols (n = 520), pressures from low staffing 
levels (n = 420) and operational interruptions to ensure continuity of care (n = 
412) were the most common service-related contributory factors (see Table 3.9 
for further details). Lack of familiarity of different staff member roles was also 
described in 53 reports. 
 
Patient-related factors included the physical and physiological characteristics of 
children and elderly people, as well as behaviour-related issues such as 
compliance. Several patient groups were discussed in terms of their potentially 
vulnerable status, particularly those with pre-existing pathophysiology or 
disability (n = 127), children (n = 89) and the frail elderly (n = 83). Non-
compliance with instructions from healthcare professionals (n = 82) was 
described in a small number of incidents. 
 
3.2.5. Excluded reports 
Around one in five reports (n = 3147, 23%) contained insufficient detail or did 
not describe a patient safety incident. Of note, although pressure ulcers can 
represent the outcome of poor care, most reports relating to pressure ulcers 
contained little descriptive or contextual information or had not occurred in the 
community setting (e.g. incident report simply stated ‘pressure ulcer, grade 3′) 
and were therefore also excluded from the analysis. Table 3.10 shows a 
summary of excluded reports. 
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Table 3.10. Summary of excluded reports 
 
 
3.2.6. National Reporting and Learning System data limitations 
One of the study objectives was to describe characteristics of the patient and 
incident such as gender, ethnicity, geography, time of day, and level of patient 
harm. Rather than amend my objectives as a result of various limitations, I have 
included them in order to highlight opportunities to improve the quality of data 
uploaded to the NRLS. 
 
● Gender is inconsistently provided as a structured variable to the NRLS 
and present in < 40% of reports. 
● Ethnicity is not captured via a structured coding framework. 
● Time of day is an inconsistent and unstructured variable that can be 
identified by free-text analysis; a decision was therefore made to 
highlight where it is important as a contextual issue. 
 
Finally, it was not possible to identify reports written by patients.   
 
  
  108 
3.3. Patient safety incidents in general practice  
Five categories of safety incidents described in reports were received from 
general practice and the inherent themes relating to the underlying reported 
causes. Cohen’s kappa statistic of inter-rater (coding) reliability for primary 
incidents was high, k = 0.71 (95% CI 0.67–0.76; p < 0.01). 
 
The five categories of incident type, in descending order of frequency, are: 
1. communication with and about patients; 
2. medication and vaccine provision; 
3. errors in investigative processes; 
4. treatment and equipment provision; and, 
5. timely diagnosis and assessment. 
 
3.3.1. Communication with and about patients 
Over one-fifth (n = 2805) of the reports described problems relating to 
communication with and about patients. Five themes were evident from 
synthesis of the reported descriptions of events and contributory factors: 
● barriers to accessing clinical services; 
● errors in information transfer between care providers; 
● up-to-date patient records; 
● delays in referral decision-making and administrative processes; and, 
● miscommunication with patients and between professionals. 
Barriers to accessing clinical services (n = 636) and delays in referral (n = 746) 
were the most frequent incidents and also contained descriptions of the most 
harm outcomes. 
 
Table 3.11 provides an overview of themes and subthemes associated with 
levels of harm for communication-related safety incidents. 
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Table 3.11. Themes and subthemes of communication-related incidents 
 
 
3.3.1.1. Barriers accessing clinical services 
Problems accessing clinical services were identified in 636 reports, and 65% of 
those described a harm outcome. Reported incidents related to difficulties in 
arranging appointments with GPs, nationally planned assessment services (e.g. 
‘new-baby check’ or cervical smears), or for message handling by, or telephone 
calls with, receptionists and delays in presentation or timely advice as a result of 
involvement of NHS Direct. 
 
Barriers to accessing acute care services had the highest proportions of serious 
harm (n = 60). Patients experienced difficulties or delays in accessing home 
visits or telephone call assessments with a triage nurse or GP, or in securing a 
primary care appointment. In addition, reports described patients not receiving 
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visits from community-based healthcare professionals, such as health visitors, 
because of a lack of information transfer from secondary care. For example: 
 
Notification of birth details not faxed through to surgery. Health visitor 
only aware on day 14 when discharge summary faxed through to 
surgery. Discharge summary telephone number of client incorrect. 
Midwife made aware by client but still no communication with Health 
visitor so no birth visit scheduled. 
 
3.3.1.2. Errors in information transfer between care providers 
Incidents arising from ineffective or inadequate transfer of clinical information 
from one provider to another were identified in 756 reports. Over one-quarter of 
these incidents led to harm (n = 235, 31%), and few incidents led to serious 
harm (n = 22). The majority of incidents occurred at the interface between 
primary and secondary care (n = 621). 
 
Reports described patients receiving letters intended for the GP from the 
hospital consultant, for example: 
 
Copies of neurology results not sent with letter concerning serious 
diagnosis – instead, sent to direct to patient. No details in letter as to 
further treatment or follow-up. Information and copy results eventually 
obtained from secretary to consultant. 
 
Some discharge and clinic letters were delayed, incorrect or incomplete, or 
indeed never sent, sometimes after long and complex inpatient stays leading to 
GPs and nurses struggling to make sense of management plans. Often the 
error was identified before the patient experienced any harm, for example: 
 
Discharge summary had bisoprolol 10 mg daily and atenolol 50 mg daily 
(both beta-blockers). Medication should have been bisacodyl tablets 10 
mg and atenolol 50 mg. Patient went to see the doctor 4 days later, blood 
pressure was low: 96/76. 
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These incidents caused distress to patients and carers, and healthcare 
professionals spent a lot of time mitigating possible harmful clinical outcomes by 
following up on actions made by the hospital team. Once errors occur, the 
consequences for the patient can escalate quickly, as in the following example: 
 
Discharge summary for patient received from ward on [Date]. Seven new 
medications on the discharge summary with no indication why they were 
started. Contacted the ward and spoke to consultant. He checked the 
notes and rang back the following day. He confirmed that the patient 
should not be taking the medications and they were not prescribed in 
hospital. A new discharge summary was agreed to be issued. We tried to 
contact the patient but he had been readmitted. Senior house officer on 
the admitting ward confirmed the patient has been receiving the seven 
medications since readmission. The patient is still in hospital. 
 
3.3.1.3. Availability and accuracy of patient records 
Reports describing unavailable or inaccurate patient records (n = 427, 15%) 
resulted in multiple communication incidents. Around 10% of reports involved 
patients aged < 1 year, which perhaps reflects the complexity of medical 
records for this age group, which include parent-held records (the Red Book), 
GP surgery records and public health vaccine records. Inaccurate or unclear 
medical records were often caused by filing errors (n = 58). For example: 
 
Patient presented with stepmother for preschool booster. Written consent 
from father was brought but parental held record was not available. 
Nurse explained she was giving REPEVAX and MMR [measles, mumps 
and rubella]. The following day stepmother called expressing concern 
that MMR had already been given in 2004. Incomplete documentation of 
initial dose of MMR booster. 
 
Other reports described cases of patient notes being unavailable and thus 
delaying or hampering child protection meetings or case conferences, and 
others reported that notes were unavailable because of IT connection problems, 
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highlighting IT system failure consequences: 
 
A loss of IT connection due to a loose connection at a surgery resulted in 
two surgery sessions without access to computer appointment or patient 
notes. 
 
3.3.1.4. Delays in referral  
Delayed referrals account for 41% of the described serious harm outcomes for 
all communication-related incidents. Referrals were most commonly delayed by 
clinician decision-making (n = 306), or a clinician forgetting to send referral 
letters or awaiting further information before doing so (n = 122). For example: 
 
Dr failed to send 2-week-rule cancer referral for patient. The training 
implication has been addressed with the doctor in the practice.  
 
Erroneously completed referrals, either from primary to secondary care services 
or from secondary to primary care, were described in 72 reports. Reports 
described practitioners’ confusion about the correct referral method to select 
from several available (especially out of hours or at weekends and public 
holidays). Ineffective protocols were identified as the most common contributory 
factor described in these reports (n = 49). Across the reports, it was apparent 
that staff found it difficult to identify the appropriate referral protocol or form or 
the correct fax number to use when sending referral letters: 
 
Attended surgery [Date] with symptoms, which warranted a 2-week 
cancer referral (upper GI [gastrointestinal] cancer). Secretary not at 
surgery Friday afternoon so form faxed by reception staff to fax number 
on form. Secretary checking referrals [1 month later] and noted no 
acknowledgement. Realised wrong fax number on form. The number of 
the fax on the cancer referral form is now for a fax machine in the 
Orthopaedic dept. Presumably they received the first fax but it wasn’t 
passed on or taken further. 
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As a result of these communication failures, patients did not receive medication 
(such as warfarin or insulin), dressings were not changed and surgical wounds 
or pressure ulcers were left untended for days. Failures to reinstate care 
packages also left vulnerable patients without basic care that led to a worsening 
of their condition and readmission. 
 
3.3.1.5. Miscommunication with patients and between professionals 
Miscommunication incidents could be divided into failures of communication 
between professionals and patients (n = 152) and failures of communication 
between healthcare professionals (n = 88). Around half of these incidents were 
harmful (n = 113, 47%), and of these incidents one in six led to serious harm. 
For example, a patient was given erroneous advice about insulin that could 
have resulted in a fatal outcome: 
 
Patient sought advice from OOH [out of hours] about his insulin – his 
insulin pens had accidentally been frozen and he was due to go away on 
holiday and needed to take meds with him. He was advised to leave 
pens out for 1.5 hours and they would be OK. 
 
Reports described doctors, nurses or reception staff giving patients incorrect 
advice with regards to taking medication, where to attend for medical attention 
or how to access other services. This led to patients being seen in an 
inappropriate setting, taking medication in incorrect doses or at an incorrect 
frequency, or being unclear as to when they should seek attention in the event 
of deterioration. Others described a lack of clear communication over the 
telephone or face to face between professionals with regard to how seriously 
unwell a patient was and how urgently they needed to be assessed, leading to 
an inappropriate delay in their assessment. 
 
3.3.2. Medication and vaccine provision 
Almost one-fifth of reports (n = 2484) described medication- and vaccine-related 
incidents. Five themes were evident from synthesis of the reported descriptions 
of incidents and contributory factors: 
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● safer medication provision; 
● reliable therapeutic drug-level monitoring processes; 
● avoidable adverse drug events; 
● immunisation-related errors for children, elderly and the 
immunocompromised; and, 
● clinician decision-making about treatments. 
 
Table 3.12 provides an overview of themes and subthemes associated with 
described levels of harm for medication- and vaccine-related incidents. ‘Serious 
harm’ is an aggregation of all reports with a moderate, severe and death 
outcome. The themes are also summarised by level of harm severity in a 
stacked bar chart in Figure 3.13. 
 
Table 3.12. Themes and subthemes of medication- and vaccine-related 
incidents 
 
 
Prescribing incidents were most frequently described (n = 763, 31% of all 
medication- and vaccine-related incidents), followed by dispensing incidents (n 
= 409, 16%) and immunisation-related errors (n = 464, 19%). Avoidable 
adverse drug events were less common (n = 139), although they were the 
reports with the highest proportion of serious harm (n = 63, 45%). Warfarin (n = 
59) and opiates (n = 21) were the drugs most often described in reports; 
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inadequate monitoring or hospital admissions because of avoidable 
complications were described as contributory factors. Opiate-related incidents 
were often related to drug-seeking behaviour, unintentional drug overdoses or 
failure to treat symptoms in palliative care patients in a timely manner. Other 
drugs described in reports are summarised in Figure 3.14. 
 
 
Figure 3.13. Stacked bar chart of medication- and vaccine-related incidents by 
level of harm 
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Figure 3.14. Stacked bar chart of drugs/drug groups by level of harm. ACEI, 
angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor; DMARD, disease-modifying anti-
rheumatic drug. 
 
3.3.2.1. Safer medication provision: prescribing 
Prescribing errors were the most frequent (n = 763, 31%) of all medication- and 
vaccine-related incidents; they included prescribing the wrong dose (n = 226) or 
even the wrong medication (n = 151). Illegible prescriptions, wrong formulations 
and prescription of wrong routes of administration were also reported.  
 
The most frequent events preceding a prescribing-related incident were errors 
of administration (n = 99, 43% of such reports), documentation (n = 36, 16%) or 
communication (n = 39, 17%). Errors in transfer of information from secondary 
to primary care were described in 90 reports; this was often because of a delay 
in receiving the information or incomplete/inaccurate information. 
 
Staff mistakes were the most frequently described contributory factor and were 
linked to other contributing factors such as IT failures (n = 17, 4%), disruptions 
to continuity of care (n = 51, 11%) and non-adherence to protocols for repeat 
prescribing (n = 26, 5%). Being a child made up 7% (n = 34) of described 
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patient-related contributory factors, and was also associated with non-continuity 
of care and staff failure to follow protocols. 
 
3.3.2.2. Safer medication provision: dispensing 
Dispensing errors were described in 409 reports (15% of all medication- and 
vaccine-related incidents). The wrong drug was described in 114 reports (29% 
of dispensing-related reports), and seven reports described serious harm 
outcomes. The wrong dose of medication dispensed was the next most frequent 
incident type (n = 91, 22%), and nine of those incidents resulted in serious harm 
outcomes. 
 
Descriptions of staff mistakes featured often (n = 84), and 32 reports identified 
confusion between similar medication names, such as trazodone and tramadol; 
amisulpride and amitriptyline; and pregabalin and Pregaday® (Wülfing Pharma 
GmbH, Gronau, Germany). For example:  
 
53-year old man dispensed trazodone 50 mg instead of tramadol 50 mg, 
sticker said tramadol on the trazodone box. Patient saw GP 5 days later 
complaining of dry mouth, blurred vision and feeling ‘spaced out’. 
 
3.3.2.3. Safer medication provision: administering 
Errors in the administering of drugs or vaccines (including oxygen) were 
described in 257 reports (9% of all medication- and vaccine-related incidents). 
Failure to administer medication at the correct time was the most frequently 
described error (n = 53, 21%), with five reports describing serious harm 
outcomes, including one patient death. For example: 
 
The nurse in a nursing home left the enoxaparin injection on the bedside 
table in preparation to inject the patient but the patient administered it 
orally because she thought it was analgesia. 
 
Administration of the wrong dose of medication was the next most frequent type 
of incident (n = 62, 24% of administration-related incidents) with seven of those 
reports describing serious harm outcomes and one resulting in death. Cases of 
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administration of the wrong medication (n = 44, 17%) or at the wrong time (n = 
41, 16%) were also reported. 
 
Prior incidents that led to an administering incident included a prescribing error 
(n = 21), inability to access a healthcare professional (n = 10) and poor 
communication between healthcare professionals and patients (n = 13). 
Reported contributory factors included staff mistakes (n = 60), including 
distraction (n = 9) or misreading labels (n = 12) and similar medication names (n 
= 7); and staff failure to follow protocol (n = 11); inadequate skill set/knowledge 
(n = 6); and patient behaviour factors (n = 9), including non-compliance. 
 
3.3.2.4. Reliable therapeutic drug-level monitoring 
Incidents related to therapeutic drug-level monitoring were described in 120 
reports (only 4% of all medication- and vaccine-related incidents); 22 reports 
described serious harm and included five patient deaths. Identified sub-themes 
identified included monitoring not commenced (n = 24) and doses not adjusted 
following monitoring (n = 12); warfarin was the most frequently involved drug (n 
= 17) and resulted in two patient deaths. 
 
Prior incidents that led to drug monitoring-related incidents included inadequate 
transfer of information from secondary to primary care (n = 11), referrals not 
made when appropriate (n = 5) and miscommunication between the healthcare 
professional and the patient (n = 6). In contrast to other medication incidents, 
staff mistakes rarely contributed to therapeutic drug-level monitoring incidents, 
being cited in only two such reports. Staff failing to follow protocol was 
described in 12 reports, for example failure to request a repeat INR for a patient 
when a new treatment was commenced. Inadequate organisational protocols 
contributed to 13 incidents, of which six related to protocols about transferring 
patients between secondary and primary care. Patient factors were also 
reported (n = 19), 10 of which resulted from patient non-compliance. Several 
reports made reference to patients on warfarin who were non-compliant with 
monitoring. Some reports described the ethical issues doctors faced, knowing 
that withdrawal of treatment would also put the patient at risk of life-threatening 
events such as pulmonary embolism or stroke. 
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3.3.2.5. Avoidable adverse drug events 
Avoidable adverse drug events were described in 139 reports (6% of all 
medication- and vaccine-related incidents), and 63 of those (45%) resulted in 
serious harm outcomes, with 10 reports recording patient death. For example: 
 
Patient was given a script by a community matron for Oramorph[®, 
Boehringer Ingelheim Limited, Bracknell, UK] 2.5 ml 4–6 hourly as 
required but the label on the bottle said take 2.5 5ml spoons, result in a 
total of 12.5 ml. This is five times the prescribed amount on the script. 
The patient had three doses over 12 hours and passed away at 6.00 
a.m. 
 
Twenty-six reports described patient-related contributory factors, such as pre-
existing pathophysiology and frailty; seven reports involved patients with known 
allergies and 22 related to patients on drugs that necessitated patient 
monitoring (not mutually exclusive). Warfarin was the most frequently described 
medication, and 16 reports described a serious outcome resulting in hospital 
admission, for example epistaxis, vaginal bleeding, haemoptysis or 
cerebrovascular accident. 
 
3.3.2.6. Immunisation-related errors for children, the elderly and the 
immunocompromised 
Immunisation-related incidents were described in 464 reports (19% of all 
medication- and vaccine-related incidents). The majority concerned vaccine 
administration (n = 386, 83%) and resulted in low harm, although three deaths 
were reported, and two incidents related to the pneumococcal vaccine not being 
administered at the appropriate time. Incidents in which either the wrong 
vaccine was administered (n = 138, 30%) or the wrong number of doses was 
administered (n = 122, 26%) were also recorded. Incidents relating to 
administration of the wrong number of doses often involved children and 
occurred because the medical documentation was inaccurate and not checked, 
resulting in the child receiving an additional, unnecessary, vaccine that could 
potentially cause an adverse event. 
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Immunisation administration errors involving medical records (n = 49) included 
discrepancies in GP records or personal records (Red Book) and/or other child-
health records. Frequent contributory factors were staff mistakes (n = 105), for 
example staff unaware of the new immunisation programme, staff confusing 
vaccinations with similar names or staff not checking the medical records, 
resulting in administration of a vaccine that was not indicated. 
 
3.3.2.7. Clinician decision-making about treatments 
Issues underpinned by clinician decision-making about treatments in acute and 
chronic situations were described in 121 reports (4% of the total medication- 
and vaccine-related incidents), with 24 reports recording serious harm 
outcomes including four patient deaths. Specifically, these reports described no 
treatment given (n = 37), insufficient treatment given (n = 19) and the wrong 
treatment given (n = 16). See examples in Box 1. 
 
Box 1. Examples of clinician decision-making errors about treatments 
 
 
A range of incidents preceded clinician decision-making errors, including 
inaccurate medical records (n = 6), poor discharge planning (n = 3), and delays 
in responding to results (n = 3). These low numbers perhaps reflect the fact that 
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reasons for errors in clinical decision-making are multifactorial. Lack of 
continuity of care was the most frequently cited contributory factor (n = 18), and 
was attributed to issues with out-of-hours care (n = 5), lack of communication 
between secondary and primary care (n = 2) and locum staff (n = 3). Within 
reports, poor communication between healthcare professionals that contributed 
to the GP not seeing the ‘whole patient’ was a frequent cross-cutting theme. 
 
3.3.3. Errors in investigative processes 
A total of 1339 reports described incidents related to clinical investigations. Four 
themes (Table 3.13) were evident from synthesis of the reported descriptions 
and contributory factors: 
1. ordering incorrect investigations to inform differential diagnosis; 
2. practical and administrative barriers for collection and transfer of 
specimens; 
3. administrative failures leading to delays, wrong results or failure to 
receive results; and, 
4. misinformed clinical decision-making and incorrectly interpreted 
investigative results. 
 
Table 3.13 provides an overview of each theme and the harm outcomes 
described in reports. There were few reports of serious harm (n = 38, 3% of 
investigative process-related incidents). Practical and administrative barriers to 
the collection and transfer of specimens were described in 866 reports (66%); of 
these, mislabelling clinical samples accounted for the majority of incidents (n = 
486, 56%). 
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Table 3.13. Themes and subthemes of investigative process-related incidents 
 
 
3.3.3.1. Ordering correct investigations to inform the differential diagnosis 
Diagnoses were often delayed or missed because of mistakes in the 
investigative process. The wrong laboratory test was ordered, or not ordered at 
all, when it would have been appropriate, in 77 reports. In 51 cases, this led to 
harmful outcomes. For example: 
A patient attended with abdominal pain and was advised they had 
irritable bowel syndrome but investigations recently have revealed late 
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stage ovarian cancer with spread to the lymph nodes. If an ultrasound 
scan had been done earlier this could have been detected sooner. 
 
Reports also described situations in which, if clinicians had organised further 
investigations or put in place a safety net for the patient to return, serious 
diagnoses could have been detected sooner. For example: 
 
Patient presented with frank haematuria from which a renal carcinoma 
was identified. It was noted that patient had presented last year with 
another incident of haematuria urinalysis * 2 positive for blood 
microscopy negative not investigated further. 
 
Delays in undertaking investigations, largely because of waiting lists, carry a 
risk of delayed treatment for preventable illness and worsening of the condition. 
It was apparent, however, that if the patient did not demand to be seen or 
undergo an investigation, then such delays would not be identified. For 
example: 
 
2-week-rule referral made by GP for suspected pancreatic cancer due to 
jaundice and deranged bloods. Seen in clinic and urgent scan was 
requested [by hospital team]. Patient re-attended surgery several times 
and scan date was chased. GP chased scan report as now 5 weeks post 
referral and still no [date]. Eventual diagnosis made of pancreatic cancer. 
 
3.3.3.2. Practical and administrative barriers for labelling and transfer of 
specimens 
Errors in administration (i.e. form filling, labelling, completing the form), although 
common (n = 796, 59%), largely resulted in low harms, such as the need for 
retesting. Transport errors were also reported; the issue of ‘sample 
deterioration’ was highlighted and concern was raised about result accuracy 
and impact on correct interpretation when needless delays in transfer had 
occurred. 
 
3.3.3.3. Administrative failures leading to delays, incorrect results or failure to 
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receive results 
Issues with the administrative (electronic and paper-based) processes enabling 
the timely receipt of test results were described in 240 reports. These issues 
were varied and included not receiving the results, delays in receiving the 
results and receiving inaccurate results. Communication issues between 
professionals and inconsistent message-handling procedures within GP 
surgeries were also implicated. Failures in practice processes to review results 
that did not occur on the same day as investigation, or those being processed 
out of hours and noted as urgent, was a recurring issue. For example: 
 
...lab phoned through a result early afternoon giving a high potassium 
level, they said it needed to be reported to a GP asap but with no other 
indication of urgency. GP on call was already out on visits and could not 
be contacted by phone, there were no other GPs in the building. 
Unfortunately the patient died whilst packing his bag to go to hospital. 
 
Most test results are sent electronically to practices. Earlier reports from the 
sample described paper copies being sent as a safety net. However, although 
the GP might read an electronic report, over-reliance on the software for 
planning next steps for management in the clinical record system does highlight 
the need for parallel (possibly manual) processes when the findings are 
potentially so serious. For example: 
 
The patient presented with cough, bloody sputum . . . known smoker and 
heavy drinker. A chest X-ray was ordered and patient given [a]moxil 500 
mg x 21. [software] mailbox showed that the GP had read the X-ray 
report but there was no direction shown, it was left unedited, no action 
taken, The X-ray  was not ‘ sent to anyone‘  it appears to have dropped 
from the active mailbox into a ‘bucket‘ awaiting action. (WORSE [sic] 
than this the GP did not know about the ‘ bucket‘)...The chest X-ray 
showed an early lung tumour which was not picked up until the patient 
presented 1 year later. His condition is now advanced and probably 
terminal. The GP had 10 minutes training on [software] with 4 GPs 
around one computer. 
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3.3.3.4. Misinformed clinical decision-making and incorrectly interpreted 
investigation results 
Errors in the review and interpretation of test results were cited in 125 reports 
(10% of all investigative process errors), of which 82 described harm outcomes. 
For example: 
 
Elderly male patient...attended surgery with recent but not current chest 
pain. Given ECG [electrocardiography], which was misread. Patient 
advised to return home but should have been sent to hospital urgently. 
Patient died at home from heart attack within 24–48hrs...Evidence the 
machine may have given GP undue confidence in his diagnosis, as it 
gave a reading of normal sinus rhythm. 
 
Unreliable or non-existent processes underpinned failures to review patients’ 
notes before the end of the general practice day or re-routing results to the 
wrong doctor for review. 
 
3.3.4. Treatment and care equipment 
Incidents involving treatment and care equipment provided for community care 
were described in 754 reports (6% of total reports). Three themes were evident 
from synthesis of the reported descriptions of events and contributory factors: 
 
1. decisions about methods of administering treatments; 
2. complications of therapeutic procedures; and, 
3. functioning and availability of care equipment. 
 
Table 3.14 provides an overview of themes and subthemes related to treatment 
and care equipment and associated levels of harm. 
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Table 3.14. Themes and subthemes of treatment- and care equipment-related 
incidents 
 
 
Harm was identified in the majority of reports (n = 515, 68%). Serious harm was 
caused by 15% of these incidents (n = 116). The unavailability of functioning 
care equipment (n = 338), such as beds to prevent pressure sores or catheter 
replacements, was the most common incident, followed by problems carrying 
out treatments in the community (n = 291). 
 
Patient characteristics such as age, frailty or pregnancy were described (n = 55, 
21%). Other contributory factors included patients not following advice or having 
sufficient knowledge for safe self-care (n = 48, 18%), or making mistakes such 
as misreading information (n = 27, 10%). 
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3.3.4.1. Decisions about methods of administering treatments 
An error in the clinical decision of what, if any, treatment to give a patient was 
identified in 125 reports, with 95 (76%) describing a harm outcome. These 
decisions were subdivided into three sub-themes. 
 
1. No treatment was given (n = 19, 15%). Treatments not administered 
varied but included insulin, dressings and emergency contraception. In 
15 cases, another incident was involved, for example a pregnant patient 
was not treated for herpes infection and another patient’s pressure ulcer 
was not treated because the equipment that was ordered was not in 
stock and an alternative in the interim was not sought. Only three (16%) 
of these reports resulted in serious harm. 
2. Insufficient treatment or monitoring was undertaken (n = 84, 68%). 
Pressure ulcers developed or deteriorated in 33 reports, often because of 
the lack of equipment, patients choosing not to use suggested treatment 
or poor care. Other reports described GPs calling an ambulance for sick 
patients, but not monitoring them or starting basic treatment while waiting 
for the ambulance. Twenty incidents in this category (24%) led to serious 
harm. 
3. Incorrect treatment (n = 20, 16%) following clinical assessment. This was 
a diverse group, with reports describing the wrong type of dressing used 
on leg ulcers, insertion of contraindicated intrauterine contraceptive coils 
and cauterising a cancerous ‘wart’. 
 
3.3.4.2. Complications of treatment procedures 
Complications arising during procedures were described in 291 (39%) reports. 
Minor infections following minor surgery and needle-stick injuries were 
described. More serious outcomes highlight the major risks associated even 
with commonplace procedures performed in general practice, which included 
uterine perforation following coil insertion, a fragment of a needle remaining in 
the shoulder joint after injection and an abscess forming at an injection site. 
These incidents were generally considered a complication of a procedure rather 
than being attributed to poor technique; thus, only 29 reports (10%) had an 
identifiable contributory factor, of which 10 were related to the patient’s 
  128 
pathophysiology, and only three were considered to be due to a healthcare 
professional’s lack of skills. 
 
Incidents in which a procedure was not carried out correctly were described in 
79 reports, resulting in poor infection control, needle-stick injuries, dressings 
adherent to wounds, new leg wounds from incorrect bandaging or urinary 
retention. Contributory factors included failure to follow protocol (n = 9), 
inadequate skill set (n = 8) and staff mistakes (n = 8). 
 
The other common group of incidents was related to timeliness of treatment (n = 
49, 17%). Many of these involved the care of catheters, but incidents related to 
the emergency care of patients and wound care were also reported. For 
example: 
 
Patient called *** as catheter had fallen out during the night. *** called 
district nurse and left a message at 03:40 giving details of the problem 
and asking if they could attend in the morning to re-catheterise. Patient 
was wearing a pad. It was a Sunday and worker alone got a message 
just after 08:00 and was unable to attend immediately. 
 
In 40 of the 49 reports, the incident occurred because the district nurses did not 
receive a referral on discharge. Of those, nine reports (18%) described serious 
harm outcomes. 
 
3.3.4.3. Functioning and availability of care equipment 
Errors around the provision and operation of equipment involved in patient care 
were described in 338 (45%) reports. Failure of equipment was common (n = 
196, 58%), and the most frequently reported types of incident involved 
malfunctioning of pressure-relieving equipment, fridges going above the 
recommended temperature range and power cuts compromising IT systems’ 
functioning. 
 
Issues directly related to access to care equipment such as dressings, insulin 
needles or catheters were identified in 97 reports. For example, some patients 
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were sent home from hospital without the necessary equipment and in other 
cases pharmacies incorrectly dispensed a short-term rather than a long-term 
catheter. In 28 reports, poor discharge planning preceded problems with care 
equipment provision. Insufficient supply of care equipment was reported 23 
times, and was generally related to not having the right equipment in the 
surgery or central stores. Items included electrocardiography paper, blood 
bottles, dressing packs and continence pads. 
 
3.3.5. Timely diagnosis and assessment 
Seven hundred and twenty-eight reports (5% of total reports) described issues 
with diagnosis and assessment of patients; three themes were evident from 
synthesis of the reported descriptions of events and contributory factors: 
1. timely triage and assessment of patients; 
2. patient assessment for safe discharge; and, 
3. missed or wrong diagnosis. 
The majority of reports described harm, and three in five of those incidents 
resulted in serious harm outcomes (n = 366, 64%). Table 3.15 provides a 
summary of incident themes and subthemes.  
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Table 3.15. Themes and subthemes of diagnosis- and assessment-related 
incidents 
 
 
Four in 10 reports had identifiable contributory factors (n = 292, 40%). Reports 
largely described four key contributory issues: lack of continuity of care (n = 56, 
19%); staff decision-making processes, mainly related to a failure to follow 
protocols or insufficient knowledge (n = 52, 18%); patient characteristics such 
as age, frailty or not having English as a first language (n = 51, 17%); and 
disease characteristics such as rare conditions or a rare presentation of a 
condition (n = 48, 16%). 
 
3.3.5.1. Timely triage and assessment of patients 
Timely triage and assessment issues were described in 242 reports; they 
included failures to recognise acutely unwell patients (n = 32) and those at risk 
of deterioration (n = 29), patients who were vulnerable to abuse or being 
abused (n = 19), and those at risk of harm from mental health problems (n = 
30). For example: 
 
Call received regarding a child who had died, the mother reported that 
she had sought assessment and advice from NHS Direct. The call was 
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prioritised as a P2 and placed in the First Advice Queue. It was picked up 
by X 24 minutes later. The child was assessed using the ‘Breathing 
problems toddler Age 1–4 years Algorithm’ and a disposition of self care 
was recorded. Boards have reviewed the call and concerns raised 
regarding the quality of assessment and appropriateness of the 
disposition. 
 
Problems with triage processes were described in relation to healthcare 
professionals in 13 reports and non-healthcare professional workers in eight 
reports. In another example involving telephone triage, the severity of the 
patient’s condition was not ascertained: 
 
Patient telephoned NHS Direct following aches in her shoulders and 
experiencing excess wind. After clinical assessment they advised the 
patient she was probably suffering from trapped wind and received 
information relating to indigestion. Following the call to NHS Direct the 
patient symptoms worsened and her husband telephoned 999 for an 
ambulance. Whilst the patient’s husband was on the telephone, the 
patient collapsed, lost consciousness and subsequently died. The post 
mortem report stated that the cause of death was ischaemic heart 
disease and coronary artery atheroma. 
 
A failure to recognise signs of abuse was preceded by poor information transfer 
from secondary to primary care in 22 reports, and by a failure to refer for 
nursing care on discharge from hospital in nine reports. Contributory factors 
included lack of continuity of care with out-of-hours services (n = 14), and 10 
reports queried whether or not the healthcare professional cited in the report 
had sufficient professional knowledge. Serious harm outcomes were described 
in 86 reports (61%). 
 
 
 
3.3.5.2. Patient assessment for safe discharge 
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Issues with risk assessment for discharge were described in 141 reports. 
Analysis of linked incidents showed that this resulted in multiple problems 
following discharge, including poor information transfer to primary care (n = 51), 
failure to refer patients for emergency care when indicated (n = 9), failure to 
refer patients for nursing care at home (n = 8), prescribing errors (n = 7) and 
problems with the provision of care equipment (n = 28). Such issues described 
in reports are reflected in the following example: 
 
Message received from GP [Date] – patient was discharged from . . . 
ward [day before] late pm – no referral sent to child district nurse. Urinary 
catheter (long term) in situ. No advice given to family re: changing 
bags/care of catheter and no bags supplied on discharge. No information 
whether DN [district nurse] can change catheter. 
 
The next example describes the discharge of twin babies with a complex in-
hospital history: 
 
The health visitor carried out a primary birth visit following the twins’ 
discharge from the SCBU (Special Care Baby Unit). There was no 
discharge letter with information for the service or medications required. 
No discharge plan. No resuscitation training given to the parent. The 
mother stated that she was told it would be given prior to discharge, but 
that it was not received. Twins discharged on oxygen therapy. No 
apnoea monitor. No risk assessment surrounding the twins’ care. No 
official referral to the paediatric community nurse and no involvement 
pre-discharge. The paediatric community nurse was not informed of the 
discharge. The twins had been cared for over the past seven weeks in 
the SCBU (Special Care Baby Unit). No liaison had been made with the 
community staff. 
 
Most patients affected (75%) were aged ≥  66 years, possibly reflecting the 
complex needs of the elderly on discharge. Not all reports highlighted so many 
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opportunities to improve clinical care as the previous example. Only 21% of 
reports (n = 30) documented a contributory factor, of which the majority (n = 17) 
discussed the complexity of the patient in terms of comorbidities. This may be 
because the reports were written in primary care and, therefore, the report 
writer was not involved in planning the discharge. 
 
3.3.5.3. Missed or delayed diagnosis 
Problems with diagnosis were identified in 345 reports, with 86% (n = 297) 
describing a harm outcome. A total of 331 reports described a missed or 
delayed diagnosis. The conditions that were missed were wide-ranging and 
included fractures, tuberculosis, diabetes mellitus, infection, pregnancy and 
myocardial infarction. These cases illustrate the difficulty of clinical decision-
making in complex patients with undifferentiated presentations, for example, 
delineating between known side effects from a prescribed drug and a possible 
red flag for a more serious diagnosis: 
 
The patient was an 85-year-old man with dementia and Parkinson 
disease who had symptoms of diarrhoea and was taking Aricept[®, Pfizer 
Inc., New York, NY, USA]. The diarrhoea was attributed to being a side 
effect of his Aricept and the doctor failed to diagnose his progressed 
colon carcinoma. 
 
A missed or delayed cancer diagnosis was described in 128 reports. Diagnostic 
problems were preceded by insufficient assessment in seven reports, by 
insufficient examination in eight reports and by failure to recognise acute 
conditions in seven reports, which suggests that missed or delayed diagnoses 
are underpinned by lack of clinical skills. This is also suggested by the 16 
reports in which the knowledge or skill of the healthcare professional was 
described as a contributory factor. For example, a lack of prior knowledge of the 
patient’s history would make it more difficult to interpret test results and 
determine if they were normal, as was evident in the following example: 
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Patient had undergone radical prostatectomy for cancer. Had follow up 
PSA [prostate-specific antigen] levels – which should be undetectable. 
Any detectable PSA level, even in ‘normal’ range, is abnormal. Previous 
detectable level passed as normal result. The patient noticed this. 
 
In 31 cases, the rare presentation of a condition was a contributory factor, and 
in 18 reports, the continuity of care between primary healthcare professionals 
was discussed. The latter contributory factor was associated with high rates of 
harmful outcomes, as 72% (n = 207) of cases led to serious harm. Fewer 
reports (n = 14) described a wrong diagnosis. These reports related to a wide 
variety of conditions, some of which were more serious than others. Wrong 
diagnoses were largely, although not exclusively, due to failures of professional 
competence, such as failing to examine a patient fully; however, some were 
attributed to unusual clinical presentations (un-differentiating signs or 
symptoms) and these cases accounted for a high proportion of serious harm 
incidents (n = 10, 71%). 
3.4. Serious harms and death in general practice 
Of the total 13,699 incident reports, 996 incidents resulted in moderate or 
severe harm to, or death of, a patient. Moderate and severe harms, using the 
WHO ICPS definitions, were permanent loss of function, conditions 
necessitating hospital admission or disability. I called these serious harms. 
 
An overview of level of harm outcome by incident category is provided in Table 
3.16. 
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Table 3.16. Summary of incident reports describing serious harm or death 
 
 
3.4.1. Contributory themes 
Fewer than half of the 996 reports (n = 431, 43%) contained descriptions of 
contributory factors. Combined with insights generated by thematic analysis, the 
four main contributory themes underpinning serious harm- and death-related 
incidents were: 
1. communication errors in the referral and discharge of patients; 
2. physician decision-making;  
3. delays in cancer diagnosis associated with unfamiliar symptom 
presentation and/or inadequate administration; and, 
4. delayed management or mismanagement following failures to recognise 
signs of clinical (medical, surgical and mental health) deterioration. 
 
Table 3.17 highlights the number of serious harms and death outcomes by each 
theme. 
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Table 3.17. Summary of incident reports describing serious harm or death 
outcomes by contributory theme 
 
 
3.4.2. Factors contributing to incidents 
In this section, I provide a summary of the contributory factors identified in all 
serious harm and death reports. Patient-related factors were the most 
frequently reported (n = 215) contributors to incidents resulting in serious harm 
and death. These included patient characteristics, such as patient 
pathophysiology (n = 51) or frailty (n = 21). For example, one patient without a 
care package following discharge from hospital, and with poor eyesight, self-
administered the wrong dose of insulin. Rare presentations, such as for an 
atypical cancer presentation, or a rare disease such as bladder cancer in a 
young child, may have made diagnosis more challenging in 43 incidents.  
 
Service-related contributory factors were also frequently described (n = 190). 
The out-of-hours primary care services (n = 48) were often implicated; for 
example, some incidents were attributed to the failure of healthcare 
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professionals to share information. In one case, the out-of-hours service failed 
to pass on urgent blood test results to the patient’s GP and thereby delayed 
further assessment. 
 
Forty-one incidents were attributed to inadequate protocols; for example, 
regarding the handling of referrals by mental health teams resulted in some 
cases in delays in assessment, and led to deterioration in the patient’s mental 
health or death by suicide. Working conditions, such as staff being too busy to 
spend sufficient time assessing a patient, were described in 17 reports. Staff-
related factors were described in 108 reports and included failure to follow 
protocols (n = 38), such as those for warfarin dosing, and staff members having 
an inadequate skill set or knowledge to assess acutely unwell patients, resulting 
in missed emergency diagnoses (n = 36). 
 
3.4.3. Examination of contributory themes 
In this section, I describe each contributory theme by considering the role of 
identified contributory factors, and, when relevant, the contributory incidents 
leading up to the incident, and other contextual issues identified by thematic 
analysis. 
 
3.4.3.1. Communication errors in the referral and discharge of patients 
Errors in the processes involved in transferring patient information compromised 
the continuity of care (contributory factor) between primary and secondary care. 
The most frequently reported error, mentioned in 47 reports, was the failure of 
referral (contributory incident) to take place as intended. These resulted in 
delays in management (incident) for 18 patients and in the death (harm 
outcome) of 10 patients. For example: 
 
Discharge home with pressure sore on sacrum and x 2 heels from 
[community hospital]. Unable to mobilise and/or eat and drink – district 
nurse was not informed. 
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Errors relating to referrals not being made were sometimes preceded by a 
contributory incident, including poor discharge planning, for example failure to 
refer to community practitioners such as district nurses for wound reviews 
(n=10), missed diagnoses (n=7) or failure to transfer patient information (n=5), 
such as failure to send patients’ discharge summaries to their GP. 
 
Premature or incomplete discharge planning (incident) was described in a 
further 31 reports. In 27 cases, this resulted in the patient being readmitted to 
hospital (outcome) and two patients died (outcome). One report described a frail 
elderly (contributory factor) gentleman who could not cope without additional 
support at home following discharge and, as a result of self-neglect 
(contributory factor), developed cellulitis from leg wounds (outcome). He was 
eventually readmitted to hospital but later died (outcome). Of the 21 incidents in 
which patient age was reported, nearly three-quarters (n=15) of patients were 
aged ≥ 66 years (contributory factor). 
 
A further 22 incidents involved errors in the transfer of patient information 
between different healthcare settings (incident), with 10 resulting in the patient’s 
admission to hospital (outcome). These included incomplete discharge 
summaries (n=5), failure to send discharge summaries (n=5) and delay in 
sending discharge summaries (n=4). In four cases, the patient’s GP failed to 
action recommendations included in the discharge summary. For example: 
 
Patient attended GP appointment with a new resident GP. Enquired 
about the referral to urology department at acute hospital that should 
have been made by the long-term locum GP 3 months previous. On 
investigation, it was found unsent in the records. 
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Few contributory factors were reported in relation to incidents involving poor 
communication between healthcare providers. Poor continuity of care between 
healthcare providers was only explicitly reported as a potential contributory 
factor in five cases. 
 
3.4.3.2. Clinician decision-making 
In total, 96 incidents were about physician decision-making as follows: 24 
reports described errors in treatment decisions, 50 reports described errors in 
decisions about prescribing medications and 22 recorded errors made in 
monitoring dose-dependent medications. For example: 
 
Patient discharged from [hospital] on [date]; no warfarin dose or INR 
results sent to GP. INR checked and information added to INRstar (or did 
not enter dose was changed in hospital). Patient given 2 mg daily 
(subsequently found dose in hospital was 0.5 mg). Patient suffered GI 
[gastrointestinal] bleed and died on [date]. 
 
Over half (n=56, 58%) of the reports were preceded by another incident 
(contributory incident). How physicians interact with paper-based and/or 
computer-based systems was the apparent underlying issue in a number of 
these incidents. These contributory incidents include errors in the transfer of 
patient information between healthcare settings (n=17), and errors in the 
process of recording and accessing patient documentation in a further seven 
reports. Missed opportunities to seek important information from patients that 
could inform decision making was described in eight reports. For example, one 
report detailed a district nurse missing the opportunity to check the 
immunisation status of a patient; the patient did not receive the required 
pneumococcal vaccine and subsequently developed pneumococcal sepsis. In 
another example, the GP failed to act on discharge advice: 
 
Practice notified that patient was being discharged following 10-day 
admission for treatment of iatrogenic hypercalcaemia caused by a high 
dose of alfacalcidol. GP did not change dose of alfacalcidiol as stated in 
letter. 
  140 
 
At least one contributory factor was identified in over half (n=54, 56%) of GP-
related medication errors. Twelve reports described how patient behaviour or 
actions contributed to the development of incidents, for example non-
compliance with instructions from the patient’s GP in some cases resulted in 
adverse drug events and recurrence of the patient’s illness. A further 15 
incidents were due, at least in part, to staff members failing to follow protocols 
or having an inadequate skill set or knowledge. For example, one GP 
prescribed 10 times the recommended dose of trimethoprim for an 8-week-old 
baby. Service-related factors included poor continuity of care between different 
healthcare professionals (n=8); for example, one patient received the wrong 
doses of insulin as a result of the lack of communication between the 
discharging medical team and the district nurses.  
 
Four incidents arose, at least in part, because the patient received care from an 
out-of-hours service. For example, one patient was prescribed a large quantity 
of amitriptyline by an out-of-hours GP despite a history of overdose, and was 
found dead 2 days later. This highlights the lack of background clinical 
information available to out-of-hours service doctors (contributory incident) 
when making clinical decisions. Of particular note, 17 incidents followed an 
error in the process of monitoring medications, of which 14 involved staff failing 
to follow protocol or having an inadequate skill set or knowledge (contributory 
factors). This included one case in which a patient’s INR was not monitored 
despite the patient being prescribed anti-tuberculosis medications known to 
interact with warfarin. The patient subsequently developed a pontine 
cerebrovascular event and was found to have an INR of 10.  
 
3.4.3.3. Delays in cancer diagnosis associated with unfamiliar symptom 
presentation and/or inadequate administration 
Missed or delayed cancer diagnosis accounted for 9% (n = 93) of reports 
describing serious patient harm or death (outcomes). In 25 cases, these were 
preceded by a contributory incident involving investigative processes, such as 
an error in reporting of diagnostic imaging results. For example, an elderly 
patient (contributory factor) with an identified lung opacification on a chest 
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radiograph was given a routine rather than an urgent referral (contributory 
incident). By the time adenocarcinoma was diagnosed, the cancer had 
metastasised and the patient developed carcinomatosis (outcome). Another 59 
reports recorded a delay in the assessment or management of a cancer 
diagnosis, and 18 of those described the death of a patient. For example: 
 
Patient attended surgery with symptoms of irritable bowel syndrome. 
Given prescription, over next few months came back for telephone 
advice. Told had colitis and given further medication. Patient was not 
given a PR [per rectal] examination at any visit. Referred to endoscopy 7 
months later and found to have bowel tumour. Patient undergoing 
chemotherapy at the time of report. 
 
In over half of incidents resulting in a delayed cancer diagnosis, the patient’s 
age was recorded (n=24, 62%), and missed cancer diagnoses were reported for 
a broad range of age groups. Symptoms of a rare presentation was the most 
common contributory factor for a delayed cancer diagnosis. Other contributory 
factors included non-disclosure of symptoms (n=9) and visiting different 
healthcare professionals for the same symptoms (n = 6). For example: 
 
Patient’s mother contacted the Patient Advice and Liaison Service, 
stating that her adult daughter died. For 6 months prior to her daughter’s 
death, the GP had been treating her for migraine, anxiety, depression 
and panic attacks. In addition, she had been losing her eyesight but the 
GP had insisted that she see an optician who had referred her back to 
the GP, stating that something else was amiss. The patient had been told 
that the GP was in touch with the optician. After the patient died, two 
brain tumours were discovered. 
 
3.4.3.4. Failures to recognise signs of clinical deterioration 
Missed or delayed diagnosis of an acute clinical condition (n = 61) frequently 
resulted from errors during telephone triage (n = 28), of which seven involved 
out-of-hours services (contributory factor). For example: 
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Call passed from NHS Direct to out-of-hours service with a ‘less urgent’ 
priority. 10-week-old baby with central cyanosis, increased respiratory 
rate, and ‘noisy’ breathing. 
 
Acute clinical conditions were missed (outcome) in 23 reports, and a further 10 
reports described the delayed diagnosis of an emergency condition (incident), 
such as bowel perforation, which resulted in a delayed hospital admission 
(outcome) and the death of a patient (outcome). Another example includes: 
 
2-month-old baby taken to A&E [accident and emergency] as Sudden 
Unexpected Death of Infancy having died at home. Baby had been seen 
by GP on previous evening with temperature of 38 Celsius; diagnosed 
with possible chest infection and prescribed amoxicillin. NICE guidance 
states that fever ≥ 38 Celsius in child less than 3 months is a red flag and 
a child should be admitted to hospital. Preliminary results from post-
mortem suggest that infection is likely cause of death. 
 
Involvement of out-of-hours services (contributory factor) was described in 10 of 
these incidents. For example: 
 
Patient seen on home visit. Advised had been seen with symptoms 
strongly suggestive of an acute stroke at home by out-of-hours service at 
approximately 2015 hours yesterday evening and told to contact her GP 
the next morning. Policy is that patient suspected of suffering an acute 
stroke should be admitted as a 999 to hospital for appropriate diagnosis 
and treatment. 
 
In eight cases, a chain of incidents occurred; for example, the healthcare 
professional did not appreciate the severity of illness (contributory incident), 
leading to delays in escalating concerns and co-ordinating urgent transport to 
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hospital (contributory incident), leading to a missed or delayed diagnosis of an 
acute condition (incident). Of the 36 reports that described emergency transport 
delays (contributory incident), 10 stated that the delay was preceded by failures 
in triaging patients (nurses in OOH call centres and on call GPs triaging home 
visits) or in the direct physical assessment of acutely unwell patients 
(contributory incidents). In addition, four incidents were preceded by inadequate 
verbal communication between healthcare professionals (contributory incident). 
 
Errors in the process of identifying patients at risk of deterioration because of 
mental health problems (contributory factor) were largely fatal, with 27 out of 29 
incidents in this sample resulting in the death of a patient. The majority of these 
involved the patient taking an overdose of medication (incident). Patient actions, 
such as not attending a planned review with their GP (contributory factor), 
contributed to these incidents in five cases. 
 
3.5. Summary of findings  
In this chapter, I have demonstrated the diverse range of patient safety 
incidents reported from general practice in England and Wales.  
 
In section 3.1, I have described the development of coding frameworks and 
their processes for application to patient safety incident reports in general 
practice.  
 
In section 3.2, I have highlighted how incident reporting systems in general 
practice are currently being used. A structured approach, guided by definitions, 
for reviewing the content of incident reports can support the identification of 
reports describing actual patient safety incidents. One in every three reports (n 
= 4668, 34% of total reports) was excluded from this study since they contained 
insufficient detail or did not describe a patient safety incident. Of included 
reports, two-thirds of incident reports did not explicitly describe reasons about 
why the incident occurred. This raises important issues about the current 
knowledge and understanding of the purpose of incident reporting systems.  
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In section 3.3, I have explored the relationships between similar categories of 
incidents, their contributory factors and outcomes, to pinpoint apparent 
opportunities for improvement (discussed in chapter 7 – Discussion). I 
examined the relationship between incidents and their contributory factors as a 
means of explaining why incidents might have occurred.  
 
In section 3.4, I have demonstrated how incidents with similar outcomes such 
as serious harms and death can permit understanding deeper underlying 
contributory themes which are not necessarily apparent when considered in 
isolation. This analysis pinpointed several processes for quality improvement 
and research activity needed at a practice and organisational level, including: 
referral and discharge processes; how physician decision making is impacted 
by administrative and information technology systems; cancer recognition and 
diagnosis; and, recognising signs of clinical (medical, surgical and mental 
health) deterioration.  
 
In chapter 4, I will explore how this method can be applied to a volume of 
reports identified by virtue of patient characteristics (e.g. vulnerable children), 
and how aligned recommendations for improvement can be generated with 
existing evidence or initiatives mapped to those and gaps for further work 
identified.   
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Chapter 4 – A programme theory and identified interventions to 
improve safety for vulnerable children   
 
In this chapter, I will address objective 4a which is to determine the process for 
using incident report analyses to inform the design of improvement projects at a 
national level. I will demonstrate how the methods developed for my thesis (and 
described in section 3.1) can be applied to a focussed analysis of national-level 
reports involving vulnerable children to yield a programme theory which 
articulates potential improvement priorities, and how a structured scoping 
review of published and grey literature can identify existing interventions for 
improvement relevant to each priority. I have detailed the rationale and method 
for utilising incident reports to generate programme theory in section 1.2.3.1. In 
this chapter, I illustrate how to generate a programme theory for an exemplar 
scenario of incident reports describing patient safety incidents involving 
vulnerable children.  
 
The outline of this chapter is summarised in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1. Overview of chapter 
Section Description 
4.1 Methods used to identify a sample of incident reports for national-level analysis 
and the scoping review processes to identify existing interventions in the 
published or grey literature.  
4.2 Description of the characteristics and themes present in incident reports about 
vulnerable children. A first-draft programme theory to improve care for 
vulnerable children is proposed.   
4.3 Findings from a scoping review of interventions to improve care safety for 
vulnerable children are described.  
4.4 An updated programme theory with mapped interventions is proposed.  
4.5 Summary of findings. 
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4.1. Methods for a national-level analysis of incident reports 
In section 3.1, I previously outlined the processes that were developed and 
refined to make sense of, and prioritise, learning present in unstructured 
incident report data. Through a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods, 
apparent priorities for improvement emerged from discussion and interpretation 
of ‘what happened’, ‘why did it occur’ and related ‘outcomes’. I used the same 
methods to characterise incident reports about vulnerable children as previously 
described in section 3.1.  
 
In this section, I will describe my methods for moving from a homogenous group 
of incident reports (e.g. patient safety incidents involving vulnerable children) to 
a plan (a programme theory) for quality improvement. I will outline the 
systematic search undertaken to identify incident reports for inclusion in the 
national-level analysis (section 4.1.1). My analysis will be summarised as a 
driver diagram which is an explanatory narrative of the theory for improvement 
(described in section 1.2.3.2).(29,305) Finally, I will describe the scoping review 
processes used for identifying existing interventions (‘improvement ideas’) to 
map against each identified change concept (section 4.1.2.).  
 
4.1.1. Identifying patient safety incident reports about vulnerable children 
To identify incident reports about vulnerable children, an operational definition 
was needed to structure the scope of the key terms that would be used to 
identify patient safety incident reports about this patient population. On review 
of the literature, it was apparent there was variation in existing definitions. A 
scoping review was previously undertaken to determine the key domains and 
related keywords described in the published and grey literature (including 
current policy directives and non-governmental organisations).(27) All existing 
definitions of vulnerability were abstracted into a Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet 
(see Appendix 10 for the range of definitions identified for ‘vulnerable child’).(27) 
 
All included definitions were agreed between me and a BSc medical student 
(Adhnan Omar) who abstracted the definitions. A comparative analysis 
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undertaken by me and Omar highlighted common themes about what was 
meant by vulnerability (see Figure 4.1).  
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Figure 4.1. Outcome from comparative analysis of vulnerability definitions 
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Concepts and themes were synthesised in discussion with a multi-disciplinary 
team including academic pediatricians (Sabine Maguire and Alison Kemp, 
Cardiff University), to inform the following definition: 
‘All children can be argued as vulnerable but circumstantially vulnerable 
children are defined as anyone under the age of 18, who are more 
susceptible to welfare loss above the socially accepted norm if faced with 
adversity, without provision of additional support services. Children were 
categorised as socially, psychologically or physically vulnerable; or 
vulnerable due to child protection risks, (See Figure 4.1 for definitions of 
categories of vulnerability) these categories are not mutually exclusive.’ 
(23) 
 
A list of key terms was derived to search the free text of incident reports in the 
NRLS database (c. 270,000 primary care reports) (see Table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2. Key terms for searching NRLS dataset  
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4.1.2. Identifying existing interventions  
Mapping interventions onto a driver diagram starts to operationalise the 
identified improvement concepts.(27) Undertaking a systematic review for each 
improvement concept would make the process of planning a QI project very 
resource intensive. A form of literature review was sought to address broad 
questions, be inclusive of published and grey literature, and enable processing 
of potentially large volumes of literature.  
 
Scoping reviews can be used to synthesise large volumes of literature rapidly, 
usually to identify existing research and policy gaps for perceived priority areas 
for intervention.(241) The advantages and disadvantages of scoping reviews 
are considered in Table 4.3.(207,211,306)  
 
 
Table 4.3. Advantages and disadvantages of scoping reviews 
Advantages Disadvantages 
· Rapid collection of data 
 
· Identification of parameters and 
gaps in the literature 
 
· Thematic analysis of qualitative 
data 
 
· Inform policy makers as to 
whether or not a full systematic 
review is required 
 
· Attempt to be systematic, 
transparent and replicable, 
sharing some characteristics of 
the systematic review 
· Potential for bias between different 
individuals who are conducting the 
scoping study 
 
· Quality of data are not assessed 
which has important implications 
for the use of the reviews in 
conclusions whereby the existence 
of studies rather than their quality 
forms the basis for drawing 
conclusions 
 
  
Scoping reviews were first developed by Arksey and O’Malley, (207) and 
numerous authors have suggested amendments to this process to advance the 
method.(241) See Appendix 11 for a comparison of scoping review methods. I 
have adhered to the amended framework proposed by Levac et al.(210) that 
includes additional systematic review principles, and includes:  
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● identifying the research question; 
● identifying relevant documentation;  
● study selection; 
● charting the data; and, 
● collating, summarising and reporting the results. 
 
I will describe each of the scoping review stages in sections 4.1.2.1 – 4.1.2.5.  
 
4.1.2.1. Identifying the research question 
A scoping review question is typically broad and should consider the target 
population (e.g. vulnerable children), concept of interest (e.g. interventions and 
initiatives to improve an aspect of care quality) and outcomes of interest (e.g. 
safety). Given the acknowledged paucity of patient safety research in primary 
care, a scoping review approach could support rapid identification of existing 
efforts to improve the concept of interest. The research question was: what 
existing interventions have been used to improve the safety of care delivered to 
vulnerable children in primary care? 
 
Key terms and Medical Sub-Headings (MeSH) were developed to reflect the 
operational definition of each variable. For example, the definition for vulnerable 
children has been defined as “anyone under the age of 18, with needs or 
circumstances requiring additional support, who are susceptible to inadequate 
care without the means to cope independently. These circumstances put these 
children at greater risk of negative events or welfare loss above a socially 
accepted norm”. 
 
Four overarching mechanisms have been identified by which care can be 
insufficient for vulnerable children. These categories were not mutually 
exclusive, and included: 
● Physical health: due to disabilities or long-term conditions, 
● Psychological health:  with mental illness or learning disabilities or have 
increased risk of mental susceptibility through life-stress or living with 
parents with mental illness, 
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● Social circumstances: where children’s’ health or development is likely to 
be significantly impaired without social care provision or their lower 
socioeconomic class or housing/family situation or their migration status 
or, 
● Child protection proceedings: including previous or current trauma, 
abuse, neglect, current abuse or those already on the child protection 
register.(307)  
 
 
4.1.2.2. Identifying relevant documentation 
Key terms and MeSH terms were developed and tested in the Medline Ovid 
database, before being adapted for other databases (see Appendix 12 for 
search strategy). Synonyms, alternative spellings, and abbreviations were 
included. Boolean operators combined search terms to balance sensitivity and 
maximise precision. Eight databases were searched for published literature: 
PsychINFO, HMIC (Health Management Information Consortium), EMBASE, 
Medline Ovid, Medline in process and other non-indexed citations, WHO Library 
Database (WHOLIS), Google Scholar and the System for Information on Grey 
Literature in Europe (SIGLE). The final three databases were established grey 
literature search engines. Searches were limited to articles published from 2000 
to coincide with the introduction of the Millennium Development Goals agenda 
for child health.(308) The most recent search was undertaken in March 2016. 
All references were exported to Endnote version X7 (Thomson Reuters). 
 
4.1.2.3. Study selection 
Two independent reviewers (Adhnan Omar and Philippa Rees) reviewed titles, 
abstracts or full text articles of relevant papers being assessed for inclusion. 
Reviewers discussed the review process to discuss challenges and 
uncertainties related to selection. If required, the search strategy was refined 
accordingly. Where disagreement occurred, I was the third-person arbitrator to 
determine final inclusion or exclusion. 
All study designs were included if they described or proposed improvement 
initiatives. For inclusion, the research: involved children under 18 years old; 
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occurred in primary care settings (initially) and later expanded to inclusion of 
secondary care settings; and described initiatives that mitigate safety issues 
arising in children with vulnerabilities. I met with the Reviewers (Omar and 
Rees) at the beginning, midpoint and final stages of the abstract review process 
to discuss any challenges and uncertainties about selection. The initial inclusion 
criteria included interventions or initiatives in primary care only. However, 
reports made by primary care professionals commonly described inter-sector 
issues; therefore, it was decided to include studies describing efforts to improve 
system processes for vulnerable children in secondary healthcare settings also. 
Further, studies or initiatives from all income settings were included given the 
international agenda set by the Sustainable Development Goals to minimise 
health and social care inequalities for children.(66) This iterative process 
throughout data selection is promoted by Levac et al.(210) Non-English studies, 
abstracts, letters and editorials were excluded as well as studies exclusively 
assessing patient safety incidents without proposing improvement ideas. 
 
4.1.2.4. Charting the data 
Included studies were extracted by a reviewer (Adhnan Omar) to a Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA). The main variables 
for data extraction were agreed with a second reviewer (Philippa Rees) after 
independent review of five articles (see Appendix 13 for an overview of 
variables). The discussion centred on keeping the extraction approach 
consistent with the objectives of the study.  
 
4.1.2.5. Collating, summarising and reporting the results 
Tables were used to describe interventions and the type of vulnerability 
addressed. A narrative synthesis was undertaken to summarise descriptions of 
the interventions and their reported outcomes. The literature was organised 
thematically according to manifest and integrative themes identified by analysis 
of incident reports.  
 
The purpose of the scoping review was to identify interventions that have 
explicit descriptions of the intervention in terms of the change concepts and 
related ideas that were developed and tested in practice. Thus, assessment of 
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the quality of the studies was not undertaken since it was beyond the scope of 
the review. However, the strength of actions specified for each intervention can 
be assessed in terms of human factors principles where the “most effective 
actions accommodate or control for the limitations of human behavior and how 
people interact with systems, tools, tasks and the environment through the use 
of design and standardisation”.(229)  
 
I assessed the strength of the interventions with a general practitioner with 
human factors training (Huw Williams) using the Action Hierarchy developed by 
the United States (US) Veterans Affairs National Center for Patient Safety 
Strength Intervention Classification (see Table 4.4).(229) The tool was modelled 
on the US National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s 
Hierarchy of Controls which had supported effective and sustained safety 
improvement in other industries.  
 
Table 4.4. Strength of intervention assessment tool (229) 
Strength Definition Example 
Strong The best at removing the 
dependence on the human to “get 
it right” (they are physical and 
permanent, rather than procedural 
and temporary). 
● implemented new devices or 
redesigned processes with 
usability testing 
● standardisation of equipment 
● forcing functions 
Intermediate Reduce the reliance on the human 
to get it right, but do not fully 
control for human error. 
● increased staffing or decreasing 
workload 
● implementation of checklists or 
cognitive aids 
● standardised communication tools 
● enhanced documentation  
● software enhancements 
Weak Support/clarify the process, but 
rely solely on the human.  
● new protocol or standard operating 
procedure 
● training and education  
● introducing warning or hazard 
labels 
● double checking 
  
Lessons from those industries suggests choosing at least one strong or 
intermediate strength action, or weaker actions as temporary measures until 
stronger actions can be committed. In healthcare, weaker interventions such as 
new training and policy establish expectations, used in isolation are unlikely to 
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achieve sustained patient safety improvements. Morse and Pollack (309) also 
consider the effort required by strength of intervention (see Figure 4.2).  
 
Figure 4.2. Nature of intervention effort and the strength of intervention 
developed from Morse and Pollack (309)  
 
For transparency, Levac et al.(210) advise a descriptive numerical summary 
analysis and a thematic analysis for synthesising results. A programme theory 
from analysis of incident reports has been used to empirically inform the design 
of the scoping study; thus, in my study this was the thematic framework for 
update / amendment following the scoping review. Next, they advocate the 
production of an output that refers to the overall purpose or research 
question.(210) In my study, the output is an updated programme theory 
articulated as a driver diagram. Interventions which contain change concepts 
relevant to each integrative theme were mapped on to the driver diagram.  
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4.2. Draft programme theory to improve care safety for vulnerable children 
informed by incident report analysis 
 
In my searches of the NRLS database, I identified 2,015 reports, of which 1,183 
reports were included for analysis. Table 4.5 provides an overview of frequent 
staff group reporters, age of children, levels of harm, and range of vulnerabilities 
described in the reports. Table 4.6 illustrates the frequency of incident types 
occurring in this sample, grouped into three integrative themes by virtue of their 
definition and meaning. Reports described harm outcomes (n=311, 27%) for 
vulnerable children ranging from low severity to death. The remaining reports 
did not describe incidents that resulted in harm (n=402, 34%) or lacked 
sufficient detail for assessment of harm severity (n=470, 40%). The most 
frequently described incidents involved: 
● Deficiencies in healthcare planning (n=187, 16%); 
● Unsatisfactory referrals (n=154, 20%); 
● Investigation and diagnosis errors (n=128, 11%); and, 
● Errors in safeguarding proceedings (n=75, 10%). 
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Table 4.5. Overview of included incident reports 
INCLUDED REPORTS 
Most frequent reporters n % 
Health visitors 278 23 
Nursing staff 198 17 
Community teams 183 16 
Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services 47 4 
Age of children in incidents  n % 
<2 years old 341 30 
2 – 10 years old 443 39 
>10 years old 348 31 
Level of harm n % 
No harm 402 34 
Low harm 222 19 
Moderate harm 76 6 
Severe harm 12 2 
Death 1 - 
Insufficient detail 470 40 
Vulnerability  n % 
Physical 124 11 
Psychological 189 16 
Social 353 30 
Child protection 517 44 
EXCLUDED REPORTS n % 
Not describing safety incident in primary care 256 31 
Contained insufficient information 239 29 
Appropriate breaches in confidentiality’ 214 26 
Defensive reporting 70 8 
Not vulnerable children 35 4 
Pressure ulcers 18 2 
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Table 4.6. Overview of harm outcomes for each patient safety incident type 
Integrative 
themes 
Type of patient safety 
incident 
Harm No 
Harm 
Moderate / 
 Severe 
Not 
Specified 
Total, n 
Recognising 
needs to 
implement 
intervention 
Care planning: inadequate 
health or social care 
intervention received 
27 
(2%) 
114 
(10%) 
9 
 (<1%) 
37 
(3%) 
187 
(16%) 
Safeguarding: delayed or 
absent detection of a child in 
need 
29 
(2%) 
57 
(5%) 
20 
(2%) 
56 
(5%) 
162 
(14%) 
Investigation and diagnosis: 
errors in standard investigative 
and diagnostic processes 
35 
(3%) 
22 
(2%) 
13 
(1%) 
58 
(5%) 
128 
(11%) 
Treatment and medication: 
issues in the medical treatment 
of patients 
32 
(3%) 
13 
(1%) 
18 
(2%) 
23 
(2%) 
86 
(7%) 
Access to healthcare: reaching 
the required healthcare setting 
5 
(<1%) 
32 
(3%) 
6 
(<1%) 
6 
(<1%) 
49 
(4%) 
Equipment: provision of 
essential equipment (e.g. 
tracheostomy, insulin needles, 
dressings) 
8 
(<1%) 
13 
(1%) 
0 9 
(<1%) 
30 
(3%) 
Referrals 
between health 
and social care 
services  
 
Referral: referral of patients 
from one service to another 
38 
(3%) 
61 
(5%) 
13 
 (1%) 
57 
(5%) 
169 
(14%) 
Breaches of confidentiality: 
where patient information is 
taken or shared without 
consent 
9 
(<1%) 
4 
(<1%) 
1 
(<1%) 
35 
(3%) 
49 
(4%) 
 
 
 
Information 
transfer to enable 
continuity of care  
Documentation: errors in 
medical records or 
documentation 
6 
(<1%) 
33 
(3%) 
1 
(<1%) 
71 
(6%) 
111 
(9%) 
Transfer of information: errors 
in information sharing not done 
face to face 
8 
(<1%) 
24 
(2%) 
2 
(<1%) 
61 
(2%) 
95 
(8%) 
Administration: management of 
patient healthcare 
appointments 
4 
(<1%) 
19 
(2%) 
1 
(<1%) 
24 
(2%) 
48 
(4%) 
Communication: errors during 
face to face interactions 
15 
(1%) 
7 
(<1%) 
5 
(<1%) 
14 
(1%) 
41 
(3%) 
 
Other 
Professionalism: inappropriate 
conduct of healthcare 
professionals 
6 
(<1%) 
3 
(<1%) 
0 19 
(2%) 
28 
(2%) 
 Total 222 
(19%) 
402 
(34%) 
89 
(8%) 
470 
(40%) 
1183 
(100%) 
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4.2.1. Interpretation of integrative themes 
All reports for each of the top four incident types, and all harm reports (low 
harm, moderate harm, severe harm and death) from the other incident types, 
were re-examined as per stage 3 of the mixed methods analytical process 
described in section 3.1.6.4 in chapter 3.  
 
Three integrative themes emerged:  
● ‘recognising needs to implement intervention’ included incidents 
where clinical decision making was affected by a diagnosis-related 
incident, deficiency in care planning or the initiation or delivery of 
treatments (medication) and equipment when needed;  
● ‘referrals between health and social care services’ included incidents 
where referral documentation contained inadequate detail, was 
incomplete or lost, or decisions about referrals were delayed; and,  
● ‘information transfer to enable continuity of care’ included incidents 
where lack of essential information about a child had not been efficiently 
exchanged within and between health and social care providers.    
 
The integrative themes represent major core functions of a system capable of 
providing safe health and social care to children. Where relevant, themes that 
existed between them were also described.  
 
In the following sections, I will highlight how the Recursive Model of Incident 
Analysis has been applied to incident reports, I will annotate the described 
content with the following terms in brackets: incident, a contributory factor, 
contributory incident or outcome.  
 
4.2.1.1. Recognising needs to implement intervention 
Children frequently suffered harm because of poorly planned interventions for 
physical care, particularly children with complex physical health problems, or 
children with child protection needs (n=459, 39% of total reports). These 
children predominantly had vulnerabilities (contributory factors) relating to social 
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issues (n=176, 38% of the planning and implementation incidents) and child 
protection issues (n=167, 36%). An inadequate assessment of essential health 
needs was the most common incident (n=114, 25%), and such children went 
without important care resources like tracheostomy care or wheelchairs (n=30, 
7%)(see example 1). This also meant newly ‘at risk’ children were not identified 
(contributory incident) and did not receive the protection needed (incident) in 
hindsight (n=63, 14%) (see examples 1, 2). 
 
Example 1. This patient has been waiting for 12 months to be seen in 
the enuresis clinic since referral. There has been another referral from 
another agency since the first referral. This child has been waiting for 
12 months. The patient’s mother has informed me that enuresis 
problem is really affecting him as it is worsening his behaviour 
problems and he is currently [receiving care from] the Community 
Learning Disability Nurse. I have now apologised to mum for the long 
wait and have now managed to discharge a patient who is now dry and 
I have now given him an appointment for the [date]. 
 
Example 2. Discharged patient home following acute hemiparesis. 
Patient discharged without access to a wheelchair or appliances to 
improve mobility. Patient requires high level of rehabilitation that 
cannot be fully met by the community team. 
 
Many children had outdated child protection plans (n=127, 28%). As a result, 
vulnerable children were in harmful or violent environments with unmet health 
and social needs (contributory factors). Staff factors underpinned many of these 
incidents. Secondly, healthcare professionals and social workers faced 
difficulties in attending multi-disciplinary case conferences to review children’s 
protection circumstances (n=39, 8%) (see example 3). Consequently, local 
authorities had outdated safeguarding or care packages in place for children, 
and inconsistencies arose in the identification and action of child protection 
concerns (contributory incidents). These were exacerbated by organisational 
factors which included strict shift constraints, workload and multiple 
commitments (n=67, 15%). 
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Example 3. Information received from Senior Nurse in safeguarding 
team that she attended an initial safeguarding conference on [date] 
which raised concerns of missed opportunities from health regarding 
the welfare and protection of a child. It was deemed the child was 
suffering chronic neglect and the senior nurse was concerned that this 
child had not had all possible opportunities explored. Procedures had 
not been adhered to regarding failed visits and significant events, and 
subsequent seeking of supervision, which led to a delay in neglect 
being recognised and acted upon. 
 
4.2.1.2. Referrals between health and social care services  
Reports described failures in referral processes from social services to health 
visiting services (n=86, 18%), or protection services to community professionals 
(n=62, 13%) (see example 4). Inadequacies in communications about a child’s 
intended health and social care provision, safeguarding issues, or follow up 
plans were frequently described incidents (n=465, 39% of total reports). Many of 
the contributory factors concern children’s social vulnerabilities (n=148, 32% of 
these information transfer reports). Seventy of those children in institutional care 
experienced harm (n=70, 15%).  
 
Example 4. Request for records received from [police] as part of 
investigation into serious assault on a child. On reviewing the CAS 
record to fulfil the police request, concerns were raised that no child 
protection referral had been made for this call at the time it was taken 
and following the nurse assessment. The child was subsequently 
taken to hospital and found to have a number of non-accidental 
injuries. 
 
Failures in decision-making whilst referring children to the necessary social or 
healthcare service resulted in delayed, incomplete or lost referrals (n=66, 
14%).The lack of clarity during referrals was a frequently described contributory 
incident that resulted in delayed child protection intervention and unmet health 
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and social care needs outcomes (n=49, 11%) (see example 5). 
 
Example 5. Step-father called about his step-daughter who had 
returned from a weekend at her father's with vaginal pain, soreness 
and smelly frothy discharge. Her behaviour had altered over the past 
month crying a lot and having nightmares. Step-father concerned that 
she has been sexually abused. Call assessed by nurse and sent 
through to the GP [out of hours] service but did not do clinical 
summary for GP highlighting the concerns. No referral made to social 
services. 
 
In addition, follow-ups were sometimes insufficient for the children’s physical 
health needs (n=28, 6%) (see examples 6, 7).  
 
Example 6. Referral by midwives regarding cannabis use by a mother 
during pregnancy was received but not acted upon by health visitors. 
Baby went on to develop and die from a neuroblastoma which is 
recognised as being linked to recreational drug use in pregnancy. 
There is no record of baby being seen by health visitors after new birth 
visit; however she was seen several times at the GP surgery for 
developmental check at six-to-eight weeks and for primary 
immunisations. This omission was picked up during child protection 
supervision when records were reviewed following the baby's death. 
 
Example 7. While in a multi-agency meeting I identified that the child 
being discussed had been lost to follow up in paediatrics. Last seen in 
my clinic with four month follow up recorded on system and letter. 
Went into system but no further appointments have been made. Has 
developmental issues but also growth issues that may need endocrine 
referral which potentially will have been delayed by this. 
 
Recurrent outcomes for these children were variable levels of harm in terms of 
deterioration in their social circumstances or medical conditions due to delays in 
accessing the required care (contributory incident) (see example 8 and 9). 
  163 
 
Example 8. Following discharge from hospital visit for bruising, on 
[date]. Child was not noted as ‘at risk’. The child’s health deteriorated 
and required subsequent re-hospitalisation. Later checks identified the 
mother’s current partner has history of abusing children – no 
safeguarding measures had been undertaken in discharge planning. 
 
Example 9: Informed on [date] by the children's community nursing 
team that [patient] had been discharged home from [hospital] with a 
nasogastric tube in situ. We had not been informed by the hospital 
dieticians or the ward, therefore we did not know what feed and 
equipment she required and had not registered her with [name of 
professional] for delivery of equipment for feeding via her nasogastric 
tube. Attempted to visit patient but could not gain access. On second 
visit, we discovered mum spoke no English and dad speaks very little. 
They had run out of syringes for feeding but were using syringes given 
to them by the community nurses. Both parents were very anxious 
about the situation.  
 
4.2.1.3. Information transfer to enable continuity of care  
Healthcare professionals often did not have the necessary information available 
about the child to deliver the required care (n=259, 22% of total reports). The 
nature of these children’s health needs meant they were often involved with 
multiple providers from social care, health visiting and/or child protection 
services (contributory factors) (n=106, 41% of care continuity reports).  
 
Reports described difficulties in the organisation and coordination of 
simultaneous health and social care interactions (contributory incident) (n=97, 
37%) (see example 10). Access to services was challenging for patients for 
whom English was not a first language (contributory factor) (n=76, 29%), owing 
to difficulty with interpreter services. As a result, repeated visits were often 
required before appropriate health and / or social care was initiated (n=53, 
20%). Patients who had changed residential address several times (n=67, 
26%), which is common for children in foster care, also faced difficulties. Such 
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children faced challenges being registered with required services (contributory 
factor) and having documentation available (contributory incident) which 
summarised their needs (n=45, 17%) (see example 11). 
 
Example 10: Due to mother’s previous history it was decided the baby 
would be removed at birth for protection. From conference on 
xx/xx/xxxx there has been no communication from Social Services 
regarding the mother and unborn child. Birth notification arrived from 
Child Health Dept and we have statutory obligation to visit. We are 
unaware of baby’s whereabouts. Hospital contacted - stated baby has 
gone to [location] - no address available despite original planned 
interventions. 
 
Example 11. Baby was brought to see GP by mother with several 
problems – conjunctivitis, wheezy chest and burn-like mark. Entry was 
made in clinical notes detailing ‘burn-like’ lesion with cause unknown. 
No further action was taken. Another member of staff saw the entry 
and realised the child had recently been taken off the child protection 
register and the mother had already had four previous children taken 
from her. 
 
4.2.2. A draft programme theory 
A summary of the integrative and manifest themes that have emerged from 
analysis of the incident reports is outlined in a driver diagram (Figure 4.3). 
Such themes represent key issues for improvement identified from incident 
reports.   
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Figure 4.3. A programme theory arising from analysis of incident reports about 
vulnerable children 
 
4.3. Findings from a scoping review to identify Interventions to improve care 
safety for vulnerable children 
In this section, I will describe the key findings from the scoping review of 
existing interventions or initiatives (collectively referred to as interventions here 
forth) in the published or grey literature. 
 
4.3.1. PRISMA Diagram 
A total of 384 potentially relevant article abstracts was retrieved from searches, 
from which 17 were included (Figure 4.4).  
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Figure 4.4. Flow diagram of included studies 
 
Articles originated from six countries, most commonly describing interventions 
in healthcare systems in upper income countries, such as the United States 
(n=12) and the United Kingdom (n=4). Studies were explicitly reported from 
primary (n=12) and secondary (n=2) care settings. Studies are summarised in 
terms of study design, strength of action for each intervention, and the 
vulnerability focus of each intervention are summarised in Table 4.7. The 
strength of the intervention is also considered ‘strong’, ‘intermediate’ or ‘weak’ 
as per the US Veterans Affairs National Center for Patient Safety Strength 
Intervention Classification.(310)  
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Table 4.7. Overview of interventions 
Study design 
Type of study 
Author, year of 
publication 
Description Strength 
of action 
Vulnerability* 
P M S C
P 
Interventional 
Randomised controlled trial 
Tait R et al. 2004 A ‘support worker’ to facilitate 
attendance for substance misuse 
treatment following an alcohol- or 
other drug-related presentation. 
S  X X  
Quasi-experimental (matched comparison)  
Gadomski A et al. 2015 Identify mental health issues amongst 
adolescents prior to GP consultation. 
I  X   
Nordentoft M et al. 2005 Suicide prevention centre run by 
psychologists and social workers. 
S  X X  
Quasi-experimental (pre- and post-) 
Hendrickson S, 2005 Novel programme in family homes to 
minimise home safety-related injuries. 
S   X  
Miller A and 
Barlup Toombs K, 2014 
Educational intervention to improve 
identification of signs of maltreatment / 
sexual abuse. 
W    X 
Observational 
Cross-sectional 
Brenner E and 
Freundlich M, 2006 
Enhanced documentation to report 
incidents to an incident reporting 
system for social workers. 
I   X X 
Ringeisen H et al. 2009 Outreach and engagement 
programme targeting vulnerable racial 
and ethnic groups with mental 
healthcare issues. 
S  X X  
Rinke M et al. 2010 Recommendations from a 
characterisation of medication 
incidents involving children prescribed 
antidepressants. 
W X X   
Cohort 
Zeanah C. et al, 2001 Multi-agency, intensive assessment of 
children placed in foster care for 
abuse or neglect, and their caregivers, 
to inform management plans. 
S   X X 
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Qualitative 
Focus groups 
Rooke J, 2015 Proposed design for educational 
programmes to support social workers 
to avoid burnout and practice safely. 
W    X 
Case study 
Hingley-Jones H and 
Allain A, 2008  
Multi-agency collaborative working to 
enhance communication between 
team and improve care continuity for 
disabled children.   
S X    
Home Office, 2014 Multi-agency safeguarding hubs to 
promote collaborative working for 
enhanced communication to achieve 
safer practices. 
S   X X 
Mixed methods 
Quality improvement report 
Hunter J, 2015 Standardising of nurse-led telephone 
triage communication protocols 
embedded into an electronic health 
record tool. 
I    X 
Woodman J et al. 2012 Enhanced documentation of child 
protection concerns in GP medical 
records.  
I    X 
Literature review 
Non-systematic 
Chin M et al. 2009 Management and leadership 
recommendations for quality 
improvement culture. 
N/A X  X  
Keane C and  
Chapman R, 2008 
Options to improve detection of child 
protection concerns in EDs. 
N/A    X 
Schilling S et al. 2012 Options to screen for interpartner 
violence amongst families attending 
the ED.  
N/A    X 
 
Key: P = physical; M = mental health; S = social; CP = child protection; ED = 
emergency department; GP = general practice; N/A = not applicable. S = 
Strong; I = Intermediate; W= Weak. * = more than one vulnerability addressed 
by an intervention / initiative if explicitly stated.  
 
  169 
4.3.2. Descriptive summary of identified interventions  
I will now describe each of the included studies grouped by the integrative 
theme to which they predominantly correspond. Where the manifest theme 
represents a concept which could belong to either integrative theme, this 
overlap is represented in the driver diagram (Figure 4.3). An additional 
integrative theme was apparent across the identified sources in terms of 
‘leadership for quality and safety’ (see Figure 4.5 later) which describes an 
organisation’s agenda for learning from patient safety incident reports and 
performance data, (311,312) and effective leadership and management of multi-
agency teams.(313)  
4.3.2.1. Recognise needs to implement intervention 
Three bodies of literature were identified, including interventions for detection of 
parental inter-partner violence, detection of mental health problems in 
adolescents; and detection of child protection issues. Six studies (or reports) 
were identified that described interventions to mitigate potential harms arising 
from absent or inadequate health and social care intervention. For clarity, any 
substantive studies referenced by those studies are described here.  
 
4.3.2.1.1. Detection of parental inter-partner violence  
A review by Schilling et al.(314) describes processes for detection of inter-
partner violence of parents (IPV) presenting with their children in the emergency 
department setting. The review outlines a strong rationale that children exposed 
to IPV are at significant risk for child maltreatment and short- and long-term 
medical, behavioural, and mental health problems. Studies cited in the review 
outline the conceptual basis and content of options for introducing an IPV 
screening tool into an Emergency Department (ED) or GP surgery, and 
includes:  
● A discussion of the prevalence of the link between IPV and child 
maltreatment;(315) 
● What interventional options exist to screen for IPV,(316) including the 
most frequently cited three question tool available;(317)  
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● A synthesis of socio-cultural barriers to IPV screening and ideas for 
overcoming those;(314) and, 
● Lessons learnt from implementation in practice;(314,318) for example, 
computer-based screening options are preferable to face-to-face 
screening and can successfully identify children at increased risk and 
promote vigilance amongst staff.(318) 
 
4.3.2.1.2. Detection of mental health problems in adolescents 
Gadomski et al.(319) report a quasi-experimental study of a tablet-based mental 
health screening tool, called “The DartScreen”, which was developed and tested 
to improve mental health discussions between adolescents and GPs.(319) The 
tool covered sensitive topics such as depression, reproductive health and 
weight. Patients should complete the screening tool before their consultation, 
and their responses are made available to the doctor to review prior to their 
consultation. The study demonstrates a pre-visit screening tool that 
incorporated mental health screening can enable adolescents to discuss 
psychosocial issues more openly. 
 
4.3.2.1.3. Detection of child protection issues 
A range of interventions were identified to support: the detection of child 
protection issues to initiate safeguarding processes and documentation in 
EDs,(320–324) and via telephone triage processes;(325) improved detections 
of physical signs of child abuse on clinical examination;(326) and assessment of 
the child and caregivers to formulate management plans.(327,328) 
 
Two studies demonstrate improved detection and subsequent management of 
child protection incidents by educating healthcare professionals. Keane and 
Chapman’s literature review of the role of ED nurses detecting child abuse 
explores options,(320) including:  
● an educational training and reminder flowchart that was developed for a 
quality improvement project to improve knowledge and skills for abuse 
identification and enhanced documentation for suspected cases amongst 
ED healthcare professionals; (321,322) 
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● an approach for reviewing documentation of suspected child abuse in 
preschool children with fractures in ED departments;(323) and, 
● an example of legislative interventions, including mandatory reporting of 
suspected sexual abuse, to tackle child abuse problems in rural 
communities in Australia.(324) 
 
A pre-post feasibility study of a brief educational intervention developed for 
physicians in Malawi to increase knowledge in assessing for evidence of child 
sexual abuse was described by Miller and Barlup Toombs.(326) The 
intervention was comprised of two one-hour lectures distinguishing between 
signs of trauma, pathology and sexual contact. The authors describe a 
statistically significant improvement in self-reported comfort for performing 
examinations and identifying signs of sexual abuse amongst the 11 (out of 21 
potentially eligible) physicians in the pre-post evaluation surveys.  
 
Hunter described a quality improvement project which aimed to improve 
telephone triaging of suspected child maltreatment cases.(325) The project was 
informed by surveys of nurses in primary and secondary care clinics, and 
measured the impact of introducing a script for guiding telephone calls about 
maltreatment. Improved confidence in the triaging process, including an 
increased ability to identify risk factors for maltreatment, and an increase in 
knowledge about appropriate protocols was reported. The benefits of using 
simulation to prepare nurses was discussed.   
 
A cohort study described by Zeanah et al.(27) evaluated a complex intervention 
designed to provide assessments and intervention to children younger than 48 
months of age who were placed in foster care for abuse or neglect, and to their 
birth and foster families. The authors report more children were freed for 
adoption and fewer children were returned to their birth parents. The relative 
risk reduction for future maltreatment was lower for children in the intervention 
group. A comprehensive description, including its conceptual basis, has been 
described by the authors in an earlier publication.(328)  The intervention was 
comprised of:   
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● intensive assessment (observation, interviews, self-report surveys) of the 
child and their caregivers to define the child’s important caregiver 
relationships (birth parents, foster carers, and child care provider) and 
identify which interventions could be needed to return the child safely to 
their parents;  
● streamlining the number of contacts by staff from the same services for 
better assessment and provision of care; and, 
● a multidisciplinary case conference informs a feedback session for 
parents and a report to the juvenile court to detail findings and 
recommendations.  
 
4.3.2.2. Referral mechanisms  
4.3.2.2.1. Multi-agency unified work processes 
A Home Office report (329) includes a case study describing multi-agency 
information sharing models called Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASH) 
across England. Evaluation of MASH showed a larger proportion of cases being 
‘escalated’ to a more serious rating and a smaller proportion being de-escalated 
to a less serious rating. MASH identified more risks than single agencies. Multi-
agency refers to collaborative working between children’s social care, the 
police, healthcare professionals, education, probation, housing and the youth 
offending service. The report outlines multiple concepts to promote enhanced 
functioning of a hub, including co-location of agencies; development and use of 
a shared risk assessment tool; independent management and leadership 
between services and teams; integrated information technology systems; 
strategic buy-in from agencies and safeguarding boards; professional 
development schemes to promote rotation of staff; and, aid interprofessional 
working.(329)  
A case study of integrated services for disabled children at two English local 
authorities by Hingley-Jones and Allain (330) corroborates the benefits of co-
locating agencies to promote communication and effective information transfer 
between professionals. The authors advise investment in the development of 
clear processes and boundaries between services.(330)  
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4.3.2.3. Interventions addressing the care continuum for vulnerable children 
Three interventional studies were identified that focussed on improving the 
continuity of care for vulnerable children. These studies focused on minimising 
the risk of children from underserved, ‘at-risk’ or lower socioeconomic 
backgrounds going without health and social care.(331–333) Further, a quality 
improvement project has been undertaken to enhance documentation of child 
protection concerns in general practice medical records to support 
communication and continuity of care between professionals.(334) Finally, a 
cross-sectional study was identified and demonstrated the utility of nationally 
collected data (when available) for determining priority groups for targeted 
improvement efforts.(335) 
 
4.3.2.3.1. Medical record alerts and flagging systems 
Woodman et al.(20) described a quality improvement project to improve the 
recording of child maltreatment concerns in general practice. The authors 
developed an approach for ‘red flagging’ children with child protection needs as 
a ‘child is cause for concern’ in their medical records. They advised an optional 
template is available for staff to include additional contextual information. This 
approach was designed for simplicity and feasibility for implementation in UK 
general practice. 
 
4.3.2.3.2. Targeting improvement at priority groups  
Ringeisen et al.(335)  demonstrate that data like the United States National 
Survey of Child and Adolescent Well-Being data can be used to determine the 
frequency and burden of unmet care needs in ethnic or racial minority groups. 
Such analyses can support prioritisation of resources for the development and 
sustainability of targeted outreach and engagement programmes.(335)  
 
The review identified two interventional studies. A randomised controlled trial by 
Tait et al.(331) demonstrated the effectiveness of assigning a support worker (a 
member of staff employed to look after the physical and mental wellbeing of 
children or vulnerable adults in care) to minimise potential barriers to treatment. 
The support worker provided reminders and offered transport to healthcare 
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appointments. At four-month follow-up, this intervention facilitated adolescent 
attendance at healthcare consultations to receive treatment and overall 
significantly reduced hazardous drug use behaviours.(331)  Nordentoft et al.(30) 
assessed by a matched comparison study the efficacy of a suicide prevention 
centre for young people by offering a two-week social and psychological 
treatment programme following principles of cognitive behavioural therapy. At 
one year, a significant reduction in attempted suicide was reported in the 
intervention group, and improvements in measures of depression, 
hopelessness, self-esteem and alcohol abuse.  
 
In-home injuries are a major source of health disparities in many neglected 
populations. Hendrickson (2005) developed a home safety intervention targeted 
at underserved Spanish-speaking populations with limited English language 
proficiency. The intervention offered a bespoke behaviour change counselling to 
minimise in-home safety risks and hazards, and the parents were given a 
brochure on injury prevention. The evaluation demonstrated high retention rates 
of safety improvements made in the home and improved self-efficacy for home 
safety behaviours.(333)    
 
4.3.2.4. Leadership for quality and safety  
Two reports were identified that discuss options for improving leadership for 
improved quality of care and safety for vulnerable children. Brenner and 
Freundlich (311) described the merits of a critical incident reporting system for 
learning from safety events involving children in foster care. The authors 
proposed a reporting tool for social workers to report predefined priority 
incidents with some requiring more urgent follow-up and action than others. The 
authors proposed a template for follow-up reporting that included what changes 
were planned and who was responsible for this process change. The tool 
includes a series of help screens to assist completion. A survey of users 
concluded the tool saved time, was easy to use, and helped to manage incident 
reports. Chin et al.(313) makes key recommendations about the ways in which 
healthcare organisations can introduce a quality improvement culture driven by 
performance data.  
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4.4. Updated programme theory with mapped literature 
The programme theory (Figure 4.3), informed by analysis of incident reports, 
has been updated following the scoping review (Figure 4.5). The purpose of the 
scoping review was to identify the concepts used to improve the safety of care 
delivered to vulnerable children. Each intervention contained one or several 
change concepts and these were mapped against relevant, and sometimes 
multiple, manifest themes (secondary drivers). Such change concepts describe 
ways to minimise circumstances, actions or influences that initiate or increase 
the risk of an incident.  
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Figure 4.5. Updated programme theory with mapped relevant literature  
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Given the heterogeneity of contexts from which the described change concepts 
had been tested, summative judgements of their effectiveness are not 
considered although the study design is included for reference in Table 4.7. I 
have made a judgement about the strength of their proposed action in human 
factors terms (described in Table 4.4) in Table 4.7. For example, ‘methods for 
detecting children in need’ includes a range of concepts with weak, intermediate 
and strong actions. Alternatively, concepts informing ‘management of multi-
agency conferences’ all demonstrate strong human factor actions. Strong 
interventions often require significant investment in staffing, finances, and 
redesign of processes. They require the team or organisational to commit to 
develop and test many changes before arriving at an infrastructure to enable 
sustainability of the changes that achieve improvement. Mapping the concepts 
to secondary drivers is intended to support ideas generating (for each concept) 
and not a means of prioritising which secondary driver should be tackled in an 
organisation first. Such priority setting should emerge from discussions within a 
QI project team and with stakeholders. This concept is demonstrated in more 
detail in chapter 5.  
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4.5. Summary of findings  
In this chapter, I sought to outline a process for using incident report analyses to 
inform the design of improvement projects at a national level (objective 4a). I 
have demonstrated how a focussed analysis of incident reports using mixed 
methods processes, including the PISA coding frameworks (objective 2), can be 
used to generate a programme theory for improvement. Scoping review 
methods have been used to identify existing interventions that comprise change 
concepts that could support the mitigation of issues and redesign of processes 
for improved patient safety. In the next chapter, I will demonstrate how the 
mixed methods approach can be applied to another exemplar topic area (i.e. 
anticoagulation) in a local context.  
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Chapter 5 – Case study of a local incident reporting system  
 
In the previous chapter, I illustrated the process for using incident report 
analyses to inform the design of QI projects using national level data (objective 
4a). To address objective 4b, I will now present a case study that explores this 
process at a local level. Thus, I sought to understand how a reporting system 
can be used to generate learning for quality improvement in a healthcare 
organisation. The case study seeks to offer insights for strategies to guide 
development of similar systems in other organisations by exploring how a 
quality improvement team in an organisation can apply the PISA coding 
frameworks to generate and apply learning from incident reports in the context 
of anticoagulation. The Health Board was selected because it had developed an 
incident reporting system for GPs which is novel given the limited promotion of 
an incident reporting culture amongst primary care professionals.(96,183) 
 
I will discuss how the methods and approach that I had developed were applied 
in the context of anticoagulation. The outline of this chapter is summarised in 
Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1. Overview of chapter 
Section Description 
5.1 As per the case study approach,(336) a description of why this case study is 
important given the emerging international interest in incident reporting systems.  
5.2 Description of the case study method, including data sources and the 
conceptual basis of the analysis. 
5.3 Description of the case including background information about the 
development of the reporting system and an outline of timeline of events for 
context, and identification of important challenges facing the management and 
leadership arising from learning derived from the reporting system. 
5.4 Analysis of case study findings in relation to Senge’s five disciplines of learning. 
(337) 
5.5 Summary of findings. 
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5.1. Why this is an important case study 
Major investments have been made internationally to establish incident 
reporting systems as leading mechanisms for patient safety learning in 
healthcare organisations.(338) There have been few evaluations of the 
effectiveness of incident reporting systems or their outputs at either a local or 
national level in healthcare, and there is little evidence to demonstrate how they 
can be effectively used to improve patient safety outcomes.(339) It is well 
recognised that incident reporting systems are limited by under-reporting, 
selective reporting, and incomplete reporting.(198) They are unable to inform 
estimates of the frequency and burden of incidents, and when compared to 
other methods of examining patient safety in organisations they often reveal 
different issues.(340) In terms of how organisations learn from incident reports, 
Waring (2009) cautions against transforming knowledge into de-contextualised 
'narrow narratives' which is “de-authored and re-constructed to reflect 
managerial assumptions about learning”.(341)  
 
In chapter 1, I described how patient safety incident reporting systems can be 
considered complex interventions to improve safety. There is mounting 
evidence that evaluations are not always well aligned with the intent and 
maturity of the intervention, and this can sometimes lead to a finding of no effect 
with what has been termed Rossi’s Iron Law of Evaluation, defined as:  
 
“The expected value of any net impact assessment of any social program 
is zero. This means that our best a priori estimate of a net impact 
assessment of a program is that it will have no effect. It also means that 
the average of net impact assessments of a large set of social programs 
will crawl asymptotically toward zero.”(342) 
 
Summative judgements about the effectiveness of complex interventions risk 
oversimplifying the diverse range of contexts in which they function. However, a 
recent systematic review of 43 studies identified evidence that incident reporting 
systems can improve safety outcomes, although all authors acknowledged the 
difficulty in demonstrating a causal relationship since they are often embedded 
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within a wider programme of safety initiatives. There was some evidence of 
changes to clinical processes and insubstantial evidence of any cultural change 
or changes in mindset.(339) None of the studies included in the systematic 
review described incident reporting systems for primary care or general 
practice. The guiding question of my case study will be to explore how, and 
under what conditions, can an incident reporting system for general practice 
initiate learning to improve patient safety.(34) 
 
5.2. Case study method 
In this section, I will describe the methods used to undertake a case study of a 
quality improvement project to improve incident reporting from GPs at Cardiff 
and Vale University Health Board. It will explore how the Clinical Governance 
team in the organisation used the methods and principles from my research to 
analyse their locally-held patient safety incident report data, identify 
improvement priorities for a QI project in the organisation, and use QI tools to 
visualise their data and establish buy-in to make changes from stakeholders 
across the organisation and its general practices.   
5.2.1. Funding of improvement project 
The opportunity to serve as a ‘quality improvement coach’ at Cardiff and Vale 
University Health Board was funded by the (former) Translation, Innovation, 
Methodology and Engagement Institute at the School of Medicine, Cardiff 
University. My tuition fees were paid to enrol in a one-year Improvement 
Advisor Professional Development (IA) programme at the Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement in Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. Throughout the 
IA programme, I was responsible for coaching a member of staff and their team 
to undertake a QI project at the Health Board. 
 
The Cardiff University organisational sponsor was Professor Keith Harding, 
Dean of Clinical Innovation, and the Cardiff and Vale University Health Board 
sponsor was Miss Maureen Fallon, the then Deputy Director of Continuous 
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Service Improvement. For the duration of the project, I mentored a senior 
manager in the NHS organisation. 
 
5.2.2. Ethical approval 
The Cardiff University School of Medicine Research Ethics Committee provided 
ethical approval (SM REC 16/6). Informed consent has been obtained from the 
key participants (e.g. Clinical Governance Manager, Organisational Sponsor) 
that I directly refer to in the case study.  
 
5.2.3. What is a case study?  
A case study is an established research approach used to “explain, describe or 
explore events or phenomena in the everyday contexts in which they 
occur”.(336)  
 
5.2.3.1. Stages of case study development  
Crowe et al.(336) outline the following stages in the development of a case 
study:  
1. Defining the case;  
2. Selecting the case(s);  
3. Collecting and analysing the data;  
4. Interpreting data; and,  
5. Reporting the findings. 
 
I will describe each stage in sections 5.2.3.2. – 5.2.3.6. 
 
5.2.3.2. Defining the case 
A case study can be defined in terms of the research question it seeks to 
address; for example, can healthcare organisations use learning from incident 
reports to improve patient safety in primary care? It is empirically informed by 
existing evidence which defines the starting context or problem. In my case 
study, best available evidence suggested incident reporting systems did not 
improve outcomes in organisations.(339) My working theory was QI tools could 
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be used to visualise patient safety incident report data,(343) and increase 
awareness of issues apparent in incident reports received by the organisation. 
In terms of context, Cardiff and Vale UHB recognised that improving patient 
safety in primary care was an emerging priority for Welsh Government and 
internationally, and an improvement agenda was needed for the organisation.   
 
5.2.3.3. Selecting the case  
The focus of the case study was on anti-coagulation since this was an examplar 
of how the Clinical Governance team applied QI methods to an improvement 
priority identified from analysis of incident reports. This case study represents 
an opportunity to understand how methods originally intended for national-level 
analysis and improvement initiatives may be adapted, and whether effective in 
the local setting, with similar objectives.   
 
5.2.3.4. Collecting and analysing the data 
A range of quantitative and qualitative data was collected during the 
improvement project. Such data are summarised in Table 5.2 in terms of the 
improvement and organisational contexts it represents.  
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Table 5.2. Case study data sources and description of content 
Source Description 
Improvement context 
MUSIQ self-
assessment 
survey 
A self-assessment survey called the Model for Understanding Success 
in Quality (MUSIQ) that was completed by the organisational sponsor, 
project team leader and the improvement coach before the project and 
at nine months.(344) The self-assessment tool explored multiple 
contextual domains to permit identification of areas of weakness for 
development by improvement team / sponsors in the organisation.  
Improvement 
project protocol 
A copy of the original improvement project protocol written with, and 
agreed by, the organisational sponsor and Clinical Governance 
Manager (see Appendix 14). 
Monthly project 
reports 
Monthly reports to comply with the assessment requirements of the 
Institute for Healthcare Improvement ‘IA programme’ containing 
quantitative run charts and Shewhart charts and explanatory 
narrative.(30) 
Field notes Field notes defined as, “shorthand reconstructions of events, 
observations, and conversations that took place in the field” taken 
during fortnightly face-to-face meetings with the team leader,(345) and 
at key meetings in organisation (e.g. Quality and Safety Faculty) and 
with the Local Medical Committee (a statutory representative 
organisation for GPs in the geographical area served by health 
board).(346) 
Organisational context 
Patient safety 
incident reports 
Review of the original patient safety incident reports submitted by GPs 
to the organisation and data management processes for those reports 
in the organisation.  
Internal 
communications 
Internal documents produced by the Clinical Governance Manager 
relating to the project.(347)  
 
Data were analysed using a Framework Analysis, which required repeated 
reviewing and sorting of the voluminous and detail-rich data.(292) An existing 
theoretical framework developed by Senge (337), arguably the most influential 
text on the concept of the learning organisation, was used to examine emerging 
themes against five disciplines of a learning organisation (see Table 5.3).(189) 
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Table 5.3. Five disciplines of a learning organisation (189) 
Dimension Definition 
Shared vision To establish a clear sense of purpose. This includes having 
conversations to shape the emerging agenda and build shared 
understanding and commitment, motivate the sharing of aspirations, 
and identify and address reservation and resistance amongst staff.  
Mental model To identify beliefs, values, mind-sets and assumptions that determine 
the way staff think and act.  
Personal mastery To manage change relationships sensitively, acceptance of having 
beliefs and values challenged and to ensure change interactions and 
related behaviours are authentic, congruent and principled.  
Team learning Teams learn by sharing experience, insights, knowledge and skills 
with each other about how to do things better. Teams develop 
reflection, inquiry and discussion skills to conduct more skillful change 
conversations and activities e.g. utilising tools like PDSA cycles.  
Systems thinking To examine inter-relationships underlying complex situations and 
interactions rather than simplistic (and mostly inaccurate) linear 
cause-effect chains. This will allow teams to unravel hidden subtleties, 
influences, leverage points and intended/unintended consequences of 
change plans and programmes and leads to deeper, more complete 
awareness of the interconnections behind changing the system. 
 
5.2.3.5. Interpreting data  
My role as a QI coach to the organisation,(348) with a vested interest in the 
processes for maximising learning from incident report data, risked introducing 
bias to my interpretation of the case study data. I sought to maximise the input 
of key stakeholders in the organisation through sharing monthly project reports 
(September 2012 to July 2013) with the organisational sponsor and project 
team for their critical input.  
 
A copy of the draft report was shared with key stakeholders for respondent 
validation purposes where I sought consensus, and alternative explanations, for 
the conclusions reached through one-to-one meetings with an executive 
director, a middle manager, and a GP in the health board.  
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5.2.3.6. Reporting the findings 
I co-authored a conference poster for presentation at an international 
conference with members of the project team (Clinical Governance Manager) 
and organisational leadership (Deputy Director of Improvement, Medical 
Director, Clinical Director, and Chief Operating Officer). A copy of the final 
report submitted for assessment by the Institute for Healthcare Improvement 
was circulated within the organisation, and an oral presentation was given to the 
organisation’s Quality and Safety Improvement Faculty (a quarterly meeting to 
celebrate innovation that is attended by the organisation’s senior leadership).  
 
5.3. Details of the case study 
5.3.1. Background to the local incident reporting system 
In 2010, integrated Health Boards that brought primary and secondary care 
together into the same organisation were formed throughout NHS Wales. There 
are 67 GP practices in the Cardiff and Vale University Health Board in South 
East Wales, United Kingdom. During the merger, GPs raised patient safety 
concerns about the primary and secondary care interface relating to discharge, 
prescribing and shared care. The Local Medical Committee (LMC), the statutory 
representative organisation for GPs practicing within the Health Board’s 
catchment area, felt that concerns that had been communicated to the previous 
secondary care organisations had not been acted upon. There was no formal or 
reliable incident reporting process in place for GPs.  
 
The Health Board and GP practices recognised the potential to improve patient 
safety through the quality of communication, interaction and cooperation 
between the sectors. In February 2012, leaders from the Health Board and the 
LMC agreed to launch a system to enable patient safety incidents to be 
reported from general practice.  
 
The new process for reporting was:  
● GPs reported incidents via a clinical letter addressed to the relevant 
Clinical Directorate to enable investigation and response and a copy was 
  187 
sent to the Primary Care Divisional Director and the Primary Care 
Clinical Governance Manager; 
● next, the Primary Care Clinical Governance Manager reviewed the 
content of the letter and coded a short free-text summary of the incident 
in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, the name of the GP practice, and the 
date received by the team (see screenshot of database in Microsoft 
Excel in Figure 5.1); and, 
● finally, the Primary Care Clinical Governance Manager acknowledged 
receipt of the incident by writing back to the reporter and liaised with 
relevant departments to ensure action. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Screenshot of warfarin-related incidents in database 
 
The reporting system received 192 reports from GPs between February 2012 
and December 2013. The system was separate to the paper-based incident 
reporting system used in the Health Board’s hospitals.  
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5.3.2. Reporting system challenges 
Several challenges arose in the first 18 months of the reporting system’s 
functioning concerning the analysis of reports and the ability of the Health Board 
to provide a timely response to the concerns raised by GPs. As a result, the rate 
of reporting from GPs had decreased and there was a sense of dwindling 
interest in the reporting system as a result of the delays in action. Several 
reasons underpinned this: 
  
● A Clinical Directorate Manager for each specialty in the Health Board had 
the responsibility to review the content of a report and consider the 
improvement options.  
● Incidents were being considered in isolation (at the Clinical Directorate 
level) and not in conjunction with other similar incidents. Variable lag 
times existed between the receipt of incident reports and reporting back 
to the GP about actions to prevent future occurrences. In some cases, a 
delay of up to three months existed.  
● Difficulty prioritising issues using data in the incident report database.  
● Reports often required telephone follow-up by the Primary Care Clinical 
Governance Manager for more detail. 
  
5.3.3. What the improvement team in the Health Board did 
I will now provide an overview of how the Health Board addressed challenges to 
develop and maintain a functioning incident reporting system.  
 
5.3.3.1. My role as an improvement coach  
As an Institute for Healthcare Improvement-trained Improvement Advisor, I 
coached the Primary Care Clinical Governance Manager to: consider what the 
key concepts for change were described in incident report data by using the 
PISA coding frameworks to code incidents and contributory factors and 
consider the implications for systems redesign; and, identify the key issues to 
be discussed and described in emerging driver diagrams.  
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5.3.3.2. Accountability and ownership 
The Chief Operating Officer (COO) established a taskforce mandating all 
Clinical Directorate Managers and Clinical Directors attend. Constituency leads 
from the LMC were invited to attend. Following the first task force meeting, 
several changes were made to the way the Health Board’s leadership learnt 
about patient safety incidents occurring in primary care:  
● a forum comprising primary and secondary care professionals and the 
LMC was established to enable better communication and joint working 
between the University Health Board (UHB) and GPs;  
● the Primary Care Clinical Governance Manager was required to ‘identify 
trends’ and write reports to the Medical Director, and those reports were 
reviewed via a standing agenda item at Executive Board and LMC 
meetings; and, 
● a primary care nurse kept an incident log and tabled it for review at 
weekly meetings with the Clinical Board Nurses and COO.  
 
Finally, members of the taskforce recognised the initial will demonstrated by the 
GPs to report incidents. To acknowledge their concerns, and in an attempt to 
demonstrate incident reporting can support systems improvement, a pilot QI 
project was agreed to support the development of the Health Board’s processes 
to learn from incident reports.  
 
5.3.3.3. A demonstration anticoagulation pilot project 
Anticoagulation-related incidents were the most frequently reported issue to the 
reporting system. Each report concerning anticoagulation had previously been 
sent to the relevant Clinical Directorate for investigation. However, by combining 
all anticoagulation-related reports, the Primary Care Clinical Governance 
Manager could undertake a brief content analysis of 27 separate incidents (18 
from an 8-month period from 15 different practices) which revealed five main 
issues when displayed in a Pareto chart (Figure 5.2). The chart demonstrates 
the descending frequency of issues in the bars, and a cumulative total of reports 
represented by the overlying line graph.  
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Figure 5.2. Pareto chart of warfarin-related issues note: more than one issue 
identified in some reports 
 
Reviewing the incident reports in detail permitted the development of a first draft 
of a driver diagram. Three primary drivers, and related secondary drivers, were 
drafted based on the incident types and contributory factors identified in reports, 
and are summarised in a driver diagram (Figure 5.3).  
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Figure 5.3. First draft of driver diagram (programme theory) for improvement of 
anticoagulation services  
 
Findings from the incident reports were presented to hospital consultants at the 
grand round by the Medical Director. There, the consultants felt the delays in 
discharge were due to patients remaining in hospital to achieve ‘stable INRs’ 
and that this was not an issue that necessitated a hospital bed. They supported 
the development of primary care services for assuming responsibility for slow-
loading warfarin. Next, a GP and secondary care forum with representatives 
from pharmacy and finance was convened to discuss options to mitigate the 
issues identified by GPs and hospital consultants. Those discussions were used 
to update the driver diagram (Figure 5.4) and permitted articulation of more 
specific and operational change concepts and ideas. For example, ‘minimise 
risks to patients discharged to the community with unstable INRs’ was updated 
to “Acute Rehabilitation Team to manage patients with ‘unstable’ INRs”. The 
related change ideas for each ‘secondary driver’ became the basis of the QI 
project plans used by the Health Board to lead change in anticoagulation 
services.  
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Figure 5.4. Updated driver diagram (programme theory) for improvement of 
anticoagulation services  
 
5.3.3.3.1. Examples of Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) cycles  
A summary of the changes made by the team are listed in the ‘Change Ideas for 
PDSA’ column of the driver diagram (Figure 5.4). PDSA is short for ‘Plan, Do, 
Study, Act’. This is a tool to structure and communicate plans for change by 
stating the objectives of each ‘cycle’ in terms of what will be done differently, 
predictions and identifying who is responsible for each process (i.e. ‘plan’), 
carrying out the development or test and documenting problems and 
unexpected observations (‘do’), analysing the data collected (‘study’), and 
considering what has been learnt to inform future developments and tests 
(‘act’).(30) Throughout the project, some changes were made simultaneously, 
whilst others required a sequential approach where learning from one change 
informed the next (see Figure 5.5).  
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Figure 5.5. Summary of PDSA cycles 
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An example outcome from a PDSA includes a cost-benefit analysis of efforts to 
minimise warfarin-related incidents for patients. The full PDSA cycle is 
described in Appendix 15. In brief, to complete the PDSA cycle, the quality 
improvement team planned to collect data about existing practices (e.g. length 
of stay of patients started on warfarin) and their consequences, and considered 
how a new model of working would function (e.g. the number of trained staff 
required, anticipated cost of enhanced service provided by general practice, 
amongst other variables). Using administrative data, the Primary Care Clinical 
Governance Manager and an Anticoagulation Pharmacist identified 25 patients 
over a calendar month who had a delayed discharge whilst awaiting a ‘stable 
INR’. The finance team estimated this cost to be £38,874 per month, with 
overall unnecessary hospitalisation costs being £466,488 per annum. Estimated 
costs were next drawn up for each of the proposed changes. The difference 
between existing practice and the proposed new models of practice 
demonstrated a potential cost saving of around £300k per annum (see Figure 
5.6 for the breakdown of costs).  
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Figure 5.6. Business case calculations comparing old and new models of INR 
monitoring 
 
Once the pilot anticoagulation project launched, the Health Board 
communicated learning from PDSAs back to LMC representatives at the 
primary and secondary care forum. There is some evidence in the Shewhart 
chart in Figure 5.7 (a graph to examine data for special causes of variation) that 
the pilot project’s initiation had some impact on increased reporting rates and in 
prompting practices that had not previously used the system to report. The 
overlying cumulative frequency chart (Figure 5.7) demonstrates this might have 
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contributed to a change in mindset for GPs that had not previously reported an 
incident to the reporting system.  
Figure 5.7. A control chart to demonstrate frequency of incident reports and an 
overlying cumulative frequency chart of the number of new reporting practices 
(red dots signify identified special cause variation) 
 
The upper control limit (UCL) in Figure 5.7 represents the limits of process 
variation for the number of reports received. The chart demonstrates from 
October 2012, following initiation of the task force, there was evidence of 
‘special cause variation’ (denoted with red dots adhering to the following rules 
suggestive of a non-random process: at least one point more than 3σ from the 
centre line and four out of five points more than 1σ from the centre line) which 
the team believed could be due to the increased number of new practices 
submitting incident reports which is apparent on the cumulative frequency chart 
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above.(349) The increase in reporting practices corresponded with the initiation 
and delivery of the pilot anticoagulation project (March 2013 onwards).  
 
5.3.3.4. Outcomes from the project  
The task force remains a fixture in the Health Board to pick up and respond to 
incidents and trends are captured via the incident reporting process and to 
agree a way forward to address issues. A formal report on patient safety 
incidents and investigative outcomes remains a standing agenda item at the 
LMC and UHB Executive Board. All general practices in the Health Board now 
deliver the enhanced service. A reimbursement of £120 for initiation / slow 
loading of warfarin, and £150 per annum per patient for ongoing management, 
has been agreed for the provision of INR monitoring and a warfarin dosing 
service. This direct enhanced service has since been extended across Wales, 
for all Health Boards and their general practices, via the General Medical 
Services Contract with effect from April 2017.  
 
When asked, “What impact has the quality improvement project made in 
Wales?” a Senior Welsh Government leader replied:  
“At the national level, there was some recognition of the need to update 
enhanced services but this work was a useful driver. This [project] 
described the systems we all acknowledge should be in place and 
allowed us to compare what was actually happening and showed us 
what needed to be updated…. It was also helpful to challenge any 
criticism of GPs, “they won’t change” as we could show that engagement 
improves as soon as systems are made to work effectively. [The work led 
in the Health Board] was a good example of a once for Wales 
approach...we don’t all need to repeat that learning.” 
 
5.4. Analysis in relation to Senge’s five disciplines of learning 
I have outlined the definitions for each of Senge’s five disciplines of learning in 
Table 5.3.  
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5.4.1. Establishing a shared vision for the project 
The Health Board recognised that post-merger morale was low amongst the 
GPs. It demonstrated tangible engagement and action by its leadership in 
support of patient safety by initiating the COO-led task force. The Assistant 
Director of Improvement commented: 
“Intervention was needed. The Health Board was taking months to 
acknowledge safety concerns raised by GPs. There were apparent 
bottlenecks in our communication processes to review and take action 
for each incident report. The task force enabled us to highlight those 
bottlenecks, restructure the way we reviewed progress and receive 
updates on actions being taken in each clinical directorate.”    
 
The task force helped to establish a shared sense of purpose that the learning 
from the incident reports that GPs had taken the time to complete mattered to 
the Health Board. As the Assistant Director of Improvement, added, “These are 
the issues and solutions [they] have reported... the [Health Board] was listening 
to them.”  
 
A first draft of a programme theory for change was developed from incident 
reports using PISA coding frameworks and related methods. This was the basis 
for the quality improvement team to subsequently co-develop (iterate / amend) 
the theory by inviting feedback from both primary and secondary care 
stakeholders. All improvement plans were agreed and signed off jointly by the 
LMC Chair and Medical Director which also imbued a sense of collaboration. To 
inform those decisions, multiple forums provided input to deepen understanding 
about the challenges faced by healthcare professionals in community and 
hospital settings.  
 
“By being able to sort the reports into similar incidents and think about 
their underlying causes, it was possible to harness the perspectives of 
GPs, which I think as [a Health Board] we had never really done before, 
and create a sense of urgency for change…. One [member of staff] wrote 
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to me saying how this project was finally achieving what the [Health 
Board] had been talking about doing for upwards of ten years!”  (Primary 
Care Clinical Governance Manager)  
 
The driver diagram (Figure 5.4) was an effective tool for displaying the 
programme theory and for orientating different stakeholders (executives, 
managers, and clinical leaders) to the key concepts and ideas for change. 
Strong support emerged to proposed changes. The Primary Care Clinical 
Governance Manager reflected on where she believes the origins of this 
support emerged:  
“We took a long-standing, seemingly intractable problem [warfarin-
related safety incidents] and demonstrated we were listening to how this 
impacted the GPs. We summarised their ideas as plans for change in a 
single driver diagram instead of a lengthy written proposal…. [the 
stakeholders] liked seeing a summary of these complex issues on one 
page, it engaged them. The proposed ideas were their ideas.”   
 
5.4.2. Inclusivity of multiple mental models 
The driver diagram represented an attempt to portray a summary of problems 
with the existing system. Such a concise overview permitted each stakeholder 
group to consider their own experiences in relation to the issues presented. 
Task force meetings provided an opportunity for multiple stakeholders to 
assimilate the feedback gained from discussions and presentations to wider 
groups of professionals and agree by consensus on the plans described in the 
driver diagram.  
 
The pilot QI project helped build a mental model (considered by Senge in terms 
of the conceptual frameworks that influence how we view the world and act in 
it)(189) of ‘what’s possible’ for the GPs, the leadership and the hospital 
professionals by undertaking a focussed analysis of incident reports and 
discussing what changes were needed. It was important to understand the 
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different perspectives on the problems identified by the incident reports; as a 
Senior Welsh Government leader described it:  
“GPs tend to identify and deal with issues within their own sphere of 
influence; they are reluctant to spend time trying to address wider issues 
where timescales are slow and processes appear complicated”. 
Bringing representatives from multiple stakeholder groups from the Health 
Board’s leadership and management, and a range of primary and secondary 
care professionals and leaders from disciplines such as medicine and 
pharmacy, permitted a combining of perspectives. The Health Board’s Patient 
Safety Manager commented, “...everybody who needed to be there to make a 
decision, take action to enact a change or to measure the impact of those 
changes, were all there each week.” The pilot project increased confidence in 
the value and utility of incident reporting systems for informing improvement 
agendas: 
 “...we noticed that once we started to acknowledge the concerns raised 
by the GPs and provided them with feedback about our plans for 
anticoagulation via their LMC representatives, new GP surgeries became 
vocal and started submitting their own incident reports. We were 
measuring the rate the reports were coming in and our charts suggested 
our activities were instilling confidence amongst GPs that had never 
previously reported an incident to the Health Board. [see Figure 5.6]” 
(Primary Care Clinical Governance Manager) 
 
5.4.3. Managing change relationships (personal mastery) 
The improvement team used different formats of communication to disseminate 
learning. An emphasis on getting opinions on the proposed plans and 
willingness to accept additions and amendments demonstrated inclusiveness. 
Communications with GPs and hospital doctors were managed via their leaders 
who explicitly sought feedback on the proposed changes in the driver diagram. 
Identifying ‘big ticket’ opportunities for the QI project that emerged from their 
incident report data helped to secure early buy-in from GP and hospital leaders 
for the pilot project. Similarly, the creation of a business case based on staff 
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concerns and ideas for improvement, which also had cost-saving implications, 
secured commitment from senior leadership. A senior Welsh Government 
leader commented: 
“As soon as the governance team showed real commitment to act the 
reporting increased, which gave the team more data to challenge areas 
within the hospital setting…. They also built a case about the risk and 
made it uncomfortable for [the Health Board] to ignore. I think this led to 
interest in solving the problem which was recognised as an 
organisational problem not a ‘GP Issue’...”  
 
The COO mandated attendance at the task force for the Health Boards senior 
leadership. The Health Board’s response time to GPs, and the action arising 
from what was learnt, became an escalated priority for all leaders attending the 
task force.  
“The meetings were regular, they were minuted, and each clinical 
directorate leader or representative had tasks to complete by the next 
meeting.”  (Assistant Director of Improvement) 
 
5.4.4. Team learning 
A structured approach for developing and testing changes in practice called the 
Model for Improvement enabled focussed inductive-deductive learning cycles 
via PDSAs (Figure 5.5). Some PDSAs took several months to move from 
development to implementation in practice; for example, in October 2012 a 
definition of a stable INR was agreed with implementation of the new agreed 
definition in February 2013. Such developments and tests of change required 
negotiation, consensus, and such complex transactions required trust between 
leaders and representatives.  
 
Nine reports described issues with management of patients with unstable INR 
or initiating warfarin in the community.  
“Although they were few in number, the reports described nine less than 
optimal outcomes for our patients. You couldn’t overlook these nine 
essentially stories about patients that might have had excellent care 
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during their stay and at the final hurdle had their experience and safety 
compromised because of poor communication and unclear awareness by 
secondary care physicians about what was realistic and is delivered by 
primary care.” (Primary Care Clinical Governance Manager) 
 
Although few in number, a PDSA was agreed to develop consensus around a 
definition of ‘stable’ INRs and a protocol for slow-loading in the community. 
Improvement team members with tacit knowledge were able to explain why 
such requests to ‘slow-load’ warfarin in the community were not feasible given 
the constraints on GPs to deliver such services safely. Changes ideas were 
identified that could enable community services to assume responsibility, and 
this informed the subsequent discussions about a contract to deliver an 
enhanced service in general practice. It also identified knowledge gaps in what 
secondary care clinicians presumed was possible in the community.  
“If anybody was unclear about what we were doing or why we were doing 
it, they could read the PDSA sheets. [Appendix 15] These took me a long 
time to fill out at first but I’m glad I did it now because they were useful to 
share at meetings…. Brought us onto the same page...” (Primary Care 
Clinical Governance Manager) 
 
5.4.5. Systems thinking 
The project, and its leadership, demonstrated the benefits of seeking multiple 
perspectives whilst attempting to understand what and how the system could be 
improved in the interests of improved safety. The initial insights from incident 
reports became the basis of further discussions about what changes were 
needed to improve anticoagulation safety.  
“The incident reports from GPs helped the consultants realise the 
implications of the actions by junior members of their team, and in some 
cases themselves.” Assistant Director for Improvement  
 
The task force chaired by the COO was initially created to clear a backlog of 
unresolved safety incidents reported by GPs within the Health Board. Members 
of the task force were chosen since they were identified as being essential for 
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improvement in the departments where issues had been highlighted by GPs 
about secondary care services. The taskforce therefore played an important 
role in pushing forwards many challenging structural changes in the project. For 
example, securing the commitment from each Clinical Directorate to provide a 
named representative to receive reports demonstrates a will to support a 
timelier process of investigation, resolution of ongoing or outstanding issues, 
and feedback to the reporting clinician. The anticoagulation project helped 
convince stakeholders that using incident reports to inform improvement 
projects can be an effective means of engaging clinicians and identifying drivers 
for change. The task force comprised diverse representation from multiple 
hierarchical levels in the Health Board.  
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5.5. A model for local incident report-driven improvement projects 
Drawing together the learning highlighted in this case study, combined with my 
previous work analysing homogenous volumes of incident reports (chapter 4), 
there are apparent stages (and related objectives) to support incident report-
driven improvement. I have summarised these stages in Figure 5.8. The case 
study highlights the benefits that can be yielded from undertaking objectives 1 
and 3 at the outset of an improvement project. Objectives 4-6 represent my 
post-hoc reflections on the benefits of updating and amending a programme 
theory arising from the activities to achieve objectives 1–3, and throughout the 
project. A scoping review of the literature was not undertaken for the project 
described in the case study. However, my subsequent research and 
development work highlights this can be beneficial for outlining existing options 
available to inform improvement plans.  
 
 
Figure 5.8. A model for an incident reporting system-driven patient safety 
improvement project 
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5.6. Conclusion 
An analysis of incident reports at a local level, using a structured approach to 
analysis including the PISA coding frameworks and related methods, can be 
used to generate a programme theory for a QI project within a healthcare 
organisation. Initial themes identified from reports can be used to guide more in-
depth discussions with relevant stakeholders. QI tools like a driver diagram can 
be used to invite key stakeholders to amend and update the theory. A model for 
incident report-driven improvement is proposed. Evidence exists to demonstrate 
how learning from incident reporting can support a healthcare organisation to 
work towards fulfilment of the criteria outlined in Senge’s five disciplines of a 
learning organisation.  
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Chapter 6 – Discussion of methods 
 
6.1. Overview of chapter  
A structured, mixed methods process has been developed to generate learning 
from incident reports. An outcome of this process can be a programme theory 
for change. The coding and analytical process has been designed to be 
replicable in healthcare organisations. A QI tool called a driver diagram can 
summarise the emerging draft programme theory. Scoping reviews and QI 
methods to engage stakeholders can be used to update and amend the 
programme theory for change.  
 
To begin to address objective 5 of my thesis, which is to: “Propose areas for 
future research and development to improve the ability to generate learning 
from patient safety incidents.”, I will reflect on the conceptual approaches taken 
to analyse patient safety incident report data, and I will describe the lessons 
learnt from the application of methods developed and / or applied to achieve 
study objectives 2-4 (objective 1 was discussed in chapter 2). 
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6.2. Reflection on conceptual approach  
I have outlined the conceptual decisions made to address my research 
objectives in section 1.6.1 of chapter 1. In this section, I will now reflect on how:  
 
● Dewey’s [pragmatic] systematic approach to inquiry, aligned with the 
mixed methods paradigm, has encouraged a reflexive process of 
development and testing to promote learning throughout the thesis 
(objectives 1-5); and how, 
● Reason’s Trajectory of Accident Opportunity has served as the basis for 
aligning the concepts and definitions from WHO ICPS to process incident 
report data to identify priorities and generate learning for improving 
safety in general practice (objectives 2-4).  
 
 
6.2.1. Dewey’s systematic approach to inquiry  
Dewey’s approach promoted a philosophy of continuous improvement of 
several processes throughout the PhD within the context of the limitations of 
incident report data and the intended research objectives, particularly:  
 
● the development of codes, their definitions and rules for application;  
● a systematic approach to exploratory descriptive analysis;  
● sensemaking of aggregates of incident reports to propose areas with the 
greatest need and opportunity for future intervention strategies to 
improve patient safety in general practice; and,  
● efficient approaches to identify existing interventions and initiatives to 
inform the design of improvement projects.  
 
6.2.1.1. Sources of learning  
The pragmatic paradigm supported my intentions to learn from both 
development and application of ideas throughout the PhD. In relation to 
Dewey’s systematic approach to inquiry (Figure 1.7 in chapter 1), many cycles 
of learning between beliefs and actions occurred in order to develop and apply 
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the methods to achieve the study objectives. I outline this learning in more detail 
in section 6.3.  
 
My prior experiences of analysing incident report data,(350–352) and 
awareness of the debate concerning the limitations of these data amongst 
clinical and informatics communities,(183,353) influenced my judgements about 
the methodological approaches needed. Thus, I acknowledged those prior 
beliefs at the outset of the study, and sought to appoint a balanced professional 
advisory group to achieve consensus on issues that might be biased by my own 
principles and intentions. The professional advisory group was comprised of 
policymakers, health services researchers, primary care patient safety 
researchers, and human factors experts. My diverse group of (grant) 
collaborators included epidemiologists, academic GPs, statisticians and 
sociologists.  
 
Meetings with collaborating colleagues and professional advisors, and 
experience from submitting and responding to peer review comments for pilot 
manuscripts submitted to journals, have advanced my ideas and understanding 
of the developed methods for generating learning from incident reports. The 
initial Professional Advisory Group meeting in Cardiff in July 2014 challenged 
my original analytical plans proposed to the National Institute for Health 
Research to address objectives 2 and 3. Pilot work which I conceptualised and 
supervised informed those discussions and has since been published in 
Pediatrics, Vaccine, the British Journal of General Practice and PLOS 
Medicine.(36,257,354,355) Further, my professional preparation as an Institute 
for Healthcare Improvement trained QI coach, and role in coaching an 
organisation to utilise the methods developed for analysis of large volumes of 
incident reports (chapters 3 and 4), has influenced my beliefs about the 
transferability of the methods developed (objectives 2-4) for use in healthcare 
organisations (chapter 5).  
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6.2.2. Reflection on Reason’s Trajectory of Accident Opportunity  
The conceptual basis of systems thinking as described by Reason provided a 
sound theoretical base to apply WHO ICPS concepts and definitions.(2,356) A 
structured ordering of codes was required to deconstruct incident report 
narratives whilst retaining their meaning (see Figure 6.1). The implied 
chronology of incidents with the trajectory was intuitive and permitted the 
application of the Recursive Module of Incident Analysis rules about the 
relationships of concepts.(288) Combined, this permitted training of multiple 
clinicians to simultaneously review reports with strong concordance. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Trajectory of a patient safety incident applied to the Swiss cheese 
model 
 
 
The Swiss cheese model was also helpful in the development of incident type 
and contributory factor classes. The concepts of ‘contributory factor’ and 
‘contributory incident’ resulted in considerable overlap of classes and their 
inherent codes in early piloting. The holes in the cheese represent incidents 
arising from human error and contributory factors which are the system 
conditions in terms of influences from patient, staff, environment, organisational 
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policies, and equipment. Nine rules were used to conceptually organise the 
relationships between incidents, contributory factors and outcomes (see Table 
3.4 in chapter 3). For example, “Rule 2: An incident can be a contributing factor 
to another incident” (as seen in Figure 6.1). The study team was supported by 
Mr Peter Hibbert (a human factors expert and one of the original developers of 
the Advanced Incident Management System) to make sense of those rules, 
apply them, and identify which codes belong in each class and why (described 
in more detail in section 6.3.2).  
6.3. Learning from applying methods  
A fundamental objective of this thesis was to develop methods to characterise 
the content of incident reports, and discussions within the coding team and the 
wider professional advisory group informed decisions about balancing the 
objectivity and subjectivity of reviewers (section 6.3.1); the development of the 
PISA coding frameworks aligned to WHO ICPS (section 6.3.2); and, the 
development of the data management system (section 6.3.3).   
 
6.3.1. Trade-off between explicit and implicit judgements 
A pilot analysis of applying the PISA frameworks to incident reports revealed 
they were often written in shorthand, and were jargon- and acronym-laden. This 
implied there could be some expectation from reporters for issues to be inferred 
by the healthcare professionals or managers reading and responsible for 
actioning the report.  
 
There is a risk of confirmation bias when researchers analysing incident reports 
attempt to validate pre-existing hypotheses about the data by drawing on their 
clinical experiences. For example, seeking to identify the information in reports 
that would corroborate the contributory factors they had pre-conceived before 
fully reviewing the incident. Similarly, a risk of frequency bias exists when the 
researchers become familiar with particular contributory factors because they 
are observed most often.(357) As Javaux, cited by Johnson,(357) cautions, 
subsequent similar incidents are likely to be classified according to the 
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commonest codes used to describe incidents irrespective of whether an incident 
is actually caused by those factors. Similarly, recognition bias is possible when 
researchers have a limited vocabulary of codes to describe incidents which do 
not necessarily reflect the complexity or conditions of what is described.(357)  
 
To achieve consistency in the application of codes, per the Recursive Model of 
Incident Analysis,(288) my collaborators and I decided that codes must 
represent what is explicitly stated in the narrative, not inferred by the clinical 
reviewer. The decision was based on an iterative approach involving regular 
discussions that drew upon our collective experiences of analysing incident 
reports and learning from the application of emerging coding frameworks to pilot 
samples of data. This approach minimised subjectivity and meant discordance 
discussions primarily concerned misunderstandings about definitions of codes 
rather than the interpretation of the incident report content. Overall, this process 
permitted informed decision-making about coding, training and quality 
assurance processes.   
 
To capitalise on the ‘soft intelligence’ inherent within incident reports (described 
earlier in section 1.5), I believed it was important to utilise the clinical expertise 
of reviewers.(192) Once the most frequent and most serious incidents had been 
identified, clinicians were instructed to re-review the content of similar reports to 
aid interpretation of the relationships between codes. This permitted a clinician-
oriented description of aggregated reports, as well as to identify apparent 
themes between similarly grouped reports. These were integrative and manifest 
themes that described the identified opportunities to intervene for systems 
improvement. 
 
6.3.2. PISA framework development  
Development of a comprehensive PISA coding framework, aligned with WHO 
ICPS, to characterise safety incident reports in general practice has permitted 
the description of events leading up to patient safety incidents, their reported 
contributory factors (human and system issues), and patient- and system-level 
outcomes. Four independent classes (a description of the incident, its 
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contributory factors and the type and level of harm) should provide sufficient 
minimal information for practising healthcare professionals to identify learning 
for improvements in future practice from the reports. 
 
The manual coding of reports was a resource-intensive process in terms of the 
application of codes and the development of the code book. Codes within each 
class were inductively added and amended throughout the study, with fewer 
iterations needed towards the end of the study. Given the shared ‘contributory’ 
nature of contributory incidents and contributory factors, codes were assigned 
to the ‘incident’ or ‘contributory factors’ framework based on strict adherence to 
the definition of those concepts i.e. codes for descriptions of what happened 
were included in the incident framework, and codes for description of why an 
incident occurred in terms of circumstances, actions or influences were included 
in the contributory factors framework. Regular team meetings held to discuss 
such changes should be emulated by those responsible for the analysis of 
incident reports within healthcare organisations to permit a shared 
understanding of codes, their definition, and application.  
 
The PISA coding framework was designed to be aligned with the conceptual 
framework for the WHO ICPS.(2) As demonstrated in chapter 2, multiple 
classification systems exist to characterise incident report data. Given their 
heterogeneity of codes and related definitions, there is a strong push from WHO 
for the uptake of ICPS to enable international comparison and identification of 
shared learning. Given its conceptual alignment, the PISA coding frameworks 
could be considered for uptake in healthcare systems internationally.  
 
The pilot analysis and discussions with the professional advisory group carefully 
considered what classes from WHO ICPS were essential to characterise safety 
incidents occurring in general practice.(2) ICPS contains 10 high level classes 
with 48 inherent concepts. This was deemed too granular for application to 
incident report data (as opposed to other data such as root cause analysis 
reports) on account of incident reports containing free text description of ‘what 
happened’, ‘perceived contributory factors’ and ‘actions to prevent recurrence’. 
Several more in-depth considerations were made during the development of the 
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coding frameworks. For completeness, to summarise this learning from my 
research, reflections are made on the Desiderata for the design of a controlled 
healthcare vocabulary outlined by Cimino (described earlier in Table 3.5 in 
section 3.1.6.2) in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1. Reflections on the Desiderata for the design of a controlled 
healthcare vocabulary. Modified from Cimino (298)  
 
Desiderata  Learning from research 
Concept 
orientation 
The code name should clearly articulate its meaning.  
Concept 
permanence 
Given the exploratory nature of the study, this desideratum 
raises an important consideration about the content of the final 
coding frameworks for external users and how they should 
update / amend these. During the development and initial 
application of the classes to the incident report data, it was 
essential to iterate and capture the learning from empirical 
analysis of incident reports.  
Meaningless 
concept 
identifier 
The Trajectory of Accident Opportunity model is the conceptual 
basis for structuring and ordering the application of codes. 
Code-dependence is essential as it implies a relationship 
between codes for a given context. Hierarchical relationships 
are important for this purpose e.g. ‘7.1.4.2. Dose dependent 
drugs’ is a ‘child’ of ‘7.1.4. Responding to results’.   
Polyhierarchy Polyhierarchy was deemed important providing it was clear 
how the definition of the code (e.g. administering) would differ 
given its relationship to the parent code (e.g. vaccine or drug).  
Formal 
definitions 
Semantic definitions underwent regular review, and as new 
reviewers joined the research group, their review / identification 
of definitions that were vague or ambiguous was sought. 
No residual 
categories 
Residual categories were created as exclusion categories. 
Given the purpose of the projects was to characterise the 
content of incident reports, this also required description of 
what was reported as an incident but was not deemed to be an 
incident by clinical reviewers. Understanding what gets 
incorrectly reported is an important learning opportunity and 
one which should be encouraged in healthcare organisations.  
Multiple 
granularities 
Other systems have enabled multiple levels of granularity, 
particularly for diagnosis, by incorporating for example, 
International Classification of Disease (ICD) codes into the 
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coding frameworks.(195) There was no perceived benefit of 
adding this layer of complexity for the clinical reviewer given 
the research objectives and the perceived limited value added 
from this approach.  
Multiple 
consistent 
views 
A focus on essential classes to represent what happened, 
perceived reasons why and planned actions to prevent 
recurrence. Given the complex nature and variable descriptions 
in reports, we agreed it was acceptable that codes may appear 
in a different order in rare cases. It was, however, not 
acceptable for different codes to be present; for example, 
selection ‘failure to call an urgent ambulance’ instead of 
‘prescribing error’. Inter-rater reliability checks were undertaken 
for 20% of the total coding. This enabled focussed discussions 
about discordance concerning the type of patient safety 
incident, and largely identified any misunderstanding about 
code definitions. Where relevant, reviewers brought issues 
concerning vague or, ambiguous definitions to weekly meetings 
for discussion and, if appropriate, action. Discordance, and 
related inter-reliability calculations, could have been sought for 
additional variables like harm outcome and harm severity; this 
should be considered in future analyses of incident reports.  
Representing 
context 
The Recursive Model of Incident Analysis structured the 
application of codes and thus preserved the assertional and 
contextual knowledge present in narratives.     
Graceful 
evolution 
A regular (weekly) audit process was undertaken and a memo 
was created in the coding management system to update users 
about changes made to the coding frameworks.  
Recognise 
redundancy 
Frequencies of codes were examined. The situations in which 
those potentially redundant codes were used were examined 
and informed decisions about redundancy and deletion. If 
deleted, decisions were made about the re-coding of the 
reports affected.  
 
 
6.3.3. Methods of analysis  
6.3.3.1. Replicable coding management systems 
Given the distributed and international nature of the project (members of my 
research team were in the UK, the USA and Australia simultaneously) and data 
security requirements, I commissioned the development of a bespoke data 
management system to support the iteration of frameworks and provide secure 
access to numerous concurrent reviewers, regardless of geographical location.  
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My brief to the informatician (Huw Evans) responsible for the development and 
maintenance of the ‘PISA database’ was to have a technical specification that 
could be replicable in healthcare organisations by an experienced information 
technology technician quickly and inexpensively. In total, the server and 
software cost no more than £5000 and utilised open source software.  
 
The PISA server had the following functions:  
● Centralised coding manual – this included a date-stamped log of 
changes made to the coding frameworks which all reviewers were 
required to review before starting each coding session. This kept 
reviewers up-to-date with changes made during any absences.  
● Incident report flagging system – reviewers were encouraged to flag near 
misses, difficult cases, and interesting, unusual or rare cases. This 
worked well since interesting cases could be indexed to illustrate themes 
representing a large collection of similar reports. Difficult cases which 
required tacit knowledge of a medical specialty or healthcare discipline 
were discussed with healthcare professional colleagues with relevant 
expertise. A bank of helpful individuals were identified and this could 
easily be emulated in a healthcare organisation.   
● Reflexive memo entry system – memos about observations or hunches 
emerging from the data, and ideas or rationales for new codes were 
recorded; this enabled the reviewers to continuously learn from each 
other and improve work processes.  
● Discordance checks – each reviewer had a real-time list of reports to 
discuss with their second reviewer which enabled learning throughout the 
study and encouraged interaction between reviewers.    
● Progress monitoring – given the large volume of reports, each reviewer 
could track their progress (number of reports coded) in relation to the 
other reviewers. This created healthy competition amongst the reviewers.     
 
The PISA coding frameworks have since been used for a MPhil project 
focussed on paediatrics safety in primary care (I was lead supervisor to Dr 
Philippa Rees, Cardiff University) and two PhD projects focussed on medication 
safety (I am co-supervisor to Mr Khalid Muhammed MPharms, University of 
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Nottingham) and ambulatory dentistry safety (I am co-supervisor to Dr Eduardo 
Ensaldo-Carrasco BDent, University of Edinburgh). The generation of bespoke 
codes by investigators working on focussed speciality or discipline-specific 
investigations is encouraged. Currently, a quarterly review is undertaken to 
review additional codes being used by new investigators to consider updating or 
amending the main PISA coding frameworks.  
 
6.3.3.2. Accessible methods 
The methods of analysis were designed to permit future adoption in healthcare 
organisations by healthcare professionals or administrators with minimal 
training. Further work is now needed to develop and test the content and 
delivery of such training. Outcome formats from analysis (e.g. clustered bar 
charts) were also chosen to provide a logical account of how priority issues for 
possible intervention were identified. In addition, clinical expertise supported 
contextual interpretation and identification of the implications of the described 
safety incidents on patients and their families.  
 
6.4. Strengths and limitations  
A primary care coding framework, aligned with the WHO ICPS, has been 
empirically developed to assist in the generation of learning from patient safety 
incident reports (objective 2). Further, this is the first mixed-methods analysis of 
safety incident reports from general practice in England and Wales (objective 
3). The PISA coding frameworks can be used with WHO ICPS, and my mixed 
methods analytical approach, can be applied to more focussed aggregates of 
similar data (e.g. vaccine incidents involving children in general 
practice)(36,343) to generate a programme theory for change which existing 
interventions or initiatives can inform (objectives 4a and 5, chapter 4). 
Organisations can also use this approach on smaller volumes of reports and 
use the programme theory to initiate a QI project (objective 4b and 5, chapter 
5).  
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Noteworthy limitations exist and broadly relate to the quality of incident report 
data (section 6.4.1) the nature of the analytical findings (6.4.2), the limitations of 
scoping reviews (6.4.3) and biases in the generation of the case study (6.4.4).   
 
6.4.1. Quality of incident report data 
Reporting systems rely on data input (reporting) to generate learning. Safety 
incident-reporting systems rely on staff to write descriptions of incidents, 
including what happened and perceived reasons for why an incident 
occurred.(358) At a local level, these reports can inform the basis of 
recommendations to mitigate harm in practice, and at a national level these 
reports may be used to identify issues that would otherwise be overlooked. The 
information described in these reports can be understood as a form of 
‘storytelling’ that represents the reporter’s position, perspective and experience, 
regardless of whether or not the reporter witnessed the incident first 
hand.(359,360) 
 
Around one-third of reports contained descriptions of contributory factors. The 
two-thirds of reports without contributory factors represent a major missed 
opportunity to learn from patient safety incidents. The relationships between 
contributory factors and similar types of incidents and contexts (i.e. manifest 
and integrative themes) can reveal potential areas to intervene to minimise the 
risk of future incidents. A total of 462 discrete NHS organisations uploaded at 
least one incident report, although over half of the reports originated from just 
30 organisations (n = 7071, 51.6%). This implies that some organisations do not 
commonly report general practice safety incidents to the NRLS, or do not have 
mechanisms for receiving reports from general practice in its organisation (i.e. 
those with good reporting cultures are likely to contribute more than those 
without such cultures).(361,362). The number of reports excluded from the 
analysis suggests a sometimes misguided use of local reporting systems in 
terms of knowledge and understanding of its purpose. It is well recognised that 
incidents are under-reported, can represent only the ‘tip of the iceberg’ and can 
be limited in narrative content.(363) Although the NRLS accepts reports from 
patients and parents, few such reports were apparent in my data set.  
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Both the coding process and thematic analysis are open to personal 
interpretation of the data, and may be subject to confirmation bias. The team 
sought to minimise personal interpretation of the data in stage 1 by adhering to 
the nine rules of the Recursive Model of Incident Analysis and designating 
codes that represent what was explicitly stated in reports.(288) In addition, 
methodological rigour was ensured by keeping an audit trail of all coding-related 
decisions, holding weekly meetings to discuss analysis, and independent 
double-coding of 20% of reports, indicating a high degree of concordance.(364–
366) The reliability of Cohen’s kappa indicated that researchers were applying 
the coding frameworks consistently. In stage 3 of the analysis, clinicians were 
encouraged to use their clinical expertise and judgement for the interpretation of 
reports aligned with priority issues identified by EDA. 
 
In summary, my analytical process required the rigour of an objective and 
structured coding process in stage 1 to ensure confidence in the identification of 
priority issues in stage 2. To augment pragmatic, clinically meaningful learning 
for improvement, a thematic analysis was undertaken in stage 3 that drew on 
the clinical expertise of reviewers. The requirement for a clinical reviewer could 
limit transferability to healthcare organisations. Modifying existing organisational 
customs like Morbidity and Mortality Review meetings to include review of 
clusters of similar reports might offer a feasible means for integrating these 
processes into existing processes.   
 
6.4.2. Nature of findings 
My findings are hypothesis generating, inductive in nature and require testing 
and development by further research and QI activities. Reporting to the NRLS 
has increased in the last decade, providing large amounts of data from which to 
generate learning.(350,364,367) There may be other harmful incident types 
occurring in primary care that are under-reported by staff because of a fear of 
being reprimanded.(362) However, despite limitations from under-reporting and 
reporting biases, analyses of NRLS data have played an important role in 
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generating lessons to mitigate harmful incidents in other areas of clinical 
practice.(362,368,369) 
 
Incident reporting is widely understood to be imperative for generating system 
learning that improves patient safety,(46,370,371) yet the literature 
demonstrates that patient safety incidents are under-reported.(363,372,373) As 
a result, there has been a great deal of interest in investigating barriers to 
incident reporting.(362,372,374) Fear of blame has been cited as a primary 
factor in the unwillingness of individual doctors to report incidents.(375,376) 
Waring (377) notes that some doctors ‘referred to the excessive time required 
for form filling that could be better spent with patients or the menial nature of 
paperwork that was somehow beneath medical expertise’. Meanwhile, the 
literature also reports that some staff fail to recognise how completing incident 
forms will impact on practice- or organisation-level change.(377,378) These 
sociocultural determinants are broad, and the influence of each will vary 
between individuals and institutions. However, they illustrate that even when 
there are procedures in place to encourage incident reporting, and even when 
those policies clearly define which incidents need to be reported, there may be 
mitigating factors. These environmental and personal issues may affect whether 
or not an incident is reported, and when and how it is reported. It is evident that 
there are significant cultural and social factors that affect the processes of 
incident reporting in healthcare settings. Quality improvement efforts are now 
needed to enhance the functioning of incident reporting systems in healthcare 
organisations.  
 
6.4.3. Scoping review limitations  
Because of the lack of standardised terminology in the published and grey 
literature concerning vulnerable children, the scoping review search strategy 
comprised broad terms to achieve a high recall of interventions or initiatives. 
The 17 studies described interventions or initiatives aimed to improve an aspect 
of patient safety for vulnerable children. Narrow research studies that did not 
explicitly discuss change concepts and ideas were excluded. Quality 
assessment is not usually undertaken for scoping reviews, although for the 
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purposes of highlighting the diverse range of research and improvement project 
reports that can populate driver diagrams, I have categorised the included 
interventions or initiatives by study design in Table 4.7.(211)  
 
The objective of the scoping review was to identify existing interventions or 
initiatives in order to inform the possible design (i.e. identified areas to 
intervene) for an improvement project. The purpose of the review is to identify 
change concepts, described in the descriptions of interventions, to minimise or 
mitigate contributory factors to patient safety incidents. Such change concepts 
are the basis of ideas (the operational and physical manifestations undertaken 
in practice) that can be introduced through QI projects in practice. For this 
reason, I have assessed the strength of described actions, in human factors 
terms, using a tool developed by the Veterans Health Association.(229) The tool 
is easy to use, and healthcare organisations should be aware of this by virtue of 
its inclusion in the Root Cause Analysis process, or at the very least appreciate 
the principle of designing better systems to enable humans to practise more 
safely.  
 
Incident report analysis can inform a first draft of a driver diagram. The scoping 
review can support the update and amendment of the driver diagram. In chapter 
4, an additional primary driver was added about ‘leadership’ given its 
predominant presence in the included literature. Similarly in chapter 5, and 
possibly the result of a smaller volume of reports, discussions with stakeholders 
enabled a more in-depth understanding of the issues originally identified from 
incident reports. Following analysis of incident reports at a local or national 
level, the driver diagram permits a concise summary of the learning from 
incident reports. Seeking the identification of themes from similar incidents 
minimises the risk of singling out incidents involving a small group of individuals.  
 
6.4.4. Biases during generation of the case study  
A case study can be generated in a number of ways, and this can be influenced 
by the epistemological stance of the researcher. Whilst my interest was in 
observing and describing how the organisation used its primary care patient 
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safety incident report data, my influence as a both an improvement coach and a 
patient safety researcher working to advance the utility of incident reports in 
organisations must be recognised.  
 
I provided the Primary Care Clinical Governance Manager with training to 
undertake an analysis of incident reports, and development of a Pareto Chart 
and driver diagram. My idea to use incident reports to empirically inform the 
content of a driver diagram had emerged from my own pilot work and I was 
interested in applying this concept in a healthcare organisation. Typically, 
descriptive accounts of a unique phenomenon are referred to as ‘intrinsic case 
studies’.(336) However, as an observer and coach, I was accruing insights 
which supported my understanding about how quality improvement teams could 
use incident reporting data in healthcare organisations, and appreciate how 
such knowledge can generate theory which can be used as a guide to support 
others to emulate such achievements in other settings. My approach was 
aligned with the pragmatic paradigm,(379) which has been described as a 
sound philosophical basis for participatory research which is inclusive of 
multiple approaches for generating learning in a practical, reflexive way.(380) 
This allowed me to generate knowledge about the social system, as well as 
advise on options to change it.(381)  Marshall et al.(380) describe a 
‘researcher-in-residence’ model where researchers position themselves as a 
“core member of a delivery team, actively negotiating a body of expertise which 
is different from, but complementary to, the expertise of managers and 
clinicians”. Further work is needed to explore how participatory research can 
support organisations to maximise the ability to generate knowledge to improve 
patient safety. 
 
My case study has required combined epistemological stances: a critical stance 
to question my own assumptions and influence, and an interpretative stance to 
understand individual and shared meanings of my observations in the wider 
organisational context.(336,382)  Given the features of my participation in the 
project, to minimise bias, a copy of the draft report submitted for assessment by 
the Institute for Healthcare Improvement was shared with key stakeholders for 
respondent validation purposes where I sought consensus, and alternative 
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explanations, for the conclusions reached. I also co-authored a conference 
poster for presentation at an international conference with members of the 
project team (Clinical Governance Manager) and organisational leadership 
(Deputy Director of Improvement, Medical Director, Clinical Director, and Chief 
Operating Officer) and this enabled achievement of consensus about the 
conclusions arising from the project.  
 
6.5. Conclusions about conceptual approach and methods 
The pragmatic paradigm has provided a sound philosophical basis conducive to 
the development and testing of a structured, mixed methods process to 
generate learning from patient safety incident reports. The coding and analytical 
processes, computer hardware and software requirements, as well as the visual 
tools used to summarise analytical findings, should be transferable for use in 
healthcare organisations. Lessons learnt about the development of coding 
frameworks can be adopted by those seeking to develop their own frameworks 
aligned with the WHO ICPS. The PISA frameworks can be applied to generate 
learning about priority areas for patient safety improvement at a local and 
national level. 
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Chapter 7 – Discussion of practice implications 
7.1. Overview of chapter  
In chapter 6, I partly addressed objective 5 by discussing the strengths and 
limitations of my research, and I described methodological lessons learnt from 
the empirical development of primary care classification frameworks (objective 
2). In this final chapter, I will explore the findings of my thesis in relation to the 
existing literature, and propose areas for future research and development 
identified from the national analysis of general practice incident reports 
(objective 3), a focussed analysis of aggregate national-level data (objective 4a) 
and the local utility of incident reports (objective 4b).  
 
7.2. Main findings from thesis  
I have demonstrated that methods, which align to the WHO International 
Classification for Patient Safety (ICPS), do not exist to deconstruct and enable 
sense making of the content of patient safety incidents reports from primary 
care (objective 1, chapter 2). 
 
Using a repository of patient safety incident reports from general practice in 
England and Wales, I have empirically developed and tested coding 
frameworks aligned to ICPS (objective 2, chapter 3-5). This is the largest ever 
analysis of general practice patient safety incident reports (objective 3, chapter 
3) and I have highlighted how: a structured approach, guided by definitions, for 
reviewing the content of incident reports can support the identification of reports 
describing actual patient safety incidents and highlight areas where the system 
is used for unintended purposes; examining the relationship between incidents 
and their contributory factor(s) provides a means of explaining why incidents 
might have occurred; and, incidents with similar outcomes such as serious 
harms can permit understanding deeper underlying contributory themes which 
are not necessarily apparent when considered in isolation. For example, several 
processes needing both quality improvement and research activity were 
apparent at a practice and organisational level, including: referral and discharge 
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processes; how physician decision making is impacted by administrative and 
information technology systems; cancer recognition and diagnosis; and, 
recognising signs of clinical (medical, surgical and mental health) deterioration.  
 
Using a mixed methods process, that incorporates PISA coding frameworks 
(objective 2, chapters 3–5), I have generated learning from incident reports and 
identified priority issues to guide future improvement efforts. Further, I used an 
analysis of similar incident reports drawn from a national database to generate 
a programme theory for systems improvement and used scoping review 
methods to identify existing interventions which could enable mitigation of 
system weaknesses and redesign of processes for safer patient care (objective 
4a, chapter 4). At a local level, I observed it was possible to use a structured 
mixed method approach to support the generation of a programme theory for a 
QI project within a healthcare organisation (objective 4b, chapter 5). From this, I 
have highlighted how QI tools like a driver diagram can be used to invite key 
stakeholders to amend and update the theory ahead of and during 
implementation of changes.  
 
7.3. Discussion of findings in the context of current literature  
I will discuss my findings described in chapters 3-5 in relation to the current 
literature, particularly to situate the relevance of my findings and related outputs 
(methods for analysing incident report data) within the WHO-led international 
agenda for patient safety incident reporting and learning systems.   
 
7.3.1. Operationalising a common vocabulary for patient safety  
WHO’s initiative to develop the ICPS gave rise to an internationally accepted, 
common vocabulary to understand patient safety. More recently, in 2014, the 
WHO recognised there was a global scarcity of standards for reporting and 
learning from patient safety incidents. A Minimal Information Model for “minimal 
meaningful learning” from patient safety incidents was developed and tested in 
the interests of supporting countries to achieve a minimal standard for 
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collecting, storing, classifying, analysing and interpreting reports.(383) The 
uptake of these minimal standards are expected in all member states, with a big 
emphasis for resource constrained countries adopting and integrating these 
standards into the design of their new or current systems.  
 
As recently as March 2016, the WHO convened representatives from 18 
countries, with most representation from low- and middle-income countries, to 
support and advance discussions towards the development of their national 
reporting and learning systems. There is growing awareness that as resource-
limited settings work to develop their own incident reporting systems, the 
surveillance and measurement processes they use to identify learning to 
improve patient safety will be critical. The coding framework and methods 
developed in my thesis are intended to advance these foundations laid by the 
WHO ICPS and Minimal Information Model.  
 
7.3.2. Developing functioning incident reporting systems  
My analysis of incident reports highlighted several limitations of the NRLS and 
the data it collects (described in more detail in section 6.4 in chapter 6). The 
large volume of reports that did not describe patient safety incidents suggests 
incident reporting systems in many organisations in England and Wales were 
being used for other unintended purposes. However, when patient safety 
incidents were described, just over one third of reports contained the detail 
needed about contributory factors to inform the design of safer systems. In this 
section, I will broadly describe the literature on improving the functioning of 
incident reporting systems in terms of the quality of incident report narratives 
(7.3.2.1) and the dissemination of learning (7.3.2.3). Methods for generating 
learning from incident reports were discussed in chapter 2.  
 
7.3.2.1. Improving the quality of incident report narratives 
In chapter 3, I demonstrated one in five reports from general practice (n = 3147, 
23%) contained insufficient detail or did not describe a patient safety incident. 
This suggests the purpose of incident reporting is misunderstood, staff are not 
completing the incident report forms properly, or the reporting system is being 
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used for unintended purposes. Further, only one-third of the incident reports 
described reasons why the incident occurred, which significantly inhibits 
learning to improve future practice. Good quality reports are a prerequisite for 
learning.(384,385) The Francis Inquiry report reflects on the limitations of 
incident reporting systems and concludes they “cannot scrutinise all of the 
incidents reported“.(386) However, fewer more in-depth reports that contain 
descriptions of why the incident occurred, in terms of highlighting underlying 
system failures, could be less demanding of reporters and analysts, and 
potentially more insightful than numerous superficial reports.(387,388) This 
does not mean lengthy descriptions are needed; instead the report should 
contain enough essential detail needed to trigger an investigation in a general 
practice or other healthcare organisation.(389) Poor reporting rates amongst 
healthcare professionals is a commonly described issue; however, there are 
several descriptions of engagement efforts to increase reporting of clinically 
important incidents.(390–394) Further, specialty-specific (e.g. anaesthesia) 
incident reporting systems tend to generate better quality reports, which is often 
attributed to clinicians reporting for the benefit of colleagues and therefore 
providing more detailed reports.(385,395,396)  
 
Reporting and learning systems rely on healthcare professionals to report, and 
be open about, patient safety incidents that they witness or are involved in.(397) 
Several papers and professional reports highlighted the importance of creating 
‘a culture of safety’ within organisations,(221,398–406) defined by the WHO as 
the, “product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions 
competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, 
and the style and proficiency of, an organisation’s health and safety 
management”.(2) Organisations that openly claim to have or seek this culture 
largely do so through having a ‘no punishment’ policy for reporters. Where there 
have been breaches of such trust in the aviation industry, they have seen 
decreases in reporting; to address this, some aviation organisations have 
provided immunity from ‘non-criminal’ incidents and this has been a powerful 
incentive to report.(407)  
 
Under-reporting is the ‘Achilles heel’ of incident reporting systems.(395,408) In 
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healthcare, fear of blame poses a significant barrier to staff fulfilling this duty 
and creates missed opportunities for systems learning and 
improvement.(47,409–411) Previous studies have demonstrated that when 
healthcare professionals report incidents, the narrative often reflects the fact 
that responsibility for the incident is placed on an individual through ‘person-
blaming,’ rather than blaming the organisation or weaknesses in the 
system.(412) It is well acknowledged that uncertainty about the implications of 
reporting, not least the personal shame about involvement in a medical error, 
can create barriers to incident reporting and learning.(409,413)  
 
The ‘second victim’ concept captures the experience of healthcare 
professionals who are involved in incidents and suffer psychological distress, 
directly from the stress of being involved in the incident and / or the collateral 
from blame attributed in the incident report or related review 
processes.(414,415) Many organisations support voluntary reporting 
mechanisms to encourage reporting of incidents deemed important for learning 
by staff.(221,239,398,400,404,406,416–422) Voluntary reporting is often 
considered essential for ‘creating a culture of safety’ where staff feel able to 
report incidents rather than being forced to report.(423) In contrast, mandatory 
requirements for reporting can often be limited to specific incident types which 
an organisation deems important to be detected, such as medication 
errors.(421,424–428) Neuspiel et al.(406) describe a multi-disciplinary approach 
where teams are encouraged to report incidents within their department for 
local-level learning, and a transparent review process is undertaken to 
determine their relevance for escalation beyond the team. Another example 
includes the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Centre’s ‘Good Catch 
Program’ which requests that staff “huddle” at the end of shifts to ensure any 
potential incidents are communicated to a lead member of staff.(429) They 
encourage competitive reporting of ‘good catches’ by rewarding frequent 
reporters. High performers are designated “patient safety champions”. This 
programme saw a dramatic increase in the volume of reports, evaluated by a 
before and after study design.(429) 
 
7.3.2.2. Disseminating learning 
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As I have demonstrated in the case study in chapter 5, timely feedback to 
reporters is a characteristic of a successful incident reporting system.(430) This 
includes providing acknowledgement of the report, informing a reporter about 
resulting actions, and highlighting any recommendations aimed at reducing 
future incidents. Such feedback can be in the form of e-mails, reports or regular 
meetings. The improvement team in my case study realised different formats 
were needed for different stakeholder groups.(157,400,417,431,432) Harvard 
hospitals disseminate incident report findings between organisations for shared 
learning purposes; this includes highlighting the ‘patient safety case of the 
week’ which can be emailed to members or published.(417) Further, the most 
severe and frequent incidents are published along with their analyses and 
recommendations. Morbidity and Mortality meetings are also frequently used to 
present findings and disseminate learning about particularly concerning 
reports.(417) 
 
The case study in chapter 5 highlights how analysis of incident reports at a local 
level can identify a focus for other methods like case note review and direct 
observation to enhance the organisation’s understanding of the identified 
patient safety risks. This corroborates what has been found in other studies 
which conclude incident reporting systems offer one lens on patient safety, 
complementary to other methods for understanding patient safety 
risks.(433,434). The case study demonstrates how similar reports (e.g. warfarin-
related incidents) can sensitise the leadership of an organisation to the variety 
of risks that might warrant further inquiry using other methods like case note 
review and observation of clinical tasks (e.g. pharmacists observing the 
administering of medicines). Several studies describe incident reports being 
discussed at ward rounds or clinical fora to glean more contextual information 
for action, and as a process to support clinical teams to own the problems and 
to buy-in to the changes deemed necessary to mitigate future similar 
incidents.(433–435)  
 
A recent systematic review concluded that incident reporting systems can 
improve safety outcomes, although all authors of included studies 
acknowledged the difficulty in demonstrating a causal relationship since they 
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are often embedded within a wider programme of safety initiatives. There was 
some evidence of changes to clinical processes and insubstantial evidence of 
any cultural change or changes in mindset.(339) The case study (chapter 5) 
also culminated in a change in national-level policy for anticoagulation services 
in Wales, and also demonstrated an increasing reporting rate from GPs over the 
study period. Consistent with other studies,(436,437) the organisation in my 
case study did not evaluate the effectiveness of the changes introduced. Similar 
to other organisations, they were able to demonstrate process changes to 
remove the identified system weaknesses.(438–440) It is a credible 
achievement for the Health Board that their leadership efforts to implement GP-
led warfarin slow-loading and management has been scaled up across Wales. 
A ‘Directed Enhanced Service for Oral Anticoagulation with Warfarin’ has been 
launched with financial remuneration for all GPs offering this service across 
Wales from April 12th, 2017.   
 
7.3.3. Learning from patients 
It was not possible to identify reports written by patients during the analysis of 
incident reports included in chapters 3 or 4. Cultivating conditions in which 
patients, parents and carers feel comfortable challenging healthcare 
professionals can prevent safety incidents.(441)  Patients and healthcare 
professionals are now co-designing new models of care delivery that inform 
local improvement initiatives; there are now demonstrable examples of 
improvements in the parent–provider relationship increasing child safety.(442–
444) Studies of patient reported safety incidents in hospitals suggest most 
patient-identified incidents are not detected by the hospital’s incident reporting 
system.(445,446) In several children’s hospitals in the United States, incident 
reporting mechanisms for parents to report safety concerns have highlighted 
how parents also identify incidents that go undetected, and overall parent 
reporting rates were higher than the hospital’s average staff incident reporting 
rate.(447)   
 
Regulation 20 (duty of candour) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 
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(Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014 outlines specific actions that healthcare 
professionals and their team must follow when an incident occurs, including 
informing patients about the incident, providing reasonable support, truthful 
information and an apology. The duty of candour, applied to patient safety, 
requires general practices to demonstrate: 
● openness – a culture where incidents and complaints can be raised 
without fear of reprimand; 
● transparency – sharing of information about what happened to staff, 
patients, the public and regulators; and, 
● candour – any patient harmed by the provision of a healthcare service is 
informed, and an intervention is made where appropriate, regardless of 
whether a complaint has been made or questions have been raised 
about the safety of care.(397,448) 
 
Several innovative approaches are emerging to involve patients in the mitigation 
of patient safety incidents. This includes providing patients with access to their 
medical records to reduce documentation discrepancies and appointment-
related incidents, as well as to provide healthcare professionals with a safety 
net.(441)  Such incidents could also be prevented by providing staff with better 
accessibility to unified records.(449) As care models for different patient groups 
change, investment is required to maximise patient understanding and 
empowerment to use those services,(450) and raise their patient safety 
concerns.  
 
7.3.4. Identifying patients at high risk of harm in the community 
In chapter 3, reports describing failures of timely diagnosis and assessment, the 
availability of treatments and care equipment, and lack of continuity of care 
following discharge often involved patients with social or medical issues that 
compromised their ability to access GP services. Exploring the accessibility of 
clinical services must be a priority for all healthcare organisations, and general 
practices should determine whether their existing telephone call-handling 
processes meet the needs and expectations of their patient population. In 2015, 
a randomised controlled trial by Campbell et al.(451) was not sufficiently 
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powered to detect differences in safety outcomes (in terms of patient mortality, 
emergency hospital admissions, and accident and emergency attendance rates) 
between same-day consultations with GPs/telephone calls, versus nurse-led 
computer-supported services or usual care. However, the accompanying 
process evaluation recognised the importance of culture, capacity and 
involvement of all practice staff when introducing such major changes to 
access. The authors recommended examination of Significant Event Audits 
(SEA) to explore safety outcomes.(452) My findings support this 
recommendation given the diversity of issues patients face while accessing 
clinical services; in particular, the need to focus future improvement efforts on 
vulnerable patient populations. 
 
Patients recently discharged from hospital and those receiving end-of-life care 
in the community or requiring regular district nursing involvement frequently did 
not receive timely follow-up by community healthcare professionals. Exploring 
options to intervene early, to manage patients at home and to mitigate 
avoidable deterioration through proactive intervention is needed. Different 
options that could achieve this are described in NHS England’s General Medical 
Services ‘enhanced service’ for vulnerable groups, which describes a complex 
intervention that includes same-day telephone consultations for patients at risk 
of unplanned hospital admission and timely follow-up by a healthcare 
professional in the practice on discharge from hospital.(453) Although there 
may be unclear benefits of standalone system changes such as telephone 
triage,(451,452) a synergy might be evident from new models that combine 
same-day telephone triage and risk stratification (or other options). Given the 
failures in care identified in chapter 3, my findings support the direction taken by 
NHS England to support GPs to develop and test new models of care delivery 
for the ‘enhanced service’ which could include: rapid response community 
nursing; support from mental health service providers; designated district 
nursing; additional discharge co-ordinator services; additional support for 
carers; and, targeted social-care services.(451) As I have previously discussed 
in chapter 1, given the largely social, rather than technical, nature of such 
interventions, an outcome-based evaluation is likely to determine a minimal or 
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null net effect. Thus, formative theory-driven evaluation options should be 
considered.(61) 
 
7.3.5. Minimising risks from human factors 
Most safety incidents are caused by a complex interaction of individual actions 
and system failures, with greater weight given to system factors.(356) Reason’s 
Swiss cheese model describes how although human error cannot be completely 
avoided, incidents are frequently the result of multiple small errors within a 
failed system: “The important question is not ‘Who blundered?’ but ‘How and 
why did the defences fail?’”.(356) 
 
A range of diagnostic errors was described in chapter 3. These incidents had 
both human and system contributory factors, and may have been errors of 
commission or omission. Croskerry et al.(454) describe a number of initiatives 
for mitigating specific cognitive errors in practice, in keeping with current 
literature around improving diagnosis and assessment by reducing dependence 
on flawless cognitive performance.(454,455) Schiff et al.(456) described the 
importance of adopting better multidisciplinary approaches, reducing pressure 
on clinicians to rely solely on their memory and clinical experience when making 
diagnoses, and instead supporting them by means of computerised and non-
technological aids. This supports my thesis findings, which demonstrate that 
lack of knowledge, oversights and mistakes were frequently described staff 
factors contributing to patient safety incidents. Cognitive errors, which are often 
unexpected active errors of commission, complicate the process of improving 
patient safety; however, focusing on providing safe systems and safety-netting 
may help minimise patient harm when errors occur.(457) 
 
Previous studies have highlighted the importance of streamlining systems for 
referral and discharge or follow-up, and using electronic systems to unify patient 
records.(458) Electronic systems are being developed to support a number of 
aspects of the diagnosis and assessment process. There is increasing support 
for the use of clinician decision support systems, to assist in managing 
consultations.(459,460) For example, a system proposed by de Wit et al.(461) 
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supports the management of polypharmacy in the elderly patient population. 
Whilst algorithms, guidelines and computer assisted diagnostic systems are 
sometimes advocated as debiasing strategies,(454,462,463) others have 
considered them to augment cognitive processes.(464,465) 
 
Vulnerable patients were described within the reports analysed. Elderly 
patients, patients with acute illness or disability have an increased risk of patient 
safety incidents.(466) Such patients often have multiple comorbidities and run 
the risk that new pathologies will be overlooked as clinicians focus on existing 
diagnoses which can undermine the presentation of new pathology.(467,468) In 
addition, they may be less able to raise concerns about their care or lack 
agency in decision-making. Guthrie et al.(467) described polypharmacy and 
choice of acceptable care strategies as specific issues for patients with 
comorbidities yet to be addressed in policy.(467) Some credible resources exist 
to guide practitioners in managing this demographic group, particularly for 
minimising risks from polypharmacy.(469,470) Involvement of patients in 
training healthcare professionals, to improve management of the vulnerable, 
has been associated with improvements in patient satisfaction, with no clear 
detrimental effects.(471,472) Cross-linking electronic guidelines for the 
management of related disorders, and to aid recognition of red flags to minimise 
diagnostic overshadowing, is a further proposal for practice-level improvement 
to mitigate human error.(467) 
 
Building IT infrastructure and functionality capable of sharing data between 
health- and social-care providers could support identification of predictors of risk 
and inform interventions to prevent future incidents.(473–475) In addition, 
efforts to transition existing written processes, and align existing electronic 
processes, could support healthcare professionals to have timely and reliable 
access to healthcare data needed for safer consultations and permit continuity 
of care across different health- and social-care sectors. 
 
Based on my findings, several hypotheses have been raised about 
improvement of referral and discharge processes. The receipt of poor quality, 
and sometimes inappropriate, referrals received by district nursing teams is well 
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described,(476–479) and each unclear referral has been estimated to cause 
five hours of extra work for district nurse teams.(480) To overcome variability in 
referral processes, the development and testing of a single, unified electronic 
referral process with an agreed baseline of minimal information should be 
agreed between professionals in primary and secondary care settings. 
 
NHS England and other organisations have previously reported that failures in 
communication processes can account for up to 33% of discharge-related 
safety incidents.(481,482) Electronic discharge documentation could prevent 
most paper-based administration failures,(483–485) and, across the UK, a 
process is underway to support 24-hour electronic discharge.(486–488) 
Accepted best practices, such as the Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines 
Network discharge document, already exist.(489,490) In parallel, patient-held 
records could aid understanding about a recent hospital stay and follow-up 
plans.(491,492)  
 
7.4. Implications for policy and practice  
Actionable findings provide the basis for improvements and interventions, and 
should be evaluated in practice as to if, and how, they can best achieve the 
desired benefits for patient safety. I will consider the immediate implications for 
policy and practice informed by the inductive approach taken during my thesis. 
Thus, my findings should be considered in the context of the strengths and 
limitations of incident report data (described in chapter 6). These will be groups 
of recommendations that apply to general practices and their commissioning 
healthcare organisations, and for the wider healthcare system. 
 
7.4.1. What can general practices do?  
7.4.1.1. Establish a reporting and learning process in general practices 
All members of the primary care team, including administrative staff, should 
have a knowledge and understanding of what patient safety is, and more 
specifically what a patient safety incident is, in the context of general practice. 
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Table 7.1 shows a range of incidents previously described in chapter 3; this 
table could be used to explore with a general practice team their existing 
knowledge and understanding of patient safety incidents. Reflecting on past 
incidents, as well as receiving feedback on incidents (described later), are also 
likely to improve future decision making.(465) 
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Table 7.1. Summary of patient safety incidents reported from general practice in 
England and Wales by Carson-Stevens et al.(493)  
Communication with patients 
● Miscommunication e.g. inadequate safety netting advice 
● Difficulties accessing clinical services e.g. telephone triage, message 
handling, appointments 
● Parent-held records unavailable 
Communication between professionals 
● Unavailable or inaccurate medical records e.g. paper notes from 
previous practice 
● Delayed referrals e.g. erroneously completed referral, delayed decision 
to refer 
● Information transfer between care providers e.g. delayed discharge 
summary or clinic letter 
Diagnosis and assessment 
● Missed or delayed diagnosis 
● Delayed assessment of care 
● Delays assessing patients with serious mental health conditions 
● Not identifying patients at risk of deterioration 
Medication and vaccine 
● Errors in prescribing, dispensing and administering medicines and 
vaccines 
● Complications with therapeutic drug monitoring processes 
Investigations 
● Ordering inappropriate investigations to inform differential diagnosis 
● Incorrect collection, or transfer, of specimens 
● Administrative failures leading to delays, wrong results or failure to 
receive results 
● Incorrectly interpreted results e.g. blood tests, imaging, other 
investigations 
Treatment and equipment 
● Complications of procedures 
● Malfunctioning and unavailability of care equipment e.g. pressure 
mattresses, oxygen, walking aids 
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The primary care team should be aware of the benefits of incident reporting at 
multiple levels, including:  
● reflection on the incident by the reporter and enhanced professional 
development (individual level); 
● identification of opportunities to undertake SEAs (practice level); 
● collated reports at a Health Board or CCG can highlight local systems 
issues for change (system level); and, 
● collated reports can help identify rare issues (national level). 
  
Staff should know how to report a patient safety incident in the practice. A 
model for generating learning in general practice is proposed in Figure 7.1, and 
includes:  
 
● initially risk-assessing what is reported and informing the relevant staff 
and patients (if appropriate) of the investigative or remedial action to be 
taken;  
● discussing incidents as a practice team to decide on which incidents 
merit a SEA, or do not require a detailed inquiry and which should be 
reported directly to the commissioning organisation’s incident reporting 
system; and,  
● prioritising which patient safety issues should form the basis of QI 
activities in the practice.  
 
Patient and staff feedback is essential throughout this learning process as a 
commitment to demonstrate a duty of candour.(448)   
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Figure 7.1. Stages of a Primary Care Patient Safety (PISA) Learning Model for 
Care Improvement (494) 
 
GPs already dedicate resources to undertake SEAs, also called Significant 
Event Review or Audits,(495) and these are often used for (personal) appraisal 
processes. The SEA process brings together multiple sources of evidence, 
which enables a more complete representation of clinical activity to be 
generated to understand the patient safety incident.(496,497) SEAs inform 
improvement efforts in practice. However, not all incidents need a SEA. GPs 
and practice teams should also write patient safety incident reports about 
incidents that have not been subject to an in-house SEA. This includes incidents 
where the patient came to no harm, or where an intervention occurred before 
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harm could reach the patient (so called ‘near misses’). These incidents will 
allow teams to identify and understand what processes are working well and 
which could be improved. 
 
Practices should consider sharing SEAs for regional or national learning 
because they represent an opportunity for the NHS to learn how to improve the 
quality and safety of primary care. To support this commitment, policy makers 
need to be more explicit about how SEAs can be integrated into existing 
reporting systems (e.g. NRLS) for wider learning.(498) 
 
Informed by the findings from my thesis, and related studies through which I 
have provided the lead supervision,(36,307,343,354,355,458,473,499) I have 
co-authored the RCGP ‘Reporting and learning from patient safety incidents in 
general practice – a practical guide’.(494) The guide describes the range of 
patient safety incidents that occur in general practice (Table 7.1); provides 
examples of local- and national-level learning from the analysis of groups of 
similar incidents (as also described in chapters 3-5); and, outlines seven stages 
for learning from patient safety incidents in general practice (Figure 7.1), 
including when to undertake a Significant Event Analysis (SEA). An exemplar 
patient safety incident reporting form is proposed in the RCGP guide (Figure 
7.2).(494) The incident report should provide essential information about what 
happened.  
 
Following receipt of an incident report by a practice manager in general 
practice, Figure 7.1 recognises the informal inquiry often required to identify 
additional details such as the severity of harm outcome, to consider the risk of a 
similar incident recurring in the practice, and determine whether any immediate 
action is needed for the patient and their family. An initial review of the incident 
report by the practice manager is proposed to decide whether the report also 
requires review, for example, by a nominated quality and safety lead partner. 
Practices should agree on rules for escalating an incident report to the 
nominated partner. However, some incidents will come to light which have been 
generated by actions outside the practice such as in hospitals. For example, a 
patient may have developed an advanced stage cancer because a radiology 
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report went missing or was misinterpreted in the hospital; however, the error 
might only be detected when the patient attends for consultation with obvious 
signs or symptoms of cancer or has an investigation repeated a few months 
later. In these circumstances, whilst the practice will need to review the incident, 
the appropriate action would be to draw the matter to the attention of the 
medical director of the hospital as well as reporting the incident to the NRLS (in 
England and Wales).  
 
The practice manager (and/or nominated partner) should decide whether the 
facts about the incident have been sufficiently determined and will be suitable 
for group discussion at the next quality and safety meeting, will require a 
Significant Event Audit, or both. If the incident is complex, it may benefit from a 
more structured investigation like a SEA. For example, a facilitated team-based 
discussion may be needed if the incident resulted from care received over 
multiple episodes by multiple GPs or the patient has a complex medical and 
social background. Similarly, for issues where input from representatives from 
secondary or tertiary services (e.g. opinion from Consultant Neurologist) would 
be beneficial, this might benefit from a SEA. Tools are suggested in the RCGP 
guide to help structure this process by considering the severity of harm and risk 
of recurrence (Figure 7.3).(494) 
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Figure 7.2. PISA Patient Safety Incident Reporting Form Template (494) 
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Figure 7.3. PISA Harm Severity Classification matrix (494) 
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7.4.1.2. Identify at-risk patients 
Practices can immediately explore their current processes for identifying 
patients who could be stratified to be at high risk of deterioration, unplanned 
admission or readmission following discharge from hospital. This should include 
multidisciplinary team involvement for undertaking the assessment of these 
patients to achieve integrated care. Several condition-specific risk stratification 
tools exist for coronary heart disease and diabetes.(500,501) More recently, a 
predictive risk-stratification tool has been developed for application to the 
general patient population to reduce unwarranted emergency admissions from 
community settings in Wales; the outcome of the step wedge cluster 
randomised trial is outstanding.(474,475)  
 
7.4.1.3. Examine patient satisfaction in relation to perceived accessibility 
Perceptions of barriers to clinical services should be explored with patients. 
First steps could include determining whether or not patients find existing 
telephone and call-handling processes meet their needs and expectations. All 
GP surgeries can immediately seek to appoint a patient representative(s), or 
even a “patient champion” staff member, to attend meetings to discuss process 
changes that will affect how patients use and interact with services. 
 
7.4.2. What can commissioning organisations do? 
7.4.2.1. Data-driven improvement 
Practices must be supported to develop a learning culture by being encouraged 
to use their own data (e.g. SEAs and GP-related patient safety incident reports) 
to identify potential candidate areas for small, local QI projects. At a 
commissioning organisational level (i.e. Clinical Commissioning Group in 
England, Health Board in Wales), those responsible for clinical governance 
could support the identification of similar incident reports between practices in 
order to identify common system weaknesses and use those ideas to inform 
system redesign efforts to minimise future risk to patients. For example, if there 
is a sufficient volume of incident reports around a specific theme, a programme 
theory can be generated to outline apparent change concepts for a QI 
project.(343) As demonstrated in chapter 5, organisations should examine their 
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existing infrastructure for receiving reports and disseminating learning back to 
practice, and monitoring the success of those mechanisms.  
 
The findings from my PhD thesis informed the agenda at an all-day event co-
hosted by 1000 Lives Improvement and the Royal College of General 
Practitioners (RCGP) in Cardiff on March 7th, 2017. Representatives from each 
Health Board in Wales, including GPs, managers and other primary care 
healthcare professionals, attended the event and supported plans to establish a 
primary care patient safety ‘community of interest’ for Wales.(502) An 
opportunity exists to utilise local and regional groups of neighbouring general 
practices to share incident reports and SEAs on a regular basis, in the interests 
of identifying priority issues for improvement in local and regional services. 
Members of the community of interest might also identify in their own 
organisations the ‘beacons’ to which others can aspire. For example, general 
practices that have high patient satisfaction scores for different patient groups, 
including socially and medically vulnerable patients, could be identified and their 
models of delivery observed to determine whether or not there are best 
practices that can be shared widely. Preliminary discussions with the 1000 
Lives Improvement leadership suggest the analyses presented in chapters 3–5, 
as well as additional published studies undertaken using my methods, will 
inform agenda- and priority-setting.      
 
7.4.2.2. Prepare the workforce to report  
There is a need to develop a culture of open reporting among healthcare 
professionals and staff in general practice. This must also extend to patients 
and carers. Clear mechanisms must exist for escalating concerns and reporting 
patient safety incidents. To ensure that incident reports can inform future 
improvement efforts, the workforce must be provided with patient safety 
education and training that increases understanding about the rationale for 
reporting and prepares them to be aware of human and system factors 
contributing to the incident. Previous reported educational interventions have 
covered the importance of incident reporting,(433,503–508) as well as guidance 
on how to report.(398,503–505,509–511) Such interventions could lead to more 
informative report narratives which could lead to enhanced systems 
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improvement capability. Despite a range of described educational interventions, 
these have not been formally evaluated to date. 
 
Global education providers such as the United States-based Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement provide free access for student healthcare 
professionals and doctors in training to undertake courses on patient safety, 
which includes coverage of human factors and root cause analysis (a 
systematic, team-based inquiry used to investigate incidents in 
organisation).(229,512) National quality improvement learning programmes like 
‘Improving Quality Together’ in Wales, already provide content on quality 
improvement methods for NHS staff.(513) This programme, and other reputable 
educational providers,(514,515) can disseminate patient safety education to 
NHS staff. With the support of a RCGP Spotlight Award, I have co-written e-
learning modules for inclusion in the RCGP Online Learning Environment called 
“Patient Safety and Quality Improvement in Primary Care”.(516)  
 
Competencies around incident reporting may be best demonstrated via 
appraisal or revalidation processes. The GMC’s appraisal and revalidation 
guidance recommends supporting evidence is required to demonstrate 
participation in activities to learn from patient safety incidents and quality 
improvement activities. The GMC guidance supports discussion about patient 
safety incidents (including those that result in no harm or were near misses) and 
states the purpose of the supporting information is to “illustrate events which 
may not have a serious outcome but highlight issues which could be handled 
with greater clinical effectiveness and patient safety, and from which lessons 
could be learnt.”(517) 
 
Using patient safety incidents to inform quality improvement activities creates 
an opportunity for GPs to demonstrate several appraisal and revalidation 
requirements stated in the GMC guidance, such as: 
● “...participation in logging any incidents or events...” 
● “...should be able to demonstrate that you are aware of any patterns in 
the types of incidents or events recorded about your practice and discuss 
any lessons learnt.” 
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● “...participation in any clinical governance meetings where incidents or 
events and learning are discussed” 
● “Discussion at appraisal should include any systematic learning from 
errors and events such as investigations and analysis, and the 
development of solutions and implementation of improvements.” 
 
7.4.3. What can national bodies interested in patient safety do? 
7.4.3.1. Support general practices to contribute to the National Reporting and 
Learning System 
 
At present, in England alone, there are numerous channels to report patient 
safety incidents. These include the NRLS, the Care Quality Commission (CQC) 
in England, the National Clinical Assessment Service, the General Medical 
Council and locally at practice level through SEAs. The CQC also conducts 
routine inspections of general practices, and the registered manager in each 
practice should also notify the CQC about serious harm outcomes occurring to 
patients in the practice.(518) These systems do not communicate with each 
other, resulting in an incomplete national picture of patient safety in primary 
care. There is a need to create a single mechanism of data capture. Currently, 
in terms of mandatory data capture, the only incidents that must be reported are 
“never events”. A set of such events relevant to primary care, such as those 
developed by de Wet et al.(519), should be agreed by policy makers and tested 
for their feasibility in general practice. 
 
An opportunity exists to better use the analysis of routinely available healthcare 
data, such as patient safety incident report data, to inform the designs of QI 
projects. The Five Year Forward View presents an opportunity to deliver the 
necessary system changes to bring patient safety in primary care to the 
fore.(520)  
 
7.4.3.2. Co-ordinated expert analysis at a national level 
To generate recommendations for practice from patient safety incident reports 
from primary care in England and Wales, I developed a mixed methods 
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approach that combined detailed data coding process, descriptive statistical 
analysis, and a thematic analysis of reports (chapter 3). New ideas and 
hypotheses emerged throughout each step of analysis. Subject matter experts 
also discussed findings and identified key areas for improvement.  
 
Analysis of incident reports at a national level needs a combined enterprise 
between clinical, research and patient safety experts to regularly review the 
output of analyses, to corroborate with existing insights from research studies 
and improvement initiatives, and to develop potential action-orientated solutions 
with strong face validity among the profession. Involvement of the Royal 
Colleges in dissemination of learning will continue to be critical, particularly in 
terms of advocating the uptake of solutions by members and recognising NRLS 
contributions for appraisal purposes. However, the future of the England and 
Wales NRLS must be secured, in terms of providing both a means for national 
learning and the expertise and resources needed to undertake regular 
systematic inquiries of these data. The Next Steps on the NHS Five Year 
Forward View report describes a ‘Patient Safety Incident Management system’ 
which NHS Improvement will develop and deliver for all healthcare settings. 
This will be an updated version of the NRLS.(521) In the report, NHS England 
pledge to “make it easy and rewarding to record patient safety incidents, 
provide feedback, and enhance learning from what has gone wrong”.  
 
7.4.3.3. Support the development of global learning registries 
To advance and accelerate the primary care patient safety agenda 
internationally, a global registry for incident reporting could support the ability to 
generate action-orientated outputs with strong face validity in the healthcare 
profession. The WHO has proposed a minimal information model to provide a 
dataset in all countries for sharing patient safety incident reports.(522) Efforts 
will then need to be made to ensure that incident reports from each country 
meet an acceptable standard to enable learning. National (and the proposed 
international) patient safety incident report systems should be designed to 
describe care failures and safety incidents, and be utilised to shape priorities for 
improvement. Similarities and differences may exist between incidents in 
different countries, across different contexts and gaining insight about rare 
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events is possible. Further, an opportunity exists to identify common system 
weaknesses that would benefit from combining the expertise and creative ideas 
for solutions from all contributing nations. Such systems should seek to 
corroborate the insights with existing research studies, develop potential 
solutions for application in practice, and share learning of the context-specific 
approaches to applying solutions. 
 
7.4.3.4. Data linkages within and between health- and social-care services 
The potential value of data linkage to evaluate the impact of patient 
characteristics on healthcare outcomes was demonstrated in a recent UK-wide 
enquiry into child mortality.(523)  As demonstrated by the characterisation of 
reports involving vulnerable children in chapter 4, insights for prioritising and 
designing future safety interventions could be gained by linking incident-
reporting systems with electronic medical records and other public or social-
care registries. This would enable the identification of incident reports relevant 
to specific groups. Sheikh et al.(524) have outlined a strategy for healthcare IT 
in the NHS which has four key components: (1) devolve the decision-making 
processes about systems procurement to practising professionals; (2) consider 
offering modest financial incentives and highlight the penalties for non-adopters 
of such systems in the future; (3) governance to ensure safe sharing of data 
between providers; and (4) oversight from a national body to coordinate national 
efforts to implement advanced healthcare IT systems.(525) Lessons from 
England’s National Programme for Information Technology suggest that 
rigorous, independent evaluations of implementation efforts are needed. 
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7.5. Recommendations for further research and development  
My thesis has generated several recommendations for further research and 
development which include the need to: corroborate learning with other primary 
care patient safety data sources (section 7.5.1); undertake wider 
characterisation of reports from primary care disciplines working in other 
community settings (section 7.5.2); utilise learning from analysis of NRLS data 
for systems improvement (section 7.5.3); and, adopting machine learning and 
natural language processing methods for incident report analysis (section 
7.5.4).   
 
7.5.1. Corroborate and gain additional insights from other patient safety data 
Further research is needed to corroborate the findings from my thesis by 
examining other sources of insight about primary care patient safety data. In 
collaboration with Professor Tony Avery (my second PhD supervisor and chief 
investigator of the Avoidable Harm study: Understanding the Nature and 
Frequency of Avoidable Harm in Primary Care, Department of Health Policy 
Research Programme PR-R11-0914-11001), we are undertaking a case note 
review of general practice records to:  
● estimate the incidence of avoidable significant harm in primary care in 
England;  
● quantify, describe and classify the patient safety incidents that result in 
avoidable significant harm and their severity; and,  
● identify ameliorable factors that, if addressed, could help reduce the 
incidence of avoidable significant harm in primary care.(526)  
 
My thesis findings have informed the design of the Avoidable Harm study. For 
example, the PISA coding frameworks, particularly descriptions of incident 
types (what happened) and contributory factors (why did it happen) are being 
used to structure each case of identified avoidable significant harm. The study 
will be completed in December 2017 and will advise on the extent to which 
future assessments of avoidable harm in primary care could be made more 
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efficient through interrogation of electronic health records, and propose areas 
for intervention that might help reduce the incidence of avoidable harm. 
 
As demonstrated by other groups working in hospital safety, complaints data 
could also be an additional source of primary care patient safety 
insight.(427,455,527) As mentioned previously, multiple organisations including 
medical defence unions also collect patient safety data in England and Wales 
(and other countries have similar set ups); a structured analysis of these data 
could also provide alternative, and complementary, opportunities to better 
understand primary care patient safety. Further, the new Healthcare Safety 
Investigation Branch launched in England in April 2017, will be undertaking up 
to 30 in-depth investigations of patient safety incidents per year. A structured 
approach to incident investigation could yield rich data on patient safety across 
a range of clinical settings to inform systems improvement.(528)  
 
7.5.2. Analysis of reports from other primary care disciplines 
In view of the findings described in chapters 3-5, the value of my potentially 
generalisable methods for interrogating and identifying learning from incident 
reports to inform systems improvements, should now be explored with reports 
from other primary care disciplines (e.g. community nursing, ambulatory 
dentistry). Classification methods that are pragmatic and flexible are needed for 
application in a range of settings for different purposes.(389) In addition to 
general practice, there are several other ‘point-of-first-access’ disciplines from 
primary care that have contributed > 200,000 reports, which include dentistry, 
pharmacy, health visiting, nursing and midwifery. In the same way that general 
practice reports were overlooked prior to this study, except for medication- and 
pharmacy-related reports, these reports have also never been systematically 
characterised. As the PISA coding frameworks and methods are utilised by 
health service researchers and healthcare professionals from different 
disciplines, it will be possible to learn how they should be amended to suit the 
needs of different professionals across the range of contexts of primary care 
delivery. I am co-supervising two PhD students that are using the PISA 
methods to characterise patient safety in other areas of primary care, these are:  
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● Mr Khalid Muhammad MPharm exploring incident reports from 
community pharmacy (with supervisors Dr Matt Boyd and Professor Tony 
Avery); and, 
● Dr Eduardo Ensaldo-Carrasco BDent exploring incident reports from 
community dentistry (with supervisors Dr Kathrin Cresswell and 
Professor Aziz Sheikh).     
 
Extending this work beyond the confines of general practice is an important next 
step to advance the field of primary care patient safety, and there is an obvious 
opportunity to obtain a more representative view of issues by analysing reports 
from other disciplines. Research being undertaken by Muhammad and Ensaldo-
Carrasco, and studies led by my previous MPhil student Dr Philippa Rees 
(focussing on community-based healthcare to children), highlight the benefits of 
drawing a large sample of reports from each discipline.  
 
In chapter 3 of my thesis, I outlined the nature and range of safety incident 
reports from general practice. I recognised more focused coding and analysis of 
general practice reports was needed, and several follow-on studies have been 
undertaken and completed. By analysing a greater volume of homogeneous 
reports from which to generate hypotheses, more in-depth insights into the 
potential contributory factors, and the likely changes (both concepts and ideas) 
that would be needed to enhance patient safety have already been undertaken 
for:  
● primary care mental health;  
● diagnosis and assessment; 
● care of older adults;  
● out-of-hours care;  
● unwell children; and, 
● vulnerable adults.  
 
Reviews of the literature, and in more recent studies scoping reviews, have 
been undertaken to identify interventions and improvement initiatives that 
address the inductive priorities that have emerged from analysis. These studies 
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are currently being prepared for submission or have been 
published.(354,458,529,530)  
 
7.5.3. Data-driven improvement agendas for primary care  
Preventive quality and safety initiatives like the 1000 Lives campaign (now the 
1000 Lives Improvement service) in Wales have claimed significant reductions 
in harm and mortality were made through reliable implementation of 
interventions in hospitals like ‘care bundles’ and ‘checklists’.(531) Such 
campaign approaches to achieve improvement at scale have not been 
rigorously evaluated.(34,532) Further, the paucity of research and development 
of patient safety in primary care means there are few primary care-specific 
interventions for improving patient safety.(96) In the absence of extensive 
research and development about where and how to intervene to improve patient 
safety in primary care, countries like England and Wales can establish their own 
data-driven primary care patient safety and improvement agendas. Acting on 
these agendas does not require learning a new set of methods and tools for 
implementation. Primary care should capitalise on the considerable experience 
about implementation already accrued by organisations that improved safety in 
hospitals over the past decade.(64) My thesis also provides the foundations to 
base plans for incident report-driven systems improvements at a national level 
(chapter 4) and local level (chapter 5). 
 
Wales has aspirations to be ‘a data-driven system’ which aligns with systems 
scientist, Peter Senge’s concept of the ‘learning organisation’.(189,533) 
Learning organisations require the supporting infrastructure for a range of 
activities and processes to create what is often described in healthcare 
organisations as a ‘culture of learning’.(534,535) The 1000 Lives Improvement 
programme has established an infrastructure for enabling Health Boards in 
Wales to train their staff to be proficient in quality improvement methods via the 
Improving Quality Together programme,(513) and regularly organised learning 
environments to share learning about the successes and challenges of 
implementation. Based on findings from my thesis, I am advising the 1000 Lives 
Improvement on their plans for primary care in Wales. 
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I have previously discussed how the outcomes from analysis of incident reports 
can trigger more in-depth investigation inquiry in general practices or healthcare 
organisations, as well as empirically inform the initial programme theories for 
systems improvement.(183) The value of incident-reporting systems will be 
realised by healthcare professionals only when their contributions are 
acknowledged and acted on. Creating an open culture of incident reporting is 
needed in all care settings, and I recognise that this is still an ongoing challenge 
in hospital settings too. (183,353) 
 
A range of research methods can be employed to study patient safety. Trigger 
tools can identify, within medical records, features suggestive of patient safety 
incidents.(536,537) Safety indices can be constructed from administrative data 
or regular data capture exercises like those advocated by the NHS patient 
safety thermometer,(538) to estimate what incidents occur and their 
frequency.(539) Methods such as significant event auditing and incident 
reporting systems can help understand why incidents occur. All such data can 
be used to inform a theory of what changes are needed to improve patient 
safety. Each offers an important, although incomplete, observation of the 
problem.(540)  
 
My thesis demonstrates that analysis of incident reports at a local and national 
level can be used to generate programme theories of change to improve patient 
safety in primary care. That said, the collection, analysis and use of incident 
report data in healthcare remains problematic, with few healthcare systems 
demonstrating that they can learn to reduce risk for future patients.(339) Further 
research and improvement activity are needed to realise the value of using 
incident report analysis to empirically inform improvement agendas.  
 
Primary care can accelerate the pace of its quality improvement agenda by 
using routine data sources like incident reports to identify local and national-
level priorities. My colleague, Dr Huw Williams, will develop and test the model 
for incident reporting system-driven patient safety improvement (Figure 5.8, 
chapter 5). Williams has secured a RCGP Marie Curie Research Fellowship 
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(2017-2019) to undertake analysis of patient safety incident reports describing 
care received by palliative care patients from the out-of-hours general practice 
service. Williams will use the learning from incident reports and a scoping 
review of the literature to inform the content for discussion at stakeholder 
events. The purpose of the stakeholder events will be to determine the 
acceptability and feasibility of identified interventions with healthcare 
professionals in general practice (and wider). Further, the events will add depth 
and update the programme theory, by exploring the following:  
● Which of the identified problems from national level analysis are relevant 
to practice in this health board?   
● Which of the interventions identified in the scoping review are feasible in 
this setting and fits with the service as it exists currently?(33)   
 
The programme theory will emerge as the basis of the QI project to be led by a 
large organisation in Wales. Williams will evaluate the QI project and update 
and amend the programme theory throughout the course of the project, and will 
identify improvement strategies and produce a ‘how to guide’ to describe the 
lessons learnt. If successful, this project will be an exemplar to demonstrate 
how a model for incident reporting system-driven patient safety improvement 
can be achieved and could be applied to the range of primary care problems 
described in section 7.5.2.  
 
In Chapter 5, I demonstrated how a small volume of incident reports could be 
used to develop a driver diagram which could be taken to frontline stakeholders 
for discussion and iteration. In the case study, the tacit knowledge of healthcare 
professionals and managers was used to operationalise the change concepts 
identified from analysis of incident reports. In this situation, a scoping review 
may have identified several ways in which other organisations have previously 
tackled this well-established problem for patient safety in primary care. 
However, the improvement team had confidence in their change ideas for each 
change concept. In the absence of change ideas, an improvement team might 
consider a review of the published and grey literature to benefit from insights 
accrued by teams in other organisations. Individual general practices are 
unlikely to have the resources to undertake such searches. However, such 
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approaches might be relevant for problem issues that have been identified for 
multiple practices in a CCG or Health Board. Guidance for deciding on whether 
to undertake a scoping review, or another kind of structured review of the 
literature, should be developed; currently, decisions to commit to a literature 
review are largely influenced by resource and skill limitations, as well as beliefs 
held by the project team around what they expect to gain from the review. 
Educational providers like the British Medical Journal (BMJ) and RCGP 
Learning recognise this challenge. Internationally, BMJ launched ‘BMJ Open 
Quality’ as an online journal inviting case reports of quality improvement 
projects.(541) Nationally, the RCGP recognised that an online repository of 
primary care improvement solutions was needed and launched ‘QI Ready’ in 
March 2017.(542)  An online platform has been created to enable sharing of 
case studies and facilitate sharing of learning between a network of GPs and 
primary care professionals working to improve quality improvement in general 
practice.  
 
7.5.4. Natural language processing 
With the WHO now advocating wider use of patient safety incident reporting 
systems, and several low- and middle-income countries planning/ embarking on 
creating such systems, there is a pressing need for research to identify cost-
effective automated approaches to data acquisition and analysis. The methods 
employed in my research have involved time-consuming manual analysis of 
these data undertaken by expensive, trained clinical analysts. This means that 
these methods cannot easily scale to low- and middle-income countries. 
 
An opportunity exists, given that at least 13,699 reports have been manually 
coded, for the data set to be used to develop the technology capable of 
automating the analysis of incident reports. A solution to manual coding is to 
use Natural Language Processing (NLP) in conjunction with machine learning, 
which together can convert unstructured free text into structured knowledge 
autonomously.(527,543–545) Such approaches demonstrate promise for the 
automation of categorising incident type.(546–548) NLP offers a set of 
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informatics tools capable of transforming text into a structured format that can 
be used for research and improvement.  
7.6. Conclusions  
Despite over a decade of patient safety research in the hospital setting, 
incident-reporting systems have struggled to gain traction with the clinical 
community, and garnered little respect from the health information and research 
communities. Therefore, if healthcare professionals in general practices are to 
invest time and effort in reporting patient safety incidents, a robust method is 
needed to learn about risk and to generate strategies to minimise future patient 
risk. Those professionals will want to see results. An opportunity exists to 
support healthcare organisations to exploit their local data to generate learning 
from incident reports and inform their quality improvement agenda. This would 
enable each organisation to undertake their own diagnostics for improvement 
and prioritise the issues that matter most to their workforces. 
 
Research included in my thesis is the first systematic analysis of safety incident 
reports from general practice reported to the NRLS. Using mixed methods, I 
have empirically developed a classification approach to enable coding of patient 
safety incident reports for the identification of the most common and frequent 
safety issues, as well as to understand the underlying clinical context reported 
by healthcare professionals. The four classes of data (incident type, contributory 
factors, level of harm and outcomes) represent the minimum data needed to 
identify learning to inform future practice improvement. Opportunities to prevent 
the issues underpinning the most commonly reported incidents, as well as those 
described as resulting in severe harm or death, were identified. 
Recommendations have been made from this analysis by a multidisciplinary 
team of clinicians, researchers and patient safety experts. 
 
To advance the field of patient safety in primary care, regular interrogation of 
routine data, such as incident reports, will be needed to inform the development 
of a national quality and safety agenda. Although there are recognised 
limitations of incident reporting system data, my research has generated 
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hypotheses through an inductive process that now requires development and 
testing through future research and improvement efforts in clinical practice. 
Using the issues that matter most to professionals to gain traction for buy-in 
could help to accelerate a culture of patient safety in primary care. 
 
A structured analysis of local incident reports permitted local improvements to 
be developed and implemented (exemplar - anticoagulation safety). Similarly, a 
structured analysis of national-level data permitted identification of more 
systematic issues concerning general and recurring safety problems, and 
further work is needed to update and amend the programme theory by 
improvement activities in a range of contexts. However, variation currently 
exists in terms of report content and its ability to inform systems improvement. 
Maximising opportunities to learn from patient safety incidents via mandatory 
data capture and a national, co-ordinated effort to support organisations to build 
the capacity and capability of their workforce to report data for learning is 
needed. 
 
Further work must now build on both deepening and broadening understanding 
of my thesis findings through methodological development, and wider 
characterisation of safety incident reports from primary care including scoping 
reviews for interventions and initiatives to address priorities. Finally, efforts to 
develop and test emerging programme theories in practice are needed and their 
effects on patient safety and experience need to be evaluated. 
 
  
  258 
References 
1.  The Information Centre for Health and Social Care. General Personal Medical 
Services: England 1998-2008 [Internet]. The Information Centre for Health and 
Social Care; 2008 Sep. Available from: 
http://content.digital.nhs.uk/catalogue/PUB00999/nhs-staf-gen-prac-1998-2008-
rep2.pdf 
2.  World Health Organization. Conceptual Framework for the International 
Classification for Patient Safety Version 1.1 [Internet]. World Health Organization; 
2009 Jan. Available from: 
http://www.who.int/patientsafety/taxonomy/icps_full_report.pdf 
3.  World Health Organization. World Health Assembly Resolution WHA 55.18 2012 
[Internet]. World Health Organization.; Available from: 
http://www.who.int/patientsafety/about/wha_resolution/en/index.html 
4.  Evans DB, Justine H, Ties B. Universal health coverage and universal access. Bull 
World Health Organ. 2013;91(8):546–546A. 
5.  Illich I. Limits to Medicine: Medical Nemesis: the Expropriation of Health. Penguin; 
1978. 296 p. 
6.  Runciman WB, Ross Baker G, Philippe M, Jauregui IL, Lilford RJ, Anne A, et al. 
The epistemology of patient safety research. Int J Evid Based Healthc. 
2008;6(4):476–86. 
7.  Shojania K, Panesar SS. Basics of patient safety. In: Panesar SS, Carson-Stevens 
A, Salvilla S, Sheikh A., editor. Patient safety and healthcare quality at a glance. 
London: Wiley-Blackwell; 2014. p. 2–3. 
8.  Runciman WB, Baker GR, Michel P, Dovey S, Lilford RJ, Jensen N, et al. Tracing 
the foundations of a conceptual framework for a patient safety ontology. Qual Saf 
Health Care. 2010 Dec;19(6):e56. 
9.  Reason J. Human Error. Cambridge University Press; 1991. 
10.  Vincent C. Patient Safety. John Wiley & Sons; 2011. 432 p. 
11.  Runciman W, Hibbert P, Thomson R, Van Der Schaaf T, Sherman H, Lewalle P. 
Towards an International Classification for Patient Safety: key concepts and terms. 
Int J Qual Health Care. 2009 Feb;21(1):18–26. 
12.  Donabedian A. The Definition of Quality and Approaches to Its Assessment. 
Health Administration Pr; 1980. 163 p. 
13.  Starfield B. Health services research: a working model. N Engl J Med. 1973 Jul 
19;289(3):132–6. 
14.  Leape LL. Error in medicine. JAMA. 1994 Dec 21;272(23):1851–7. 
15.  Aveling E-L, Emma-Louise A, Michael P, Mary D-W. What is the Role of Individual 
Accountability in Patient Safety? A Multi-Site Ethnographic Study. In: The 
Sociology of Healthcare Safety and Quality. 2016. p. 36–51. 
16.  Marsh I. Theory and Practice in Sociology. Routledge; 2014. 336 p. 
  259 
17.  Kennedy I, Grubb A. Medical Law. Oxford University Press; 2000. 2303 p. 
18.  Catchpole K. Human factors. In: Panesar S, Carson-Stevens A, Salvilla S, Sheikh 
A, editors. Patient Safety and Healthcare Improvement at a Glance. Wiley; 2014. 
p. 8–11. (At a Glance). 
19.  Brook RH, McGlynn EA, Cleary PD. Measuring Quality of Care. N Engl J Med. 
1996;335(13):966–70. 
20.  Batalden PB, Davidoff F. What is “quality improvement” and how can it transform 
healthcare? Qual Saf Health Care. 2007;16(1):2–3. 
21.  Committee on Quality of Health Care in America, Institute of Medicine. Crossing 
the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century. National 
Academies Press; 2001. 360 p. 
22.  Deming WE. The New Economics: For Industry, Government, Education. 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for advanced engineering study; 
2000. 
23.  Langley GJ, Moen R, Nolan KM, Nolan TW, Norman CL, Provost LP. The 
Improvement Guide: A Practical Approach to Enhancing Organizational 
Performance. John Wiley & Sons; 2009. 512 p. 
24.  Wilson T, Plsek P, Berwick D, Others. Learning from around the world: 
experiences and thoughts of collaborative improvement from seven countries. 
Boston: Institute for Healthcare Improvement. 2001; 
25.  Berwick DM, Calkins DR, McCannon CJ, Hackbarth AD. The 100,000 lives 
campaign: setting a goal and a deadline for improving health care quality. JAMA. 
2006 Jan 18;295(3):324–7. 
26.  Lewis CI. Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge. London: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, editor. 1929. 
27.  Davidoff F, Dixon-Woods M, Leviton L, Michie S. Demystifying theory and its use 
in improvement. BMJ Qual Saf. 2015 Mar;24(3):228–38. 
28.  Reed JE, McNicholas C, Woodcock T, Issen L, Bell D. Designing quality 
improvement initiatives: the action effect method, a structured approach to 
identifying and articulating programme theory. BMJ Qual Saf. 2014;23(12):1040–8. 
29.  Scott PJ. Mixed Methods: A Paradigm for Holistic Evaluation of Health IT. Stud 
Health Technol Inform. 2016;222:102–13. 
30.  Langley GJ, Moen R, Nolan KM, Nolan TW, Norman CL, Provost LP. The 
improvement guide: a practical approach to enhancing organizational 
performance. John Wiley & Sons; 2009. 
31.  Taylor MJ, McNicholas C, Nicolay C, Darzi A, Bell D, Reed JE. Systematic review 
of the application of the plan-do-study-act method to improve quality in healthcare. 
BMJ Qual Saf. 2014 Apr;23(4):290–8. 
32.  Ostom E. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective 
action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1990. 
33.  Davidoff F, Dixon-Woods M, Leviton L, Michie S. Demystifying theory and its use 
  260 
in improvement. BMJ Qual Saf. 2015;24(3):228–38. 
34.  Parry GJ, Carson-Stevens A, Luff DF, McPherson ME, Goldmann DA. 
Recommendations for evaluation of health care improvement initiatives. Acad 
Pediatr. 2013 Nov;13(6 Suppl):S23–30. 
35.  Grol R, Wensing M, Eccles M, Davis D. Improving Patient Care: The 
Implementation of Change in Health Care. John Wiley & Sons; 2013. 
36.  Rees P, Edwards A, Powell C, Evans HP, Carter B, Hibbert P, et al. Pediatric 
immunization-related safety incidents in primary care: A mixed methods analysis of 
a national database. Vaccine. 2015 Jul 31;33(32):3873–80. 
37.  Grol R. Personal paper: Beliefs and evidence in changing clinical practice. BMJ. 
1997;315(7105):418–21. 
38.  Dixon-Woods M, McNicol S, Martin G. Overcoming challenges to improving 
quality. The Health Foundation; 2012. 36 p. 
39.  Marshall M, Pronovost P, Dixon-Woods M. Promotion of improvement as a 
science. Lancet. 2013 Feb 2;381(9864):419–21. 
40.  Dixon-Woods M, McNicol S, Martin G. Ten challenges in improving quality in 
healthcare: lessons from the Health Foundation’s programme evaluations and 
relevant literature. BMJ Qual Saf. 2012 Oct;21(10):876–84. 
41.  Dixon-Woods M, Baker R, Charles K, Dawson J, Jerzembek G, Martin G, et al. 
Culture and behaviour in the English National Health Service: overview of lessons 
from a large multimethod study. BMJ Qual Saf. 2014 Feb;23(2):106–15. 
42.  Martin GP, Dixon-Woods M. Can we tell whether hospital care is safe? Br J Hosp 
Med . 2014 Sep;75(9):484–5. 
43.  Dixon-Woods M, Mary D-W, Bosk CL, Aveling EL, Goeschel CA, Pronovost PJ. 
Explaining Michigan: Developing an Ex Post Theory of a Quality Improvement 
Program. Milbank Q. 2011;89(2):167–205. 
44.  Schimmel EM. The hazards of hospitalization. Ann Intern Med. 1964 Jan;60:100–
10. 
45.  Mills DH. Medical insurance feasibility study. A technical summary. West J Med. 
1978 Apr;128(4):360–5. 
46.  Kohn LT, Corrigan JM, Donaldson MS. To err is human: building a safer health 
system. Institute of Medicine (US) Committee on Quality of Health Care in 
America. Washington, DC: National Academy Press; 1999. 
47.  Health D of. An organisation with a memory [Internet]. 2001. Available from: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/
prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4
065086.pdf 
48.  Pittet D, Donaldson L. Clean Care is Safer Care: a worldwide priority. Lancet. 2005 
Oct 8;366(9493):1246–7. 
49.  World Health Organization. WHO guidelines for safe surgery: safe surgery saves 
lives. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2009. 
  261 
50.  Haynes AB, Weiser TG, Berry WR, Lipsitz SR, Breizat A-HS, Dellinger EP, et al. A 
surgical safety checklist to reduce morbidity and mortality in a global population. N 
Engl J Med. 2009 Jan 29;360(5):491–9. 
51.  Bosk CL, Dixon-Woods M, Goeschel CA, Pronovost PJ. Reality check for 
checklists. Lancet. 2009 Aug 8;374(9688):444–5. 
52.  Urbach DR, Govindarajan A, Saskin R, Wilton AS, Baxter NN. Introduction of 
surgical safety checklists in Ontario, Canada. N Engl J Med. 2014 Mar 
13;370(11):1029–38. 
53.  Leape LL. The checklist conundrum. N Engl J Med. 2014 Mar 13;370(11):1063–4. 
54.  Pronovost P, Peter P, Dale N, Sean B, David S, Haitao C, et al. An Intervention to 
Decrease Catheter-Related Bloodstream Infections in the ICU. N Engl J Med. 
2006;355(26):2725–32. 
55.  Bion JF, Mary D-W. Keystone, Matching Michigan, and Bacteremia Zero. Crit Care 
Med. 2014;42(5):e383–4. 
56.  Bion J, Richardson A, Hibbert P, Beer J, Abrusci T, McCutcheon M, et al. 
“Matching Michigan”: a 2-year stepped interventional programme to minimise 
central venous catheter-blood stream infections in intensive care units in England. 
BMJ Qual Saf. 2013 Feb;22(2):110–23. 
57.  Benn J, Jonathan B, Susan B, Anam P, Anna P, Sandra I, et al. Perceptions of the 
impact of a large-scale collaborative improvement programme: experience in the 
UK Safer Patients Initiative. J Eval Clin Pract. 2009;15(3):524–40. 
58.  Parand A, Burnett S, Benn J, Iskander S, Pinto A, Vincent C. Medical engagement 
in organisation-wide safety and quality-improvement programmes: experience in 
the UK Safer Patients Initiative. BMJ Qual Saf. 2010;19(5):e44–e44. 
59.  Benning A, Dixon-Woods M, Nwulu U, Ghaleb M, Dawson J, Barber N, et al. 
Multiple component patient safety intervention in English hospitals: controlled 
evaluation of second phase. BMJ. 2011 Feb 3;342:d199. 
60.  Chen Y-F, Hemming K, Stevens AJ, Lilford RJ. Secular trends and evaluation of 
complex interventions: the rising tide phenomenon. BMJ Qual Saf. 2016 
May;25(5):303–10. 
61.  Ioannidis JPA. Why most published research findings are false. PLoS Med. 2005 
Aug;2(8):e124. 
62.  Perla RJ, Parry GJ. The epistemology of quality improvement: it’s all Greek. BMJ 
Qual Saf. 2011 Apr;20 Suppl 1:i24–7. 
63.  Cresswell KM, Panesar SS, Salvilla SA, Carson-Stevens A, Larizgoitia I, 
Donaldson LJ, et al. Global research priorities to better understand the burden of 
iatrogenic harm in primary care: an international Delphi exercise. PLoS Med. 2013 
Nov;10(11):e1001554. 
64.  Sheikh A, Panesar SS, Larizgoitia I, Bates DW, Donaldson LJ. Safer primary care 
for all: a global imperative. Lancet Glob Health. 2013 Oct;1(4):e182–3. 
65.  Gillam S. Is the declaration of Alma Ata still relevant to primary health care? BMJ. 
2008 Mar 8;336(7643):536–8. 
  262 
66.  Murray CJL. Choosing indicators for the health-related SDG targets. Lancet. 2015 
Oct 3;386(10001):1314–7. 
67.  Gunn SWA, Michele M. The Declaration of Alma-Ata on Primary Health Care. In: 
Concepts and Practice of Humanitarian Medicine. p. 21–3. 
68.  Starfield B, Barbara S, Leiyu S, James M. Contribution of Primary Care to Health 
Systems and Health. Milbank Q. 2005;83(3):457–502. 
69.  Kostopoulou O, Delaney B. Confidential reporting of patient safety events in 
primary care: results from a multilevel classification of cognitive and system 
factors. Qual Saf Health Care. 2007 Apr;16(2):95–100. 
70.  Panesar SS, deSilva D, Carson-Stevens A, Cresswell KM, Salvilla SA, Slight SP, 
et al. How safe is primary care? A systematic review. BMJ Qual Saf. 2016 
Jul;25(7):544–53. 
71.  Avery T, Barber N, Ghaleb M, Franklin BD, Armstrong S, Crowe S, et al. The 
PRACtICe Study. Prevalence and causes of prescribing errors in general practice) 
A report for the GMC. 2012; 
72.  Britt H, Miller GC, Steven ID, Howarth GC, Nicholson PA, Bhasale AL, et al. 
Collecting data on potentially harmful events: a method for monitoring incidents in 
general practice. Fam Pract. 1997 Apr;14(2):101–6. 
73.  Fischer G, Fetters MD, Munro AP, Goldman EB. Adverse events in primary care 
identified from a risk-management database. J Fam Pract. 1997 Jul;45(1):40–6. 
74.  Bhasale AL, Miller GC, Reid SE, Britt HC. Analysing potential harm in Australian 
general practice: an incident-monitoring study. Med J Aust. 1998 Jul 20;169(2):73–
6. 
75.  Holden J, O’Donnell S, Brindley J, Miles L. Analysis of 1263 deaths in four general 
practices. Br J Gen Pract. 1998 Jul;48(432):1409–12. 
76.  Woolf SH, Kuzel AJ, Dovey SM, Phillips RL Jr. A string of mistakes: the 
importance of cascade analysis in describing, counting, and preventing medical 
errors. Ann Fam Med. 2004 Jul;2(4):317–26. 
77.  Mitchell ED, Greg R, Una M. Understanding diagnosis of lung cancer in primary 
care: qualitative synthesis of significant event audit reports. Br J Gen Pract. 
2013;63(606):37–46. 
78.  Mitchell ED, Rubin G, Merriman L, Macleod U. The role of primary care in cancer 
diagnosis via emergency presentation: qualitative synthesis of significant event 
reports. Br J Cancer. 2015;112:S50–6. 
79.  Rodrigues SP, van Eck NJ, Waltman L, Jansen FW. Mapping patient safety: a 
large-scale literature review using bibliometric visualisation techniques. BMJ Open. 
2014 Mar 13;4(3):e004468. 
80.  Jha AK, Larizgoitia I, Audera-Lopez C, Prasopa-Plaizier N, Waters H, Bates DW. 
The global burden of unsafe medical care: analytic modelling of observational 
studies. BMJ Qual Saf. 2013 Oct;22(10):809–15. 
81.  Stewart AL, Lynch KJ. Identifying discrepancies in electronic medical records 
through pharmacist medication reconciliation. J Am Pharm Assoc . 2012 
  263 
Jan;52(1):59–66. 
82.  Bradley MC, Fahey T, Cahir C, Bennett K, O’Reilly D, Parsons C, et al. Potentially 
inappropriate prescribing and cost outcomes for older people: a cross-sectional 
study using the Northern Ireland Enhanced Prescribing Database. Eur J Clin 
Pharmacol. 2012 Oct;68(10):1425–33. 
83.  Taylor LK, Kawasumi Y, Bartlett G, Tamblyn R. Inappropriate prescribing 
practices: the challenge and opportunity for patient safety. Healthc Q. 2005;8 Spec 
No:81–5. 
84.  van der Hooft CS, Jong GW ’t, Dieleman JP, Verhamme KMC, van der Cammen 
TJM, Stricker BHC, et al. Inappropriate drug prescribing in older adults: the 
updated 2002 Beers criteria--a population-based cohort study. Br J Clin 
Pharmacol. 2005 Aug;60(2):137–44. 
85.  Al Khaja KAJ, Damanhori AHH, Al-Ansari TM, Sequeira RP. Topical 
corticosteroids in infants: prescribing pattern and prescribing errors in Bahrain. 
Pharm World Sci. 2007;29(4):395–9. 
86.  Kane-Gill SL, Van Den Bos J, Handler SM. Adverse Drug Reactions in Hospital 
and Ambulatory Care Settings Identified Using a Large Administrative Database. 
Ann Pharmacother. 2010;44(6):983–93. 
87.  Zavaleta-Bustos M, Miriam Z-B, Castro-Pastrana LI, Ivette R-H, López-Luna MA, 
Bermúdez-Camps IB. Prescription errors in a primary care university unit: urgency 
of pharmaceutical care in Mexico. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Farmacêuticas. 
2008;44(1):115–25. 
88.  Hider P, Lay-Yee R, Crampton P, Davis P. Comparison of services provided by 
urban commercial, community-governed and traditional primary care practices in 
New Zealand. J Health Serv Res Policy. 2007;12(4):215–22. 
89.  Krska J. Pharmacist-led medication review in patients over 65: a randomized, 
controlled trial in primary care. Age Ageing. 2001;30(3):205–11. 
90.  Granas AG, Christian B, Vidar H, Cecilie H, Arvid K, Blix HS, et al. Evaluating 
categorisation and clinical relevance of drug-related problems in medication 
reviews. Pharm World Sci. 2010;32(3):394–403. 
91.  Tamblyn R, Huang A, Taylor L, Kawasumi Y, Bartlett G, Grad R, et al. A 
Randomized Trial of the Effectiveness of On-demand versus Computer-triggered 
Drug Decision Support in Primary Care. J Am Med Inform Assoc. 2008;15(4):430–
8. 
92.  Howell L, LydiaPleotis H, Scott M, Jacqueline J, DanielJ T, Joy M. Can automated 
alerts within computerized physician order entry improve compliance with 
laboratory practice guidelines for ordering Pap tests? J Pathol Inform. 
2014;5(1):37. 
93.  Batuwitage BT, Kingham JGC, Morgan NE, Bartlett RL. Inappropriate prescribing 
of proton pump inhibitors in primary care. Postgrad Med J. 2007;83(975):66–8. 
94.  Avery AJ, Rodgers S, Cantrill JA, Armstrong S, Cresswell K, Eden M, et al. A 
pharmacist-led information technology intervention for medication errors 
(PINCER): a multicentre, cluster randomised, controlled trial and cost-
  264 
effectiveness analysis. Lancet. 2012 Apr 7;379(9823):1310–9. 
95.  Dreischulte T, Donnan P, Grant A, Hapca A, McCowan C, Guthrie B. Safer 
Prescribing — A Trial of Education, Informatics, and Financial Incentives. N Engl J 
Med. 2016 Mar 17;374(11):1053–64. 
96.  Makeham M, Pont L, Prgomet M, Carson-Stevens A, Lake R, Purdy H, et al. 
Patient safety in primary healthcare [Internet]. SAX Institute, Australia; 2015 Dec. 
Available from: http://www.safetyandquality.gov.au/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/Patient-safety-in-primary-healthcare-a-review-of-the-
literature-August-2015.docx 
97.  Arora S, Burner E, Terp S, Nok Lam C, Nercisian A, Bhatt V, et al. Improving 
attendance at post-emergency department follow-up via automated text message 
appointment reminders: a randomized controlled trial. Acad Emerg Med. 2015 
Jan;22(1):31–7. 
98.  El-Kareh R, Gandhi TK, Poon EG, Newmark LP, Ungar J, Lipsitz S, et al. Trends 
in primary care clinician perceptions of a new electronic health record. J Gen 
Intern Med. 2009 Apr;24(4):464–8. 
99.  Garment AR, Lee WW, Christina H, Erica P-C. Development of a Structured Year-
End Sign-Out Program in an Outpatient Continuity Practice. J Gen Intern Med. 
2012;28(1):114–20. 
100.  Gurwitz JH, Field TS, Ogarek J, Tjia J, Cutrona SL, Harrold LR, et al. An 
electronic health record-based intervention to increase follow-up office visits and 
decrease rehospitalization in older adults. J Am Geriatr Soc. 2014 May;62(5):865–
71. 
101.  Hoffmann B, Müller V, Rochon J, Gondan M, Müller B, Albay Z, et al. Effects of 
a team-based assessment and intervention on patient safety culture in general 
practice: an open randomised controlled trial. BMJ Qual Saf. 2013;23(1):35–46. 
102.  Marsteller JA, Hsiao C-J, Underwood WS, Woodward P, Barr MS. A simple 
intervention promoting patient safety improvements in small internal medicine 
practices. Qual Prim Care. 2010;18(5):307–16. 
103.  Singh R, Ranjit S, Ashok S, Reva F, Don M, Anderson DR, et al. A Patient 
Safety Objective Structured Clinical Examination. J Patient Saf. 2009;5(2):55–60. 
104.  Verbakel NJ, Zwart DLM, Langelaan M, Verheij TJM, Wagner C. Measuring 
safety culture in Dutch primary care: psychometric characteristics of the SCOPE-
PC questionnaire. BMC Health Serv Res. 2013 Sep 17;13:354. 
105.  Zwart DLM, Van Rensen ELJ, Kalkman CJ, Verheij TJM. Central or local 
incident reporting? A comparative study in Dutch GP out-of-hours services. Br J 
Gen Pract. 2011;61(584):183–7. 
106.  Moeller AD, Rasmussen K, Nielsen KJ. Learning and feedback from the Danish 
patient safety incident reporting system can be improved. Dan Med J [Internet]. 
2016 Jun;63(6). Available from: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27264943 
107.  Heideveld-Chevalking AJ, Hiske C, Johan D, Hein G, Wolff AP. The impact of a 
standardized incident reporting system in the perioperative setting: a single center 
experience on 2,563 `near-misses¿ and adverse events. Patient Saf Surg. 
  265 
2014;8(1):46. 
108.  Mikkelsen KL, Thommesen J, Andersen HB. Validating the Danish adaptation 
of the World Health Organization’s International Classification for Patient Safety 
classification of patient safety incident types. Int J Qual Health Care. 2013 
Apr;25(2):132–40. 
109.  Kilskar S, Melby L, Øren A, Lippestad J. Does a national incident reporting 
system contribute to improved patient safety: A Norwegian case. In: ESREL 2015. 
2015. p. 3801–9. 
110.  Cassidy C, Arnot-Smith J, Smith A. Critical incident reports concerning 
anaesthetic equipment: Analysis of the UK National Reporting and Learning 
System (NRLS) data from 2006. Eur J Anaesthesiol. 2008;25(Sup 44):7–8. 
111.  Howell A-M, Burns EM, Bouras G, Donaldson LJ, Athanasiou T, Darzi A. Can 
Patient Safety Incident Reports Be Used to Compare Hospital Safety? Results 
from a Quantitative Analysis of the English National Reporting and Learning 
System Data. PLoS One. 2015 Dec 9;10(12):e0144107. 
112.  Rutter PD, Panesar SS, Darzi A, Donaldson LJ. What is the risk of death or 
severe harm due to bone cement implantation syndrome among patients 
undergoing hip hemiarthroplasty for fractured neck of femur? A patient safety 
surveillance study. BMJ Open. 2014 Jun 12;4(6):e004853. 
113.  Williams SD, Ashcroft DM. Medication errors: how reliable are the severity 
ratings reported to the national reporting and learning system? Int J Qual Health 
Care. 2009 Oct;21(5):316–20. 
114.  Pham JC, Colantuoni E, Dominici F, Shore A, Macrae C, Scobie S, et al. The 
harm susceptibility model: a method to prioritise risks identified in patient safety 
reporting systems. Qual Saf Health Care. 2010 Oct;19(5):440–5. 
115.  Cousins DH, Gerrett D, Warner B. A review of medication incidents reported to 
the National Reporting and Learning System in England and Wales over 6 years 
(2005-2010). Br J Clin Pharmacol. 2012 Oct;74(4):597–604. 
116.  Rocos B, Donaldson LJ. Alcohol skin preparation causes surgical fires. Ann R 
Coll Surg Engl. 2012 Mar;94(2):87–9. 
117.  Wahr JA, Shore AD, Harris LH, Rogers P, Panesar S, Matthew L, et al. 
Comparison of intensive care unit medication errors reported to the United States’ 
MedMarx and the United Kingdom's National Reporting and Learning System: a 
cross-sectional study. Am J Med Qual. 2014 Jan;29(1):61–9. 
118.  Healey F, Scobie S, Oliver D, Pryce A, Thomson R, Glampson B. Falls in 
English and Welsh hospitals: a national observational study based on 
retrospective analysis of 12 months of patient safety incident reports. Qual Saf 
Health Care. 2008 Dec;17(6):424–30. 
119.  Yardley IE, Donaldson LJ. Patient safety matters: reducing the risks of 
nasogastric tubes. Clin Med . 2010 Jun;10(3):228–30. 
120.  Donaldson LJ, Panesar SS, Darzi A. Patient-safety-related hospital deaths in 
England: thematic analysis of incidents reported to a national database, 2010-
2012. PLoS Med. 2014 Jun;11(6):e1001667. 
  266 
121.  Yardley IE, Donaldson LJ. Deaths following prehospital safety incidents: an 
analysis of a national database. Emerg Med J. 2016 Oct;33(10):716–21. 
122.  Howell A-M, Panesar SS, Burns EM, Donaldson LJ, Darzi A. Reducing the 
burden of surgical harm: a systematic review of the interventions used to reduce 
adverse events in surgery. Ann Surg. 2014 Apr;259(4):630–41. 
123.  Franklin BD, Panesar SS, Vincent C, Donaldson LJ. Identifying systems failures 
in the pathway to a catastrophic event: an analysis of national incident report data 
relating to vinca alkaloids. BMJ Qual Saf. 2014 Sep;23(9):765–72. 
124.  Panesar SS, Ignatowicz AM, Donaldson LJ. Errors in the management of 
cardiac arrests: an observational study of patient safety incidents in England. 
Resuscitation. 2014 Dec;85(12):1759–63. 
125.  Donaldson LJ, Panesar SS, McAvoy PA, Scarrott DM. Identification of poor 
performance in a national medical workforce over 11 years: an observational 
study. BMJ Qual Saf. 2014 Feb;23(2):147–52. 
126.  Panesar SS, Netuveli G, Carson-Stevens A, Javad S, Patel B, Parry G, et al. 
The orthopaedic error index: development and application of a novel national 
indicator for assessing the relative safety of hospital care using a cross-sectional 
approach. BMJ Open. 2013 Nov 21;3(11):e003448. 
127.  Kane-Gill S, Sandra K-G. Institutional and National MEDMARX Data Have 
Differences in Causes and Types of Medication Errors but Agree on the Higher 
Propensity for Harm in the ICU. Crit Care Med. 2013;41(9):e234–5. 
128.  Santell JP, Hicks RW, Judy M, Cousins DD. Medication Errors: Experience of 
the United States Pharmacopeia (USP) MEDMARX Reporting System. J Clin 
Pharmacol. 2003;43(7):760–7. 
129.  Hicks RW, Becker SC, Cousins DD. Harmful Medication Errors in Children: A 5-
Year Analysis of Data from the USP’s MEDMARX® Program. J Pediatr Nurs. 
2006;21(4):290–8. 
130.  Grissinger MC, Hicks RW, Keroack MA, Marella WM, Vaida AJ. Harmful 
medication errors involving unfractionated and low-molecular-weight heparin in 
three patient safety reporting programs. Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf. 2010 
May;36(5):195–202. 
131.  Slight SP, Eguale T, Amato MG, Seger AC, Whitney DL, Bates DW, et al. The 
vulnerabilities of computerized physician order entry systems: a qualitative study. J 
Am Med Inform Assoc. 2016 Mar;23(2):311–6. 
132.  Latif A, Rawat N, Pustavoitau A, Pronovost PJ, Pham JC. National study on the 
distribution, causes, and consequences of voluntarily reported medication errors 
between the ICU and non-ICU settings. Crit Care Med. 2013 Feb;41(2):389–98. 
133.  Lahue BJ, Pyenson B, Iwasaki K, Blumen HE, Forray S, Rothschild JM. 
National burden of preventable adverse drug events associated with inpatient 
injectable medications: healthcare and medical professional liability costs. Am 
Health Drug Benefits. 2012 Nov;5(7):1–10. 
134.  Gokhman R, Seybert AL, Phrampus P, Darby J, Kane-Gill SL. Medication errors 
during medical emergencies in a large, tertiary care, academic medical center. 
  267 
Resuscitation. 2012 Apr;83(4):482–7. 
135.  Pham JC, Andrawis M, Shore AD, Fahey M, Morlock L, Pronovost PJ. Are 
temporary staff associated with more severe emergency department medication 
errors? J Healthc Qual. 2011 Jul;33(4):9–18. 
136.  Jones KJ, Cochran GL, Xu L, Skinner A, Knudson A, Hicks RW. The 
Association Between Pharmacist Support and Voluntary Reporting of Medication 
Errors: An Analysis of MEDMARX(®) Data. In: Henriksen K, Battles JB, Keyes MA, 
Grady ML, editors. Advances in Patient Safety: New Directions and Alternative 
Approaches (Vol 1: Assessment). Rockville (MD): Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality; 2011. 
137.  Santell JP, Kowiatek JG, Weber RJ, Hicks RW, Sirio CA. Medication errors 
resulting from computer entry by nonprescribers. Am J Health Syst Pharm. 2009 
May 1;66(9):843–53. 
138.  Bundy DG, Shore AD, Morlock LL, Miller MR. Pediatric vaccination errors: 
application of the “5 rights” framework to a national error reporting database. 
Vaccine. 2009 Jun 12;27(29):3890–6. 
139.  Schein JR, Hicks RW, Nelson WW, Sikirica V, Doyle DJ. Patient-controlled 
analgesia-related medication errors in the postoperative period: causes and 
prevention. Drug Saf. 2009;32(7):549–59. 
140.  Hicks RW, Becker SC. An Overview of Intravenous-related Medication 
Administration Errors as Reported to MEDMARX®, a National Medication Error-
reporting Program. J Infus Nurs. 2006;29(1):20–7. 
141.  Alexander DC, Bundy DG, Shore AD, Morlock L, Hicks RW, Miller MR. 
Cardiovascular medication errors in children. Pediatrics. 2009 Jul;124(1):324–32. 
142.  Stavroudis TA, Shore AD, Morlock L, Hicks RW, Bundy D, Miller MR. NICU 
medication errors: identifying a risk profile for medication errors in the neonatal 
intensive care unit. J Perinatol. 2010 Jul;30(7):459–68. 
143.  Rinke ML, Bundy DG, Shore AD, Colantuoni E, Morlock LL, Miller MR. Pediatric 
antidepressant medication errors in a national error reporting database. J Dev 
Behav Pediatr. 2010 Feb;31(2):129–36. 
144.  Weingart SN, Toro J, Spencer J, Duncombe D, Gross A, Bartel S, et al. 
Medication errors involving oral chemotherapy. Cancer. 2010 May 
15;116(10):2455–64. 
145.  Storey MA, Weber RJ, Besco K, Beatty S, Aizawa K, Mirtallo JM. Evaluation of 
Parenteral Nutrition Errors in an Era of Drug Shortages. Nutr Clin Pract. 2016 
Apr;31(2):211–7. 
146.  Schiff GD, Amato MG, Eguale T, Boehne JJ, Wright A, Koppel R, et al. 
Computerised physician order entry-related medication errors: analysis of reported 
errors and vulnerability testing of current systems. BMJ Qual Saf. 2015 
Apr;24(4):264–71. 
147.  Rutter M, Matthew R, Claire N, Colin R, Julietta P, Roger B. Risk factors for 
adverse events related to polypectomy in the English Bowel Cancer Screening 
Programme. Endoscopy. 2014;46(02):90–7. 
  268 
148.  Rutter MD, Nickerson C, Patnick J, Rees CJ, Blanks RG. OC-011 Beware the 
Caecum: Colonoscopic Adverse Events in the English NHS Bowel Cancer 
Screening Programme. Gut. 2013;62(Suppl 1):A5.1–A5. 
149.  Gupta S, Sachin G, Maggie V, Fraser CH, Noriko S, Saunders BP, et al. 891b: 
Colonoscopic Adverse Events in a UK Based Bowel Cancer Screening Centre. 
Gastrointest Endosc. 2010;71(5):AB137. 
150.  Martin SK, Etchegaray JM, Simmons D, Belt WT, Clark K. Development and 
Implementation of The University of Texas Close Call Reporting System. In: 
Henriksen K, Battles JB, Marks ES, Lewin DI, editors. Advances in Patient Safety: 
From Research to Implementation (Volume 2: Concepts and Methodology). 
Rockville (MD): Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (US); 2011. 
151.  Simmons D, Mick J, Graves K, Martin SK. 26,000 Close Call Reports: Lessons 
from the University of Texas Close Call Reporting System. In: Henriksen K, Battles 
JB, Keyes MA, Grady ML, editors. Advances in Patient Safety: New Directions and 
Alternative Approaches (Vol 1: Assessment). Rockville (MD): Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality; 2011. 
152.  Khorsandi M, Maziar K, Christos S, Kevin B, Afshin A. Quality review of an 
adverse incident reporting system and root cause analysis of serious adverse 
surgical incidents in a teaching hospital of Scotland. Patient Saf Surg. 
2012;6(1):21. 
153.  Nakajima K. A web-based incident reporting system and multidisciplinary 
collaborative projects for patient safety in a Japanese hospital. Qual Saf Health 
Care. 2005;14(2):123–9. 
154.  Fukuda H, Imanaka Y, Hirose M, Hayashida K. Impact of system-level activities 
and reporting design on the number of incident reports for patient safety. Qual Saf 
Health Care. 2010;19(2):122–7. 
155.  Heideveld-Chevalking AJ, Calsbeek H, Damen J, Gooszen H, Wolff AP. The 
impact of a standardized incident reporting system in the perioperative setting: a 
single center experience on 2,563 “near-misses” and adverse events. Patient Saf 
Surg. 2014 Dec 10;8(1):46. 
156.  Munting KE, van Zaane B, Schouten ANJ, van Wolfswinkel L, de Graaff JC. 
Reporting critical incidents in a tertiary hospital: a historical cohort study of 
110,310 procedures. Can J Anaesth. 2015 Dec;62(12):1248–58. 
157.  Benn J, Koutantji M, Wallace L, Spurgeon P, Rejman M, Healey A, et al. 
Feedback from incident reporting: information and action to improve patient safety. 
Qual Saf Health Care. 2009 Feb;18(1):11–21. 
158.  Website [Internet]. [cited 2016 Oct 6]. Available from: National Patient Safety 
Agency (2011) What is a patient safety incident? Available: 
http://www.npsa.nhs.uk/nrls/reporting/what-is-a-patient-safety-incident/. Accessed 
21 May 2014. 
159.  Sevdalis N, Norris B, Ranger C, Bothwell S, Wristband Project Team. Closing 
the safety loop: evaluation of the National Patient Safety Agency’s guidance 
regarding wristband identification of hospital inpatients. J Eval Clin Pract. 2009 
Apr;15(2):311–5. 
  269 
160.  Lankshear AJ, Sheldon TA, Lowson KV, Watt IS, Wright J. Evaluation of the 
implementation of the alert issued by the UK National Patient Safety Agency on 
the storage and handling of potassium chloride concentrate solution. Qual Saf 
Health Care. 2005 Jun;14(3):196–201. 
161.  Gerrett D, Lamont T, Paton C, Barnes TRE, Shah A. Prescribing and monitoring 
lithium therapy: summary of a safety report from the National Patient Safety 
Agency. BMJ. 2010 Nov 19;341:c6258. 
162.  Lamont T, Cousins D, Hillson R, Bischler A, Terblanche M. Safer administration 
of insulin: summary of a safety report from the National Patient Safety Agency. 
BMJ. 2010 Oct 13;341:c5269. 
163.  Healey F, Sanders DS, Lamont T, Scarpello J, Agbabiaka T. Early detection of 
complications after gastrostomy: summary of a safety report from the National 
Patient Safety Agency. BMJ. 2010 May 4;340:c2160. 
164.  Healey F, Darowski A, Lamont T, Panesar S, Poulton S, Treml J, et al. 
Essential care after an inpatient fall: summary of a safety report from the National 
Patient Safety Agency. BMJ. 2011 Jan 28;342:d329. 
165.  Catchpole K, Bell MDD, Johnson S. Safety in anaesthesia: a study of 12,606 
reported incidents from the UK National Reporting and Learning System. 
Anaesthesia. 2008 Apr;63(4):340–6. 
166.  Cassidy N, Duggan E, Williams DJP, Tracey JA. The epidemiology and type of 
medication errors reported to the National Poisons Information Centre of Ireland. 
Clin Toxicol . 2011 Jul;49(6):485–91. 
167.  Smith AF, Mahajan RP. National critical incident reporting: improving patient 
safety. Br J Anaesth. 2009 Nov;103(5):623–5. 
168.  Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry. Report of the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry: Executive Summary. The 
Stationery Office; 2013. 119 p. 
169.  Website [Internet]. [cited 2016 Oct 6]. Available from: National Health Service. 
NRLS Quarterly Data Workbook up to December 2014. 2015. 
http://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/resources/?entryid45=135410 
170.  Patient Safety - Alerts [Internet]. National Patient Safety Agency. [cited 2017 
Apr 16]. Available from: http://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/resources/type/alerts/ 
171.  Stavropoulou C, Charitini S, Carole D, Paul T. How Effective Are Incident-
Reporting Systems for Improving Patient Safety? A Systematic Literature Review. 
Milbank Q. 2015;93(4):826–66. 
172.  Drysdale SB, Timothy C, Natalie C, Zita-Rose M, Chinthika P, Adam N, et al. 
The impact of the National Patient Safety Agency intravenous fluid alert on 
iatrogenic hyponatraemia in children. Eur J Pediatr. 2009;169(7):813–7. 
173.  Lankshear A, Lowson K, Weingart SN. An assessment of the quality and impact 
of NPSA medication safety outputs issued to the NHS in England and Wales. BMJ 
Qual Saf. 2011 Apr;20(4):360–5. 
174.  Sari AB-A, Sheldon TA, Cracknell A, Turnbull A. Sensitivity of routine system for 
  270 
reporting patient safety incidents in an NHS hospital: retrospective patient case 
note review. BMJ. 2007 Jan 13;334(7584):79. 
175.  Westbrook JI, Li L, Lehnbom EC, Baysari MT, Braithwaite J, Burke R, et al. 
What are incident reports telling us? A comparative study at two Australian 
hospitals of medication errors identified at audit, detected by staff and reported to 
an incident system. Int J Qual Health Care. 2015 Feb;27(1):1–9. 
176.  Olsen S, Neale G, Schwab K, Psaila B, Patel T, Chapman EJ, et al. Hospital 
staff should use more than one method to detect adverse events and potential 
adverse events: incident reporting, pharmacist surveillance and local real-time 
record review may all have a place. Qual Saf Health Care. 2007 Feb;16(1):40–4. 
177.  O’Neil AC, Petersen LA, Cook EF, Bates DW, Lee TH, Brennan TA. Physician 
reporting compared with medical-record review to identify adverse medical events. 
Ann Intern Med. 1993 Sep 1;119(5):370–6. 
178.  Makeham M, Dovey S, Runciman W, Larizgoitia I, On behalf of the Methods & 
Measures Working Group of the WHO World Alliance for Patient Safety. Methods 
and measures used in primary care patient safety research [Internet]. World Health 
Organization; 2008. Available from: 
http://www.who.int/patientsafety/research/methods_measures/makeham_dovey_fu
ll.pdf 
179.  Gaal S, Verstappen W, Wolters R, Lankveld H, van Weel C, Wensing M. 
Prevalence and consequences of patient safety incidents in general practice in the 
Netherlands: a retrospective medical record review study. Implement Sci. 2011 
Apr 6;6:37. 
180.  Wetzels R, Wolters R, van Weel C, Wensing M. Mix of methods is needed to 
identify adverse events in general practice: a prospective observational study. 
BMC Fam Pract. 2008 Jun 15;9:35. 
181.  Wetzels R, Wolters R, van Weel C, Wensing M. Harm caused by adverse 
events in primary care: a clinical observational study. J Eval Clin Pract. 2009 
Apr;15(2):323–7. 
182.  Carruthers I, Philip P. Safety first: a report for patients, clinicians and healthcare 
managers. Great Britain Department of Health; 2006. 
183.  Carson-Stevens A, Edwards A, Panesar S, Parry G, Rees P, Sheikh A, et al. 
Reducing the burden of iatrogenic harm in children. Lancet. 2015 Apr 
25;385(9978):1593–4. 
184.  Garvin DA. Building a learning organization. Harv Bus Rev. 1993 Jul;71(4):78–
91. 
185.  Garvin DA. Learning in Action: A Guide to Putting the Learning Organization to 
Work. Harvard Business Press; 2003. 256 p. 
186.  Edmondson AC. Strategies of learning from failure. Harv Bus Rev. 2011 
Apr;89(4):48–55, 137. 
187.  Edmondson AC. Learning from failure in health care: frequent opportunities, 
pervasive barriers. Qual Saf Health Care. 2004 Dec;13 Suppl 2:ii3–9. 
  271 
188.  Wilkinson JE, Rushmer RK, Davies HTO. Clinical governance and the learning 
organization. J Nurs Manag. 2004;12(2):105–13. 
189.  Senge PM. The fifth discipline fieldbook: Strategies and tools for building a 
learning organization. Crown Business; 2014. 
190.  Tsai Y. Learning organizations, internal marketing, and organizational 
commitment in hospitals. BMC Health Serv Res. 2014 Apr 4;14:152. 
191.  deBurca S. The learning health care organization. Int J Qual Health Care. 
2000;12(6):457–8. 
192.  Martin GP, McKee L, Dixon-Woods M. Beyond metrics? Utilizing “soft 
intelligence” for healthcare quality and safety. Soc Sci Med. 2015 Oct;142:19–26. 
193.  Macrae C, Carl M. The problem with incident reporting: Table 1. BMJ Qual Saf. 
2015;25(2):71–5. 
194.  Berwick D. A promise to learn--a commitment to act: improving the safety of 
patients in England. London: Department of Health. 2013;6. 
195.  Runciman WB, Williamson JAH, Deakin A, Benveniste KA, Bannon K, Hibbert 
PD. An integrated framework for safety, quality and risk management: an 
information and incident management system based on a universal patient safety 
classification. Qual Saf Health Care. 2006 Dec;15 Suppl 1:i82–90. 
196.  The World Alliance For Patient Safety Drafting Group, Sherman H, Castro G, 
Fletcher M, Hatlie M, Hibbert P, et al. Towards an International Classification for 
Patient Safety: the conceptual framework. Int J Qual Health Care. 2009;21(1):2–8. 
197.  Runciman WB. Lessons from the Australian Patient Safety Foundation: setting 
up a national patient safety surveillance system—is this the right model? Qual Saf 
Health Care. 2002 Sep 1;11(3):246–51. 
198.  Donaldson LJ, Panesar SS, Darzi A. Patient-Safety-Related Hospital Deaths in 
England: Thematic Analysis of Incidents Reported to a National Database, 2010–
2012. PLoS Med. 2014 Jun 24;11(6):e1001667. 
199.  Williams H, Huw W, Alison C, Andrew C-S. Opportunities for incident reporting. 
Response to: “The problem with incident reporting” by Macraeet al. BMJ Qual Saf. 
2015;25(2):133–4. 
200.  Denzin NK, Lincoln YS. Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry. SAGE Publications; 
2012. 
201.  Kuhn TS. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50th Anniversary Edition. 
University of Chicago Press; 2012. 
202.  Scott PJ. Mixed Methods: A Paradigm for Holistic Evaluation of Health IT. In: 
Ammenwerth E, Rigby M, editors. Evidence-Based Health Informatics. 2016. p. 
102–13. 
203.  Morgan DL. Pragmatism as a Paradigm for Social Research. Qual Inq. 
2014;20(8):1045–53. 
204.  Rossman GB, Wilson BL. Numbers and words combining quantitative and 
qualitative methods in a single large-scale evaluation study. Eval Rev. 
  272 
1985;9(5):627–43. 
205.  Sieber SD. The integration of fieldwork and survey methods. Am J Sociol. 
1973;1335–59. 
206.  Battles JB, Dixon NM, Borotkanics RJ, Rabin-Fastmen B, Kaplan HS. 
Sensemaking of patient safety risks and hazards. Health Serv Res. 2006 Aug;41(4 
Pt 2):1555–75. 
207.  Arksey H, O’Malley L. Scoping studies: towards a methodological framework. 
Int J Soc Res Methodol. 2005;8(1):19–32. 
208.  Brien SE, Lorenzetti DL, Lewis S, Kennedy J, Ghali WA. Overview of a formal 
scoping review on health system report cards. Implement Sci. 2010 Jan 15;5:2. 
209.  Higgins JPT, Green S. Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of 
Interventions. John Wiley & Sons; 2011. 672 p. 
210.  Levac D, Colquhoun H, O’Brien KK. Scoping studies: advancing the 
methodology. Implement Sci. 2010 Sep 20;5:69. 
211.  Grant MJ, Booth A. A typology of reviews: an analysis of 14 review types and 
associated methodologies. Health Info Libr J. 2009 Jun;26(2):91–108. 
212.  Kaplan HS, Battles JB, Van der Schaaf TW, Shea CE, Mercer SQ. Identification 
and classification of the causes of events in transfusion medicine. Transfusion . 
1998 Nov;38(11-12):1071–81. 
213.  Makeham MAB, Stromer S, Bridges-Webb C, Mira M, Saltman DC, Cooper C, 
et al. Patient safety events reported in general practice: a taxonomy. Qual Saf 
Health Care. 2008 Feb;17(1):53–7. 
214.  Armitage G. Double checking medicines: defence against error or contributory 
factor? J Eval Clin Pract. 2008 Aug;14(4):513–9. 
215.  Katz RI, Lagasse RS. Factors influencing the reporting of adverse perioperative 
outcomes to a quality management program. Anesth Analg. 2000 Feb;90(2):344–
50. 
216.  Hesselgreaves H, Watson A, Crawford A, Lough M, Bowie P. Medication safety: 
using incident data analysis and clinical focus groups to inform educational needs. 
J Eval Clin Pract. 2013 Feb;19(1):30–8. 
217.  Ngamprasertwong P, Kositanurit I, Yokanit P, Wattanavinit R, Atichat S, 
Lapisatepun W. The Thai anesthesia incident monitoring study (Thai AIMS): an 
analysis of perioperative myocardial ischemia/infarction. J Med Assoc Thai. 2008 
Nov;91(11):1698–705. 
218.  Panesar SS, Noble DJ, Mirza SB, Patel B, Mann B, Emerton M, et al. Can the 
surgical checklist reduce the risk of wrong site surgery in orthopaedics?--Can the 
checklist help? Supporting evidence from analysis of a national patient incident 
reporting system. J Orthop Surg Res. 2011 Apr 18;6:18. 
219.  Nuckols TK, Bell DS, Paddock SM, Hilborne LH. Contributing factors identified 
by hospital incident report narratives. Qual Saf Health Care. 2008 Oct;17(5):368–
72. 
  273 
220.  Morag I, Gopher D, Spillinger A, Auerbach-Shpak Y, Laufer N, Lavy Y, et al. 
Human factors-focused reporting system for improving care quality and safety in 
hospital wards. Hum Factors. 2012 Apr;54(2):195–213. 
221.  Snijders C, van Lingen RA, Klip H, Fetter WPF, van der Schaaf TW, Molendijk 
HA, et al. Specialty-based, voluntary incident reporting in neonatal intensive care: 
description of 4846 incident reports. Arch Dis Child Fetal Neonatal Ed. 2009 
May;94(3):F210–5. 
222.  Lubberding S, Zwaan L, Timmermans DRM, Wagner C. The Nature and 
Causes of Unintended Events Reported at 10 Internal Medicine Departments. J 
Patient Saf. 2011 Dec;7(4):224–31. 
223.  Gawande AA, Zinner MJ, Studdert DM, Brennan TA. Analysis of errors reported 
by surgeons at three teaching hospitals. Surgery. 2003 Jun;133(6):614–21. 
224.  Schildmeijer K, Unbeck M, Muren O, Perk J, Pukk Härenstam K, Nilsson L. 
Retrospective record review in proactive patient safety work - identification of no-
harm incidents. BMC Health Serv Res. 2013 Jul 22;13:282. 
225.  Pronovost PJ, Thompson DA, Holzmueller CG, Lubomski LH, Dorman T, 
Dickman F, et al. Toward learning from patient safety reporting systems. J Crit 
Care. 2006 Dec;21(4):305–15. 
226.  Needham DM, Thompson DA, Holzmueller CG, Dorman T, Lubomski LH, Wu 
AW, et al. A system factors analysis of airway events from the Intensive Care Unit 
Safety Reporting System (ICUSRS). Crit Care Med. 2004 Nov;32(11):2227–33. 
227.  Needham DM, Sinopoli DJ, Thompson DA, Holzmueller CG, Dorman T, 
Lubomski LH, et al. A system factors analysis of “line, tube, and drain” incidents in 
the intensive care unit. Crit Care Med. 2005;33(8):1701–7. 
228.  Pham JC, Colantuoni E, Dominici F, Shore A, Macrae C, Scobie S, et al. The 
harm susceptibility model: a method to prioritise risks identified in patient safety 
reporting systems. Qual Saf Health Care. 2010 Oct;19(5):440–5. 
229.  Veterans Affairs National Centre for Patient Safety. Root Cause Analysis Tools 
[Internet]. United States Department of Veterans Affairs; 2015. Available from: 
http://www.patientsafety.va.gov/docs/joe/rca_tools_2_15.pdf 
230.  Van Vuuren W, Shea CE, van der Schaaf TW, Technische hogeschool 
(Eindhoven P-B. The development of an incident analysis tool for the medical field. 
Eindhoven University of Technology, Faculty of Technology Management; 1997. 
231.  Hadziabdic E, Heikkilä K, Albin B, Hjelm K. Problems and consequences in the 
use of professional interpreters: qualitative analysis of incidents from primary 
healthcare. Nurs Inq. 2011 Sep;18(3):253–61. 
232.  Hickner J, Zafar A, Kuo GM, Fagnan LJ, Forjuoh SN, Knox LM, et al. Field Test 
Results of a New Ambulatory Care Medication Error and Adverse Drug Event 
Reporting System—MEADERS. Ann Fam Med. 2010 Nov 1;8(6):517–25. 
233.  Kosiek K, Vögele A, Lainer M, Sönnichsen A, Bowie P, Godycki-Cwirko M. 
Validity of and interrater agreement on the LINNEAUS Euro-PC medication safety 
incident classification system in primary care in Poland. J Eval Clin Pract. 2014 
Aug;20(4):369–74. 
  274 
234.  Knudsen P, Herborg H, Mortensen AR, Knudsen M, Hellebek A. Preventing 
medication errors in community pharmacy: frequency and seriousness of 
medication errors. Qual Saf Health Care. 2007 Aug;16(4):291–6. 
235.  Knudsen P, Herborg H, Mortensen AR, Knudsen M, Hellebek A. Preventing 
medication errors in community pharmacy: root-cause analysis of transcription 
errors. Qual Saf Health Care. 2007 Aug;16(4):285–90. 
236.  O’Beirne M, Sterling PD, Zwicker K, Hebert P, Norton PG. Safety incidents in 
family medicine. BMJ Qual Saf. 2011;20(12):1005–10. 
237.  Rosser W, Dovey S, Bordman R, White D, Crighton E, Drummond N. Medical 
errors in primary care: results of an international study of family practice. Can Fam 
Physician. 2005 Mar;51:386–7. 
238.  Shaw R, Drever F, Hughes H, Osborn S, Williams S. Adverse events and near 
miss reporting in the NHS. Qual Saf Health Care. 2005 Aug;14(4):279–83. 
239.  Zwart DLM, Steerneman AHM, van Rensen ELJ, Kalkman CJ, Verheij TJM. 
Feasibility of centre-based incident reporting in primary healthcare: the SPIEGEL 
study. BMJ Qual Saf. 2011 Feb;20(2):121–7. 
240.  Zwart DLM, Heddema WS, Vermeulen MI, van Rensen ELJ, Verheij TJM, 
Kalkman CJ. Lessons learnt from incidents reported by postgraduate trainees in 
Dutch general practice. A prospective cohort study. BMJ Qual Saf. 2011 
Oct;20(10):857–62. 
241.  Daudt HML, van Mossel C, Scott SJ. Enhancing the scoping study 
methodology: a large, inter-professional team’s experience with Arksey and 
O'Malley's framework. BMC Med Res Methodol. 2013;13(1):48. 
242.  Peters MDJ, Godfrey CM, Khalil H, McInerney P, Parker D, Soares CB. 
Guidance for conducting systematic scoping reviews. Int J Evid Based Healthc. 
2015 Sep;13(3):141–6. 
243.  Shea BJ, Bouter LM, Peterson J, Boers M, Andersson N, Ortiz Z, et al. External 
validation of a measurement tool to assess systematic reviews (AMSTAR). PLoS 
One. 2007 Dec 26;2(12):e1350. 
244.  O’Brien KK, Colquhoun H, Levac D, Baxter L, Tricco AC, Straus S, et al. 
Advancing scoping study methodology: a web-based survey and consultation of 
perceptions on terminology, definition and methodological steps. BMC Health Serv 
Res. 2016 Jul 26;16:305. 
245.  Linnaeus-PC Collaboration. International taxonomy of medical errors in primary 
care—version 2. Washington, DC: The Robert Graham Center. 2002; 
246.  Wilson T, Sheikh A. Enhancing public safety in primary care. BMJ. 2002 Mar 
9;324(7337):584–7. 
247.  Makeham MAB, Dovey SM, County M, Kidd MR. An international taxonomy for 
errors in general practice: a pilot study. Med J Aust. 2002 Jul 15;177(2):68–72. 
248.  Klemp K, Dovey S, Valderas JM, Rohe J, Godycki-Cwirko M, Elliott P, et al. 
Developing a patient safety incident classification system for primary care. A 
literature review and Delphi-survey by the LINNEAUS collaboration on patient 
  275 
safety in primary care. Eur J Gen Pract. 2015 Sep;21 Suppl:35–8. 
249.  Parker D, Wensing M, Esmail A, Valderas JM. Measurement tools and process 
indicators of patient safety culture in primary care. A mixed methods study by the 
LINNEAUS collaboration on patient safety in primary care. Eur J Gen Pract. 
2015;21(sup1):26–30. 
250.  Frigola-Capell E, Pareja-Rossell C, Gens-Barber M, Oliva-Oliva G, Alava-Cano 
F, Wensing M, et al. Quality indicators for patient safety in primary care. A review 
and Delphi-survey by the LINNEAUS collaboration on patient safety in primary 
care. Eur J Gen Pract. 2015 Sep;21 Suppl:31–4. 
251.  Boyatzis RE. Transforming qualitative information: thematic analysis and code 
development. Sage Publications, Inc; 1998. 
252.  Leinhardt G, Leinhardt S. Exploratory Data Analysis: New Tools for the Analysis 
of Empirical Data. 1980. 73 p. 
253.  National Patient Safety Agency. What is a patient safety incident? [Internet]. 
National Patient Safety Agency. [cited 2016 Apr 1]. Available from: 
http://www.npsa.nhs.uk/nrls/reporting/what-is-a-patient-safety-incident/ 
254.  General Medical Council. Encouraging a learning culture by reporting errors 
[Internet]. 2016 [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Available from: http://www.gmc-
uk.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/27249.asp 
255.  Care Quality Commission. Nigel’s surgery 24: Reporting patient safety incidents 
to the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) for GP practices [Internet]. 
Care Quality Commission. [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Available from: 
http://www.cqc.org.uk/content/nigels-surgery-24-reporting-patient-safety-incidents-
national-reporting-and-learning-system 
256.  National Patient Safety Agency. What is a Patient Safety Incident? [Internet]. 
National Patient Safety Agency. [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Available from: 
http://www.npsa.nhs.uk/nrls/reporting/what-is-a-patient-safety-incident/ 
257.  Williams H, Edwards A, Hibbert P, Rees P, Prosser Evans H, Panesar S, et al. 
Harms from discharge to primary care: mixed methods analysis of incident reports. 
Br J Gen Pract. 2015 Dec;65(641):e829–37. 
258.  Patton MQ. Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods. SAGE; 2002. 
259.  Runciman WB, Ross Baker G, Philippe M, Jauregui IL, Lilford RJ, Anne A, et al. 
The epistemology of patient safety research. Int J Evid Based Healthc. 
2008;6(4):476–86. 
260.  Spittal MJ, Findlay GP, Spencer I. A prospective analysis of critical incidents 
attributable to anaesthesia. Int J Qual Health Care. 1995 Dec;7(4):363–71. 
261.  Weingart SN, Callanan LD, Ship AN, Aronson MD. A physician-based voluntary 
reporting system for adverse events and medical errors. J Gen Intern Med. 2001 
Dec;16(12):809–14. 
262.  Shojania MD KG, Shojania KG, Hamill TR, Sara K, Ng VL, Astion ML. 
Classifying Laboratory Incident Reports to Identify Problems That Jeopardize 
Patient Safety. Am J Clin Pathol. 2003;120(1):18–26. 
  276 
263.  Hoffmann B, Beyer M, Rohe J, Gensichen J, Gerlach FM. “Every error counts”: 
a web-based incident reporting and learning system for general practice. Qual Saf 
Health Care. 2008;17(4):307–12. 
264.  Silas R, Tibballs J. Adverse events and comparison of systematic and voluntary 
reporting from a paediatric intensive care unit. Qual Saf Health Care. 2010 
Dec;19(6):568–71. 
265.  Subhedar NV, Parry HA. Critical incident reporting in neonatal practice. Arch 
Dis Child Fetal Neonatal Ed. 2010 Sep;95(5):F378–82. 
266.  Itoh K, Omata N, Andersen HB. A human error taxonomy for analysing 
healthcare incident reports: assessing reporting culture and its effects on safety 
performance. J Risk Res. 2009;12(3-4):485–511. 
267.  Dovey SM, Meyers DS, Phillips RL Jr, Green LA, Fryer GE, Galliher JM, et al. A 
preliminary taxonomy of medical errors in family practice. Qual Saf Health Care. 
2002 Sep;11(3):233–8. 
268.  Makeham MAB, Stromer S, Bridges-Webb C, Mira M, Saltman DC, Cooper C, 
et al. Patient safety events reported in general practice: a taxonomy. Qual Saf 
Health Care. 2008 Feb;17(1):53–7. 
269.  Kostopoulou O. From cognition to the system: developing a multilevel taxonomy 
of patient safety in general practice. Ergonomics. 2006;49(5-6):486–502. 
270.  Kostopoulou O, Delaney B. Confidential reporting of patient safety events in 
primary care: results from a multilevel classification of cognitive and system 
factors. Qual Saf Health Care. 2007 Apr;16(2):95–100. 
271.  Makeham MAB, Dovey SM, County M, Kidd MR. An international taxonomy for 
errors in general practice: a pilot study. Med J Aust. 2002 Jul 15;177(2):68–72. 
272.  Rubin G, George A, Chinn DJ, Richardson C. Errors in general practice: 
development of an error classification and pilot study of a method for detecting 
errors. Qual Saf Health Care. 2003 Dec;12(6):443–7. 
273.  Tuttle D, Holloway R, Baird T, Sheehan B, Skelton WK. Electronic reporting to 
improve patient safety. Qual Saf Health Care. 2004 Aug;13(4):281–6. 
274.  Zwart DLM, Van Rensen ELJ, Kalkman CJ, Verheij TJM. Central or local 
incident reporting? A comparative study in Dutch GP out-of-hours services. Br J 
Gen Pract. 2011 Mar;61(584):183–7. 
275.  Waring JJ. A qualitative study of the intra-hospital variations in incident 
reporting. Int J Qual Health Care. 2004 Oct;16(5):347–52. 
276.  Manias E, Kinney S, Cranswick N, Williams A. Medication errors in hospitalised 
children. J Paediatr Child Health. 2014 Jan;50(1):71–7. 
277.  Schultz TJ, Crock C, Hansen K, Deakin A, Gosbell A. Piloting an online incident 
reporting system in Australasian emergency medicine. Emerg Med Australas. 
2014 Oct;26(5):461–7. 
278.  Astion ML, Shojania KG, Hamill TR, Kim S, Ng VL. Classifying laboratory 
incident reports to identify problems that jeopardize patient safety. Am J Clin 
Pathol. 2003 Jul;120(1):18–26. 
  277 
279.  Edwards BJ, Laumann AE, Nardone B, Miller FH, Restaino J, Raisch DW, et al. 
Advancing pharmacovigilance through academic–legal collaboration: the case of 
gadolinium-based contrast agents and nephrogenic systemic fibrosis—a research 
on adverse drug events and reports (RADAR) report. Br J Radiol. 
2014;87(1042):20140307. 
280.  Tighe CM, Woloshynowych M, Brown R, Wears B, Vincent C. Incident reporting 
in one UK accident and emergency department. Accid Emerg Nurs. 2006 
Jan;14(1):27–37. 
281.  Doherty C, Mc Donnell C. Tenfold Medication Errors: 5 Years’ Experience at a 
University-Affiliated Pediatric Hospital. Pediatrics. 2012;129(5):916–24. 
282.  Considine J, Mitchell B, Stergiou HE. Frequency and nature of reported 
incidents during Emergency Department care. Emerg Med J. 2010;28(5):416–21. 
283.  Osmon S, Harris CB, Dunagan WC, Prentice D, Fraser VJ, Kollef MH. 
Reporting of medical errors: an intensive care unit experience. Crit Care Med. 
2004 Mar;32(3):727–33. 
284.  Neily J, Mills PD, Eldridge N, Carney BT, Pfeffer D, Turner JR, et al. Incorrect 
surgical procedures within and outside of the operating room: a follow-up report. 
Arch Surg. 2011 Nov;146(11):1235–9. 
285.  The World Alliance For Patient Safety Drafting Group, Sherman H, Castro G, 
Fletcher M, Hatlie M, Hibbert P, et al. Towards an International Classification for 
Patient Safety: the conceptual framework. Int J Qual Health Care. 2009;21(1):2–8. 
286.  Thomson R, Lewalle P, Sherman H, Hibbert P, Runciman W, Castro G. 
Towards an International Classification for Patient Safety: a Delphi survey. Int J 
Qual Health Care. 2009;21(1):9–17. 
287.  Carson-Stevens A, Hibbert P, Williams H, Others. Characterising the nature of 
primary care patient safety incident reports in England and Wales: mixed methods 
study. BMJ Open. 2015; 
288.  Hibbert P, Runciman W, Deakin A. A Recursive Model of Incident Analysis. 
Australian Patient Safety Foundation; 2007. 
289.  Ritchie J, Jane R, Liz S. Qualitative data analysis for applied policy research. In: 
Analyzing qualitative data. 2011. p. 173–94. 
290.  Reason J. Human Error. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1990. 
291.  Battles JB, Shea CE. A system of analyzing medical errors to improve GME 
curricula and programs. Acad Med. 2001 Feb;76(2):125–33. 
292.  Ritchie J, Spencer L. Qualitative data analysis for applied policy research. The 
qualitative researcher’s companion. 2002;573:305–29. 
293.  Tukey JW. Exploratory Data Analysis. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company; 
1977. 
294.  Saldana J. The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers. SAGE; 2015. 
295.  MacQueen KM, McLellan E, Kay K, Milstein B. Codebook Development for 
Team-Based Qualitative Analysis. Field methods. 1998;10(2):31–6. 
  278 
296.  Carey JW, Morgan M, Oxtoby MJ. Intercoder Agreement in Analysis of 
Responses to Open-Ended Interview Questions: Examples from Tuberculosis 
Research. Field methods. 1996;8(3):1–5. 
297.  Gorden RL. Basic Interviewing Skills. Waveland Press; 1998. 
298.  Cimino JJ. Desiderata for controlled medical vocabularies in the twenty-first 
century. Methods Inf Med. 1998 Nov;37(4-5):394–403. 
299.  Hurwitz B, Sheikh A. Health Care Errors and Patient Safety. John Wiley & 
Sons; 2011. 
300.  Merrill RM. Statistical Methods in Epidemiologic Research. Jones & Bartlett 
Publishers; 2015. 
301.  Glaser BG, Strauss AL. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research. Transaction Publishers; 2009. 
302.  Charmaz K. Constructivist grounded theory. J Posit Psychol. 2017;12(3):299–
300. 
303.  Barry CA, Britten N, Barber N, Bradley C, Stevenson F. Using reflexivity to 
optimize teamwork in qualitative research. Qual Health Res. 1999 Jan;9(1):26–44. 
304.  National Data Guardian for Health and Social Care. Review of data security, 
consent and opt-outs [Internet]. [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Report No.: 2016. Available 
from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/535
024/data-security-review.PDF 
305.  Provost L, Bennett B. What’s your theory? Driver diagram serves as tool for 
building and testing theories for improvement. Quality Progress. 2015;(July):36–
43. 
306.  Armstrong R, Hall BJ, Doyle J, Waters E. Cochrane Update. “Scoping the 
scope” of a cochrane review. J Public Health . 2011 Mar;33(1):147–50. 
307.  Omar A, Rees P, Evans HP, Williams H, Cooper A, Banerjee S, et al. 
Vulnerable children and their care quality issues: a descriptive analysis of a 
national database. BMJ Qual Saf. 2015 Nov 22;24(11):732–3. 
308.  Liu L, Johnson HL, Cousens S, Perin J, Scott S, Lawn JE, et al. Global, 
regional, and national causes of child mortality: an updated systematic analysis for 
2010 with time trends since 2000. Lancet. 2012;379(9832):2151–61. 
309.  Morse RB, Pollack MM. Root cause analyses performed in a children’s hospital: 
events, action plan strength, and implementation rates. J Healthc Qual. 2012 
Jan;34(1):55–61. 
310.  Mills PD, Neily J, Kinney LM, Bagian J, Weeks WB. Effective interventions and 
implementation strategies to reduce adverse drug events in the Veterans Affairs 
(VA) system. Qual Saf Health Care. 2008 Feb;17(1):37–46. 
311.  Brenner E, Freundlich M. Enhancing the safety of children in foster care and 
family support programs: automated critical incident reporting. Child Welfare. 2006 
May;85(3):611–32. 
  279 
312.  Rooke J. Exploring the support mechanisms health visitors use in safeguarding 
and child protection practice. Community Pract. 2015 Oct;88(10):42–5. 
313.  Chin MH, Alexander-Young M, Burnet DL. Health care quality-improvement 
approaches to reducing child health disparities. Pediatrics. 2009 Nov;124 Suppl 
3:S224–36. 
314.  Schilling S, Snyder A, Scribano PV. Intimate Partner Violence—Pediatric Risks 
of “Not Asking–Not Telling.” Clin Pediatr Emerg Med. 2012/9;13(3):229–38. 
315.  Jouriles EN, McDonald R, Slep AMS, Heyman RE, Garrido E. Child abuse in 
the context of domestic violence: prevalence, explanations, and practice 
implications. Violence Vict. 2008;23(2):221–35. 
316.  Scribano PV, Stevens J, Marshall J, Gleason E, Kelleher KJ. Feasibility of 
Computerized Screening for Intimate Partner Violence in a Pediatric Emergency 
Department. Pediatr Emerg Care. 2011;27(8):710–6. 
317.  Feldhaus KM, Koziol-McLain J, Amsbury HL, Norton IM, Lowenstein SR, Abbott 
JT. Accuracy of 3 brief screening questions for detecting partner violence in the 
emergency department. JAMA. 1997 May 7;277(17):1357–61. 
318.  Bair-Merritt MH, Feudtner C, Mollen CJ, Winters S, Blackstone M, Fein JA. 
Screening for intimate partner violence using an audiotape questionnaire: a 
randomized clinical trial in a pediatric emergency department. Arch Pediatr 
Adolesc Med. 2006 Mar;160(3):311–6. 
319.  Gadomski AM, Fothergill KE, Larson S, Wissow LS, Winegrad H, Nagykaldi ZJ, 
et al. Integrating mental health into adolescent annual visits: impact of previsit 
comprehensive screening on within-visit processes. J Adolesc Health. 2015 
Mar;56(3):267–73. 
320.  Keane C, Chapman R. Evaluating nurses’ knowledge and skills in the detection 
of child abuse in the Emergency Department. Int Emerg Nurs. 2008 Jan;16(1):5–
13. 
321.  Benger JR, Pearce V. Simple intervention to improve detection of child abuse in 
emergency departments. BMJ. 2002 Mar 30;324(7340):780. 
322.  Benger JR, McCabe SE. Burns and scalds in pre-school children attending 
accident and emergency: accident or abuse? Emerg Med J. 2001 May;18(3):172–
4. 
323.  Ziegler DS, Sammut J, Piper AC. Assessment and follow-up of suspected child 
abuse in preschool children with fractures seen in a general hospital emergency 
department. J Paediatr Child Health. 2005;41(5-6):251–5. 
324.  Ainsworth F. Mandatory reporting of child abuse and neglect: does it really 
make a difference? Child & Family Social Work. 2002 Feb 1;7(1):57–63. 
325.  Hunter J. An Intervention to Improve the Comfort And Satisfaction of Nurses in 
the Telephone Triage of Child Maltreatment Calls. Pediatr Nurs. 2015 
Nov;41(6):296–300. 
326.  Miller AJ, Barlup Toombs K. Educating physicians internationally in the 
diagnosis of child sexual abuse: evaluation of a brief educational intervention in 
  280 
Malawi. J Child Sex Abus. 2014;23(3):247–55. 
327.  Zeanah CH, Larrieu JA, Heller SS, Valliere J, Hinshaw-Fuselier S, Aoki Y, et al. 
Evaluation of a preventive intervention for maltreated infants and toddlers in foster 
care. J Am Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry. 2001 Feb;40(2):214–21. 
328.  Zeanah CH, Larrieu JA. Intensive intervention for maltreated infants and 
toddlers in foster care. Child Adolesc Psychiatr Clin N Am. 1998 Apr;7(2):357–71. 
329.  Multi Agency Working and Information Sharing Project: Final Report [Internet]. 
Home Office; 2014 Jul. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/338
875/MASH.pdf 
330.  Hingley-Jones H, Allain L. Integrating services for disabled children and their 
families in two English local authorities. J Interprof Care. 2008 Oct;22(5):534–44. 
331.  Tait RJ, Hulse GK, Robertson SI. Effectiveness of a brief-intervention and 
continuity of care in enhancing attendance for treatment by adolescent substance 
users. Drug Alcohol Depend. 2004 Jun 11;74(3):289–96. 
332.  Nordentoft M, Branner J, Drejer K, Mejsholm B, Hansen H, Petersson B. Effect 
of a Suicide Prevention Centre for young people with suicidal behaviour in 
Copenhagen. Eur Psychiatry. 2005 Mar;20(2):121–8. 
333.  Hendrickson SG. Reaching an underserved population with a randomly 
assigned home safety intervention. Inj Prev. 2005 Oct;11(5):313–7. 
334.  Woodman J, Allister J, Rafi I, de Lusignan S, Belsey J, Petersen I, et al. A 
simple approach to improve recording of concerns about child maltreatment in 
primary care records: developing a quality improvement intervention. Br J Gen 
Pract. 2012 Jul;62(600):e478–86. 
335.  Ringeisen H, Casanueva CE, Urato M, Stambaugh LF. Mental health service 
use during the transition to adulthood for adolescents reported to the child welfare 
system. Psychiatr Serv [Internet]. 2015; Available from: 
http://ps.psychiatryonline.org/doi/abs/10.1176/ps.2009.60.8.1084 
336.  Crowe S, Cresswell K, Robertson A, Huby G, Avery A, Sheikh A. The case 
study approach. BMC Med Res Methodol. 2011 Jun 27;11:100. 
337.  Johnson C, Spicer D, Wallace J. An Empirical Model Of The Learning 
Organisation. University Of Bradford; 2011. 
338.  Noble DJ, Panesar SS, Pronovost PJ. A public health approach to patient 
safety reporting systems is urgently needed. J Patient Saf. 2011 Jun;7(2):109–12. 
339.  Stavropoulou C, Doherty C, Tosey P. How Effective Are Incident-Reporting 
Systems for Improving Patient Safety? A Systematic Literature Review. Milbank Q. 
2015;93(4):826–66. 
340.  Sari AB-A, Sheldon TA, Cracknell A, Turnbull A. Sensitivity of routine system for 
reporting patient safety incidents in an NHS hospital: retrospective patient case 
note review. BMJ. 2007 Jan 13;334(7584):79. 
341.  Waring JJ. Constructing and re-constructing narratives of patient safety. Soc 
Sci Med. 2009 Dec;69(12):1722–31. 
  281 
342.  Rossi P. The iron law of evaluation and other metallic rules. Research in social 
problems and public policy. 1987;4(1987):3–20. 
343.  Rees P, Carson-Stevens A, Williams H, Panesar S, Edwards A. Quality 
improvement informed by a reporting and learning system. Arch Dis Child. 2014 
Jul;99(7):702–3. 
344.  Kaplan HC, Provost LP, Froehle CM, Margolis PA. The Model for 
Understanding Success in Quality (MUSIQ): building a theory of context in 
healthcare quality improvement. BMJ Qual Saf. 2012 Jan;21(1):13–20. 
345.  Van MJ. Tales of the field: on writing ethnography. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press; 1988. 
346.  Emerson RM, Fretz RI, Shaw LL. Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes, Second 
Edition. University of Chicago Press; 2011. 
347.  Kaiser Permanente. SBAR toolkit [Internet]. California: Kaiser Permanente; 
2011 [cited 2017 Jan 1]. Available from: 
http://www.ihi.org/resources/Pages/Tools/sbartoolkit.aspx 
348.  Improvement Advisor – Overview [Internet]. Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement. [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Available from: 
http://www.ihi.org/education/inpersontraining/ImprovementAdvisor/Pages/default.a
spx 
349.  Provost LP, Murray S. The Health Care Data Guide: Learning from Data for 
Improvement. John Wiley & Sons; 2011. 
350.  Panesar SS, Carson-Stevens A, Salvilla SA, Patel B, Mirza SB, Mann B. 
Patient safety in orthopedic surgery: prioritizing key areas of iatrogenic harm 
through an analysis of 48,095 incidents reported to a national database of errors. 
Drug Healthc Patient Saf. 2013 Mar 24;5:57–65. 
351.  Panesar SS, Carson-Stevens A, Mann BS, Bhandari M, Madhok R. Mortality as 
an indicator of patient safety in orthopaedics: lessons from qualitative analysis of a 
database of medical errors. BMC Musculoskelet Disord. 2012 Jun 8;13:93. 
352.  Panesar SS, Netuveli G, Carson-Stevens A, Javad S, Patel B, Parry G, et al. 
The orthopaedic error index: development and application of a novel national 
indicator for assessing the relative safety of hospital care using a cross-sectional 
approach. BMJ Open. 2013 Nov 21;3(11):e003448. 
353.  Williams H, Cooper A, Carson-Stevens A. Opportunities for incident reporting. 
Response to: “The problem with incident reporting” by Macrae et al. BMJ Qual Saf. 
2016 Feb;25(2):133–4. 
354.  Rees P, Edwards A, Powell C, Hibbert P, Williams H, Makeham M, et al. Patient 
Safety Incidents Involving Sick Children in Primary Care in England and Wales: A 
Mixed Methods Analysis. PLoS Med. 2017 Jan;14(1):e1002217. 
355.  Rees P, Edwards A, Panesar S, Powell C, Carter B, Williams H, et al. Safety 
incidents in the primary care office setting. Pediatrics. 2015 Jun;135(6):1027–35. 
356.  Reason J. Human error: models and management. BMJ. 2000 Mar 
18;320(7237):768–70. 
  282 
357.  Johnson CW. Reasons for the Failure of Incident Reporting in the Healthcare 
and Rail Industries. In: Components of System Safety. Springer, London; 2002. p. 
31–57. 
358.  Battles JB, Shea CE. A system of analyzing medical errors to improve GME 
curricula and programs. Acad Med. 2001 Feb;76(2):125–33. 
359.  Sanne JM. Incident reporting or storytelling? Competing schemes in a safety-
critical and hazardous work setting. Saf Sci. 2008;46(8):1205–22. 
360.  Staender S, Sven S, Mark K. Critical Incident Reporting. Approaches in 
Anaesthesiology. In: Safety in Medicine. 2000. p. 65–81. 
361.  Panesar SS, Cleary K, Sheikh A. Reflections on the National Patient Safety 
Agency’s database of medical errors. JRSM Short Rep. 2009;102(7):256–8. 
362.  Lawton R. Barriers to incident reporting in a healthcare system. Qual Saf Health 
Care. 2002;11(1):15–8. 
363.  Sari AB-A, Sheldon TA, Cracknell A, Turnbull A. Sensitivity of routine system for 
reporting patient safety incidents in an NHS hospital: retrospective patient case 
note review. BMJ. 2007 Jan 13;334(7584):79. 
364.  Green J, Thorogood N. Qualitative Methods for Health Research. SAGE; 2013. 
360 p. 
365.  Thompson C, McCaughan D, Cullum N, Sheldon TA, Raynor P. Increasing the 
visibility of coding decisions in team-based qualitative research in nursing. Int J 
Nurs Stud. 2004 Jan;41(1):15–20. 
366.  Satya-Murti S. Users’ Guides to the Medical Literature: Essentials of Evidence-
Based Clinical Practice Users' Guides to the Medical Literature: A Manual for 
Evidence-Based Clinical Practice. JAMA. 2002;287(11):1464–6. 
367.  Pham JC, Gianci S, Battles J, Beard P, Clarke JR, Coates H, et al. Establishing 
a global learning community for incident-reporting systems. Qual Saf Health Care. 
2010 Oct;19(5):446–51. 
368.  Lamont T, Beaumont C, Fayaz A, Healey F, Huehns T, Law R, et al. Checking 
placement of nasogastric feeding tubes in adults (interpretation of x ray images): 
summary of a safety report from the National Patient Safety Agency. BMJ. 2011 
May 5;342:d2586. 
369.  Lamont T, Watts F, Panesar S, MacFie J, Matthew D. Early detection of 
complications after laparoscopic surgery: summary of a safety report from the 
National Patient Safety Agency. BMJ. 2011 Jan 19;342:c7221. 
370.  Barach P. How the NHS can improve safety and learning. BMJ. 
2000;320(7251):1683–4. 
371.  Weiner BJ, Hobgood C, Lewis MA. The meaning of justice in safety incident 
reporting. Soc Sci Med. 2008 Jan;66(2):403–13. 
372.  Evans SM. Attitudes and barriers to incident reporting: a collaborative hospital 
study. Qual Saf Health Care. 2006;15(1):39–43. 
373.  de Feijter JM, de Grave WS, Muijtjens AM, Scherpbier AJJA, Koopmans RP. A 
  283 
comprehensive overview of medical error in hospitals using incident-reporting 
systems, patient complaints and chart review of inpatient deaths. PLoS One. 2012 
Feb 16;7(2):e31125. 
374.  Pfeiffer Y, Manser T, Wehner T. Conceptualising barriers to incident reporting: a 
psychological framework. Qual Saf Health Care. 2010 Dec;19(6):e60. 
375.  Lester H, Tritter JQ. Medical error: a discussion of the medical construction of 
error and suggestions for reforms of medical education to decrease error. Med 
Educ. 2001 Sep;35(9):855–61. 
376.  Wu AW. Medical error: the second victim. The doctor who makes the mistake 
needs help too. BMJ. 2000 Mar 18;320(7237):726–7. 
377.  Waring JJ. Beyond blame: cultural barriers to medical incident reporting. Soc 
Sci Med. 2005 May;60(9):1927–35. 
378.  Eland IA, Belton KJ, van Grootheest AC, Meiners AP, Rawlins MD, Stricker BH. 
Attitudinal survey of voluntary reporting of adverse drug reactions. Br J Clin 
Pharmacol. 1999 Oct;48(4):623–7. 
379.  Misak C. New Pragmatists. Clarendon Press; 2007. 
380.  Marshall M, Pagel C, French C, Utley M, Allwood D, Fulop N, et al. Moving 
improvement research closer to practice: the Researcher-in-Residence model. 
BMJ Qual Saf. 2014 Oct;23(10):801–5. 
381.  Meyer J. Action Research. In: Qualitative Research in Health Care. Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd; 2006. p. 121–31. 
382.  Doolin B. Power and resistance in the implementation of a medical 
management information system. Information Systems Journal. 2004;14(4):343–
62. 
383.  World Health Organization. Preliminary version of minimal information model for 
patient safety [Internet]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2014 [cited 2017 Apr 
1]. Available from: http://www.who.int/patientsafety/implementation/IMPS_working-
paper.pdf 
384.  Billings C, Cook RI, Woods DD, Miller C. Incident reporting systems in medicine 
and experience with the aviation safety reporting system. In: A tale of two stories: 
contrasting views of patient safety Report from a workshop on assembling the 
scientific basis for progress on patient safety McLean, VA: National Patient Safety 
Foundation at the AMA. 1998. 
385.  Merry AF. Safety in anaesthesia: reporting incidents and learning from them. 
Anaesthesia. 2008 Apr;63(4):337–9. 
386.  Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry. Report of the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry: Executive Summary [Internet]. 
London: The Stationery Office; 2013 Feb [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279
124/0947.pdf 
387.  Vincent CA. Analysis of clinical incidents: a window on the system not a search 
for root causes. Qual Saf Health Care. 2004 Aug;13(4):242–3. 
  284 
388.  Vincent C. Incident reporting and patient safety. BMJ. 2007 Jan 
13;334(7584):51. 
389.  Macrae C. The problem with incident reporting. BMJ Qual Saf. 2016 
Feb;25(2):71–5. 
390.  Uribe CL, Schweikhart SB, Pathak DS, Dow M, Marsh GB. Perceived barriers 
to medical-error reporting: an exploratory investigation. J Healthc Manag. 2002 
Jul;47(4):263–79. 
391.  Lawton R, Parker D. Barriers to incident reporting in a healthcare system. Qual 
Saf Health Care. 2002 Mar;11(1):15–8. 
392.  Schectman JM, Plews-Ogan ML. Physician perception of hospital safety and 
barriers to incident reporting. Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf. 2006 Jun;32(6):337–43. 
393.  Schuerer DJE, Nast PA, Harris CB, Krauss MJ, Jones RM, Boyle WA, et al. A 
new safety event reporting system improves physician reporting in the surgical 
intensive care unit. J Am Coll Surg. 2006 Jun;202(6):881–7. 
394.  Rowin EJ, Lucier D, Pauker SG, Kumar S, Chen J, Salem DN. Does error and 
adverse event reporting by physicians and nurses differ? Jt Comm J Qual Patient 
Saf. 2008 Sep;34(9):537–45. 
395.  Panesar SS, Cleary K, Sheikh A. Reflections on the National Patient Safety 
Agency’s database of medical errors. J R Soc Med. 2009 Jul;102(7):256–8. 
396.  Runciman WB, Helps SC, Sexton EJ, Malpass A. A classification for incidents 
and accidents in the health-care system. J Qual Clin Pract. 1998 Sep;18(3):199–
211. 
397.  Halligan AWF. Implications for medical leaders of the proposed Duty of 
Candour. Clinical Risk. 20(1-2):29–31. 
398.  Tuttle D, Holloway R, Baird T, Sheehan B, Skelton WK. Electronic reporting to 
improve patient safety. Qual Saf Health Care. 2004 Aug;13(4):281–6. 
399.  Usin MF, Ramesh P, Lopez CG. Implementation of an event reporting system in 
a transfusion medicine unit: a local experience. Malays J Pathol. 2004 
Jun;26(1):43–8. 
400.  Haller G, Myles PS, Stoelwinder J, Langley M, Anderson H, McNeil J. 
Integrating incident reporting into an electronic patient record system. J Am Med 
Inform Assoc. 2007 Mar;14(2):175–81. 
401.  Phillips RL, Dovey SM, Hickner JS, Graham D, Johnson M. The AAFP Patient 
Safety Reporting System: Development and Legal Issues Pertinent to Medical 
Error Tracking and Analysis. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (US); 
2005. 
402.  Conlon P, Havlisch R, Kini N, Porter C. Using an Anonymous Web-Based 
Incident Reporting Tool to Embed the Principles of a High-Reliability Organization. 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; 2008. 
403.  Pham JC, Gianci S, Battles J, Beard P, Clarke JR, Coates H, et al. Establishing 
a global learning community for incident-reporting systems. Qual Saf Health Care. 
2010 Oct;19(5):446–51. 
  285 
404.  Nakajima K, Kurata Y, Takeda H. A web-based incident reporting system and 
multidisciplinary collaborative projects for patient safety in a Japanese hospital. 
Qual Saf Health Care. 2005 Apr;14(2):123–9. 
405.  Lyons P, Walton M. Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care. 
National Patient Safety Education Framework bibliography. Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2005. 
406.  Neuspiel DR, Guzman M, Harewood C. Improving Error Reporting in 
Ambulatory Pediatrics with a Team Approach. In: Henriksen K, Battles JB, Keyes 
MA, Grady ML, editors. Advances in Patient Safety: New Directions and 
Alternative Approaches (Vol 1: Assessment). Rockville (MD): Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality; 2011. 
407.  Chassin MR, Loeb JM. High-reliability health care: getting there from here. 
Milbank Q. 2013;91(3):459–90. 
408.  Vincent C, Aylin P, Franklin BD, Holmes A, Iskander S, Jacklin A, et al. Is health 
care getting safer? BMJ. 2008 Nov 13;337:a2426. 
409.  Vincent C, Stanhope N, Crowley-Murphy M. Reasons for not reporting adverse 
incidents: an empirical study. J Eval Clin Pract. 1999 Feb;5(1):13–21. 
410.  Waring JJ. Beyond blame: cultural barriers to medical incident reporting. Soc 
Sci Med. 2005 May;60(9):1927–35. 
411.  Singh H, Sittig DF. Advancing the science of measurement of diagnostic errors 
in healthcare: the Safer Dx framework. BMJ Qual Saf. 2015 Feb;24(2):103–10. 
412.  Ottewill M. The current approach to human error and blame in the NHS. Br J 
Nurs. 2003;12(15):919–24. 
413.  O’Connor AM. The attitude of staff towards clinical risk management. AVMA 
Medical & Legal Journal. 1996;2(4):119–22. 
414.  Wu AW, Steckelberg RC. Medical error, incident investigation and the second 
victim: doing better but feeling worse? BMJ Qual Saf. 2012 Apr;21(4):267–70. 
415.  Wu AW. Medical error: the second victim. The doctor who makes the mistake 
needs help too. BMJ. 2000 Mar 18;320(7237):726–7. 
416.  Grant MJC, Larsen GY. Effect of an Anonymous Reporting System on Near‐
miss and Harmful Medical Error Reporting in a Pediatric Intensive Care Unit. J 
Nurs Care Qual. 2007;22(3):213. 
417.  Hoffmann B, Beyer M, Rohe J, Gensichen J, Gerlach FM. “Every error counts”: 
a web-based incident reporting and learning system for general practice. Qual Saf 
Health Care. 2008 Aug 1;17(4):307–12. 
418.  Hession-Laband E, Mantell P. Lessons learned: use of event reporting by 
nurses to improve patient safety and quality. J Pediatr Nurs. 2011 Apr;26(2):149–
55. 
419.  Silas R, Tibballs J. Adverse events and comparison of systematic and voluntary 
reporting from a paediatric intensive care unit. Qual Saf Health Care. 2010 
Dec;19(6):568–71. 
  286 
420.  Kivlahan C, Sangster W, Nelson K, Buddenbaum J, Lobenstein K. Developing a 
comprehensive electronic adverse event reporting system in an academic health 
center. Jt Comm J Qual Improv. 2002 Nov;28(11):583–94. 
421.  Mattioli G, Guida E, Montobbio G, Pini Prato A, Carlucci M, Cama A, et al. 
Near-miss events are really missed! Reflections on incident reporting in a 
department of pediatric surgery. Pediatr Surg Int. 2012 Apr;28(4):405–10. 
422.  West DR, Westfall JM, Araya-Guerra R, Hansen L, Quintela J, VanVorst R, et 
al. Using Reported Primary Care Errors to Develop and Implement Patient Safety 
Interventions: A Report from the ASIPS Collaborative. Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (US); 2005. 
423.  Cohen MR. Why error reporting systems should be voluntary. BMJ. 2000 Mar 
18;320(7237):728–9. 
424.  Emslie S, Knox K, Pickstone M. Improving Patient Safety: Insights from 
American, Australian & British Healthcare: Based on the Proceedings of a Joint 
ECRI and Department of Health Conference to Introduce the National Patient 
Safety Agency. ECRI; 2003. 
425.  McKay J, Bowie P, Murray L, Lough M. Attitudes to the identification and 
reporting of significant events in general practice. Clinical Governance: An 
International Journal. 2004;9(2):96–100. 
426.  Michel P. Strengths and weaknesses of available methods for assessing the 
nature and scale of harm caused by the health system: literature review [Internet]. 
World Health Organization; 2003 [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Available from: 
http://cdrwww.who.int/entity/patientsafety/research/P_Michel_Report_Final_versio
n.pdf 
427.  Christiaans-Dingelhoff I, Smits M, Zwaan L, Lubberding S, van der Wal G, 
Wagner C. To what extent are adverse events found in patient records reported by 
patients and healthcare professionals via complaints, claims and incident reports? 
BMC Health Serv Res. 2011 Feb 28;11:49. 
428.  Stow J. Using medical-error reporting to drive patient safety efforts. AORN J. 
2006 Sep;84(3):406–8, 411–4, 417–20; quiz 421–4. 
429.  Barnard D, Dumkee M, Bains B, Gallivan B. Implementing a Good Catch 
program in an integrated health system. Healthc Q. 2006;9 Spec No:22–7. 
430.  Leape L And Abookire S. WHO draft guidelines for adverse event reporting and 
learning systems [Internet]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2005 [cited 2017 
Apr 1]. Available from: 
http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/resources/Reporting_Guidelines.pdf 
431.  Pierson S, Hansen R, Greene S, Williams C, Akers R, Jonsson M, et al. 
Preventing medication errors in long-term care: results and evaluation of a large 
scale web-based error reporting system. Qual Saf Health Care. 2007 
Aug;16(4):297–302. 
432.  Antonacci AC, Lam S, Lavarias V, Homel P, Eavey RD. Benchmarking surgical 
incident reports using a database and a triage system to reduce adverse 
outcomes. Arch Surg. 2008 Dec;143(12):1192–7. 
  287 
433.  Beckmann U, Bohringer C, Carless R, Gillies DM, Runciman WB, Wu AW, et al. 
Evaluation of two methods for quality improvement in intensive care: facilitated 
incident monitoring and retrospective medical chart review. Crit Care Med. 2003 
Apr;31(4):1006–11. 
434.  Marang-van de Mheen PJ, van Hanegem N, Kievit J. Effectiveness of routine 
reporting to identify minor and serious adverse outcomes in surgical patients. Qual 
Saf Health Care. 2005 Oct;14(5):378–82. 
435.  Beckmann U, West LF, Groombridge GJ, Baldwin I, Hart GK, Clayton DG, et al. 
The Australian Incident Monitoring Study in Intensive Care: AIMS-ICU. The 
development and evaluation of an incident reporting system in intensive care. 
Anaesth Intensive Care. 1996 Jun;24(3):314–9. 
436.  Frey B, Buettiker V, Hug MI, Waldvogel K, Gessler P, Ghelfi D, et al. Does 
critical incident reporting contribute to medication error prevention? Eur J Pediatr. 
2002 Nov;161(11):594–9. 
437.  Anderson JE, Kodate N, Walters R, Dodds A. Can incident reporting improve 
safety? Healthcare practitioners’ views of the effectiveness of incident reporting. 
Int J Qual Health Care. 2013 Apr;25(2):141–50. 
438.  Wong SC, Kelly SP, Sullivan PM. Patient safety in vitreoretinal surgery: quality 
improvements following a patient safety reporting system. Br J Ophthalmol. 2013 
Mar;97(3):302–7. 
439.  Grant C, Ludbrook G, Hampson EA, Semenov R, Willis R. Adverse 
physiological events under anaesthesia and sedation: a pilot audit of electronic 
patient records. Anaesth Intensive Care. 2008 Mar;36(2):222–9. 
440.  Sullivan M, Ghroum P. Incident reporting to improve clinical practice in a 
medium-secure setting: Assessing when acts of violence and self-harm were likely 
to occur enabled one clinic to deploy staff more effectively, say Mike Sullivan and 
Peter Ghroum. Mental Health Practice. 2013;16(7):16–20. 
441.  Coulter A and Ellins J. Patient-focused interventions: A review of the evidence 
[Internet]. London: Picker Institute Europe; 2006 Aug [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Available 
from: 
http://www.health.org.uk/sites/health/files/PatientFocusedInterventions_ReviewOfT
heEvidence.pdf 
442.  Dunston R, Lee A, Boud D, Brodie P, Chiarella M. Co-production and health 
system reform--from re-imagining to re-making. Australian Journal of Public 
Administration. 2009;68(1):39–52. 
443.  Boyle D, Clarke S, Burns S. Aspects of co-production: the implications for work, 
health and volunteering. London: New Economics Foundation; 2006. 
444.  Klaber RE, Roland D. Delivering quality improvement: the need to believe it is 
necessary. Arch Dis Child. 2014 Feb;99(2):175–9. 
445.  Weingart SN, Pagovich O, Sands DZ, Li JM, Aronson MD, Davis RB, et al. 
What can hospitalized patients tell us about adverse events? Learning from 
patient-reported incidents. J Gen Intern Med. 2005 Sep;20(9):830–6. 
446.  Weissman JS, Schneider EC, Weingart SN, Epstein AM, David-Kasdan J, 
  288 
Feibelmann S, et al. Comparing patient-reported hospital adverse events with 
medical record review: do patients know something that hospitals do not? Ann 
Intern Med. 2008 Jul 15;149(2):100–8. 
447.  Khan A, Coffey M, Litterer KP, Baird JD, Furtak SL, Garcia BM, et al. Families 
as Partners in Hospital Error and Adverse Event Surveillance. JAMA Pediatr. 2017 
Apr 1;171(4):372–81. 
448.  Care Quality Commission. Regulation 20: Duty of candour [Internet]. Care 
Quality Commission. 2015 [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Available from: 
http://www.cqc.org.uk/content/regulation-20-duty-candour 
449.  Royal College of General Practitioners. Enabling patients to access electronic 
health records: guidance for health professionals [Internet]. London: Royal College 
of General Practitioners; 2010 [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Available from: 
http://www.rcgp.org.uk/-/media/Files/Informatics/Health-Informatics-Enabling-
Patient-Access.ashx?la=en 
450.  Nutbeam D. Health literacy as a public health goal: a challenge for 
contemporary health education and communication strategies into the 21st 
century. Health Promot Int. 2000 Sep 1;15(3):259–67. 
451.  Campbell JL, Fletcher E, Britten N, Green C, Holt T, Lattimer V, et al. The 
clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of telephone triage for managing 
same-day consultation requests in general practice: a cluster randomised 
controlled trial comparing general practitioner-led and nurse-led management 
systems with usual care (the ESTEEM trial). Health Technol Assess. 2015 
Feb;19(13):1–212, vii – viii. 
452.  Campbell JL, Fletcher E, Britten N, Green C, Holt TA, Lattimer V, et al. 
Telephone triage for management of same-day consultation requests in general 
practice (the ESTEEM trial): a cluster-randomised controlled trial and cost-
consequence analysis. Lancet. 384(9957):1859–68. 
453.  NHS England. A programme of action for general practice [Internet]. NHS 
England; 2014 [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Available from: https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/gp-prog-action2.pdf 
454.  Croskerry P, Singhal G, Mamede S. Cognitive debiasing 2: impediments to and 
strategies for change. BMJ Qual Saf. 2013 Oct;22 Suppl 2:ii65–72. 
455.  de Feijter JM, de Grave WS, Muijtjens AM, Scherpbier AJJA, Koopmans RP. A 
comprehensive overview of medical error in hospitals using incident-reporting 
systems, patient complaints and chart review of inpatient deaths. PLoS One. 2012 
Feb 16;7(2):e31125. 
456.  Schiff GD, Kim S, Abrams R, Cosby K, Lambert B, Elstein AS, et al. Diagnosing 
Diagnosis Errors: Lessons from a Multi-institutional Collaborative Project. Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality (US); 2005. 
457.  Almond S, Mant D, Thompson M. Diagnostic safety-netting. Br J Gen Pract. 
2009 Nov;59(568):872–4; discussion 874. 
458.  Williams H, Edwards A, Hibbert P, Rees P, Prosser Evans H, Panesar S, et al. 
Harms from discharge to primary care: mixed methods analysis of incident reports. 
Br J Gen Pract. 2015 Dec;65(641):e829–37. 
  289 
459.  Murff HJ, Gandhi TK, Karson AK, Mort EA, Poon EG, Wang SJ, et al. Primary 
care physician attitudes concerning follow-up of abnormal test results and 
ambulatory decision support systems. Int J Med Inform. 2003 Sep;71(2-3):137–49. 
460.  Ramnarayan P, Winrow A, Coren M, Nanduri V, Buchdahl R, Jacobs B, et al. 
Diagnostic omission errors in acute paediatric practice: impact of a reminder 
system on decision-making. BMC Med Inform Decis Mak. 2006 Nov 6;6:37. 
461.  de Wit HAJM, Mestres Gonzalvo C, Hurkens KPGM, Mulder WJ, Janknegt R, 
Verhey FR, et al. Development of a computer system to support medication 
reviews in nursing homes. Int J Clin Pharm. 2013 Oct;35(5):668–72. 
462.  Ely JW, Graber ML, Croskerry P. Checklists to reduce diagnostic errors. Acad 
Med. 2011 Mar;86(3):307–13. 
463.  Croskerry P. The importance of cognitive errors in diagnosis and strategies to 
minimize them. Acad Med. 2003 Aug;78(8):775–80. 
464.  Elstein AS, McNutt R. Can metacognition minimize cognitive biases?[Electronic 
response to Croskerry P, Acad Med 2003; 78: 775-80]. Acad Med. 2003;78. 
465.  Bradley CP. Commentary: Can we avoid bias? BMJ. 2005;330(7494):784. 
466.  Leape LL, Brennan TA, Laird N, Lawthers AG, Localio AR, Barnes BA, et al. 
The nature of adverse events in hospitalized patients. Results of the Harvard 
Medical Practice Study II. N Engl J Med. 1991 Feb 7;324(6):377–84. 
467.  Guthrie B, Payne K, Alderson P, McMurdo MET, Mercer SW. Adapting clinical 
guidelines to take account of multimorbidity. BMJ. 2012 Oct 4;345:e6341. 
468.  Holland AJ. Ageing and learning disability. Br J Psychiatry. 2000 Jan;176:26–
31. 
469.  Duerden M, Avery T, Payne R. Polypharmacy and medicines optimisation: 
making it safe and sound [Internet]. London: The King’s Fund; 2013 [cited 2017 
May 1]. Available from: 
https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/files/kf/field/field_publication_file/polypharmacy-
and-medicines-optimisation-kingsfund-nov13.pdf 
470.  The Model of Care Polypharmacy Working Group. Polypharmacy guidance 
[Internet]. Scotland: NHS Scotland; 2012 Oct [cited 2017 May 1]. Available from: 
http://www.central.knowledge.scot.nhs.uk/upload/Polypharmacy%20full%20guidan
ce%20v2.pdf 
471.  Langton H, Barnes M, Haslehurst S, Rimmer J, Turton P. Collaboration, user 
involvement and education: a systematic review of the literature and report of an 
educational initiative. Eur J Oncol Nurs. 2003 Dec;7(4):242–52. 
472.  Simpson EL, House AO. Involving users in the delivery and evaluation of 
mental health services: systematic review. BMJ. 2002 Nov 30;325(7375):1265. 
473.  Rees P, Edwards A, Powell C, Evans H, Panesar S, Carson-Stevens A. 
Disparities in the quality of primary healthcare for socially deprived children. Arch 
Dis Child. 2015 Mar;100(3):299–300. 
474.  Porter A, Kingston MR, Evans BA, Hutchings H, Whitman S, Snooks H. It could 
be a “Golden Goose”: a qualitative study of views in primary care on an 
  290 
emergency admission risk prediction tool prior to implementation. BMC Fam Pract. 
2016;17(1):1. 
475.  Hutchings HA, Evans BA, Fitzsimmons D, Harrison J, Heaven M, Huxley P, et 
al. Predictive risk stratification model: a progressive cluster-randomised trial in 
chronic conditions management (PRISMATIC) research protocol. Trials. 2013 Sep 
18;14:301. 
476.  Bowers B, Cook R. Using referral guidelines to support best care outcomes for 
patients. Br J Community Nurs. 2012 Mar;17(3):134–8. 
477.  Jarvis A, Mackie S, Arundel D. Referral criteria: making the district nursing 
service visible. Br J Community Nurs. 2006 Jan;11(1):17–22. 
478.  Audit Commission for Local Authorities and the National Health Service in 
England and Wales. First assessment: a review of district nursing services in 
England and Wales [Internet]. London: Audit Commission; 1999 [cited 2017 Apr 1]. 
Available from: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20150421134146/http://archive.audit-
commission.gov.uk/auditcommission/subwebs/publications/studies/studyPDF/1314
.pdf 
479.  Waters KR. Discharge planning: an exploratory study of the process of 
discharge planning on geriatric wards. J Adv Nurs. 1987 Jan;12(1):71–83. 
480.  Clover C. Botched referrals cost district nurses five hours each. Nursing Times 
[Internet]. 2010 [cited 2017 Apr 1]; Available from: 
https://www.nursingtimes.net/news/primary-care/botched-referrals-cost-district-
nurses-five-hours-each/5020576.article 
481.  NHS England Patient Safety. Review of National Reporting and Learning 
System (NRLS) incident data relating to discharge from acute and mental health 
trusts [Internet]. London: Department of Health; 2014 [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Available 
from: https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/nrls-summary.pdf 
482.  Hesselink G, Zegers M, Vernooij-Dassen M, Barach P, Kalkman C, Flink M, et 
al. Improving patient discharge and reducing hospital readmissions by using 
Intervention Mapping. BMC Health Serv Res. 2014 Sep 13;14:389. 
483.  Stainkey L, Pain T, McNichol M, Hack J, Roberts L. Matched comparison of GP 
and consultant rating of electronic discharge summaries. HIM J. 2010;39(3):7–15. 
484.  Pocklington C, Al-Dhahir L. A comparison of methods of producing a discharge 
summary: handwritten vs. electronic documentation. BJMP. 2011;4(3):a432. 
485.  Maslove DM, Leiter RE, Griesman J, Arnott C, Mourad O, Chow C-M, et al. 
Electronic versus dictated hospital discharge summaries: a randomized controlled 
trial. J Gen Intern Med. 2009 Sep;24(9):995–1001. 
486.  NHS Wales Informatics Service. Welsh Clinical Portal [Internet]. [cited 2017 Apr 
1]. Available from: www.wales.nhs.uk/nwis/page/52547 
487.  Health and Social Care Information Centre. Clinical Record Standards 
[Internet]. [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Available from: 
https://digital.nhs.uk/article/269/Clinical-Record-Standards 
  291 
488.  Scottish Patient Safety Programme. Driver Diagram and Change Package – 
Safe and Reliable Patient Care within Practice and Across the Interface. NHS 
Scotland; 
489.  Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network. The SIGN Discharge Document 
[Internet]. Edinburgh: Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network; 2012 [cited 2017 
Apr 1]. Available from: www.sign.ac.uk/pdf/sign128.pdf 
490.  Health and Social Care Information Centre, Academy of Medical Royal 
Colleges. Standards for the clinical structure and content of patient records 
[Internet]. London: Health and Social Care Information Centre; 2013 Jul [cited 
2017 May 1]. Available from: 
https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/file/194/download?token=85IJ287y 
491.  Delbanco T, Walker J, Bell SK, Darer JD, Elmore JG, Farag N, et al. Inviting 
patients to read their doctors’ notes: a quasi-experimental study and a look ahead. 
Ann Intern Med. 2012 Oct 2;157(7):461–70. 
492.  Davies P. Should patients be able to control their own records? BMJ. 2012 Jul 
30;345:e4905. 
493.  Carson-Stevens A, Hibbert P, Williams H, Evans HP, Cooper A, Rees P, et al. 
Characterising the nature of primary care patient safety incident reports in the 
England and Wales National Reporting and Learning System: a mixed-methods 
agenda-setting study for general practice [Internet]. Southampton (UK): 
Southampton: National Institute for Health Research; 2016 Sep [cited 2017 Apr 1]. 
Available from: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK385186/ 
494.  Carson-Stevens A and Donaldson L. Reporting and learning from patient safety 
incidents in general practice: a practical guide [Internet]. London: Royal College of 
General Practitioners; 2017 [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Available from: 
http://www.rcgp.org.uk/-/media/Files/CIRC/Patient-Safety/Reporting-and-learning-
from-patient-safety-incidents.ashx?la=en 
495.  Pringle M, Bradley C. Significant event auditing: a user’s guide. Occas Pap R 
Coll Gen Pract. 1995 Mar;(70):23–5. 
496.  Hook EB, Regal RR. The value of capture-recapture methods even for apparent 
exhaustive surveys. The need for adjustment for source of ascertainment 
intersection in attempted complete prevalence studies. Am J Epidemiol. 1992 May 
1;135(9):1060–7. 
497.  Nagurney JT, Brown DFM, Sane S, Weiner JB, Wang AC, Chang Y. The 
accuracy and completeness of data collected by prospective and retrospective 
methods. Acad Emerg Med. 2005 Sep;12(9):884–95. 
498.  Bowie P, Pope L, Lough M. A review of the current evidence base for significant 
event analysis. J Eval Clin Pract. 2008 Aug;14(4):520–36. 
499.  Rees P, Edwards A, Powell C, Williams H, Hibbert P, Makeham M, et al. 
Identifying priorities for improved child healthcare: a mixed methods analysis of 
safety incident reports. BMJ Qual Saf. 2015 Nov 22;24(11):730–1. 
500.  Rothe U, Müller G, Schwarz PEH, Seifert M, Kunath H, Koch R, et al. 
Evaluation of a Diabetes Management System Based on Practice Guidelines, 
Integrated Care, and Continuous Quality Management in a Federal State of 
  292 
Germany. Diabetes Care. 2008 May 1;31(5):863–8. 
501.  Wilson PW, D’Agostino RB, Levy D, Belanger AM, Silbershatz H, Kannel WB. 
Prediction of coronary heart disease using risk factor categories. Circulation. 1998 
May 12;97(18):1837–47. 
502.  Blackmore C. Managing Systemic Change: Future Roles for Social Learning 
Systems and Communities of Practice? In: Blackmore C, editor. Social Learning 
Systems and Communities of Practice. Springer London; 2010. p. 201–18. 
503.  Harris CB, Krauss MJ, Coopersmith CM, Avidan M, Nast PA, Kollef MH, et al. 
Patient safety event reporting in critical care: a study of three intensive care units. 
Crit Care Med. 2007 Apr;35(4):1068–76. 
504.  Tighe CM, Woloshynowych M, Brown R, Wears B, Vincent C. Incident reporting 
in one UK accident and emergency department. Accid Emerg Nurs. 2006 
Jan;14(1):27–37. 
505.  Walshe K, Bennett J, Ingram D. Using adverse events in health-care quality 
improvement: results from a British acute hospital. Int J Health Care Qual Assur. 
1995;8(1):7–14. 
506.  Considine J, Mitchell B, Stergiou HE. Frequency and nature of reported 
incidents during Emergency Department care. Emerg Med J. 2011 May;28(5):416–
21. 
507.  James RH. 1000 anaesthetic incidents: experience to date. Anaesthesia. 2003 
Sep;58(9):856–63. 
508.  Braithwaite J, Westbrook M, Travaglia J. Attitudes toward the large-scale 
implementation of an incident reporting system. Int J Qual Health Care. 2008 
Jun;20(3):184–91. 
509.  Doherty C, Mc Donnell C. Tenfold medication errors: 5 years’ experience at a 
university-affiliated pediatric hospital. Pediatrics. 2012 May;129(5):916–24. 
510.  McNally KM, Sunderland VB. No-Blame Medication Administration Error 
Reporting by Nursing Staff at a Teaching Hospital in Australia. Int J Pharm Pract. 
1998;6(2):67–71. 
511.  Itoh K, Omata N, Andersen HB. A human error taxonomy for analysing 
healthcare incident reports: assessing reporting culture and its effects on safety 
performance. J Risk Res. 2009;12(3-4):485–511. 
512.  Patel E, Nutt SL, Qureshi I, Lister S, Panesar SS, Carson-Stevens A. Leading 
change in health-care quality with the Institute for Healthcare Improvement Open 
School. Br J Hosp Med . 2012 Jul;73(7):397–400. 
513.  Public Health Wales. Improving Quality Together [Internet]. 1000 Lives 
Improvement. 2017 [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Available from: 
http://www.1000livesplus.wales.nhs.uk/iqt 
514.  Royal College of General Practitioners. RCGP e-learning [Internet]. Royal 
College of General Practitioners. [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Available from: 
http://elearning.rcgp.org.uk/mod/page/view.php?id=3928 
515.  Walsh K, Dillner L. Launching BMJ learning: online learning resources based on 
  293 
the best available evidence. BMJ: British Medical Journal. 2003;327(7423):1064. 
516.  Carson-Stevens A and Cooper A. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement in 
Primary Care [Internet]. RCGP Learning. Royal College of General Practitioners; 
2017 [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Available from: 
http://elearning.rcgp.org.uk/course/info.php?popup=0&id=242 
517.  General Medical Council. Supporting information for appraisal and revalidation 
[Internet]. London: General Medical Council; 2012 Mar [cited 2017 Apr 1]. 
Available from: http://www.gmc-
uk.org/RT___Supporting_information_for_appraisal_and_revalidation___DC5485.
pdf_55024594.pdf 
518.  Care Quality Commission. Nigel’s surgery 32: Duty of Candour and General 
Practice (regulation 20) [Internet]. Care Quality Commission. 2015 [cited 2017 Jan 
1]. Available from: http://www.cqc.org.uk/content/nigels-surgery-32-duty-candour-
and-general-practice-regulation-20 
519.  de Wet C, O’Donnell C, Bowie P. Developing a preliminary “never event” list for 
general practice using consensus-building methods. Br J Gen Pract. 2014 
Mar;64(620):e159–67. 
520.  NHS England. Five year forward view [Internet]. NHS England; 2014 [cited 
2017 Apr 1]. Available from: https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/5yfv-web.pdf 
521.  Durkin M. Global Ministerial Patient Safety Summit. WHO Global Consultation – 
Setting Priorities for Global Patient Safety; 2016 Sep 28; Florence, Italy. 
522.  World Health Organization. Reporting Patient Safety Incidents [Internet]. World 
Health Organization. 2014 [cited 2014 Jul 18]. Available from: 
www.who.int/patientsafety/implementation/information_model/en/ 
523.  Wolfe I, Macfarlane A, Donkin A, Marmot M, Viner R. Why children die: death in 
infants, children and young people in the UK Part A [Internet]. London: Royal 
College of Paediatrics and Child Health; 2014. Available from: 
http://www.bacaph.org.uk/images/documents/bacaph-
publications/death_in_infants_children_and_young_people_in_the_uk.pdf 
524.  Sheikh A, Atun R, Bates DW. The need for independent evaluations of 
government-led health information technology initiatives. BMJ Qual Saf. 2014 
Aug;23(8):611–3. 
525.  Sheikh A, Jha A, Cresswell K, Greaves F, Bates DW. Adoption of electronic 
health records in UK hospitals: lessons from the USA. Lancet. 2014 Jul 
5;384(9937):8–9. 
526.  Bell BG, Campbell S, Carson-Stevens A, Evans HP, Cooper A, Sheehan C, et 
al. Understanding the epidemiology of avoidable significant harm in primary care: 
protocol for a retrospective cross-sectional study. BMJ Open. 2017 Feb 
17;7(2):e013786. 
527.  Kimia AA, Savova G, Landschaft A, Harper MB. An Introduction to Natural 
Language Processing: How You Can Get More From Those Electronic Notes You 
Are Generating. Pediatr Emerg Care. 2015 Jul;31(7):536–41. 
  294 
528.  NHS England. Next steps on the NHS five year forward view [Internet]. NHS 
England; 2017 Mar [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Available from: 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/NEXT-STEPS-ON-THE-
NHS-FIVE-YEAR-FORWARD-VIEW.pdf 
529.  Gibson R, Azfal M, Williams H, Edwards A, Hibbert P, Sheikh A, et al. Unsafe 
opioid replacement therapy in England and Wales: a mixed-methods study. 
Lancet. 2017 Feb 23;389:S38. 
530.  Cooper A, Edwards A, Williams H, Evans HP, Avery A, Hibbert P, et al. Sources 
of unsafe primary care for older adults: a mixed-methods analysis of patient safety 
incident reports. Age Ageing. 2017 May 16;1–7. 
531.  NHS Wales. Two years to make a difference in Welsh Healthcare 2008-2010 
[Internet]. Cardiff: NHS Wales; 2010 [cited 2017 Apr 1]. Available from: 
http://www.1000livesplus.wales.nhs.uk/sitesplus/documents/1011/TwoYearsToMa
keADifference.pdf 
532.  Dixon-Woods M, Bosk CL, Aveling EL, Goeschel CA, Pronovost PJ. Explaining 
Michigan: developing an ex post theory of a quality improvement program. Milbank 
Q. 2011;89(2):167–205. 
533.  Wilkinson JE, Rushmer RK, Davies HTO. Clinical governance and the learning 
organization. J Nurs Manag. 2004;12(2):105–13. 
534.  Tsai Y. Learning organizations, internal marketing, and organizational 
commitment in hospitals. BMC Health Serv Res. 2014 Apr 4;14:152. 
535.  deBurca S. The learning health care organization. Int J Qual Health Care. 
2000;12(6):457–8. 
536.  Brenner S, Detz A, López A, Horton C, Sarkar U. Signal and noise: applying a 
laboratory trigger tool to identify adverse drug events among primary care patients. 
BMJ Qual Saf. 2012 Aug;21(8):670–5. 
537.  De Wet C, Bowie P. Screening electronic patient records to detect preventable 
harm: a trigger tool for primary care. Qual Prim Care. 2011;19(2):115–25. 
538.  Power M, Fogarty M, Madsen J, Fenton K, Stewart K, Brotherton A, et al. 
Learning from the design and development of the NHS Safety Thermometer. Int J 
Qual Health Care. 2014 Jun;26(3):287–97. 
539.  Carson-Stevens A, Edwards A, Panesar S, Parry G, Rees P, Sheikh A, et al. 
Reducing the burden of iatrogenic harm in children. Lancet. 2015 Apr 
25;385(9978):1593–4. 
540.  Vincent C. Patient Safety. London: John Wiley & Sons; 2010. 
541.  Bagenal J. BMJ Open Quality launch. BMJ Open Qual. 2017 Jul 
13;6(2):e000148. 
542.  QI Ready [Internet]. Royal College of General Practitioners. 2017 [cited 2017 
Aug 21]. Available from: http://www.rcgp.org.uk/QI-Ready 
543.  Melton GB, Hripcsak G. Automated detection of adverse events using natural 
language processing of discharge summaries. J Am Med Inform Assoc. 2005 
Jul;12(4):448–57. 
  295 
544.  Hirschberg J, Manning CD. Advances in natural language processing. Science. 
2015 Jul 17;349(6245):261–6. 
545.  Erhardt RA-A, Schneider R, Blaschke C. Status of text-mining techniques 
applied to biomedical text. Drug Discov Today. 2006 Apr;11(7-8):315–25. 
546.  Wong ZS-Y, Akiyama M. Statistical text classifier to detect specific type of 
medical incidents. Stud Health Technol Inform. 2013;192:1053. 
547.  Ong M-S, Magrabi F, Coiera E. Automated categorisation of clinical incident 
reports using statistical text classification. Qual Saf Health Care. 2010 
Dec;19(6):e55. 
548.  Fujita K, Akiyama M, Park K, Yamaguchi EN, Furukawa H. Linguistic analysis of 
large-scale medical incident reports for patient safety. Stud Health Technol Inform. 
2012;180:250–4. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  296 
Appendices 
Appendix 1. Search strategy for scoping review (Chapter 2) 
Database: Ovid MEDLINE(R) In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations and 
Ovid MEDLINE(R)  
 
1     Medical Errors/mt, pc, sn [Methods, Prevention & Control, Statistics & 
Numerical Data] 
2     Quality Assurance, Health Care/mt, og, st, sn [Methods, Organization & 
Administration, Standards, Statistics & Numerical Data] 
3     Risk Management/mt, og, st, sn [Methods, Organization & Administration, 
Standards, Statistics & Numerical Data] 
4     Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting Systems/sn 
5     Patient Safety/ 
6     Postoperative Complications/ 
7     Iatrogenic Disease/pc 
8     Diagnostic Errors/mt, pc, sn [Methods, Prevention & Control, Statistics & 
Numerical Data] 
9     Safety Management/mt, og, st, sn [Methods, Organization & Administration, 
Standards, Statistics & Numerical Data] 
10     (medica$ adj2 error$).ab,ti.  
11     (safety adj2 manag$).ab,ti.  
12     (surg$ adj2 error$).ab,ti.  
13     (diagnostic adj error$).ab,ti.  
14     (iatrogenic adj disease).ab,ti.  
15     malpractice.ab,ti. 
16     (safety adj2 culture).ab,ti.  
17     (near adj2 failure).ab,ti. 
18     (near adj2 miss).ab,ti.  
19     ((incident$ or safe$ or event$) adj3 report$).tw.  
20     or/1-18 
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21     *Informatics/ or *Online systems/ or (system$ or report$ or scheme or 
organi$ation or method$ or technique$ or procedure$ or process$ or approach$ 
or structure$ or classification or practice or admin$ or method$).tw. 
22     20 and 21 
 
 
Database: Embase Classic+Embase  
1     medical error/ae, pc [Adverse Drug Reaction, Prevention] 
2     *risk management/ 
3     adverse drug reaction/co, dm, ep, pc [Complication, Disease Management, 
Epidemiology, Prevention] 
4     *patient safety/ 
5     *health care quality/  
6     postoperative complication/ep, pc [Epidemiology, Prevention] 
7     iatrogenic disease/ 
8     diagnostic error/pc [Prevention]  
9     *Safety/ 
10     malpractice/  
11     (medica$ adj2 error$).ab,ti.  
12     (safety adj manag$).ab,ti.  
13     (surg$ adj2 error$).ab,ti.  
14     (diagnostic adj error$).ab,ti.  
15     (iatrogenic adj disease).ab,ti.  
16     safety culture.ab,ti.  
17     (near adj2 failure).ab,ti.  
18     (near adj2 miss).ab,ti.  
19     ((incident$ or safe$ or event$) adj2 report$).tw.  
20     or/1-19  
21     online system/  
22     (informatic$ or system$ or report$ or scheme or organi$ation or method$ 
or technique$ or procedure$ or process$ or approach$ or structure$ or 
classification or practice or admin$ or method$).tw.  
23     21 or 22  
24     20 and 23  
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Database: Wiley COCHRANE Library  
#1 medical error*:ab,ti  
#2 medication error*:ab,ti  
#3 "diagnostic error*":ab,ti  
#4 iatrogenic disease:ab,ti  
#5 malpractice:ab,ti  
#6 "safety culture":ab,ti  
#7 "near failure":ab,ti  
#8 "near miss":ab,ti  
#9 "patient safety":ti,ab  
#10 safety event report*:ti  
#11 safety manage*:ab,ti  
#12 "risk management":ti,ab  
#13 adverse drug reaction:ti  
#14 #1 or #2 or #3 or #4 or #5 or #6 or #7 or #8 or #9 or #10 or #11 or #12 or 
#13  
#15 system or method or procedure or process or approach or practice:ti  
#16 #14 and #15  
 
 
 
Database: Science Citation Index Expanded 
 
# 3 
 
#2 AND #1 
# 2 TI=(medical error OR medication error OR diagnostic error OR 
iatrogenic disease OR malpractice OR safety culture OR “near 
failure” OR “near miss” OR patient safety OR safety event report 
OR safety manage OR risk manage OR adverse drug reaction OR 
medication error OR diagnostic error OR iatrogenic disease OR 
malpractice OR patient safety OR risk management OR adverse 
drug event) 
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH 
Timespan=All years 
# 1 Ti=(informatics or Online systems or system or report or scheme 
or method or technique or procedure or process or approach or 
structure or classification or practice) 
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Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH 
Timespan=All years 
 
Grey literature searching 
The following search terms were inputted to website search engines: ‘incident 
report,’ ‘safety,’ ‘patient safety,’ and ‘healthcare quality'. When over 1000 hits 
were retrieved, a member of the research team reviewed the first 100 records. 
Links to publications, research papers and central repositories of organisation 
reports were sought. In the instance of poorly constructed websites, the site 
maps were used to locate intended links. In addition to hand searching for 
website links, individual website search engines were utilised to identify 
additional material.  
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Appendix 2. List of the organisational websites relevant to patient safety 
searched for grey literature (Chapter 2) 
 
▪ European Centre for Health Policy European Centre for Social Welfare 
and Policy Research Health Impact Assessment Database 
▪ International Health Policy Library  
▪ International Network of Agencies for Health Technology Assessment  
▪ World Health Organization 
▪ Centre for Study Health System Change  
▪ Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Health Policy Institute  
▪ National Center for Policy Analysis  
▪ Institute for Healthcare Improvement 
▪ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services  
▪ U.S. Agency for healthcare Research and Quality  
▪ U.S. National Institute of Health 
▪ U.S. Dept. Veteran Affairs 
▪ Monash Institute of Health Services Research 
▪ Centre for Health Services and Policy Research (Australia)  
▪ The Fraser Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences  
▪ Australia Health and Aging  
▪ Australian Policy Online  
▪ Centre for Clinical Effectiveness (Monash University)  
▪ Centre for Health Economics (Monash University)  
▪ Manitoba Centre for Health Policy 
▪ Centre for Health Economics (University of York)  
▪ Centre for Reviews and Dissemination (University of York) 
▪ Institute for Public Policy Research  
▪ The King’s Fund  
▪ National Institute for Clinical Excellence  
▪ Policy Studies Institute  
▪ PROSPERO Database 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▪ UK National Health Service  
▪ UK Health and Wellbeing  
▪ UK National Research Register 
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Appendix 3. Table of included studies (Chapter 2) 
Title of paper Study 
design 
Authors Country Year Journal Discipline Name of 
Classification 
Classification 
1000 anaesthetic incidents: 
experience to date 
case study R. Hugh James UK 2003 Anaesthesia Anaesthetics Royal College of 
Anaesthetists’ 
incident categories 
and RCA CIRS 
Novel 
Classification 
3,520 medication errors 
evaluated to assess the 
potential for IT-based 
decision support 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Binzer K1, 
Hellebek A. 
Europe 2011 Studies in 
Health 
Technology and 
Informatics 
Pharmacy and 
Pharmacology 
Veterans 
Administration 
Severity 
Assessment Code 
Novel 
Classification 
A comparative analysis of 
incident reporting lag times 
in academic medical centres 
in Japan and the USA. 
comparative 
analysis 
Regenbogen SE, 
Hirose M, Imanaka 
Y, Oh EH, Fukuda 
H, Gawande AA, 
Takemura T, 
Yoshihara H. 
North 
America 
2010 Quality & Safety 
in Health Care 
Unspecified Novel classification Not Explicit 
A compararison of 
iatrogenic injury studies in 
Australia and the USA II: 
reviewer behaviour and 
quality of care 
comparative 
analysis 
Runciman WB, 
Webb RK, Helps 
SC, Thomas EJ, 
Sexton EJ, 
Studdert DM, 
Brennan TA. 
Australasia 2000 International 
Journal for 
Quality in Health 
Care 
Unspecified Generic 
Occurrence 
Classification 
(GOC) 
AIMS 
A comprehensive overview 
of medical error in hospitals 
using incident-reporting 
systems, patient complaints 
and chart review of inpatient 
deaths. 
mixed 
method 
de Feijter JM, de 
Grave WS, 
Muijtjens AM, 
Scherpbier AJ, 
Koopmans RP. 
Europe 2012 PLoS One Unspecified ICPS ICPS 
A novel error-reporting tool 
in pediatric intensive care 
prospective 
cross-
sectional 
Kolovos NS, 
Bratton SL, Levy 
FH. 
North 
America 
2008 Journal of 
Healthcare 
Quality 
Intensive Care NCC MERP NCC MERP 
A physician-based voluntary 
reporting system for adverse 
events and medical errors. 
descriptive Weingart SN, 
Callanan LD, Ship 
AN, Aronson MD. 
North 
America 
2001 Journal of 
General Internal 
Medicine 
Cardiology Novel Classification Novel 
Classification 
A preliminary taxonomy of 
medical errors in General 
Practice 
descriptive S M Dovey, D S 
Meyers, R L 
Phillips Jr, L A 
Green, G E Fryer, 
J M Galliher, J 
Kappus, P Grob 
North 
America 
2002 Quality & Safety 
in Health Care 
All International 
Taxonomy of 
Medical Errors in 
Primary Care 
International 
Taxonomy of 
Medical Errors 
in Primary Care 
(LINNAEUS) 
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A prospective analysis of 
critical incidents attributable 
to anaesthesia 
prospective 
cross-
sectional 
Spittal MJ, Findlay 
GP, Spencer I. 
UK 1995 International 
journal for 
quality in health 
care 
Anaesthetics Unspecified Not Explicit 
A review of medication 
administration errors 
reported in a large 
psychiatric hospital in the 
United Kingdom 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Camilla Malyn 
Haw, Geoff 
Dickens, Jean 
Stubbs 
UK 2005 Psychiatric 
services 
Psychiatry NCC MERP NCC MERP 
A review of medication 
incidents reported to the 
National Reporting and 
Learning System in England 
and Wales over 6 years 
(2005-2010) 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
David H. Cousins, 
David Gerrett & 
Bruce Warner 
UK 2011 British Journal 
of Clinical 
Pharmacology 
Unspecified NRLS classification Novel 
Classification 
A review of safety incidents 
in England and Wales for 
vascular endothelial growth 
factor inhibitor medications. 
descriptive Kelly SP, Barua A. UK 2011 Eye  Other Unspecified NRLS 
A string of mistakes: the 
importance of cascade 
analysis in describing, 
counting, and preventing 
medical errors. 
prospective 
cross-
sectional 
Woolf SH, Kuzel 
AJ, Dovey SM, 
Phillips RL Jr. 
North 
America 
2004 Annals of Family 
Medicine 
General 
Practice 
International 
Taxonomy of 
Medical Errors in 
Primary Care 
International 
Taxonomy of 
Medical Errors 
in Primary Care 
(LINNAEUS) 
A system factors analysis of 
"line, tube, and drain" 
incidents in the intensive 
care unit. 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Needham DM, 
Sinopoli DJ, 
Thompson DA, 
Holzmueller CG, 
Dorman T, 
Lubomski LH, Wu 
AW, Morlock LL, 
Makary MA, 
Pronovost PJ. 
North 
America 
2005 Critical Care 
Medicine 
Intensive Care System theory Novel 
Classification 
A system factors analysis of 
airway events from the 
Intensive Care Unit Safety 
Reporting System (ICUSRS) 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Needham DM, 
Thompson DA, 
Holzmueller CG, 
Dorman T, 
Lubomski LH, Wu 
AW, Morlock LL, 
Pronovost PJ. 
North 
America 
2004 Critical Care 
Medicine  
Unspecified Novel taxonomy Novel 
Classification 
Accidents and incidents 
involving patients in a 
mental health service 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Anne Fairlie 
Richard Brown 
UK 1994 Journal of 
Advanced 
Nursing 
Psychiatry Unspecified Not Explicit 
Adverse event reporting: 
lessons learned from 4 
years of Florida office data. 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Coldiron B, Fisher 
AH, Adelman E, 
Yelverton CB, 
North 
America 
2005 Dermatologic 
Surgery 
Surgery Unspecified Not Explicit 
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Balkrishnan R, 
Feldman MA, 
Feldman SR. 
Adverse events and 
comparison of systematic 
and voluntary reporting from 
a paediatric intensive care 
unit. 
comparative 
analysis 
Silas R, Tibballs J. Australasia 2010 Quality & Safety 
in Health Care 
Intensive Care Unspecified Novel 
Classification 
Adverse events and near 
miss reporting in the NHS. 
prospective 
cross-
sectional 
Shaw R, Drever F, 
Hughes H, Osborn 
S, Williams S. 
UK 2005 Quality & Safety 
in Health Care 
Acute Care Unspecified Not Explicit 
Adverse events in plastic 
surgery 
prospective 
cross-
sectional 
Z. Hassan and 
P.D. Hodgkinson 
UK 2003 British Journal 
of Plastic 
Surgery 
Surgery Based on Wilson's 
generic taxonomy 
Novel 
Classification 
Adverse incidents, patient 
flow and nursing workforce 
variables on acute 
psychiatric wards: the 
Tompkins Acute Ward Study 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Bowers L, Allan T, 
Simpon A, Nijman 
H,& Warren J. 
UK 2007 International 
Journal of Social 
Psychiatry 
Psychiatry NPSA scale NRLS 
Adverse occurrences in 
intensive care units. 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Abramson NS, 
Wald KS, Grenvik 
AN, Robinson D, 
Snyder JV. 
North 
America 
1980 JAMA Intensive Care Unspecified Not Explicit 
An analysis of Australian 
adverse drug events. 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Malpass A, Helps 
SC, Runciman 
WB. 
Australasia 1999 Journal of 
Quality in 
Clinical Practice 
Unspecified Generic 
Occurrence 
Classification 
(GOC) 
AIMS 
An analysis of computer-
related patient safety 
incidents to inform the 
development of a 
classification. 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Magrabi F, Ong 
MS, Runciman W, 
Coiera E. 
Australasia 2010 Journal of the 
American 
Medical 
Informatics 
Association 
Unspecified AIMS AIMS 
An analysis of critical 
incidents relevant to 
pediatric anesthesia 
reported to the UK National 
Reporting and Learning 
System, 2006-2008. 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
MacLennan AI, 
Smith AF. 
UK 2010 Paediatric 
Anaesthesia 
Anaesthetics NRLS NRLS 
An evaluation of 
departmental radiation 
oncology incident reports: 
anticipating a national 
reporting system. 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Terezakis SA, 
Harris KM, Ford E, 
Michalski J, 
DeWeese T, 
Santanam L, Mutic 
S, Gay H. 
North 
America 
2013 International 
Journal of 
Radiation, 
Oncology, 
Biology, Physics 
Oncology and 
Radiology 
Novel Classification Novel 
Classification 
  305 
An overview of intravenous-
related medication 
administration errors as 
reported to MEDMARX, a 
national medication error-
reporting program 
mixed 
method 
Hicks RW, Becker 
SC. 
North 
America 
2006 Journal of 
Infusion Nursing 
Pharmacy and 
Pharmacology 
NCC MERP NCC MERP 
Anaesthetic adverse 
incident reports: an 
Australian study of 1,231 
outcomes 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Aders A, Aders H. Australasia 2005 Anaesthesia 
and Intensive 
Care 
Anaesthetics Unspecified Not Explicit 
Analysis of errors reported 
by surgeons at three 
teaching hospitals. 
mixed 
method 
Gawande AA, 
Zinner MJ, 
Studdert DM, 
Brennan TA. 
North 
America 
2003 Surgery Surgery According to 
Vincent's 
"Framework for 
analysing risk and 
safety in clinical 
medicine" 
Novel 
Classification 
Anesthesia-related mortality 
and morbidity over a 5-year 
period in 2,363,038 patients 
in Japan 
mixed 
method 
Kawashima Y, 
Takahashi S, 
Suzuki M, Morita 
K, Irita K, et al..  
Asia 2003 Acta 
Anaesthesiologi
ca Scandinavica 
Anaesthetics Unspecified Not Explicit 
Antiretroviral medication 
errors in a national 
medication error database 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Gray J, Hicks RW, 
Hutchings C. 
North 
America 
2005 AIDS Patient 
Care and STDs 
Pharmacy and 
Pharmacology 
MEDMARX Novel 
Classification 
Application of data mining to 
the identification of critical 
factors in patient falls using 
a web-based reporting 
system. 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Lee TT, Liu CY, 
Kuo YH, Mills ME, 
Fong JG, Hung C. 
Asia 2011 International 
Journal of 
Medical 
Informatics 
Nursing and 
Midwifery 
Unspecified Not Explicit 
Are sequential compression 
devices commonly 
associated with in-hospital 
falls? A myth-busters review 
using the patient safety net 
database 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Boelig MM1, Streiff 
MB, Hobson DB, 
Kraus PS, 
Pronovost PJ, 
Haut ER. 
North 
America 
2011 Journal of 
Patient Safety 
Unspecified PSN Harm Scores Not Explicit 
Audits and critical incident 
reporting in paediatric  
anaesthesia: lessons from 
75,331 anaesthetics 
retrospectiv
e & 
prospective 
cross-
sectional 
Sharon Wan, Yew 
Nam Siow , Su 
Min Lee, Agnes 
NG 
Asia 2013 Singapore 
Medical Journal 
Neonatal Care 
and 
Paediatrics 
Unspecified Not Explicit 
Benchmarking surgical 
incident reports using a 
database and a triage 
system to reduce adverse 
outcomes. 
prospective 
cross-
sectional 
Anthony C. 
Antonacci, MD, 
SM; Steven Lam, 
PA; Valentina 
Lavarias, RN, MA; 
Peter Homel, PhD; 
Roland D. Eavey, 
North 
America 
2008 Archives of 
Surgery 
Surgery Unspecified Not Explicit 
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MD, SM 
Can the surgical checklist 
reduce the risk of wrong site 
surgery in orthopaedics?--
Can the checklist help? 
Supporting evidence from 
analysis of a national patient 
incident reporting system. 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Panesar SS, 
Noble DJ, Mirza 
SB, Patel B, Mann 
B, Emerton M, 
Cleary K, Sheikh 
A, Bhandari M. 
UK 2011 Journal of 
Orthopaedic 
Surgery and 
Research 
Surgery Used NRLS codes 
to identify but then 
developed novel 
classification 
Novel 
Classification 
Cardiac surgery errors: resul
ts from the UK National Rep
orting and Learning System. 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Martinez, 
Elizabeth A. 
Shore, Andrew. 
Colantuoni, 
Elizabeth. Herzer, 
Kurt. Thompson, 
David A. Gurses, 
et al.  
North 
America 
2011 International 
Journal for 
Quality in Health 
Care 
Cardiology Novel classification Novel 
Classification 
Central or local incident 
reporting? A comparative 
study in Dutch GP out-of-
hours services 
quasi-
experimenta
l 
Zwart DL, Van 
Rensen EL, 
Kalkman CJ, 
Verheij TJ. 
Europe 2011 British Journal 
of General 
Practice  
General 
Practice 
ORCE procedure Novel 
Classification 
Characteristics of falls in a 
large academic radiology 
department: occurrence, 
associated factors, 
outcomes, and quality 
improvement strategies 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Abujudeh H1, 
Kaewlai R, Shah 
B, Thrall J. 
North 
America 
2011 American 
Journal of 
Roentgenology 
Oncology and 
Radiology 
Novel taxonomy Novel 
Classification 
Characteristics of 
medication errors and 
adverse drug events in 
hospitals participating in the 
California Pediatric Patient 
Safety Initiative. 
prospective 
cross-
sectional 
Takata GS, 
Taketomo CK, 
Waite S. 
North 
America 
2008 American 
Journal of 
Health System 
Pharmacology 
Neonatal Care 
and 
Paediatrics 
NCC MERP NCC MERP 
Characteristics of 
medication errors with 
parenteral cytotoxic drugs 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
A. FYHR, R. 
AKSELSSON 
Europe 2012 European 
Journal of 
Cancer Care 
All NCC MERP NCC MERP 
Classifying Health 
Information Technology 
patient safety related 
incidents - an approach 
used in Wales. 
descriptive Warm D, Edwards 
P. 
UK 2012 Applied Clinical 
Informatics 
Unspecified Unspecified Novel 
Classification 
Classifying laboratory 
incident reports to identify 
problems that jeopardize 
patient safety. 
evaluation Astion ML, 
Shojania KG, 
Hamill TR, Kim S, 
Ng VL. 
North 
America 
2003 American 
Journal of 
Clinical 
Pathology 
Other Novel Classification Novel 
Classification 
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Clinical handover incident 
reporting in one UK general 
hospital. 
retrospectiv
e cross-
sectional 
Pezzolesi C, 
Schifano F, 
Pickles J, Randell 
W, Hussain Z, 
Muir H, Dhillon S. 
UK 2010 International 
Journal for 
Quality in Health 
Care 
Unspecified Datix Common 
Classification 
System (CCS) 
Novel 
Classification 
Collecting data on 
potentially harmful events: a 
method for monitoring 
incidents in general practice. 
mixed 
method 
Britt H, Miller GC, 
Steven ID, 
Howarth GC, 
Nicholson PA, 
Bhasale AL, 
Norton KJ. 
Australasia 1997 General 
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Appendix 5. Protocol submitted for NIHR HS&DR 12/64/118  
 
Protocol – version 2 (July 2013) 
 
PROJECT TITLE 
Characterising the nature of primary care patient safety incident reports in England and Wales: 
mixed methods study. 
 
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
Primary care is overdue its recognition as a threat to patient safety where over a quarter of a 
million UK patients will experience harm in this setting each year (Panesar, Carson-Stevens et 
al. in review). A WHO-commissioned review of primary care patient safety research highlighted 
a limited appreciation of the causal pathways underpinning patient safety incidents (PSIs) that 
arise and translate into harm, and a limited understanding about where and how to effectively 
intervene. Further, no studies have explained or even hypothesised reasons why some 
incidents are more commonly reported and what opportunities exist to prevent them (WHO 
2012).  
 
The National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) contains over 47,000 PSI reports from 
frontline clinicians in primary care in England and Wales and is the largest repository of primary 
care reports in the world.  
 
We propose a mixed-methods study to use the NRLS database to understand the nature and 
range of PSIs that have resulted in harm to patients in primary care. We will identify patient 
safety incident reports from primary care in England and Wales between April 2003 and June 
2012. All incidents resulting in severe harm and death will be analysed, and a 25% random 
sample of reports with all compulsory fields and free-text incident descriptions completed 
(available for 99.9% of total reports). Reports will be exported to STATA (StataCorp LP, USA) 
for descriptive statistical analysis and NVivo (QSR International Pty Ltd, Australia) for thematic 
content analysis.  
 
Key incident characteristics will be identified using descriptive statistics (objectives 1&2) 
whereby differences in proportions of demographics e.g. incident type, incident location, and 
patient characteristics with the severity of harm event will be assessed by Chi-squared and 
Fisher’s exact tests, and t-test. Subsequent logistic regression modelling will evaluate 
relationships between those variables to harm outcomes in the data (objective 3). Attributes with 
statistically significant relationships with any level of harm will be organised by their strength of 
association.  
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Free-text descriptions will be characterised by thematic analysis (objectives 4 & 5). This 
requires ‘sense making’ of the reported story and eliciting human factors and organizational 
issues discussed within it (Reason 1990; Reason 1995; Vincent et al. 1998; Henriksen and 
Kaplan 2003). Free-text will be categorised according to the LINNEAUS Primary Care Patient 
Safety Incident Classification scheme to describe the content of each report 
(http://www.linneaus-pc.eu). This taxonomy has only previously been informed by a systematic 
review and expert consensus methods; we will therefore iterate the taxonomy based on 
empirical analysis of the England and Wales data. As categories are assigned e.g. ‘wrong drug 
administered’, similar cases can be identified and higher-level themes will emerge e.g. 
‘administration errors’ (Cooke and Scobie 2009). Reports will be interrogated inductively. Two 
primary care doctors and a research nurse will undertake analysis independently. We will 
describe the content of the text, the context and characteristics of the incident; identify patterns 
or recurring themes in the data; and compare incidents with different characteristics.  
 
We anticipate the research will benefit patients and the NHS by: characterising patient safety 
incidents - understanding the nature, range and potential contributory influences - that lead to 
harm in primary care for the first time; and identifying how reporting of incidents can be 
improved to facilitate future learning. 
 
BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE 
Patient safety in primary care – an overlooked priority 
Around 1 in 10 hospital in-patients experience a patient safety incident during their care (de 
Vries et al. 2008). Unsafe care is thus responsible for a substantial, potentially preventable, 
burden of disease (Landrigan et al. 2010). Over the past decade, most of the research on 
patient safety has been based in secondary care where it has been demonstrated possible to 
identify patterns in errors and determine those most frequently leading to major harm and 
isolate those most amenable to prevention. Informed by those epidemiological studies, patient 
safety in secondary care is now in an era of implementing interventions. There is now 
recognition similar work is needed in primary care (WHO 2012). 
 
Studies of risk and iatrogenic patient harm, however, pose substantial challenges in primary 
care given the heterogeneity in primary care provision. The challenges of safe primary care 
relate to the variety of healthcare professionals that intervene, the data they exchange (verbally 
and written), and the movement of the patient between these, as well as the episodic and 
decentralised nature of care. The discipline of patient safety relies on evidence that harm is due 
to a multifactorial chain of events (Institute of Medicine 1999; Reason 2000). The underlying 
assumption is that if systems (i.e. organisations and networks of organisations) and working 
conditions within these can be optimised, then the occurrence of patient safety incidents is less 
likely.  
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Frequency and causes of primary care patient safety incidents  
Until recently there was no robust evidence on the frequency of errors in primary care (WHO 
2012). Our meta-analysis of a subset of studies suggested that 1.0% (95% CI 1.0–2.0) of all 
patient encounters in primary care in high-income countries involved an error, with major harm 
resulting from 12·8% (95% CI 9.8–15.8) of these errors (Panesar et al. in review). Based on our 
estimates, of the 303.9 million consultations per annum in general practices in England alone 
(2008-9), approximately 4 million (1·3%) will involve a patient safety incident. Over half a million 
(12.8%) of these are likely to have resulted in substantial harm to patients. General practice 
consultations only represent a subset of the encounters in primary care so the actual burden 
from errors in this setting (i.e. pharmacy, nursing, dentistry, out of hours services, community 
hospitals) is likely to be substantially higher then these estimates suggests. 
 
Our systematic review (Panesar et al., in review) also identified that few studies have 
hypothesised or explained the causes or contributing factors to patient safety incidents in 
primary care (Britt et al. 1997; Fischer et al. 1997; Bhasale et al. 1998; Holden et al. 1998; 
Woolf et al. 2004; Kostopoulo and Delaney, 2007; Mitchel et al. 2013). No such studies have 
occurred within the United Kingdom.  
 
Patient Safety Reporting Systems  
All methods to examine patient safety incidents in healthcare provide only a partial picture of the 
problem. Patient Safety Reporting Systems offer an avenue for frontline healthcare 
professionals and patients to report details about the patient safety incidents they have been 
involved in or witnessed. In England and Wales, the National Reporting and Learning System 
(NRLS) receives reports about any “unintended or unexpected incident that could have or did 
lead to harm for one or more patients receiving NHS funded care”. The reported information can 
therefore be used to advance understanding about the magnitude and nature of preventable 
harm.  
 
Leading experts recognise that despite limitations of reporting systems –underreporting, 
incomplete view of incident, and reporting biases – they provide multiple perspectives over time 
and form an integral part of routine monitoring in clinical practice (Vincent 2010). Underreporting 
is the Achilles’ heal of a patient safety reporting system, and only 47,000 reports (0.4% of the 
total number of NRLS reports) exist from primary care. This reflects a poor reporting culture 
from primary care staff in England and Wales in the past decade, and is probably a reflection of 
the national emphasis placed on patient safety in hospital settings (Panesar et al. 2009). 
Paradoxically, despite the large number of incident reports received by patient safety reporting 
systems like the NRLS, reporting systems have been shown to detect only about 6% of adverse 
events found by a systematic review of records (Sari et al. 2007). This represents a mismatch 
between what actually occurs in clinical care and what healthcare professionals report as a 
‘patient safety incident’. The Francis report (2013) could dramatically influence the reporting 
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culture amongst primary care healthcare professionals, as well as what gets reported by them, 
since it states they must play a greater role in quality monitoring, and reaffirmed their role to 
report adverse events and suboptimal care. Demonstrating the benefits of the learning 
generated from patient safety incident reports will nurture this reporting culture (Leape 2002; 
Leape and Berwick 2005). 
 
Supporters of Patient Safety Reporting Systems believe they are not being used to their full 
potential to benefit patients (Noble et al. 2011). National systems rely on patient safety experts 
methodically trawling through patient safety incidents by severity and frequency. For example, 
each incident reported as leading to death or serious harm is reviewed individually by trained 
clinical staff at the NHS Commissioning Board (formerly at the National Patient Safety Agency) 
and a range of outputs are produced to provide solutions to patient safety problems. These 
include one-page reports called Rapid Response Reports, quarterly data summaries and topic-
specific information on topics such as preventing inpatient falls in hospitals. NRLS staff will 
frequently consult subject-matter experts from professional organisations such as the Royal 
Colleges. NHS organisations also have deadlines imposed on them by which time they should 
have implemented key findings from such reports. These have offered important insights that 
have helped to shape national policy – for example, for demonstrating the risks of bone cement 
implantation syndrome associated with use of cement in hip fracture surgery, and the potential 
for IT-based interventions to reduce many cases of drug allergy related morbidity. (Cresswell 
and Sheikh 2008; Panesar et al. 2009)  
 
Little attention, however, has centred on the development of methods for making use of the 
potential learning from the majority of incident reports that are not routinely analysed. Thus, it is 
unsurprising that no studies within primary care have undertaken a structured, systematic 
exploration of free-text description of patient safety incidents. Researchers have previously used 
descriptive statistics and thematic analysis to identify areas for intervention in secondary care 
including: prescribing and monitoring lithium therapy (Gerrett et al. 2010); reliable administration 
of insulin (Lamont et al. 2010); early detection of complications in surgical care (Healey et al. 
2010; Lamont et al. 2011; Panesar et al. 2011); and essential care after an inpatient fall (Healey 
et al. 2011). In addition, clinical researchers have explored descriptions of patient safety 
incidents in anaesthesia and identified system deficiencies relating to practical procedures, 
communication of information to patients, verbal and written communication practices, and 
continuity of care (Catchpole et al. 2008; Cassidy et al. 2011). Their analysis also led to the 
development of an anaesthesia-specific incident report data collection form (Smith and Mahajan 
2009).  
 
EVIDENCE EXPLAINING WHY THIS RESEARCH IS NEEDED NOW 
Primary care is overdue its recognition as a threat to patient safety. It poses unique challenges 
for the design of better quality systems of care delivery, given its heterogeneous models of 
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delivery and diversity of patients with a wide variety of undifferentiated complaints, uncertain 
diagnoses and multiple comorbidities (Makeham et al. 2008). Transferring lessons from 
advances made from over a decade of patient safety research in specialist care settings may 
therefore not be without problems. The underpinning evidence base, whether in terms of 
conceptual frameworks, epidemiology, or interventions all therefore potentially need to be 
developed in their own right (WHO 2012). 
 
Our WHO-commissioned systematic review and Delphi expert consensus study (February 
2012) highlighted the paucity of empirical work that explores the relationship between cause 
(the error) and effect (harm), and the underlying system failures that facilitate this relationship. 
Of the 193 primary studies and 14 systematic reviews included in the systematic review, most 
studies estimated the frequency of patient safety incidents and their associated burden. No 
studies hypothesise or explain the reasons why incidents occurred and what opportunities exist 
to prevent them through a systematic exploration of free-text descriptions made about the 
incidents.  
 
In 2003, a major national investment was made to better understand patient safety incidents 
occurring in England and Wales called the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS). 
The NRLS contains a free-text description of the event, perceived causative factors, and any 
planned actions made locally following the incident. Over 47,000 incident reports exist from 
primary care in England and Wales and these have never previously been systematically 
analysed. Such reports permit a retrospective ‘window’ on the healthcare system, providing a 
means of looking to the future, by identifying weaknesses of the system that are still present and 
could lead to further incidents involving patients (Vincent 2004).  
 
Our proposed study will characterise a wide range of patient safety incidents that have led to 
harm, and demonstrate priority areas to focus the design of interventions, both in incident 
reporting, and system changes to enhance safety. This is an unexploited area within primary 
care patient safety, and post-Francis (2013) should serve to demonstrate the value of safety 
monitoring and frame the benefits of a reporting culture for doctors, nurses and patients in the 
NHS. 
 
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
We propose a mixed-methods study to use the NRLS database to understand the nature and 
range of patient safety incidents that have resulted in harm to patients in primary care.  
 
We will undertake secondary quantitative and qualitative analysis of NRLS data from 
primary care to: 
1. Describe the frequency of different types of patient safety incidents. 
2. Describe incident characteristics such as patient age, gender, and ethnicity, geography, time 
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of day, and severity of harm. 
3. Determine which characteristics are associated with different levels of patient harm.  
4. Undertake a thematic content analysis of free-text qualitative data to describe the incidents, 
and iterate an existing taxonomy using empirical evidence based on these primary care-related 
incidents from England and Wales.  
5. Map relationships between themes, i.e. categories of incidents and potential contributory 
influences, and elicit possible areas with opportunity for intervention. 
 
RESEARCH PLAN / METHODS 
We propose to undertake the study over 18 months. To address objectives 1-5, we will use 
descriptive statistical methods and thematic content analysis to interrogate a dataset of over 
47,000 patient safety incidents reported to the NRLS from primary care. 
 
Step 1. Organising and sampling data 
All patient safety incident reports to the NRLS from primary care in England and Wales between 
April 2003 and June 2012 will be considered as the complete dataset. These include incidents 
from settings including GP surgeries, residential care homes, community pharmacies, opticians, 
out-of-hours services, hospices, and others. We include an overview of the NRLS and examples 
of its data in an attached appendix. 
 
We will analyse 100% of reports on patient death or severe harm (sample size to be determined 
during Phase 1) as per previous work (Cousins et al. 2012; Panesar et al. 2012; Cooke and 
Scobie 2009). A random number generator will be used to identify a 25% random sample of all 
remaining reports. We chose 25% since it will represent approximately 12,500 reports that we 
judge to be a large volume of reports but realistic to analyse within the study timeframe. Based 
on our experience of incident report analysis at the former NPSA, and previous work (Panesar 
et al. 2012; Panesar et al. 2013), it is feasible to code approximately 100 reports per day, taking 
approximately 6 months to complete qualitative analysis (objectives 4&5). 
 
Step 2. Statistical tests and modeling 
Incident characteristics will be identified using descriptive statistics (objectives 1&2). Differences 
in proportions of demographics such as incident type, the incident location, and patient 
characteristics with the severity of harm event will be assessed by Chi-squared and Fisher’s 
exact tests, with differences in means calculated by t-test. Subsequent logistic regression 
modeling will evaluate the relationships between incident type, incident location, and patient 
characteristics, to harm outcomes in the data (objective 3). Logistics odds ratios will be 
calculated to determine the odds of an event occurring; for example the odds of an event 
occurring in the out-of-hours clinic compared with all other settings. To rank the incident 
locations according to the degree of reported harm, we will calculate Harm Susceptibility Ratios, 
(Pham et al. 2010; Martinez et al. 2011) which are the odds of reported harm for each incident 
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location compared with the average odds of reported harm across all other incident locations. A 
Harm Susceptibility Ratio of greater/less than 1 for a particular variable indicates that incidents 
attributable to that location had higher/lower reported odds of harm compared with the average 
odds of reported harm for the cumulative incident types. Harm susceptibility ratios will be 
calculated from a random-effects logistic regression model that accounts for sources of variation 
in the data. We will undertake the same process for independent patient variables (e.g. age, 
gender, ethnicity) and incident characteristics using this approach. Attributes identified to have a 
statistically significant relationship with any level of harm will be arranged hierarchically in 
categories based on their strength of association. 
 
Formal sample size calculations for quantitative analysis are not given at this stage of our 
Research Design since the final number of variables to be included in the regression model 
cannot be made a priori.  
 
Step 3. Thematic content analysis 
Free-text data will be characterised by thematic analysis (objectives 4 & 5). This requires ‘sense 
making’ of the story reported (Vincent et al. 1998; Henriksen and Kaplan 2003). The free-text 
will be categorised according to an existing Primary Care Patient Safety Incident Classification 
scheme (a taxonomy) in order to describe the content (i.e. what happened) of each patient 
safety report (LINNEAUS EURO-PC, http://www.linneaus-pc.eu). This taxonomy was informed 
by a systematic review and expert consensus; we will iterate this taxonomy based on our 
empirical analysis of the England and Wales NRLS data. As categories are assigned e.g. 
‘wrong dose administered’ and ‘wrong drug administered’, similar cases can be identified and 
themes will emerge e.g. ‘administration errors’ (Cooke and Scobie 2009). Reports will be 
interrogated inductively. Secondly, the coding team will develop a separate coding framework 
for ‘perceived causative factors’ by eliciting human factors and organizational issues discussed 
within the reports.  
 
Two primary care doctors and a research nurse, with backgrounds in qualitative research, will 
undertake analysis independently. This will allow us to describe the content of the text, context 
and characteristics of the incident, identify any patterns or recurring themes in the data, and to 
compare incidents with different characteristics. The analysis will be informed by human factors 
engineering principles to guide ‘sensemaking’, defined as “the active process of assigning 
meaning to ambiguous data”, in order to identify the learning that can be used to inform 
improvements in clinical care (Reason, 1990; Battles et al., 2006).  
 
In addition, the two assessors will independently review the harm designation based on the free 
text description and a third reviewer (a senior clinician) will resolve any disputes. This will 
require knowledge and understanding of the primary care context and to draw upon past 
experiences. The typology of harm proposed by Vincent and colleagues (2013) will be used, 
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and includes: treatment specific harm; harm due to over-treatment; general harm from 
healthcare; harm due to failure to provide appropriate treatment; harm resulting from delayed or 
inadequate diagnosis; and psychological harm and feeling unsafe. In addition, this approach is 
underpinned by the Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s recommendation to review harm 
from the patient’s point of view, asking, “Would you be happy if the event happened to you? If 
the answer is no, then likely there was harm.” (Griffin and Resar, 2009:11) 
 
We will take an inductive approach to thematic analysis; that is, as new ideas emerge from the 
analysis, interrogation of the dataset will seek to extend and add insight to our enquiry. We are 
unable to propose a sample size based on the inductive nature of our enquiry. 
 
Study outcomes 
● Detailed description of primary care Patient Safety Incident characteristics in England and Wales 
(objectives 1 & 2). 
● Model of contributory influences underpinning Patient Safety Incidents in primary care (objective 
3). 
● Refinement of a primary care patient safety taxonomy using empirical England and Wales data 
(objectives 4&5).  
● Candidate areas, prioritised for intervention development, to minimise the risk of healthcare-
related harm (objectives 5). 
 
DISSEMINATION AND PROJECT OUTPUTS 
Communicate with reporting health organisations 
This will be the largest study of its kind in primary care, and we anticipate it will serve as a 
stepping-stone for developing a range of interventions and approaches aimed at improving 
safety in this setting. The study will clarify the primary care contexts and aspects of care 
provision that need priority attention in high-income countries, and provide a greater 
understanding about how patient safety could be improved and identify interventions to limit 
patient safety incidents.  
 
The impact of the study is potentially immediate, as it will provide evidence and priorities for the 
development of safer clinical practices across the UK, particularly knowledge and understanding 
of the actions and processes in daily work that influence the safety of patients. We will 
summarise our findings for dissemination to NHS organisations. Examples might include better 
training for primary care healthcare professionals in preventing commonly occurring incidents 
and improved organisational processes that detect potential incidents before they cause harm. 
Furthermore, because of our strong working links with the NRLS, we are ideally placed to 
feedback from this work to enhance the future reporting and analysis of primary care PSIs. 
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We anticipate our study will provide momentum for promoting a reporting culture in primary care 
via established improvement programmes in England and Wales. We will explore strategies for 
dissemination with the Advisory group, consisting of senior policy and operational 
representatives of both nations. It is likely that this will involve presentations at leading national 
conferences, as well as securing invitations to smaller seminars and local meetings to a variety 
of professional and lay audiences.  
 
Peer-reviewed, open-access publications and conference presentations 
The work is novel, and as with previous patient safety research led by members of our team 
(which has resulted in major publications in for example The Lancet, BMJ, PLoS Medicine) we 
anticipate a number of high profile publications from this work. We aim to demonstrate the value 
of qualitative analysis of free-text within incident reports to generate hypotheses about causal 
relationships. This could contribute a step-change in epidemiological study design for further 
work in primary care patient safety.  
 
We will submit study outputs for oral presentation at the Society for Academic Primary Care 
annual scientific meeting, and the BMJ/IHI International Forum on Quality and Safety in 
Healthcare (Europe) and the IHI National Forum on Quality and Safety in Healthcare (USA). 
 
Education and training of healthcare professionals and patients 
We will deliver four regional training events (to be held in England and Wales) on the role of 
general practitioners in patient safety. We will seek Royal College of General Practitioners 
(RCGP) support and endorsement for the events and look to organise a session at the RCGP 
annual conference. Training days will be aimed at general practice registrars (those in their final 
year of training) and their trainers (those responsible for their supervision). Longer-term goals 
include the integration of ‘patient safety reporting’ as recognised demonstrable competencies 
within GP training and revalidation appraisals, and to support these via e-learning modules (e.g. 
BMJ Learning) and NHS Clinical Knowledge Summaries.  
 
During those educational sessions, we expect to identify the critical points in care that 
compromise patient safety and elicit learning for feedback to frontline staff, patient groups, 
policy makers and managers. We believe our findings could be of interest to patient advocacy 
organizations and special interest groups; it is likely further work will involve galvanizing such 
energy around the prototyping and trial of a primary care-specific reporting form for patients.  
 
PLAN OF INVESTIGATION AND TIMETABLE 
The proposed study will run from Friday 1st November 2013 for a period of 18 months. Key 
events, and associated durations, are listed below. 
 
(i) Recruitment of researchers and administration staff – Months 1-3; 
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(ii) Qualitative software training – Month 3;  
(iii) Advisory group will meet via teleconference (months 9 & 18) and face-to-face (months 3 & 
12). 
(iv) Study management group (all co-applicants) – monthly teleconference and face-to-face 
(month 3, 12 &18).  
(v) Data extraction, checking, cleaning and organisation–months 2-4; 
(vi) Descriptive (statistical) analysis and thematic analysis–months 4-16; 
(vii) Report write up– months 17-18.  
(viii) Education sessions for stakeholders – month 18.  
 
PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
We have established a work partnership between Cardiff University, Imperial College London, 
University of Edinburgh and University of Nottingham. Our team comprises an international 
healthcare policy expert (Prof Sir Liam Donaldson); a senior epidemiologist and WHO Safer 
Primary Care programme chair (Prof Aziz Sheikh); a healthcare researcher, clinician and 
healthcare improvement educationalist (Dr Andrew Carson-Stevens); a NRLS methodological 
expert (Dr Sukhmeet Panesar); three patient safety researchers (Prof Anthony Avery, Prof 
Adrian Edwards, Dr Sharon Mayor); a patient co-applicant and the former RCGP Patient 
Engagement Chair (Mr Antony Chuter); a senior mathematician (Prof Paul Harper); and a 
medical anthropologist (Dr Luke Cowie) and senior medical sociologist (Dr Fiona Wood).  
 
Dr Carson-Stevens and Professor Edwards are Co-Chief Investigators, and will be supported by 
a strong team of experienced co-applicants. Dr Carson-Stevens will oversee the management 
of recruited staff and ensure all milestones are met within the proposed timescale. In addition to 
the core team (described in Table 1 - below), recruited staff will facilitate this extensive 
programme of data analysis. We have also secured contributions from an academic general 
practice registrar at 1 day per week to support data analysis (costs covered by Cardiff 
University/ Wales Deanery).  
 
We have adopted a matrix management approach to maximise the operational and intellectual 
contributions of all co-applicants. Dr Carson-Stevens and Professor Edwards will oversee the 
week-to-week running of the study with additional support from Dr Panesar and Cardiff-based 
colleagues (Dr Mayor, Dr Cowie and Dr Wood). The study management group (all co-
applicants) will teleconference on a monthly basis and have 3 face-to-face meetings (months 3, 
12, 18). 
 
Advisory group 
We have convened an advisory group to ensure independence of the work and advise on 
potential networks and initiatives for dissemination of study outputs. Advisory group members 
have influence and responsibility across the relevant specialist disciplines – research, service 
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delivery, healthcare improvement, clinical medicine, health policy – to ensure our research has 
immediate relevance and impact on patient safety in primary care within the UK and 
internationally. The Advisory group will meet face-to-face at months 3 and 12, with two 
teleconferences in the interim months 9 and 18. 
 
The following colleagues have agreed to participate (indicated by *): 
Prof David Bates, Harvard School of Public Health, USA*; Mrs Jan Davies, Head of Clinical 
Governance, Welsh Government*; Professor Jonathon Gray, University of Auckland, New 
Zealand*; Dr Karen Gully, Primary Care Lead in Welsh Government*; Dr Gareth Parry, Institute 
for Healthcare Improvement, USA*; Dr Maxine Power, Department of Health*; 1 General 
Practitioner, England*; Dr Donna Luff, Boston Children’s Hospital, USA*, and, at least 2 out of 
the 4 patient representatives will be present at each meeting.  
 
APPROVAL BY ETHICS COMMITTEE 
We plan to seek ethical approval from the Cardiff University School of Medicine Research 
Ethics Committee prior to study commencement. It is very likely that person-specific information 
has been removed locally (at healthcare organisations prior to submission of reports to the 
NRLS). Should such information be disclosed within a report and raise professionalism or 
patient safety issues, we will inform the relevant leads at the NHS commissioning board/NHS 
Wales that can institute the relevant clinical governance mechanisms, or the General Medical 
Council to instigate Fitness to Practise procedures as most appropriate, so that they can 
appropriately deal with those concerns.  
 
PATIENT AND PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 
We have invited an experienced lay person/patient, Mr Antony Chuter, to be a co-applicant on 
this project. He has participated in all study planning meetings and has been consulted on all 
issues relating to PPI. Mr Chuter will contribute towards the design of patient-specific outputs, 
attend monthly study team meetings and will keep all lay participants updated by 
teleconference. The additional laypersons (Jillian Beggs, Kausar Iqbal and Susan Howe) all 
have prior lay representative experience and will support the project on a rotation at ½ day per 
month. This will ensure at least two laypersons are in attendance at each monthly study team 
meeting (Mr Chuter plus one other), and all will attend the Professional Advisory Group 
meetings. They will work alongside Mr Chuter and Dr Carson-Stevens at different phases of the 
study and attend training every 6 months. Initially this programme will include discussing their 
roles, the purpose of the project and ways to influence the study; and subsequent meetings will 
provide an opportunity to reflect together and bring items for discussion to feedback into the 
study, including interpretation of emerging results. 
 
Applicant 
and % time 
commitment 
Expertise Operational contribution Intellectual 
contributions 
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Dr Andrew 
Carson-
Stevens 
(50%) 
Design and 
evaluation of 
healthcare 
improvement 
education/ 
NRLS 
analysis/ 
qualitative 
methods 
Research design, liaising 
with NIHR, staffing, budget, 
advisory board, team 
meetings, engagement and 
publication strategy, 
supervision and mentoring 
of recruited staff, analysing 
and reporting data, 1st draft 
of academic outputs.  
Identification of candidate 
areas of clinical practice 
intervention and 
improvement in incident 
reporting process. 
Professor 
Anthony 
Avery  
(2.5%) 
Design and 
trial of patient 
safety 
interventions 
Triangulating study findings 
with existing patient safety 
knowledge in key areas 
e.g. medication error.  
Experience of 
development of primary 
care patient safety 
interventions. 
Mr Antony 
Chuter  
(7.5%)  
PPI PPI Lead; equal partner in 
study. 
Design of patient-specific 
study outputs.  
Dr Luke 
Cowie 
(2.5%) 
Qualitative 
methods 
Advise on use of NVivo 
software/ contribute to 
coding as a non-clinician.  
Advise on modelling of 
qualitative data.  
Prof Sir Liam 
Donaldson  
(2.5%) 
International 
health policy/ 
NRLS analysis 
Liaison with Department of 
Health and international 
(WHO) healthcare policy 
leads. 
Strategic actions and 
collaborations at the policy 
and service level. 
Prof Adrian 
Edwards 
(10%) 
Healthcare 
Improvement  
Supervision and mentoring 
of Dr Carson-Stevens, 
research design, 
publication strategy, 
production of academic 
outputs.  
Academic output and 
dissemination strategy; 
identification of candidate 
areas of clinical practice 
intervention.  
Prof Paul 
Harper 
(2.5%) 
Mathematical 
modelling 
Database design and 
management; statistician 
supervision. 
Modelling techniques and 
statistical analysis of 
quantitative data.  
Dr Sharon 
Mayor 
(2.5%) 
Harm 
measurement 
Educational material 
development. 
Development of 
educational materials for 
nursing and NHS 
manager groups/ 
interviews. 
Dr Sukhmeet 
Panesar 
(10%) 
NRLS 
analysis/ 
Patient Safety/ 
Public Health/ 
Quantitative 
methods 
Liaison with the NRLS at 
NHS Commissioning 
Board; advise statistician 
on NRLS analysis; 
production of academic 
outputs. 
Development of 
recommendations for 
NRLS and NRLS-specific 
interventions; modelling 
techniques of NRLS data. 
Prof Aziz 
Sheikh 
(2.5%) 
Patient safety 
research/ 
Epidemiology 
Liaison with RCGP and 
WHO SPC programme. 
Strategic actions and 
collaborations with 
international research 
community/ WHO SPC 
programme.  
Dr Fiona 
Wood 
(10%) 
Qualitative 
methods & 
medical 
sociology 
Develop rigorous coding 
process; develop systems 
that will capture the 
learning from the 
methodological 
development. 
Drafting of 
methodological-focussed 
study outputs and 
recommendations for 
qualitative analysis of 
patient safety incident 
reports.   
Table 1. Expertise, Operational and Intellectual contributions of co-applicants 
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EXPERTISE AND JUSTIFICATION OF SUPPORT REQUIRED 
The expertise, operational and intellectual contributions of each co-applicant are included in 
Table 1 (above). We request the following costs to support: 
 
1. A clinical academic research team for interpretation of incident reports 
Salary for 1 x Clinical Academic specializing in primary care medicine at 0.5 WTE for 18 months 
+ 1 x Grade 6 research nurse with qualitative methods proficiency at 0.8 WTE for 18 months. A 
second primary care doctor has volunteered to contribute to this study at 1 day per week for 18 
months (institutional costs covered by Cardiff University). Researchers with a clinical 
background will interpret the incident reports as medical terminology is often used and reports 
can describe a series of events without stating clearly what the incident was. This requires 
subject expertise to interpret the text, with an understanding of best practices in each case, to 
identify what went wrong. Such methods incorporate human factors engineering principles to 
guide sensemaking, defined as “the active process of assigning meaning to ambiguous data”, 
and identify the learning that can be used to inform improvements in clinical care. Thus, 
generalising (indexing and condensing of data) requires an understanding of the task being 
described, the context it occurs, and the nuances of clinical practice.  
 
2. An experienced clinical academic study team from several subject disciplines 
Funds for 7 x co-applicants AA, LC, LD, PH, SM, AS at 0.025 WTE. This study provides an 
opportunity to draw upon expertise from research, patient safety, health policy, as well as 
primary care clinicians and patients. We have built a team across several UK universities to 
incorporate the knowledge, skills and experience we believe necessary to deliver this study 
agenda. We have budgeted time for one-hour monthly meetings with one-hour preparation per 
meeting and three face-to-face meetings lasting approximately 8 hours.  
 
Dr Panesar will work as a private consultant at 0.1 WTE (approximately half a day per week); he 
has extensive experience of modelling the NRLS dataset and will work closely with the recruited 
statistician and Prof Paul Harper; and will work with Dr Carson-Stevens to oversee analyses 
and produce academic study outputs.  
 
Professor Edwards will contribute at 0.1 WTE as co-Chief Investigator. He will contribute 
supervision and mentoring of Dr Carson-Stevens (an early career researcher), and intellectual 
contributions to research design, publication strategy, and production of academic outputs. 
 
Dr Wood will contribute at 0.1 WTE; she will work within the Cardiff-based team at half a day per 
week to guide the thematic content analysis coding process; work to develop systems that will 
capture the learning from the methodological development arising from this exploratory work; as 
well as oversee and partake in coding as a non-clinician. Dr Wood will also work closely with 
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team members responsible for statistical analysis and modelling of the data (Prof Paul Harper, 
Dr Sukhmeet Panesar & the recruited statistician).  
 
Mr Chuter will contribute 1.5 days per month. Three lay members (Jillian Beggs, Kausar Iqbal, 
Susan Howe) will contribute at 0.5 days per month and attend study team and professional 
advisory group meetings. 
 
3. Administration support 
A grade 3 administrative assistant at 0.5 WTE for 18 months is required to plan and coordinate 
study team and professional advisory group meetings.  
 
4. Descriptive statistical analyses and modelling expertise 
A grade 6 statistician to lead on statistical analysis at 0.4 WTE for 12 months; Prof Paul Harper 
(co-applicant) will supervise this work.  
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Appendix 6. List of collaborators for NIHR HS&DR 12/64/118 
 
Collaborators (and co-authors of NIHR HS&DR report) 
Peter Hibbert (Program Manager, Australian Institute for Health Innovation, 
Macquarie University) was a member of the PAG, provided human factors 
training to the study team and contributed to classification development. 
 
Dr Huw Williams (Academic GP, Primary Care Patient Safety Research Group, 
Division of Population Medicine, School of Medicine, Cardiff University) 
undertook data coding and analysis, and contributed to study team discussions 
about study findings and policy and practice recommendations. 
 
Dr Huw Prosser Evans (Academic F2 Doctor and Clinical Informatics Lead, 
Primary Care Patient Safety Research Group, Division of Population Medicine, 
School of Medicine, Cardiff University) designed and developed the analysis 
software and undertook data coding and analysis. 
 
Dr Alison Cooper (Academic GP Fellow, Primary Care Patient Safety Research 
Group, Division of Population Medicine, School of Medicine, Cardiff University) 
undertook data coding and analysis. 
 
Dr Philippa Rees (Research Assistant, Primary Care Patient Safety Research 
Group, Division of Population Medicine, School of Medicine, Cardiff University) 
contributed to the pilot analyses of data and development of the classification 
system. 
 
Anita Deakin (Patient Safety Report Analyst, Australian Patient Safety 
Foundation) undertook data coding and contributed to the development of the 
classification system. 
 
Dr Emma Shiels (Academic F2 Doctor, Primary Care Patient Safety Research 
Group, Division of Population Medicine, School of Medicine, Cardiff University) 
undertook data coding and analysis. 
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Dr Russell Gibson (Academic F2 Doctor, Primary Care Patient Safety Research 
Group, Division of Population Medicine, School of Medicine, Cardiff University) 
assisted with the analysis of coded data. 
 
Amy Butlin (Medical Student, Primary Care Patient Safety Research Group, 
Division of Population Medicine, School of Medicine, Cardiff University) 
contributed to the pilot analyses of data and development of the classification 
system. 
 
Dr Ben Carter (Lecturer in Medical Statistics, Division of Medical Education, 
School of Medicine, Cardiff University) provided statistical advice. 
 
Paul McEnhill (Medical Student, Primary Care Patient Safety Research Group, 
Division of Population Medicine, School of Medicine, Cardiff University) 
contributed to pilot analyses of data and the development of the classification 
system. 
 
Dr Hope Olivia Ward (Research Assistant, Primary Care Patient Safety 
Research Group, Division of Population Medicine, School of Medicine, Cardiff 
University) contributed to pilot analyses of data and the development of the 
classification system. 
 
Dr Raymond Samuriwo (Lecturer in Adult Nursing, Primary Care Patient Safety 
Research Group, Division of Population Medicine, School of Medicine, Cardiff 
University) contributed to data analysis. 
 
Antony Chuter (Independent patient) contributed to conceptualisation of the 
study design and study team discussions about study findings and policy and 
practice recommendations. 
 
Professor Sir Liam Donaldson (Professor of Public Health, London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine) contributed to conceptualisation of the study 
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design and study team discussions about study findings and policy and practice 
recommendations. 
 
Dr Sharon Mayor (Senior Lecturer in Healthcare Improvement, Division of 
Population Medicine, School of Medicine, Cardiff University) contributed to 
conceptualisation of the study design and study team discussions about study 
findings. 
 
Dr Sukhmeet Panesar (Adjunct Assistant Professor, Department of Medicine, 
Baylor College of Medicine) contributed to conceptualisation of the study 
design. 
 
Professor Aziz Sheikh (Co-Director, Centre for Medical Informatics, Usher 
Institute of Population Health Sciences and Informatics, The University of 
Edinburgh) contributed to conceptualisation of the study design and study team 
discussions about study findings and policy and practice recommendations. 
 
Dr Fiona Wood (Senior Lecturer, Division of Population Medicine, School of 
Medicine, Cardiff University) contributed qualitative methodological input. 
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Appendix 7. Professional advisory group for NIHR HS&DR 12/64/118 
 
Dr Karen Gully, Senior Medical Officer, Welsh Government.  
Janet Davies, Patient Safety Advisor, Welsh Government.  
Professor Nigel Sparrow, Senior National GP Advisor, Care Quality 
Commission.  
Dr Gareth Parry, Institute for Healthcare Improvement and Harvard Medical 
School.  
Dr Donna Luff, Boston Children’s Hospital and Harvard Medical School.  
Dr Meredith Makeham, Australian Institute for Healthcare Innovation. 
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Appendix 8. Aneurin Bevan University Health Board Research Risk Review 
Committee Review  
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Appendix 9. PISA classification frameworks 
 
A. INCIDENT DESCRIPTORS FRAMEWORK  
 
1 ** ADMINISTRATION **  
1.1 Filing system – information filed incorrectly 
  
1.2 Message handling – errors in the taking and distributing of messages 
  
1.3 Appointments – errors in managing appointments for healthcare 
1.3.1 Primary care appointments 
1.3.2 Secondary care appointments 
 
1.4 Payment – errors in the process of healthcare payment systems 
  
1.5 Ability to access healthcare professional – delays or unable to see 
healthcare professional 
1.5.1 Home visits  
1.5.2 Returning phone calls  
1.5.3 Out-of-hours 
 1.5.4 Health visiting  
1.5.5 Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services  
1.5.6 Occupational therapy 
 
1.6 Transfer of patient information – incorrect or inefficient transfer of patient 
information across healthcare systems  
1.6.1 Between care settings  
1.6.1.1 From primary to secondary care  
1.6.1.1.1 Lost  
1.6.1.1.2 Not sent  
1.6.1.1.3 Incorrect/incomplete  
1.6.1.1.4 Delayed 
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1.6.1.1.5 Illegible 
1.6.1.2 From secondary to primary care  
1.6.1.2.1 Lost 
1.6.1.2.2 Not sent  
1.6.1.2.3 Incorrect/incomplete  
1.6.1.2.4 Delayed  
1.6.1.2.5 Illegible 
1.6.1.3 Between primary care settings  
1.6.1.3.1 Lost  
1.6.1.3.2 Not sent  
1.6.1.3.3 Incorrect/incomplete  
1.6.1.3.4 Delayed  
1.6.1.3.5 Illegible 
  
1.6.2 New diagnoses – incorrect or inefficient transfer of patient information 
from secondary care regarding new diagnoses 
  
1.6.3 Appropriate follow up – incorrect or inefficient transfer of patient regarding 
necessary follow-up of patient. e.g. requirements for follow up screening or 
regular review 
1.6.4 Involving out-of-hours – incorrect or inefficient transfer of patient 
information between in- and out- of hours services 
  
1.6.5 NHS direct – incorrect or inefficient transfer of patient information between 
NHS direct and other services 
  
1.7 Breaches of confidentiality – patient confidentiality breached via 
documentation error 
  
2 ** DOCUMENTATION** 
2.1 Medical records – errors involving patient’s personal medical records  
2.1.1 Record(s) unavailable – records could not be accessed when neede  
2.1.1.1 Red book  
2.1.1.2 General practice records   
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2.1.1.3 Child health records   
2.1.1.4 Lost medical records 
  
2.1.2 Care given but not documented – records did not contain documentation 
of care 
  
2.1.3 Record not up to date or complete – information missing from record  
2.1.3.1 Discrepancies between vaccine records 
2.1.3.1.1 Red book  
2.1.3.1.2 General practice records  
2.1.3.1.3 Child health records  
  
2.1.4 Inaccurate or unclear medical records / medical record error 
2.1.4.1 Red book   
2.1.4.2 General practice records   
2.1.4.3 Child health records  
  
2.2 Death certificates – errors concerning patient’s death certificates 
  
3 ** REFERRAL ** 
3.1 Human – human referral errors i.e. not system-based  
3.1.1 Not performed when indicated – a person failed to refer when indicated 
  
3.1.1.1 Delayed referral – errors in the timely referral of patients 
3.1.1.1.1 Secondary care 
3.1.1.1.2 Specialist care  
3.1.1.1.3 Emergency care  
3.1.1.1.4 Nursing  
3.1.1.1.5 Social care  
3.1.1.1.6 Health visitor  
3.1.1.1.7 General practice 
3.1.1.1.8 Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services 
3.1.1.2 Referral not made when appropriate – referral decision-making error  
3.1.1.2.1 Secondary care 
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3.1.1.2.2 Specialist Care  
3.1.1.2.3 Emergency Care  
3.1.1.2.4 Nursing  
3.1.1.2.5 Health visitor  
3.1.1.2.6 Social care  
3.1.1.2.7 General practice 
3.1.1.2.8 Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service 
3.1.1.3 No follow up arranged – did not follow-up or were not asked to follow-up 
  
3.1.2 Incomplete /incorrect referral – someone did not complete referral  
3.1.3 Illegible referral – someone created an illegible referral letter/ document
  
3.1.4 Inappropriate referral to primary care – work inappropriately passed to 
primary care  
3.1.5 Inappropriate referral – someone inappropriately referred a patient 
3.1.6 Referral refused – someone refused to accept a referral of a patient 
  
3.2 Administration  
3.2.1 Not sent – letter of referral erroneously not sent by office  
3.2.2 Delayed – letter of referral delayed at office level 
3.2.3 Lost – letter of referral lost in the system   
3.2.4 Not acted upon – referral successful but patient not seen by physic  
3.2.4.1 Refused patient referral refused by receiving office  
3.2.5 Inappropriate referral – referral made erroneously at office level  
3.2.6 Social work referral issues – administrative errors in the social work 
referral process 
  
4 ** DIAGNOSIS AND ASSESSMENT ** 
4.1 Diagnosis – errors in the process of identifying/ defining a patient’s illness 
4.1.1 Missed diagnosis – failing to spot a particular illness 
4.1.2 Wrong diagnosis – misidentifying the patient’s illness 
4.1.3 Delayed diagnosis– not identifying an illness in a timely manner 
4.1.3.1 Cancer  
4.1.3.2 Emergency condition  
  366 
4.1.3.3 Contagious condition 
 
4.2 Insufficient assessment – not adequately assessing the patient clinically 
4.2.1 Triage – errors in the process of assessing the severity of a patient’s 
condition 
4.2.1.1 By healthcare professional  
4.2.1.2 By non-healthcare professional 
4.2.2 History – errors in the process of taking a patient’s medical history 
4.2.3 Examination – errors in the process of examining patients 
4.2.4 Identifying vulnerable or high-risk patient – failure to identify risky patients 
4.2.5 Emergency vehicle use – inappropriate transfer vehicle used (e.g. private 
vehicle instead of ambulance) 
4.2.6 Discharge planning – premature discharge and poor discharge planning  
  
4.3 Delayed assessment – a delay in assessment for care or care adjunct 
  
5 ** TREATMENT & PROCEDURES (excludes drugs/vaccines)  
5.1 Clinical treatment decision – errors in decisions to treat or how to treat  
5.1.1 No treatment given – inappropriate decision not to treat 
5.1.2 Insufficient treatment given – failure to provide adequate treatment 
5.1.3 Wrong treatment given – providing inappropriate treatment 
  
5.2 Other non-medication treatment errors  
5.2.1 Ordering treatments – wrong treatment ordered or treatment not ordered 
when appropriate  
5.2.2 Implementation – error in conducting the correctly chosen process or 
procedure 
 
5.2.3 Complication  
5.2.3.1 Complication from execution of procedure 
  
5.2.3.2 Adverse event suffered by patient as a result of treatment other than 
medication 
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5.2.4 Timeliness – treatment other than medication not administered in a timely 
fashion  
5.2.5 Execution of care – error in choosing the correct process or procedure 
5.2.6 Wrong anatomical side/site – administering treatment at the wrong site 
5.2.7 Insufficient supply of treatment – not having adequate supplies to treat 
patients 
 
6 ** MEDICATION & VACCINES ** 
6.1 Clinical treatment decision – errors in decisions to treat or how to treat with 
medications 
6.1.1 No treatment given – inappropriate decision not to treat 
6.1.2 Insufficient treatment – failure to provide adequate treatment  
6.1.3 Wrong treatment given – providing inappropriate treatment 
6.1.4 Treatment not ordered – failure to request an appropriate treatment 
  
6.2 Medication prescribing – errors in the medication prescribing process 
  
6.2.1 Wrong medication – patient was prescribed incorrect medication  
6.2.2 Wrong patient – mediation was prescribed for wrong patient  
6.2.3 Wrong dose – medication was prescribed at incorrect dose  
6.2.4 Wrong route – medication was prescribed for incorrect route   
6.2.5 Wrong time – medication was prescribed for incorrect/ inappropriate time
  
6.2.6 Unsafe medication – mediation prescribed was unsafe  
6.2.6.1 Teratogenic  
6.2.6.2 Contraindicated  
6.2.6.3 Allergy  
  
6.2.7 Wrong formulation – inappropriate formulation of medication was 
prescribed e.g. liquid versus tablet  
6.2.8 Wrong number of doses – incorrect quantity of medication prescribed  
6.2.9 Illegible/ unclear prescription – prescription document is unclear 
6.2.10 Incomplete prescription e.g. brand not specified – prescription document 
not fully completed 
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6.3 Medication dispensing – errors in the medication dispensing process 
6.3.1 Wrong medication – patient was dispensed incorrect medication  
6.3.2 Wrong patient – medication was dispensed to incorrect patient  
6.3.3 Wrong dose – medication was not dispensed at safe dose intended  
6.3.4 Wrong route – incorrect dose of medication was dispensed  
6.3.5 Wrong time – medication was not dispensed for appropriate time   
6.3.6 Wrong formulation – medication was not dispensed as appropriate 
formulation e.g. liquid versus tablet 
6.3.7 Not dispensed – medication was not dispensed  
6.3.8 Allergy – dispensed to a patient with known allergy 
6.3.9 Out of date – medication dispensed was out of date 
6.3.10 Wrong label – medication was dispensed with wrong label 
6.3.11 Wrong number of doses – wrong quantity of medication was dispensed  
6.3.12 Inappropriate medication – medication dispensed was inappropriate e.g. 
for that specific patient 
6.3.13 Wrong container – medication was dispensed in inappropriate container  
  
6.4 Medication administration – errors in the medication administering process 
6.4.1 Wrong medication – patient received incorrect medication 
6.4.2 Wrong patient – patient received another patient’s medication  
6.4.3 Wrong dose – patient received incorrect medication dose 
6.4.4 Wrong route – patient received medication via the incorrect route  
6.4.5 Wrong time – patient took medication at incorrect time  
6.4.6 Wrong formulation – patient took inappropriate medication formulation  
6.4.7 Out of date – patient took out of date medication 
6.4.8 Allergy – patient received medication they had a known allergy to  
6.4.9 Medication not administered – patient did not receive medication 
6.4.10 Reconstitution error – patient received inappropriately reconstituted 
medication  
 
6.5 Monitoring medication – error in the process of monitoring dose-dependent 
medications, or those with side effects 
6.5.1 Lack of monitoring – failure to appropriately monitor 
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6.5.2 Medication dose not appropriately adjusted – failed to appropriately act on 
monitoring 
  
6.6 Adverse event – patient suffered a complication as a result of medication 
6.6.1 Allergy – unknown that patient had any allergies 
  
6.7 Drug omission – medication was erroneously not given to or not taken by 
patient  
6.8 Patient overdose – patient self-administered overdose 
6.9 Incorrect storage of medication – medication was not stored appropriately  
6.10 Medication timeliness – medication was not commenced in a timely 
fashion 
  
6.11 Vaccines 
6.11.1 Vaccine prescribing – errors in the vaccine prescribing process 
6.11.1.1 Wrong vaccine – patient was not prescribed appropriate vaccine 
6.11.1.2 Wrong patient – vaccine was prescribed for wrong patient 
6.11.1.3 Wrong dose – vaccine was not prescribed at appropriate dose  
6.11.1.4 Wrong route – vaccine was not prescribed for appropriate route  
6.11.1.5 Wrong time – vaccine was not prescribed for appropriate time  
6.11.1.6 Contraindicated – vaccine prescribed was contraindicated  
6.11.1.7 Wrong formulation – vaccine prescribed was of wrong formulation 
6.11.1.8 Wrong number of doses – incorrect quantity of vaccines prescribed 
 
6.11.2 Vaccine dispensing – errors in the vaccine dispensing process 
6.11.2.1 Wrong vaccine – patient was not dispensed appropriate vaccine 
6.11.2.2 Wrong patient – vaccine was dispensed for wrong patient 
6.11.2.3 Wrong dose – vaccine was dispensed at incorrect dose  
6.11.2.4 Wrong route – vaccine was dispensed for incorrect route 
6.11.2.5 Wrong time – vaccine was not dispensed for inappropriate time 
6.11.2.6 Wrong number of doses – incorrect quantity of vaccines were 
dispensed  
6.11.2.7 Stored incorrectly – vaccines were not stored correctly  
6.11.2.8 Out of date – expired vaccines were in storage  
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6.11.2.9 Not dispensed – vaccines were unavailable/ not dispensed 
6.11.2.10 Wrong formulation – incorrect vaccine formulations were stored 
6.11.2.11 Wrong label – vaccines were dispensed with incorrect labels  
6.11.2.12 Contraindicated – contraindicated vaccine was dispensed 
  
6.11.3 Vaccine administration – errors in the vaccine administering proces  
6.11.3.1 Wrong vaccine – patient received incorrect vaccine 
6.11.3.2 Wrong patient – patient received another patient’s vaccine 
6.11.3.3 Wrong dose – patient received the incorrect vaccine dose 
6.11.3.4 Wrong route – patient vaccinated via incorrect route  
6.11.3.5 Wrong time – patient vaccinated at incorrect time  
6.11.3.6 Wrong amount – patient vaccinated with wrong number of doses 
6.11.3.7 Stored incorrectly – patient vaccinated with inappropriately stored 
vaccine 
6.11.3.8 Out of date – patient vaccinated with expired vaccine 
6.11.3.9 Contraindicated vaccine – patient vaccinated with contraindicated 
vaccine 
6.11.3.10 Not administered – patient not vaccinated  
6.11.3.11 Used/dirty needle – patient vaccinated using non-sterile needle  
6.11.3.12 Wrong site – patient vaccinated at wrong anatomical location 
6.11.3.13 Reconstitution error – patient vaccinated with inappropriately 
reconstituted vaccine 
 
6.11.4 Adverse event – patient suffered a complication as a result of medication
   
6.11.5 Batch recall – a batch of vaccines recalled after use 
  
6.12 Vaccine unavailable –  unable to source appropriate vaccines 
   
7 ** INVESTIGATIONS **  
7.1 Laboratory – errors in the process of laboratory investigations 
7.1.1 Ordering – wrong test ordered or test not ordered when appropriate 
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7.1.2 Implementing – errors in the process of obtaining or processing a 
laboratory specimen 
7.1.2.1 Mislabeled sample  
 
7.1.3 Reporting – error in the process of physician receiving accurate test 
results including errors of delay 
7.1.4 Responding to results – inappropriate response to a laboratory result 
   
7.2 Diagnostic imaging – errors in the process of diagnostic imaging 
investigations 
7.2.1 Ordering – wrong test ordered or test not ordered when appropriate 
7.2.2 Implementing – errors in the process of obtaining or processing of a 
diagnostic image 
7.2.2.1 Mislabeled request form 
7.2.3 Reporting – error in the process of physician receiving accurate test 
results including errors of delay 
7.2.4 Responding to results – inappropriate response to a laboratory result 
  
7.3 Other investigations – errors in the process of other investigations 
7.3.1 Ordering – wrong test ordered or test not ordered when appropriate 
7.3.2 Implementing – errors in the process of obtaining or processing of other 
diagnostic investigation 
7.3.3 Reporting – error in the process of physician receiving accurate test 
results including errors of delay 
7.3.4 Responding to results – inappropriate response to a result of other 
investigations 
  
8 ** COMMUNICATION **  
These are human failures, and do not include breakdowns in the systems that 
are used to communicate information. 
  
8.1 With patients or caregivers – errors in communication between physicians 
or healthcare professionals and patients or caregivers 
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8.1.1 Wrong advice given to patient or caregiver – includes information about 
accessing emergency services, self–management or safety netting 
8.1.1.1 By healthcare professional 
8.1.1.2 By non-healthcare professional 
  
8.1.2 Failure to convey seriousness/urgency of patient condition  
8.1.3 Consent errors – errors in the process of obtaining informed consent 
  
8.2 Between healthcare professionals – errors in communication between 
healthcare professionals 
8.2.1 Failure to convey seriousness/urgency of patient condition  
8.2.2 Handover–related inadequacies 
 
8.3 Between healthcare and non–healthcare professionals  
  
9 ** EQUIPMENT ** 
9.1 Therapeutic adjunct provision – failures in the process of therapeutic adjunct 
provision  
9.2 Insufficient supply – failure to adequately supply equipment or a lack of 
equipment 
9.2.1 Stolen equipment 
 
9.3 Failure of equipment – equipment failing to fulfill its purpose  
9.3.1 Damaged  
9.3.2 Faulty  
9.3.3 Misused 
9.3.4 Computerised Physician Order Entry  
 
10 ** OTHER ** 
10.1 Professionalism  
10.2 Environmental hazard 
10.3 Transport issues  
10.4 Failure to prevent fall/injury 
10.5 Failure to follow up ‘unwell’ or vulnerable child 
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10.6 Failure to prevent pressure ulcer 
 
B. CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS FRAMEWORK 
 
1 ** PATIENT OR CAREGIVER FACTORS ** 
1.1 Geography – the area where patients live including its characteristics 
1.1.1 Out of area – patient new to area 
1.1.2 Access difficulties because of geography 
  
1.2 Language – patient or caregiver unable to communicate in English  
 
1.3 Behavior – the way in which patients or caregivers act of conduct 
themselves 
1.3.1 Non-compliance – patient does not follow advice or instructions 
1.3.1.1 Takes own discharge   
1.3.1.2 Patient does not take medication as instructed or advised  
1.3.1.3 Non-disclosure  
1.3.1.4 Violent 
  
1.4 Health - factors related to the patient's physical and mental health 
1.4.1. Frailty – reduced physiological reserve, fragile  
1.4.2. Disability   
1.4.3. Allergy  
1.4.4 Immunocompromised  
1.4.5 Coagulation problems 
1.4.6 Pregnancy  
1.4.7 Epilepsy 
1.4.8 Poor renal function 
 
1.5. Knowledge – insufficient knowledge of inadequate application of knowledge 
  
1.6. Looked-after child – child not in the care of their parents e.g. foster care 
 
1.7 Age – child-specific factors 
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1.7.1 Weight-based dosing 
 
1.8 Ethnicity – the child belongs to a certain social group  
 
2 ** STAFF FACTORS **  
2.1 Health – physical and mental wellbeing 
2.1.1 Fatigue  
 
2.2 Task – a piece of work to be done or undertaken. 
2.2.1 Failure to follow protocol – not adhering to organizational guidelines 
2.2.1.1 New protocol 
2.2.2 Inadequate skill set/knowledge – insufficient knowledge of inadequate 
application of knowledge 
  
2.3 Cognitive - includes abilities such as perception, learning, memory, 
language, concept formation, problem solving, and thinking. 
2.3.1 Mistake – unintentional cognitive lapses 
2.3.1.1 Distraction/ inattention/ oversight/forgot  
2.3.1.2 Similar medication names/appearances confused  
2.3.1.3 Similar patient names  
2.3.1.4 Haste/ poor time management  
2.3.1.5 Misread/ did not read 
2.3.1.6 Patient ID label 
 
2.3.2 Violation - deliberate breaking of a rule 
2.3.3 Stress - mental or emotional strain 
2.3.4 No or poor supervision or assistance of staff 
2.3.5 Critical thinking – problem solving 
  
3 ** EQUIPMENT / MEDICATION/ VACCINE FACTORS ** 
3.1 Poor design – impractical or in some way inadequate 
  
3.2 Poor storage – impractical or inadequate storage 
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3.3 Poor packaging – impractical or inadequate storage 
 
3.4 Failure of equipment/ medication/ vaccine – unable to fulfill its purpose 
  
4 ** ORGANISATION FACTORS **  
4.1 Protocols or guidelines – existing guidelines not fit for purpose 
4.1.1 Mental health   
4.1.2 Vulnerable patients    
4.1.3 Investigations  
4.1.4 Referrals 
4.1.5 Epilepsy management plan  
4.1.6 Asthma management plan  
4.1.7 School care plan 
4.1.8 Diabetic management plan  
4.1.9 Palliative care plan 
 
4.2 Interpreter services – communication aids to reduce language barriers 
  
4.3 Continuity of care – issues with the co-ordination of services 
4.3.1 Patient unknown to staff   
4.3.2 Within primary care  
4.3.2.1 Out-of-hours service  
4.3.2.2 Registering with a general practice 
4.3.3 Between secondary and primary care  
4.3.4 Access block – cannot move a patient because there is no space  
4.3.5 Locum/ agency staff 
  
4.4 Working conditions – factors relating to the work environment  
4.4.1 Staffing levels 
4.4.1.1 Shift pattern 
4.4.1.2 Insufficient numbers of staff 
4.4.1.2.1 Doctors 
4.4.1.2.2 Nurses 
4.4.1.2.3 Allied health professionals 
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4.4.1.3. Sickness  
4.4.2 Team factors 
4.4.2.1 Culture   
4.4.2.2 Inadequate leadership 
4.4.2.3 Disagreement amongst teams   
4.4.3 Busy/overloaded by work 
4.4.4 interruptions 
 
4.5. Education and training – insufficient education and training of staff 
4.5.1 Supervision  
4.5.2 Knowledge of others roles 
4.5.3 Caregiver training   
 
4.6 Service availability – a required service is unavailable  
 
4.7 Long wait for service – unacceptable delays in service access 
  
5 ** ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS **  
5.1 Care facility has poor access for emergency vehicles 
 
 
C. OUTCOME FRAMEWORK 
 
1 ** PATIENT HARM ** - direct harm to the patient physically or mentally 
1.1 Clinical harm – impaired bodily function 
1.1.1 Pain / discomfort 
1.1.2 Swelling 
1.1.3 Rash 
1.1.4 Nausea 
1.1.5 Redness  
1.1.6 Bruising   
1.1.7 Dizziness/ faint/ loss or altered consciousness 
1.1.8 Bleeding   
1.1.9 Changes in physiological parameters 
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1.1.9.1 Fever 
1.1.9.2 Breathless  
1.1.10 General deterioration/progression of condition  
1.1.11 Pressure ulcer  
1.1.11.1 Pressure ulcer developed  
1.1.11.2 Pressure ulcer deteriorated   
1.1.12 Other wound/ulcer  
1.1.13 Admitted to the high dependency or intensive care unit  
1.1.14 Seizures   
1.1.15 Admitted to hospital/ visited emergency department   
1.1.16 Infection  
1.1.17 Migraine  
1.1.18 Poor diabetic control 
1.1.18.1 Diabetic ketosis/ ketoacidosis  
1.1.19 Developmental delay   
1.1.20 Diarrhea  
1.1.21 Emergency surgery  
1.1.22 Liver failure  
1.1.23 Constipation 
  
1.2 Injury - tissue damage 
1.2.1 Laceration 
1.2.2 Perforation  
1.2.3 Fracture  
1.2.4 Skin tear  
1.2.5 Pain / discomfort  
1.2.6 Swelling  
1.2.7 Redness 
1.2.8 Bruising    
1.2.9 Bleeding  
1.2.10 Needle stick   
1.2.11 Burn 
1.2.12 Fall 
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1.3 Psychological / emotional distress – patient suffering 
 
1.4 Death – the end of life  
 
1.5 Cardio-respiratory arrest – inadequate circulation due to sudden 
cardiac failure and abnormal or absent breathing 
 
2 ** PATIENT INCONVENIENCE ** - increased patient burden  
2.1 Repeated tests / procedure / additional treatment  
2.2 Delays in management (assessment or treatment)  
2.3 Increased documentation  
2.4 Financial implication  
2.5 Repeated visits to/from health care providers  
2.6 Unnecessary treatment  
2.7 Extended hospital stay  
2.8 Hospital admission 
  
3 ** ORGANISATIONAL INCONVENIENCE ** - increased organisational 
burden 
3.1 Increased documentation  
3.2 Phone calls/follow-up  
3.3 More equipment / supplies used  
3.4 Delays in using facilities  
3.5 Legal implication  
3.6 Complaint made 
3.7 Financial implication 
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Appendix 10. Definitions of vulnerable child 
 
Definition Source Important concepts identified Key terms 
         Social  
‘‘Vulnerable children are those –  
(a) who are unlikely to achieve or maintain, 
or have the opportunity of achieving or 
maintaining, a reasonable standard of 
health or development without the 
provision for them of social care services,  
(b) whose health or development is likely 
to be significantly impaired, or further 
impaired, without the provision for them of 
social care services,  
(c) who have a physical or mental 
impairment,  
(d) who are in the care of a public 
authority, or  
(e) who are provided with accommodation 
by a public authority in order to secure 
their well-being.’’ 
UK Parliament, House of Commons, Welsh 
Affairs. 
 
Link:  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/c
m200708/cmselect/cmwelaf/576/57605.htm 
– Will not achieve reasonable 
standard of health without 
provision of social care 
services. 
– Have mental or physical 
disability. 
– Provided accommodation or 
are in the care of a public 
authority. 
Children in care, social 
care, foster care, social 
services, disability, public 
housing, social services, 
public authority, council 
housing 
“A vulnerable child in this context is one 
who is not within the social care system, 
but where there are warning signals that 
the child is becoming at risk of harm. The 
child and his or her family is likely to be 
receiving help from one or more agencies, 
and while no single agency has identified 
a significant risk to the child, when 
information from all agencies is pooled, the 
picture that emerges indicates that there 
are many factors having a negative impact 
Child and Maternal Health Observatory.  
 
Link:  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/2
0170302100842/http://www.chimat.org.uk/r
esource/view.aspx?RID=164673  
– Not within the social care 
system. 
– Child or his or her family is 
receiving help from more than 
one agency. 
Services, social worker, 
agency, agencies 
  380 
on the child. While inter-agency data 
sharing to resolve child protection 
concerns is established, data sharing to 
identify these children who are earlier on in 
the process tends not to happen routinely 
in a similar way.” 
‘’Children most at risk of experiencing 
inequalities and poor life chances. Focus 
is on those whose experience of multiple, 
adverse, overlapping factors in their lives 
makes them vulnerable to significant risk 
of poor outcomes.’’ 
National Child Bureau.  
 
Link: http://www.ncb.org.uk/areas-of-
activity/vulnerable-children  
– Multiple and overlapping 
experiences. 
 
 
‘‘Vulnerable children are identified as 
having needs or circumstances that 
require particularly perceptive intervention 
and/or additional support. This includes 
children – 
(a) From low income backgrounds, 
(b) living with domestic abuse, adult 
mental health issues and substance 
abuse, 
(c) Children ‘in need’ or with a child 
protection plan, 
(d) Children who are in the care of the 
local authority (looked after children), or 
(e) Those with protected characteristics, 
as defined by the Equality Act 2010, 
including Gypsy and Traveller 
communities, minority ethnic groups or 
those from same sex parent families.’’ 
Ofsted 
 
Link:  
http://ww5.swindon.gov.uk/moderngov/docu
ments/s69891/Childrens%20Centres%20-
%20Appendix%203%20-
%20Ofsted%20Definition%20of%20Vulnera
bility.pdf 
– Socioeconomically deprived. 
– Domestic abuse and child 
protection issues. 
– Mental disability. 
– Children in care. 
– Protected characteristic 
children have higher needs. 
Low income, low 
socioeconomic class, 
poverty, traveller, minority, 
looked after children, 
greater needs, support 
‘‘Over one third of the children in the 
United Kingdom grow up in conditions of 
socioeconomic deprivation. In 
consequence they experience poorer 
health than their more affluent peers. 
Within this socioeconomically deprived 
population exist several groups of children 
Webb, E. Children and the inverse care 
law. BMJ. 1998; 316(7144):1588. 
 
doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.316.7144.158
8 
– Large population of children in 
socioeconomic deprivation, 
predisposing to vulnerability. 
– Poorer access to healthcare. 
Homeless, refugee, 
deprived, low 
socioeconomical class, 
marginalised, access, 
ethnic minority, poor access 
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and young people who are profoundly 
marginalized—   
(a) Homeless children, 
(b) Refugees, 
(c) Traveler communities, 
(d) Children in care. 
These groups have poor access to health 
services and as a result poor. Other 
groups, such as children from minority 
ethnic communities and adolescents, have 
poor access to services. ’’ 
‘‘Children and young people who are in 
need of support but are resilient. This 
includes children who are not suffering 
from an imminent risk of physical abuse or 
neglect and whose vulnerability does not 
reach obvious thresholds for statutory 
intervention. Young carers are an example 
where their resilient capabilities are 
frequently allowed to predominate in their 
assessment of their needs.’’ 
Ward, H. and Rose, W. Approaches to 
Needs Assessment in Children’s Services. 
Gateshead. Jessica Kingsley Publisher;  
2002. 
– Child carers can cope so are a 
hidden group to services. 
– Due to their coping underlying 
emotional needs are 
frequently. 
– Wide literature base on 
caregiving being detrimental to 
health.  
Young carer, caregiver, 
needs, social care, mental, 
social exclusion, social 
isolation, care burden 
‘‘Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC) 
are children affected by HIV and AIDS by 
virtue of, among others, living in a 
household where one or more people are 
ill, dying or deceased, or which fosters 
orphans, and children whose care givers 
are too ill or old to continue to care for 
them. They often have more health needs 
than their peers.’’ 
Tagurum, Y. et al.  Situational analysis of 
orphans and vulnerable children in urban 
and rural communities of Plateau State. 
Ann. Afr. Med. 2015; 14(1):18-24.  
– Affected by HIV/AIDS. 
– Carers can no longer take 
care of them. 
– More health needs than their 
peers. 
HIV, AIDS, orphans, 
household, unwell carers 
‘‘The loss of a parent through death or 
desertion is an important aspect of 
vulnerability. Additional factors leading to 
vulnerability included severe chronic 
illness of a parent or caregiver, poverty, 
hunger, lack of access to services, 
inadequate clothing or shelter, 
Skinner, D. et al. Towards a definition of 
orphaned and vulnerable children. AIDS 
and Behaviour. 2006; 10(6):619-626. 
– Orphans are vulnerable. 
– Loss of parent or chronic 
illness of parent. 
Poverty, hunger, lack of 
Poverty, orphan, loss of 
parent, carer, adoptee, 
adopted, chronic illness, 
overcrowding 
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overcrowding, deficient caretakers, and 
factors specific to the child, including 
disability, direct experience of physical or 
sexual violence, or severe chronic illness.’’ 
shelter – e.g. stigma of low 
socioeconomic class, are all 
additional factors. 
‘‘ A child whose parents are dead.’’ Oxford Dictionary – No parental care. 
– Are in care of public 
authorities or not in care at all. 
Orphan, loss of parent 
         Mental  
‘‘Literature shows consistently increased 
levels of psychological morbidity among 
refugee children, especially post-traumatic 
stress disorder, depression, and anxiety 
disorders. The delivery of mental health 
care for these children is also different. 
There is particular concern for the plight of 
unaccompanied children.’’ 
Fazel, M. and Stein, A. The mental health 
of refugee children. Archives of Disease in 
Childhood. 2002; 87(5):366-370. 
– Stress from the country of 
origin, the migration and the 
resettling in foreign country is 
a traumatic experience. 
– Increased morbidity in this 
demographic. 
– Children as a group have 
greater dependence on 
outside sources for protection 
and care. 
Refugee, mental health, 
depression, anxiety, stress, 
refuge, dependant, culture, 
migration, immigration 
‘‘Many different factors affect the mental 
health of forcibly displaced children in the 
presence of substantial life challenges, 
such as perceived discrimination, being 
unaccompanied, poor finances, parental 
psychiatric problems.’’ 
Fazel, M., Veed, R., Panter-Brick, C. and 
Stein, A. Mental health of displaced and 
refugee children resettled in high-income 
countries: risk and protective factors. 
Lancet.2012; 379(9812):266-282. 
– As above  
– Parental psychiatric problems 
Discrimination, racism, 
lauguage, Low income 
Lower socioeconomic class, 
poverty, poor, parental 
mental illness, parental 
psychiatric illness 
‘‘Refugees resettled in western countries 
could be about ten times more likely to 
have post-traumatic stress disorder than 
age-matched general populations in those 
countries. Worldwide, tens of thousands of 
refugees and former refugees resettled in 
Fazel, M., Wheeler, J. and Danesh, J. 
Prevalence of serious mental disorder in 
7000 refugees resettled in western 
countries: a systematic review. Lancet. 
2005; 365(9467):1309-1314. 
– Age matched refugees have 
higher prevalence’s of PTSD. 
– It is seen in studies in varying 
Refugee, stress, low 
income, mental health 
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western countries probably have post-
traumatic stress disorder. Five surveys of 
260 refugee children from three countries 
yielded a prevalence of 11% (7–17%) for 
post-traumatic stress disorder.’’ 
countries. 
‘‘Children with learning disabilities have a 
significantly reduced ability to understand 
new or complex information, to learn new 
skills (impaired intelligence) with a reduced 
ability to cope independently (impaired 
social functioning).’’ 
Calder, M. and Hackett, S. Assessment in 
Child Care. 2nd edition. Dorset. Russell 
House Publishing. 2013. 
– Affected by the way they are 
perceived in the communities 
they live in. 
– Cannot cope independently. 
– Cannot learn new skills.  
Learning disability, 
impairment, intellectual 
disability, learning 
difficulties, mental 
retardation, dyslexia, 
dyspraxia 
‘‘Children and adolescents with learning 
disabilities have high rates of mental 
health problems and behavioural 
difficulties. Comorbid disorders such as 
epilepsy, autism and attention-deficit 
hyperactivity disorder are common 
 
and 
overall there is more than a six-fold 
increased risk of mental illness.’’ 
Emerson, E. and Hatton, C. Mental health 
of children and adolescents with intellectual 
disabilities in Britain. The British Journal of 
Psychiatry. Royal College of Psychiatry, 
London, 2007. 
– Conditions like autism are not 
illnesses but the resulting 
social isolation results in 
mental illness such as 
depression. 
Depress, mental illness, 
isolation, epilepsy, autism, 
ADHD 
‘‘Children can feel afraid, anxious or guilty 
about their parent’s illness, and find it hard 
to make and keep friends. Mental illness 
can be difficult to understand and some 
children and young people fear that the 
same thing could happen to them. A 
mentally ill parent can behave in ways that 
can be confusing or distressing for 
children. Some children are more resilient 
than others and seem to cope better with 
their parent’s mental illness, understanding 
more of what is happening and supporting 
their parent with confidence. A child’s age, 
gender, temperament and intelligence are 
among a range of factors that affect a 
child’s resilience to this particular 
situation.’’ 
Family Minded. Supporting Children in 
families affected by mental illness. 
Barnardo’s. 2008. 
Link: 
http://www.barnardos.org.uk/family_minded
_report.pdf  
 
 
– Uncertainty about their parents 
condition can cause anxiety, 
guilt and social isolation. 
– Ability to cope is affected. 
– Resilience is decreased which 
increases vulnerability. 
 
Young carer, uncertain, 
mental illness, social 
isolation, distress, anxiety, 
mental handicap 
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‘‘Children with learning disabilities were 
significantly more likely to: 
(a) Have poor general health, 
(b) Have been exposed to a greater variety 
of adverse life events (e.g., domestic 
abuse, serious accidents, abuse), 
(c) Live in poverty, 
(d) Have a mother who has mental health 
issues.’’ 
The Mental Health of Children and 
Adolescents with Learning Disabilities in 
Britain. Lancaster University. 2007. 
– With learning disabilities have 
poorer health, and more 
adverse life events. 
– Higher chance of being in 
poverty. 
Poverty, poor, abuse, 
adverse life events, learning 
disability 
         Physical (Disability) 
‘‘Disabled children are not the same as 
one another but rather have their own 
individual needs and specific disabilities. 
To compare in other ways can result in 
their abuse being overlooked and 
assumed to be part of their ‘condition’ as 
research has shown injuries were 
accepted as an ‘inevitable feature of the 
child’s disability’ rather than the abuse 
inflicted on them.’’ 
Wilson, K. and James, A. The Child 
Protection Handbook. 3rd edition. Elsevier. 
2007. 
– Disability must be seen as 
individual. 
– Injuries are accepted as part 
of the disability incorrectly. 
– Legislation protecting from 
harm covers ‘‘harm suffered 
considered significant on the 
child’s health and 
development compared with 
what one could expect of a 
similar child’ which doesn’t 
work with disabled children. 
Disabled, injury, injuries, 
wheelchair, aids, crutch, 
abuse, impairment, 
physiotherapy, physical 
handicap 
‘‘Deaf and disabled children are more 
likely to be abused than non-disabled 
children. They are particularly vulnerable 
to abuse because they are -  
(a) not offered the same protection as non-
disabled children  
(b) often treated as different, and less 
likely to (c) receive adequate sex 
education or information about their own 
bodies  
Safe Network 
 
Link: 
http://www.safenetwork.org.uk/training_and
_awareness/Pages/disabled_children.aspx  
– As above 
– Not educated specifically 
about their own bodies. 
– More isolated. 
– Less communication. 
Communication, education, 
isolation, disabled, mobility 
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(d) generally more isolated, both physically 
and socially and also from mainstream 
facilities and services  
(e) less likely to have people who they can 
communicate with  
(f) Dependent on others for their most 
important needs, such as feeding, taking 
medication or their intimate care needs. ‘’ 
‘‘When a disabled child is referred to 
Children’s Social Care for assessment it 
can be for many reasons, ranging from 
practical service requests to concerns 
about significant risk of harm. These 
frameworks however were not initially 
designed with disabled children in mind. 
This has led to basic services being too 
intrusive and complex assessments 
lacking. This can lead to the views of the 
child not being listened to and in cases 
risks not understood and responded to.’’ 
Calder, M. and Hackett, S. Assessment in 
Child Care. 2nd edition. Dorset. Russell 
House Publishing. 2013. 
– As above. 
– Inadequate frameworks, 
institutionalised discrimination. 
– Needs not met correctly. 
Discrimination, needs 
assessment, occupational 
therapy, housing, stress,  
         Child Protection 
‘‘Many children accept maltreatment as a 
"normal" family dynamic and do not 
recognize the need for help or 
intervention. While this may be particularly 
true for young children, older youth often 
report family violence as usual, expected, 
and part of their environment. Note: We 
are reminded that parents who were 
themselves raised with drugs and alcohol, 
domestic violence, or mental health issues 
often don't see their own histories as 
abusive. They were in fact vulnerable as 
children and are less likely to protect their 
own children without this realization.’’ 
Ohio Child Welfare Training Program 
 
Link:  
http://www.ocwtp.net/PDFs/CAPMIS/D.%20
Child%20Vulnerabilities%20Reading.pdf  
– Children who grow up with 
abuse do not recognise it as 
abuse and thus do not seek 
out help. 
– Parents can be abusive 
without realising as they grew 
up used to abuse. 
Abuse, maltreatment, harm, 
child protection, injury, 
stress 
“Neglect is the failure of a parent to 
provide for the development of the child – 
where the parent is in a position to do so – 
in one or more of the following areas: 
health, education, emotional development, 
Krug, E., Dahlberg, L., Mercy, J., Zwi, A. 
and Lozano, R. World report on violence 
and health. WHO. 2002. 
– Failure of parent to provide for 
the child where there is 
provision to do so. 
Neglect, development, self-
protection, abandonment, 
mistreatment, desertion, 
disregard 
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nutrition, shelter and safe living conditions. 
Neglect is distinguished from 
circumstances of poverty in that neglect 
can occur only in cases where reasonable 
resources are available to the family or 
caregiver.”  
– Distinguished from cases of 
poverty. 
‘‘Children and young people on the Child 
Protection Register have been identified 
as being at risk of significant harm. This 
vulnerability has necessitated a multi-
agency response with an identified child 
protection plan put in place. All key 
agencies involved with the child and family 
should be aware of the child protection 
plan in place.’’ 
East Renfrewshire Child Protection 
Committee 
 
Link:  
http://www.eastrenfrewshire.gov.uk/CHttpH
andler.ashx?id=3558&p=0  
– Children on this register are 
predefined as vulnerable. 
– Multi-agency responses are 
preset. 
Protection plan, agency, 
response, harm, child 
protection register 
‘‘The term ‘child protection’ refers to 
preventing and responding to violence, 
exploitation and abuse against children – 
including commercial sexual exploitation, 
trafficking, child labour and harmful 
traditional practices. Child protection 
programmes also target children who are 
uniquely vulnerable to these abuses, such 
as when living without parental care, in 
conflict with the law and in armed conflict. 
Children subjected to violence, 
exploitation, abuse and neglect are at risk 
of death, poor physical and mental health, 
HIV/AIDS infection, educational problems, 
displacement, homelessness, vagrancy 
and poor parenting skills later in life.’’ 
Child Protection Information Sheet. What is 
Child Protection? UNICEF. 2006. 
 
Link: 
http://www.unicef.org/protection/files/What_
is_Child_Protection.pdf  
– Child protection includes 
sexual, physical, emotional 
and financial abuse. 
– Those subject to this abuse 
are at risk of poor outcomes. 
Child protection, abuse, 
neglect, sexual abuse, 
violence, conflict, 
homelessness, vagrancy, 
exploitation 
‘‘Preschool children who have been 
neglected or emotionally abused exhibit a 
range of serious emotional and 
behavioural difficulties and adverse 
mother-child interactions that indicate that 
these children require prompt evaluation 
and interventions’’ 
 
Naughton, AM. et al. Emotional, 
behavioural, and developmental features 
indicative of neglect or emotional abuse in 
preschool children: a systematic review. 
JAMA Peadiatric. 2013; 167(8):769-775. 
   
– Neglected or abused children 
in their pre-school exhibit 
behavioural difficulties as they 
grow older. 
– Require additional evaluation 
Abuse, emotional abuse, 
neglect, learning disability 
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and interventions.  
‘‘Child abuse is any action by another 
person – adult or child – that causes 
significant harm to a child. It can be 
physical, sexual or emotional, but can just 
as often be about a lack of love, care and 
attention. We know that neglect, whatever 
form it takes, can be just as damaging to a 
child as physical abuse. An abused child 
will often experience more than one type 
of abuse, as well as other difficulties in 
their lives. It often happens over a period 
of time, rather than being a one-off event. 
And it can increasingly happen online.’’ 
NSPCC 
 
Link: 
http://www.nspcc.org.uk/preventing-
abuse/child-abuse-and-neglect/  
– Cause significant harm. 
– Sexual, emotional, physical, 
neglect. 
Significant harm, sexual, 
emotional, physical, 
neglect,  
 
Appendix 11. Comparison of scoping review methods  
Amendments to the original Arksey & O’Malley scoping review approach 
Amendment to 
Scoping Review 
method 
Subject area Summary of changes Justification of changes 
Anderson et al. 2008 Scoping studies 
in the 
commissioning of 
research in the 
organisation and 
delivery of health 
services 
1. Relate scoping studies to 
a particular health service 
context 
2. Have multidisciplinary 
scoping teams 
3. Give teams time to 
integrate diverse findings 
4. Research commissioners 
must be explicit about the 
1. Allows a more evidence-based approach to relating 
recommendations to context 
2. Due to the wide-ranging nature of the findings it is 
necessary to have as wide a range of individuals on 
the scoping team in order to properly review the 
literature 
3. A tight time scale prevents a more considered and 
comprehensive response 
4. There has previously been a disconnect between 
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aim and intended uses of 
scoping studies. 
the literature in the review and the end 
recommendations as well as this, some reviews were 
missing recommendations about what to do next, the 
key purpose of a scoping study. 
Davis et al. 2009 Scoping studies 
in nursing 
No specific changes were 
made to the framework but 
the requirement to have a 
standardised and 
reproducible study was 
highlighted. The authors 
commented on the relative 
embryonic nature of such 
studies, particularly in the 
field of nursing, and stated 
that further development of 
the framework was required 
following further research. 
Not applicable. 
Grant et al. 2009 Generic research 
methods 
No specific changes made 
to the framework but 
comments on limitations 
include that such studies 
cannot be used to 
recommend policy due to 
there being no weighing of 
the quality of the evidence 
presented. 
Not applicable. 
 
Levac et al. 2010 ‘Reviewing health 
evidence’ 
1. Clarifying and linking the 
purpose and research 
question 
2. Balancing feasibility with 
1. The purpose of the study, together with the research 
question were not well enough linked in the original 
framework 
2. The original framework was not well balanced 
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the breadth and 
comprehensiveness of the 
study 
3. Using an iterative team 
approach to selection of 
studies and data extraction 
4. Incorporating a numerical 
summary as well as 
qualitative summary 
5. Consideration of 
implications of findings to 
practice, policy or research 
6. Making the ‘consultation 
with stakeholders’ stage a 
compulsory stage 
between feasibility and comprehensiveness and one 
may argue went into too much detail versus the need 
to be feasible 
3. The original framework did not see the selection 
process as iterative and may have missed out key 
studies versus this approach. 
4. To better summarise the data collected 
5. The original framework was not comprehensive 
enough in applying to the ‘real world’ the findings of the 
review 
6. The final step in the original framework often yielded 
very useful results and making it compulsory seems 
like an obvious development of the framework. 
Armstrong et al 2011 Cochrane 
Review of 
Scoping Studies 
This paper does not make 
any specific 
recommendations to the 
original framework, other 
than summarising the work 
of Levac et al (see above) 
and combining it with the 
original framework 
The paper highlights the need for an evidence-based 
logical and reproducible procedure for conducting 
scoping reviews and highlights that if such studies are 
published they are highly useful for directing future 
research. 
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Appendix 12. Search terms for vulnerable children scoping review 
 
1. Medicat* error* 
2. Abuse*  
3. Neglect* 
4. Child adj3 negl* 
5. Child adj3 safeguard* 
6. Child adj3 Prote* 
7. Triag* adj3 error* 
8. Triag* adj3 incident* 
9. Clinical assessment adj3 error* 
10. Patient assessment adj3 error* 
11. Assessment adj3 safety incident 
12. Diagnos* error* 
13. Diagnos* incident*  
14. Patient* record* adj3 error* 
15. Medical record* adj3 error* 
16. Referral* adj3 error* 
17. Referral* adj3 safety 
18. Referral* adj3 incident* 
19. Communicat* adj3 error* 
20. Communicat* adj3 failure 
21. Communicat* incident*  
22. Communicat* adj3 patient* safety 
23. (1-22)/ OR 
24. Drug adj3 error* 
25. Drug adj3 program* 
26. 24 OR 25 
27. exp Child Health Services/ or exp Child, Preschool/ or exp Child/ 
28. Paediatri*  
29. Pediatri* 
30. exp Adolescent/ or exp Adolescent Health Services/ 
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31. exp Infant/ Newborn/ 
32. (27-31)/ OR  
33. Improve* adj3 interven* 
34. exp Quality Improvement/ 
35. Error* adj3 prevent* 
36. Safety adj3 improve* 
37. Error* adj3 reduc* 
38. (34-37)/ OR  
39. Animals 
40. Animal stud* 
41. 39 OR 40 
42. 23 AND 33 AND 38 
43. 42 NOT 26 NOT 41 
44. Looked adj3 after 
45. Disab* 
46. Learning adj3 di* 
47. Vulnerab* 
48. Psych* 
49. Homeless 
50. Maltreatment 
51. Social adj3 services 
52. Social adj3 care 
53. Language  
54. Developmental delay  
55. (45-54)/ OR 
56. 43 AND 55  
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Appendix 13. Data extraction sheet
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Appendix 14. Quality improvement project plan  
Identifying opportunities to improve the quality of patient care in primary 
care via a functioning local reporting and learning system 
 
What are we trying to accomplish? 
 
Background:  Primary care poses unique challenges for the design of better 
quality systems of care delivery, given its heterogeneous models of delivery and 
diversity of patients with a wide variety of undifferentiated complaints.  For over 
a decade in healthcare, patient safety incident report systems have offered an 
opportunity to capture learning for improvement by understanding 
characteristics about events and contributory factors that led to incidents 
occurring. Leading experts recognize that despite limitations of reporting 
systems (underreporting, incomplete view of incident, and reporting biases) they 
provide multiple perspectives over time and form an integral part of routine 
monitoring in clinical practice. (Vincent 2010)  
 
There has been little effort internationally to extend the advances made in 
hospital-based patient safety incident reporting to community settings (a model 
of a functioning reporting and learning system is proposed in Appendix A). 
Consequently, there is a poor reporting culture amongst healthcare 
professionals working in primary care in England and Wales (<0.05% of all total 
reports received by the National Reporting and Learning System between 2003-
2013). Preliminary analysis of primary care incident reports from England and 
Wales over the past decade suggests that there is a misunderstanding amongst 
reporters about the purpose of reporting (i.e. around 40% percentage of reports 
contain little useful information to inform learning) as well as some confusion 
about what information needs to be included within reports (Carson-Stevens et 
al., unpublished).  
 
Organisational activities to date: In 2012, GPs raised concerns about their 
inability to feedback system issues that were compromising the quality of 
patient care. CVUHB launched a reporting system for General Practitioners 
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(GPs) to enable better communication and joint working between the health 
board and GPs.  
 
Over the past 9 months, the reporting process has been as follows: 
● GPs report incidents via a clinical letter addressed to the relevant clinical 
area to enable investigation and response and cc’d to the Primary Care 
Divisional Director and the Primary Care Clinical Governance Manager; 
● The Clinical Governance Manager log the reports and links with the 
reporter and relevant departments to ensure action; 
● Clinical Governance Manager ‘identities trends’ and reports to CVUHB 
Medical Director, and a standing agenda item at CVUHB Executive 
Board and LMC (a statutory representative organisation for GPs 
practicing within CVUHB’s remit) meetings. 
 
CVUHB has 67 GP practice groups serving a population of over 500,000 
patients at 92 GP surgeries (18 practice groups have more than one GP 
surgery) in the region. Only 32/67 GP practices are reporting incidents. 
Incidents solely relate to problems with secondary care (I.e. no primary care 
issues reported).   
 
Organisational rationale for project: The project directly relates to Standard 23 
for Health Services, 'organisations should ensure concerns are reported upon 
and expended to in an appropriate and timely manner'. Further, the incidents/ 
near misses relating to the primary/secondary care interface impact directly on 
quality, safety and the patient and carer experience. A functioning reporting and 
learning system could mitigate risk by learning from interface incidents reported 
and improving systems and processes to avoid recurrence.  
 
Financial considerations: There has been up to 15 reports, each requiring 
further investigation, generated in any one month; this has required 
considerable additional time from the Clinical Governance Manager and 
Medical Director. Incident trends will highlight the need to improve systems and 
service changes that will have financial implications (increase and decrease). 
But, trends could also lead to standardization of processes and reduce 
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variation. Likely complaints or claims could also reduce, and thus result in 
system savings (although existing system is not sensitive to detect financial 
benefit of avoided incidents).  
 
Challenges with the existing system, include: 
● Aimed solely at GPs and predominantly focused on ‘what went wrong in 
the hospital’. 
● No formal advice or guidance on what types of information to report for 
organisational learning (identifying what caused the problem, where it 
occurred, who needs to be involved in subsequent investigation and 
improvement efforts). Missing information often generates in the need to 
contact the busy reporter for further information and introduces delays in 
actioning and overall response. 
● Popularity of reporting by GPs is placing resource pressures on Clinical 
Risk Manager overseeing paper-based system; for example, managing 
paper trail audit from initial receipt of letter, to actioning, to resolution of 
issues, follow up on missing information with the reporter, transcribing 
important information into a separate standalone database, and finally 
independent identification of trends. 
 
Opportunities for system re-design, include: 
● Convert to electronic system by integrating primary care reporting system 
into wider CVUHB used by all other clinical specialties.  
● Integrating existing Significant Event Analyses (a technique to reflect on 
and learn from individual cases) undertaken at practice-level into the 
system for organisational level learning and wider national learning. 
● Co-develop guidance and a report form (with prompts) with GPs based 
on their existing and ongoing experiences, best-available evidence on 
how to classify incidents in terms of data capture (i.e. what information is 
needed for organisational and wider national learning) and frequent local 
assessment of commonly missing variables of information.  
● Co-develop a standard operating procedure with GPs, LMC, CVUHB 
Executive board to addresses what to report and exploring scope for 
extending definition of incident to include all relevant system-level quality 
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issues (not just ‘patient safety incidents’ that already has a clear 
definition) based on organisational and wider national agenda priorities.  
● Consider processes for other healthcare professionals (community and 
practice based nurses, community midwives, pharmacists, et al.), as well 
as patients, to report to the system. 
● Transfer insights from research (which includes early designs of audit 
tools for practical use by managers and clinicians to improve the quality 
of reporting).  
 
Goals of improvement project 
We aim to improve the quality of patient care in primary care at Cardiff and Vale 
University Health Board (CVUHB) by redesigning an existing local patient safety 
incident reporting and learning system to identify at least one priority area for 
improvement within the organisation. This will include achieving the following 
goals from Nov 1st to July 1st 2013:  
● Increased overall incident reporting rate by 25%;  
● Increased number of practices reporting (90% of total); 
● At least 1 other healthcare professional (in addition to a GP) reporting 
from a practice from 10% of practices;  
● At least 5% of practices advocating patients to report;  
● Decrease time taken by risk management to action a report by 50%; and, 
● Increase the quality of total incident reports by X%.  
 
How do we know that a change is an improvement? 
 
The following outcome (O), process (P) and balancing (B) measures and 
feedback (F) will be used to define the impact of the changes made.   
 
Number of reports and reporting quality 
● Total number of incident reports from GPs (O) 
● Overall quality of incident reports from primary care at CVUHB (O) 
● Number of identified issues for improvement (O) 
● Number of issues informing improvement projects (O) 
● Number of reports per practice (P) 
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● Quality of incident reports per practice (P) 
● Number of reports by patients (P / O) 
● Number of reports completed correctly (P) 
 
Reporting process  
● Duration between incident occurring and professional reporting it (P) 
● Experience of reporters (F / B) 
● Time taken to complete online form (P) 
 
Risk management team handling of reports 
● Time for risk management team to acknowledge report (P) 
● Time for risk management team to complete investigation of each report 
(P) 
● Time for risk management team to follow up missing or further 
information needed to action a report (P / B) 
● Diversity of Healthcare Professionals (and patients) reporting (P) 
 
Organisational feedback 
● Time to provide feedback to reporters (P) 
● Time to feed forwards to Executive meeting (P) 
● Time to feed forwards to LMC meeting (P) 
● Number of complaints (O) 
 
What changes can we make that will lead to improvement? 
 
See project driver diagram for change concepts and specific change ideas. A 
multidisciplinary team will lead this improvement project.  
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Project Driver Diagram 
 
Primary Driver Secondary Driver Key Change 
Concept 
Specific Change 
Ideas 
Functioning and 
Responsive 
Reporting and 
Learning System 
Accessibility to 
report 
User-friendly 
reporting 
Inform first draft of form 
from evaluation of 
previous incident 
reports deemed ‘high 
quality’ 
Develop form with 
stratified sample of 
high and low reporters 
Ensure IT infrastructure 
in place to support set 
up of icons on desktop 
/ intranet 
Develop 
troubleshooting guide 
for IT issues  
Efficiency of 
reporting process 
Minimise duplication 
and ensure 
usefulness of 
information 
Identify important 
variables of info with 
Risk Management 
team to commonly 
‘action a report’ (Pareto 
Chart method) 
Develop prompts 
based on ‘high quality’ 
reporting variables to 
focus reporting 
narratives 
Identify balance 
between data quality 
and time to 
complete form 
Regular team meetings 
to identify commonly 
missing information 
requiring f/up calls with 
reporters 
Evaluation of user 
experience 
Develop reported 
‘estimated time to 
complete form’ 
measure  
Timely response Response to report Develop IT 
infrastructure to 
acknowledge report 
within 24 hours 
Explore options for 
thematised responses 
to recognize 
importance of issue 
and educate the 
reporter in return 
SOP for verbal and 
written response from 
risk management team 
& escalation  
Action Grading 
System 
Develop a grading 
system to determine 
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urgency for action 
  Track response time 
Explore options for 
responses (automated 
or via other 
communication 
methods) based on 
urgency 
Healthcare 
professionals to 
provide descriptive, 
useful and timely 
incident reports 
  
   
Education and 
Training to report 
SOP of incident 
reporting 
Determine by 
stakeholder … what 
constitutes an incident 
and scope banding of 
reporting (i.e. issues 
with secondary care, 
primary care, all care) 
Establish 
protocols/guidance for 
writing report 
Guidance for accessing 
reporting system 
Determine escalation 
procedures for urgent 
clinical issues 
Increase Reporting 
Quality 
Application of a 
quality scoring 
indicator 
Develop quality scoring 
tool  
Align quality scoring 
criteria with prompts 
Look for variation in 
reporting quality by: GP 
Practice, practitioner, 
healthcare professional 
role 
Identify low/… quality 
reporting practices and 
seek feedback re: 
understanding sources 
of variation 
Create mechanism for 
feeding back data 
quality willing practices 
Determine time lag 
between incident 
occurring and being 
reported 
Develop 
Infrastructure to 
support the 
Reporting and 
Learning System 
Leadership Report 
themes/outcomes to 
key stakeholders:- 
- Patients 
- HCP 
- LMC 
- Executive Board; 
 
Representation of 
key stakeholders on 
project steering 
group 
Develop format for 
learning outputs for 
each key stakeholder 
audience (including 
relevant outcomes 
Stakeholder analysis of 
power/roles ratio 
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Executive 
endorsement of 
reporting 
Memos / forewords 
from CEO, consistent 
narrative at key events, 
organisational website 
and publications 
Incentives to report Create excellence 
award’ based on 
practices where most 
different types of health 
care professionals 
report, any efforts to 
encourage patients to 
report etc. 
National influences Align with existing 
revalidation 
requirements for 
doctors 
Encourage significant 
event audits (these are 
assessment 
undertaking by 
practitioners in-house 
in each practice) to 
feed into the reporting 
system too 
 
Quality checking by 
Government 
Train Welsh 
Government staff to 
use quality scoring too 
(NB: interest already 
expressed to quality 
assure health board in 
this way) 
Seek to incorporate 
significant event 
analysis into 
Reporting and 
Learning Systems 
Welsh Government to 
mandate all SEA’s to 
be contributed locally 
and HB, level for 
learning purposes 
SOP for contribution 
to National 
Reporting and 
Learning System in 
England and Wales 
Develop/Review 
Existing Criteria 
/process of ‘when to 
report’ 
Finance Determine waste in 
terms of time 
currently taken to 
facilitate paper trail/ 
follow up of missing 
information by risk 
management team 
Development of a 
realistic and 
manageable 
assessment of time to 
complete administrative 
tasks 
 Cost-benefits 
analysis of staffing a 
patient (+clinician) 
reporting line 
 
Report cost saved 
for those incidents 
triggering 
improvement/actions 
with established 
cost-effectiveness 
consequences 
known e.g. 
preventable 
Work with Innovation 
and Improvement team 
to explore how this has 
been done previously; 
identify what could be 
done to support the 
identification of cost 
benefits within the 
existing measurement 
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rehospitalisation  systems. 
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Appendix A. Overview of a reporting and learning system at an 
operational, organisational and regulatory level (from Benn, J., Koutantji, 
M., Wallace, L., Spurgeon, P., Rejman, M., Healey, A., et al. (2009). Feedback 
from incident reporting: information and action to improve patient safety. Qual 
Saf Health Care, 18(1), 11-21.)  
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Appendix 15. Completed PDSA cycle  
 
 
MODEL FOR IMPROVEMENT       DATE 3/01/2013       
Objective for this PDSA Cycle: Undertake a cost-benefit 
analysis of efforts to minimise Warfarin-related incidents for 
patients.  
 
Is this cycle used to develop, test, or implement a change?  
Develop a change.  
 
What question(s) do we want to answer on this PDSA cycle? 
- What key issues have resulted in deleterious outcomes for patients? 
- What costs are associated with those outcomes, and what would a 
monthly and annual extrapolation for the health board be? 
- How could those key issues (sub-themes) inform opportunities to 
improve existing Warfarin services for patients?  
 
Plan:  
Plan to answer questions: Who, What, When, Where 
ACS & SR to undertake thematic analysis of Warfarin-related incidents 
submitted over 12 months by 4/1/13.  
Claire to order case notes of patients identified by pharmacy as discharged on 
Warfarin in a defined 2-week period by 7/1/13. SR and lead pharmacist for 
coagulation to undertake case-note review and identify potential deleterious 
outcomes jointly by 10/01/13.  
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NM to liaise with finance department re: cost of extra day stay and extrapolate 
potential monthly and annual costs by 13/01/13.  
 
Discuss identified issues (sub-themes) at task force meeting and identify 
potential changes to inform Driver Diagram through group discussion by end of 
meeting on 13/1/2013. SR and ACS responsible for producing first draft of 
driver diagram to share with team by 15/1/13.  
 
Predictions (for questions above based on plan): 
- Identification of sub-themes will permit prioritization of common issues to focus 
change concepts/ideas.  
- Delayed discharge is an expected outcome. Case note review could identify 
patients experiencing further iatrogenic harm as a result of their increased length 
of stay. Costs can be estimated for increased length of stay and common 
iatrogenic harms (e.g. VAP, HAI).  
- The issues identified by the incident reports can become the focus of the change 
concepts and ideas for improving the care model.  
 
Do:  
Carry out the change or test; Collect data and begin analysis. 
 
Finance team very forthcoming with figures and willing to be contacted to contribute to 
further calculations. Common issues identified by GPs in clinical incident reports 
heavily influenced discussions and focus of change ideas for a new model of care 
delivery.  
 
Case note review required a structured tool to collect data. Pharmacy lead had 
previously used a modified trigger tool for this purpose. SR needed brief training to use 
the tool.    
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Study:  
Complete analysis of data;  
 
Case-note review for all in-patients admitted during a 2-week period in October 2013, 
of the patients on Warfarin who were discharged, 22% had a delay in discharge of at 
least 1 day (range 1-7 days) solely due to the need for in-patient INR monitoring. One 
patient developed a hospital-acquired pneumonia as a result of delayed discharge. 
 
The reasons for discharge delay (sub-themes) included: poor secondary care 
understanding and communication of INR (tackled in May 2013 via the Warfarin 
SBAR), variation of ‘stable’ INR definitions (different INR protocols in place for 
acceptance of patients), and capacity for community-team to pick up ‘unstable’ INR 
patients.  
 
This cost has been estimated as £38,874 per month, based on the 25 patients in this 
position, we estimate unnecessary hospitalization costs to be £466,488 per annum for 
the health board. 
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Further areas identified for improvement 
 
 
 
 
Associated costs of existing services and estimates of new service (as per driver 
diagram): existing costs on top and new costs on the bottom. 
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Compare the data to your predictions and summarize the learning 
 
- The three common issues underpinning incident reports relating to Warfarin 
were identified. Secondary care clinicians understood the issues and identified 
opportunities to mitigate such issues occurring in the future.  
- Costs estimated as a result of delayed discharges from the current model of 
anticoagulation services shocked the task force. Improving the service was 
recognized as a priority. One patient was identified as having preventable 
hospital acquired pneumonia as a result of her delayed discharge. Case note 
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review was useful although likely to identify more iatrogenic harms if 
undertaken with a larger sample. Costs can be estimated by ICD codes.  
- Estimated costs have been drawn up to parallel the proposed primary drivers for 
the new anticoagulation service to demonstrate the potential cost saving of 
around £300k.  
 
The cost-benefits analysis, and the first draft of a change model, will assist to build 
confidence amongst primary care (and secondary care) healthcare professionals in the 
value of incident reporting. This has generated an improvement project within/from an 
improvement project as anticipated.  
  
Act:  
Are we ready to make a change? Plan for the next cycle 
 
Next steps include: 
● Identify team members to lead the Warfarin improvement project (SR, 
NM included and ACS to continue as improvement advisor); [System 
Improvement - 2ry Driver] 
● Feedback the proposed changes for testing to the LMC [primary care 
doctors group] to build will amongst GPs to report further incidents and 
demonstrate value of new reporting system; and, [Issue Analysis – 2ry 
Driver] [System Improvement – 2ry Driver] 
● Highlight potential cost saving at next UHB Quality Improvement Faculty 
meeting to obtain CEO & Chair endorsement for project. [Leadership 
(endorsement at board level) 2ry driver] 
 
